

CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ORDERS:
EMPIRE, BALANCE OF POWER, AND LIBERAL GOVERNANCE

by

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A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements
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Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

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Abstract

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There is a persistent gap between the abstract concepts elites use to understand the elements of international orders and the actual material foundations that underpin those orders. In medieval times European societies conceived of international order in the form of Universal Monarchy, although material power was not sufficiently concentrated to permanently reach further than to the next town. In the early eighteenth century, rulers practised international order as a territorial balance of power, while territorial states were fully formed only in the early nineteenth century. This begs the question of how the abstract concepts that IR practitioners work with to order international interactions actually emerge on the ground. I propose that they result from concrete forms of representation, like warfare practices, diplomatic practices, or representative buildings, which create IR's macro-phenomena in the daily interactions between people. Forms of representation characterize the units of the international system and position them towards each other in relations of subordination, superiority, or equality. These spatial configurations constitute the deep generative grammar of an international order. When the forms of representation change the international order changes. I develop two mechanisms of change based on struggles over forms of representation and on contingent changes in representative forms. To trace the effects of representative forms as material signs I propose a new methodological apparatus based on Peircean semeiotics. I empirically study the transition from a medieval ordering mechanism of empire to the ordering mechanism of a

territorial balance of power, and use the findings to illustrate how we might understand the potential emergence of a postmodern order in Europe.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the most sustained debates in the international relations literature involves whether we are experiencing a fundamental change in the deep generative grammar of the international order, and if so how we are best to understand this transition. Research focuses on the emergence of new actors in the system, the role of technological innovations, increased market liberalization, changing social imaginaries, and the general processes of globalization. Associated with these debates are questions about the disappearance, refinement, or maintenance of sovereignty, doubts about the territorial basis of politics, and analyses of new forms of governance.¹ In this context John Ruggie (1993) followed by others (see, for example, Burch 2000; Deudney 2007; Nexon 2009; Phillips 2011; Philpott 2001), sought to understand the current transitions in international order by focusing on similar transitions we have experienced in the past. The goal was to develop the necessary vocabulary and conceptual apparatus to be able to analyze international order change.

This dissertation follows in the same line of research. It differs from previous theories of international order change in that it seeks to understand the persistent gap between the abstract concepts we use to understand elements of orders, and the actual on- the-

1. The literature is too vast to be referenced in its entirety. I therefore limit myself to merely a few examples: Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; Appadurai 1996; Ba and Hoffmann 2005; Burch 2000; Caporaso 1996; Castells 1998, 2000; Curtis 2011; Freguson and Mansbach 2004; Hardt and Negri 2000; Held et al. 1999; Kalmo and Skinner 2010; Krasner 1999; Rosenau 1979; Rosenau 1990; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Sassen 2006; Scholte 2000; Sending and Neumann 2010; Shinoda 2000; Strange 1996.

ground foundations that underpin those orders. In the medieval period international order was conceived of in the form of universal monarchy (Barracough 1950; Bosbach 1988; Hagender 1985), even though Europe was scattered in innumerable feudal lordships and material power was not sufficiently concentrated to permanently reach much further than to the next town (Osiander 2001b; Teschke 1998). In the middle of the eighteenth century, rulers started to practise international order in terms of a territorial balance of power, although territorial states were fully formed only in the nineteenth century, much later than the IR canon had assumed until quite recently (Branch 2011; Teschke 2003; Osiander 2001a). Some even argue that the territorial state never fully came into existence (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; Krasner 1999; Mann 1986). It is clear that in the eighteenth century there were not many territorial states in Europe. Austria (Nexon 2009), Prussia (Breuilly 1993; Sheehan 1989), Spain (Osiander 1994), and Russia (Anderson 1961; Bruun 1967) resembled some form of a dynastic composite state with unclear boundaries; Germany was composed of confusing overlapping suzerainties that were extremely difficult to portray on a two-dimensional map (Black 1990); and Italy was a rag rug of independent city states and occupied territories. At the same time, however, European leaders and their diplomats already conceived of and practised a territorial balance of power (Gulick 1967; Luard 1992; Schroeder 1994). According to Sassen (2006, 20) “we can see herein one version of the notion that to implement sovereign territorial authority required imagining something that did not quite exist as a material reality.” And yet it appeared to statesmen that unitary and independent actors with clearly demarcated boundaries could balance each other internationally. In other words, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that the territorial balance of power as Europe’s ordering principle came into existence prior to the territorial state.

This begs the question: how do the abstract concepts that IR scholarship works with actually emerge on the ground? Rather than relying on invisible intersubjectively shared ideas, or on the functional effects of unobservable material structures, I suggest focusing on perceivable forms of representation such as warfare practices, diplomatic practices, religious rituals, specific artifacts, or representative buildings that create IR’s macro-

phenomena on the micro-level in the daily interactions between people.² For example, we know that the territorial state exists only if we can experience it through its forms of representation, be they Cartesian maps, specific state buildings like the White House, national flags, police officers in their uniforms, or passports. These forms of representation characterize the territorial state. They define how statesmen and diplomats see the world and what they think they have to govern. In this sense forms of representation do not represent a reality that lies underneath them but *create* reality in the very process of representation.

While I do not deny that unit characteristics, such as a certain degree of economic development, or administrative and military capabilities, can and often do affect international order, they need to be translated into the international public sphere through specific forms of representation to be recognizable. As long as there were no such indicators as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that would allow statesmen to evaluate the economic strength of a country, it was impossible to include economic strength in balance-of-power calculations directly. In fact, the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 tried to include a population's wealth in their balancing calculations, but they did not know how to do so (see [chapter 6](#)).

As Shapiro observed, “we lose something when we think of representation as mimetic” (1988, xii). No one-to-one connection between forms of representation and unit-level attributes exists. Forms of representation do not merely mimic unit-level characteristics and a disconnection can occur between unit-level attributes and the forms of representation that are perceived internationally. For example, Cartesian maps represented territorial states as bounded areas in space over which power was spread evenly well before such territorial states existed on the ground (Branch 2014). A focus on highly visible forms of representation, which IR scholars nonetheless barely notice, therefore promises to add analytical leverage to our understanding of international order and international order change.

2. The use of the word *representation* is not unified in the IR literature. Some authors (for example, Bartelson 2005, Pouliot 2010a) use the word with a representative view of language, which suggests that reality is mirrored in language and language represents that reality accurately. I use the word to highlight the renditions of the units of the international system that bring those units into existence.

Forms of representation characterize the units of the international system, and they position them in relations of subordination, superiority, or equality with each other. Specific international orders emerge from these spatial configurations. In other words, forms of representation produce and perform certain kinds of international order. When the forms of representation change, the international order changes because the individuals acting in the international sphere will then see the world differently and they will have different tools at their disposal to order it. For instance, the medieval coronation ritual expressed hierarchical relations of superiority and subordination. In the gothic cathedral only the clergy, and especially the archbishop as the representative of the pope, had access to the altar, while the laity remained in the nave. The king was positioned exactly in between the laity and the clergy, and had to acquire his right to rule through the unc-tion and the coronation performed by the archbishop. After the reformation many kings decided to nominate their own archbishops, and occasionally they even crowned themselves, expressing their divine right to rule that was independent from the pope. Thus they effectively eliminated their subordination to the pope and the church in general. The medieval ordering mechanism of universal monarchy depended on such representative forms as the coronation ritual, which established hierarchical relations between the actors. Once those representative forms disappeared, universal monarchy could no longer function as an ordering principle for Europe.

The dissertation develops two mechanisms of change, both of which are based on the observation that distinct orders and distinct forms of representation exist in different fields.³ In complex societies people tend to cluster in specific groupings and spaces which are relatively autonomous from each other, and which have their own unique rules, membership criteria, and distinct orders. These fields often constitute specific domains of social interaction, such as economics, politics, religion, or academia and they can but do not have to be geographically defined. Fields are not transcendental or functional domains in the sense that every society has an economic field, a political field, and an academic field, for example. Rather, they emerge through societal interaction.

3. A similar understanding has already been introduced into the IR literature with the concept of heterarchic systems, which are multiply ranked systems (Donnelly 2009). Heterarchy expresses that differently ordered hierarchies involving the same actors can exist in distinct functional domains.

Identifying which fields exist in a particular society has to be researched empirically. When I refer to an economic field or a religious field, my claim is not essentialist in the sense that all economic factors are located in the economic field and that economic considerations do not influence any other field, but rather that in concrete societies it can be within a specific space, and among a certain group of people that the economy gets defined. Other societies might not have an economic field. If an economic field does not exist, the notion of the economy as a separate domain of social interaction does not exist.

Each field has its unique kind of order. In each field specific rules of the game prevail, and different forms of representation matter. Thus in the academic field, publications are an academic's most important forms of representation, whereas in the religious field it might be someone's possession of relics, that define the person's spiritual capacity. The co-existence of multiple fields allows for people and forms of representation to travel from one field to another; these movements create opportunities for change.

When people move from one field to another they can be confronted with an inferior position in the new field to the one they were used to in the old field, because they might not possess the adequate representative forms to achieve a high standing in the new field. This mismatch between their dispositions acquired in their past historical experiences and their position in the new field is an instance of hysteresis. Hysteresis can result in a variety of different responses, one of which is to seek to change the forms of representation in the new field. Struggles over forms of representation can consequently erupt and new forms of representation can emerge from these struggles. The new forms of representation then align the positions of the actors in the field, and thereby precipitate a change of international order.

This was the case of Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia in the eighteenth century ([chapter 6](#)). These three powers had not been fully socialized into the European political field and consequently they did not master its dominant forms of representation particularly well, which centered primarily on issues of diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremony. They consistently found themselves outmanoeuvred by the representatives of France and Austria. Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia experienced hysteresis—Great

Britain already had acquired a high standing in her overseas empire, and Russia had been used to a high position from the Central Asian political field. To improve their position in the European order Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain purposefully sought to ridicule diplomatic precedence, and simultaneously made use of and supported emerging changes in the military realm to elevate the army to the highest representative form of the state. Their success led to the disappearance of diplomatic precedence, thereby replacing a hierarchical international order with the principle of sovereign equality. Simultaneously the army was elevated to the highest representative form of the state, giving rise to several great powers who sought to balance each other to prevent universal monarchy's reoccurrence.

The second mechanism of change is an unintentional form of change, which can follow from a relatively minor change in a particular form of representation that will then affect other forms of representation through positive loophole effects. The consequence can be a major change in forms of representation, which affects the character of the units in the international system and their relation to each other. For example, the invention of linear perspectival painting for religious reasons led to changes in a series of other forms of representation, such as Cartesian mapping practices, fortification designs, practices of warfare, and palace and garden architecture. The combined effect of these forms of representation was the conception of territorial states as like units with a single power centre that power spreads from evenly up to the border, and that exist horizontally next to each other, rather than vertically in hierarchical relations ([chapter 5](#)). The conception of a territorial balance of power as Europe's ordering principle partly depended on these forms of representation.

My theoretical and empirical framework have been inspired by a large variety of preceding scholarship, but four intellectual influences are especially worth mentioning. Ruggie's (1993) seminal article "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations" provided the first impetus. Although this article is among the most cited in the IR literature, there have been very few attempts to explicitly address the issues he raised, especially the claim that single-point perspective in painting created a new spatial episteme, a new way of conceiving of space that ushered in the develop-

ment of the territorial state. In his conclusion Ruggie suggested that in our current time, postmodern political forms such as the European Union might be the result of multiperspectivalism. This dissertation sets out to develop a full theoretical apparatus based on Ruggie's propositions that allows us to understand how single-point perspective in painting and other forms of representation could have an effect on international order, and it conducts an expansive empirical analysis to demonstrate the historical consequences of representative forms. Secondly, my theoretical framework has been strongly influenced by Bourdieu's work (1990). In many ways this dissertation applies a reframed version of Bourdieu's social theory to international relations, and to a *longue durée* historical analysis to understand international order change. Third and fourth, recent research conducted on the effects of specific forms of representation on elements of international order, especially Branch's focus on mapping practices (2012; 2014) and Ringmar's (2012) emphasis on theatrical performance has helped to sharpen my own arguments.

Empirically I adopt a *longue durée* historical perspective on international order change in Europe.⁴ The analysis starts in the twelfth century with the medieval ordering mechanism of empire and studies the changes that resulted in the modern ordering mechanism of a territorial balance of power that was fully completed by the time of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Contrary to the common perception in IR scholarship that entirely new international orders emerge suddenly from the ashes of major wars (Hall 1999; Ikenberry 2011; Phillips 2011), my empirical research shows that the European order was, over most of the time period studied, in a transitory stage between a past whose remnants continued into the present and a future that was not yet fully accomplished. My historical analysis therefore has to grapple with temporal and geographical overlap, as well as with the incompleteness of the studied processes. The findings from the historical research helped me understand current trends in the European Union, and in the last empirical chapter I address the question of how far we can interpret the EU as a new

4. Reus-Smit (2013b) rightly observed that the geographical extent of international orders has never been fixed and the outer limits of orders are marked by "struggles over recognition" (p. 1066). This is no different in the European case, where the geographical extent of Europe admittedly varied over the centuries. For the most part I leave these geographical variations aside, but in [chapter 6](#) I address them directly and demonstrate how the struggles over recognition at the margins of the order can at times result in a change of the order itself.

postmodern international order. The data for the empirical research were gathered from site visits and museum visits, the analysis of several primary documents, two and a half months of participant observation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union, forty-six interviews with EU policy-makers and bureaucrats, and secondary literature searches spanning a large variety of disciplines ranging from history, psychology, and anthropology to geography, linguistics, and religious studies.

1.1 Defining International Order

The most common definition of international order in the literature interprets international order as the governing arrangements that exist between states (Bull 1977; Ikenberry 2011; Sorensen 2011). For Bull international order is a patterned regularity between sovereign states to maintain the independence of states, and ensure a modicum of peace and stability between them with the help of such fundamental institutions as diplomacy, international law, great powers, or the balance of power. This very comprehensive definition provides a good starting point to structure a discussion about international order, although, as I will argue, each of its components is too narrow to contain the full spectrum of possible international orders.

First, the claim that international order's purpose is to secure peace is too narrow because as several authors have already noticed, among them Bull himself, organized violence can be an integral part of an international order (Bull 1977; Ikenberry 2011; Phillips 2011; Philpott 2011; Schatzki 2001a).⁵ For most scholars organized violence plays a purely functional role: it can guarantee a given order's stability by restraining and punishing those who seek to undermine the order. However, organized violence as a form of representation can also have a constitutive effect on the fundamental nature of the international order (see [chapter 5](#) and [chapter 6](#)).

Closely related to this point is the widespread opinion that international order needs to be underpinned by material force to be effective and stable (Bull 1977; Deudney 2007;

5. To be sure, studies such as Mitzen's (2013), which portrays the significance of international institutions for establishing a more peaceful international order, have their own value and address important questions, but they narrow their analysis to one particular aspect of international order.

Gilpin 1981; Ikenberry 2011; Krasner 2000; Phillips 2011; Waltz 1979). Although I agree that international order has to find some material expression to be durable, an exclusive focus on physical force, and even a focus on “carrots and sticks” including economic incentives and threats, is significantly too narrow to capture the large variety of ways in which international order can be maintained. As we will see in [chapter 4](#), in medieval society the Church’s power was based on material forms such as gothic cathedrals, a system of diplomatic representatives, the possession of saints’ relics, etc., which attributed the Church with supernatural might that affected people’s behavior. The Church’s spiritual power did not spring out of thin air; it was based on very concrete material forms, but those did not have the typical causal effects IR scholarship traditionally understands material factors to have. To get a full grasp of a particular international order’s nature and the variations between international orders we need to consider a much larger set of material phenomena.

Third, understanding international order as patterned regularity is too narrow because it does not allow us to capture variations upon a theme. How do we know when a certain variation is still within the existing order and when it creates a new type of order? As Schatzki put it, leaning on his interpretation of Wittgenstein’s concept of family resemblance, “discernment of dispersion at the alleged place of regularity [thus] suggests that a viable conception of order must accommodate manifolds of variably similar and divergent entities as ordered phenomena” (2001b, 43). Defining international order as an arrangement⁶ of the international system’s units has the advantage that it does not depend on exact repetition for the discernment of order, but can take into account variation within a given framework. “An arrangement is a layout of entities in which they relate and take up places with respect to one another” (Schatzki 2001b, 43). In other words, a social space is created and defined by how the entities of the international system are positioned vis-à-vis each other, for example, vertically in hierarchical relations, or horizontally in egalitarian relations (see also Donnelly 2009). The order changes when the units are arranged differently, that is, when they relate differently to each other.

6. This understanding of social order is by no means uncommon. Employing the word *assemblages*, a similar conception of order has been advocated by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), Latour (2005), and Sassen (2006). Reus-Smit (2013b, c) uses the term *configuration* to describe the same phenomenon.

Fourth, the common understanding that an international order is an order between states is too narrow. While many scholars who focus on changes from one territorial state order to another have highlighted important dynamics, by definition those studies cannot analyze the change from a territorial state order to an entirely different order. Thus Wendt (1999) examines how different state identities can lead to more or less benign orders among territorial states, and Reus-Smit (1999) shows how the changing moral purpose of the state can lead to different types of orders between territorial states. In this sense Reus-Smit's work deals with "purposive change," whereas I put more emphasis on "configurative change" (Reus-Smit 1999, 164).

An exclusive focus on the arrangements between states blinds us to perhaps the most fundamental changes that are currently happening in the international order, which involve the conception of global governance, the variety of actors within its processes, and related questions about the possible loss of state sovereignty. To be able to discern those changes we have to also understand how the units of the international system get formed, and how particular actors become the units of a certain international order and others not.

In a critique of Waltz's (1979) *Theory of International Politics*, Ruggie (1986) provided a good starting point to think about these questions. His focus on differentiation as the "principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another" (Ruggie 1986, 142)—they can be, for example, territorial as in the sovereign state system or functional—directs our attention to the deep generative grammar that underlies a given international order. This deep generative grammar, which Reus-Smit calls an order's "deep constitutive structure" (2013c, 169), has conditioning effects on all the order's other elements, be they specific governing practices, or concrete rules.⁷ In other words, an order's rules and practices depend upon the character of the units that exist in the order and on the ways in which they relate to each other. Ruggie's focus on the unperpinnings of the international order is crucial to understand fundamental change in the international order, but the concept of differentiation might be underspecified. It

7. For a discussion of this concept see also Donnelly 2012a; Donnelly 2012b; Albert 2010; Buzan 1993; Buzan and Little 1996; Kessler and Kratochwil 2010; Reus-Smit 2013b, c; Ruggie 1993.

is not obvious that there always have to be clear principles separating the units from one another, and it is not clear how the principles of differentiation come into existence.

Without necessarily contradicting Ruggie, I prefer to specify that the deep structure of a given international order is based on two aspects, namely the nature of the international system's units, and how the units are arranged in relation to each other: whether they are in relations of subordination, superiority, or equality. This understanding of the international order's basic foundation contains Reus-Smit's conception of international order as "systemic configurations of political authority," based on "politico-spatial assumptions" (Reus-Smit 2013b: 1059). My argument is that the characteristics of the units, as well as how they are related to each other are expressed through forms of representation. In this sense forms of representation have a constitutive effect on the deep generative grammar of an international order.

The underlying structure of an international order affects how the units interact with each other. It shapes the practices that are intended to maintain the arrangements but it does not fully determine all those practices, as numerous scholars who have studied variations among orders of territorial states have already remarked (Reus-Smit 1999; Wendt 1999). Even so, the forms of representation, which define the units and position them in relation to each other, also serve as tools for maintaining the order. For example, the territorial balance of power is a specific international order consisting of territorial states, which are related to each other horizontally in relations of equality. These relations and the characteristics that define territorial states as units of the international system are based on such representative forms as Cartesian maps, or the war-making practices of hierarchically ordered armies with single command structures, dressed in uniforms, and fighting along a frontline. At the same time these representative forms serve as tools for the balancing practices of statesmen intending to maintain the given arrangement. So while not all ordering practices are forms of representation, some of them are. This also means that with the same forms of representation we can have orders that differ from each other in some respects if those ordering practices, which are not forms of representation, differ.

In sum, the definition of international order adopted here consists of three factors:

the characteristics that define the units of the international system, the arrangements in which the units of the international system relate to each other, and the practices through which the units interact with each other and maintain the given arrangements.⁸ I do not include fundamental institutions, or intersubjective norms and principles as separate factors in my definition of international order, as other scholars tend to do (see, for example, Phillips 2011; Reus-Smit 2013c),⁹ because I consider these to be already subsumed under the three defining elements of international order. The most primary institutions that define the units of the international system, such as sovereignty, are elements of an order's deep generative grammar in that they define the characteristics of the units and how they are arranged in relation to each other. Alternatively, fundamental institutions that regulate state behavior are already subsumed under the practices that serve to maintain a given order. In Reus-Smit's words, "the terms 'fundamental institutions' and 'basic institutional practice' are frequently used interchangeably" (Reus-Smit 1999, 14). Fundamental institutions are the rules that guide practices but as such they might be a purely analytical rather than an ontological category. We can observe these rules in practices: practices both embody the rules and produce them. If fundamental institutions then are inherent in practices, it is unnecessary to include them as a separate defining feature of international order.

Different kinds of international orders can co-exist next to each other when different international fields co-exist. Positing ex-ante the exclusive existence of one single international order in a pre-defined political domain can mean that we overlook the varied and potentially contradictory logics that shape international interactions—that we artificially impose a logical and theoretical unity on international relations and overlook the diversity of tendencies that drive international relations. In fact, it is precisely in the overlap between different fields with distinct orders and the interactions between actors

8. This definition of international order has some overlap with Reus-Smit's definition of international order, which is composed of three elements: "a systemic configuration of institutionalised power and authority (sovereignty, heteronomy, suzerainty, empire, etc.), an architecture of fundamental rules and practices that facilitate coexistence and cooperation between loci of authority, and a framework of constitutional social norms that license both of these" (2013c, 167). I split Reus-Smit's first element into two components and leave out his third element.

9. According to Reus-Smit, for example, "ensembles of intersubjective norms and principles license a particular systemic configuration of political authority" (ibid., 170).

from those different fields that international order change can occur.

The empirical chapters focus on six types of international orders: empire or universal monarchy, medieval heteronomy, a hierarchical order between territorial states, a territorial balance of power, liberal governance of a space of flows, a territorial state arrangement based on multilateralism, and a European federal state model. Some of these types of international order coexisted at the same time and place, but were valid in different fields.




Figure 1.1: Historically Coexisting International Orders and their Change.

The ordering principle of empire operated in the medieval religious field, and coexisted with the ordering principle of heteronomy applicable in the temporal feudal field. In the medieval order of universal monarchy or empire, a large variety of different units were arranged hierarchically in a single universal space with the pope and/or the emperor at its head. The imperial hierarchy was maintained through such practices and forms of representation as coronation rituals and their reverse, anathemas, or the practices linked

to canon law. The word *empire* had a different meaning in medieval and early modern Europe from how IR scholars tend to use it today. For IR scholars, empires are usually “hierarchical systems of rule in which peripheral polities are formally subordinated to a ruling metropolis” (Reus-Smit 2013c, 183). By contrast, in medieval Europe the word *imperium* signified a singular hierarchical order, but not necessarily formal rule. It would have been a contradiction in terms to talk about several co-existing empires; there could only ever be one empire. Only in the course of the nineteenth century did *empire* come to signify rule abroad (Koebner 1961).

Next to empire, medieval Europe had in its temporal feudal realm an international order based on heteronomy marked by variegated relations between different kinds of actors built on overlapping authority structures. The order was maintained through such practices as unrestricted and non-exclusive forms of diplomatic representation and warfare practices (chapter 4). Because single command structures did not exist, diplomatic representatives could serve multiple principals at the same time and military contingents could fight in the (occasionally contradicting) interests of several masters.

The imperial order and the feudal heteronomous order gradually yielded to a hierarchical order between territorial states that was expressed in and maintained through such practices as diplomatic precedence and ceremony. In the course of the eighteenth century this hierarchical arrangement gave way to an egalitarian order in which territorial states as like units balanced each other. The territorial balance of power that emerged was not only an order-maintaining practice but a unique kind of order in its own right. Independent territorial states on whose inside authority is spread evenly (as characteristics that define the units of the international system) and the understanding that those territorial states relate to each other on equal terms (as the arrangements in which the units of the international system relate to each other) were defining features of the balance of power. Together with the balancing practices that served to maintain the order, the territorial balance of power thus contains the three features I established for defining an international order. Without the understanding that territorial states are independently existing units that are functionally alike, balancing practices would look entirely different. They could, for example, resemble the checks and balances from domestic politics.

Without the understanding of egalitarian arrangements between the units, the very notion of balancing would not make any sense. Balancing is by definition a practice focused on establishing equality. Because the practices of balancing, the characteristics of the international system's units, and the arrangements between the units are so profoundly intertwined, we should understand the late eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century balance of power as a particular international order. This also becomes apparent from the fact that the balancing practices intended to maintain the order made use of the most prevalent forms of representation at the time, such as Cartesian maps or existing military practices, which simultaneously defined the units of the international system and positioned them in relation to each other ([chapter 5](#) and [chapter 6](#)).

The arguably postmodern order in the European Union has its deep generative grammar in the economic field in the form of a space of flows. Flows are the units of the system and they coexist with each other in a universal and horizontal space. The order relies on liberal governance practices to maintain itself and to manage and regulate flows and movement. I define *liberal governance* in line with Neumann and Sending (2010, 3) and leaning on Foucault (2008) as “modes of governing modelled on the market and operating ‘through freedom.’” The European order is still incomplete because it is still in the process of construction. Struggles over competing forms of representation are also struggles over competing forms of international order. The postmodern order coexists and competes with an egalitarian territorial state arrangement maintained through traditional multilateral diplomacy, and an international order based on the model of a federal state with checks and balances between essentially equal, but unlike-units, in which the European Parliament has a degree of democratic oversight ([chapter 7](#)).

Type of international order	Nature of the units	Arrangement of the units	(select) practices ensuring the stability of the order
Empire/ Universal Monarchy	Large variety of entities	Universal hierarchy	Coronation rituals, anathemas, canon law, papal diplomacy
Medieval heteronomy	Large variety of entities	Place-bound heteronomy	Unrestricted and non-exclusive diplomatic and warfare practices
Hierarchical order between territorial states	Territorial states	Universal hierarchy	Diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremonial
Territorial balance of power	Territorial states	Egalitarian	Territorial balancing practices
Postmodern order	Flows	Egalitarian	Management of flows with the help of liberal governance practices
Multilateral order of territorial states	Territorial states	Egalitarian	Multilateral treaty making and diplomacy
European federal state model	Bureaucratic institutions (European Parliament, European Commission, Council of the European Union, etc.)	Diffuse hierarchy	Some checks and balances between unlike units with practices of democratic oversight, practices of domestic federal orders

Table 1.1: Studied Types of International Orders.

1.2 Literature Review

IR scholars who have studied international order change can be grouped along two continuous axes. In the first dimension we can differentiate between exogenous and endogenous approaches. Endogenous approaches establish a causal or constitutive relationship in which unit-level characteristics affect the characteristics of an international order. Inversely, exogenous approaches move from ordering characteristics to unit-level attributes or from system-wide variables to ordering principles. The second axis distinguishes between material and ideational frameworks of analysis. While numerous theories fall neatly into one of the four quadrants, some are located along one axis, combining material and ideational or exogenous and endogenous perspectives into their models. Still others are located at the centre of the graph, thus combining all four approaches together.

Although any such exercise in mapping and categorization permits scholars to easily orient themselves in a certain literature, it also has the disadvantage of simplifying quite complex theoretical arguments. Readers should therefore consider the following figure (Figure 1.2) as a useful sketch rather than as an authoritative inventory.




Figure 1.2: Classification of Existing Theories of International Order.

Available theories of international order constitution and change cannot explain the

disconnection that can occur between on-the-ground unit-level attributes and the character of a specific international order. By definition those approaches, which use endogenous factors as their explanans to understand changes of international order, can explain a situation where the type of international order lags behind changes in domestic features, but not the inverse, or a complete disconnection between domestic features and international order (Hall 1999; Morgenthau 1985; Reus-Smit 1999; Ruggie 1982; Spruyt 1994; Teschke 1998). Theoretical approaches that use exogenous material factors as their independent variable to analyze change of international orders have so far been unable to explain qualitative change because existing material approaches exclusively focus on the functional dimension of materiality. Because they study the distribution of capabilities, or technologically induced changes in violence interdependence, they can explain a higher or lower degree of centralization in a particular order, but they cannot account for the emergence of a qualitatively different kind of order (Deudney 2007; Gilpin 1981; Waltz 1979). Alternatively, most authors who have focused on the effects of systemic ideas on the emergence of new types of international order have not paid much attention to the mechanisms by which ideas spread and obtain practical effects. Scholars often analyze philosophical texts without paying much attention to how these texts either reflect ordering patterns or even shape them (Bartelson 1995; Philpott 2001).

A focus on concrete forms of representation—particular artifacts, representative practices, and language—promises to alleviate some of the difficulties of the existing literature on international order change. It permits us to understand how ideas are instantiated at the daily, practical level of politics, and simultaneously adds a constitutive dimension to material reality. For example, the introduction of modern mapping techniques has brought the image of the territorial state to life, well before the territorial state existed on the ground (Branch 2011), but it simultaneously had an effect on the planning and strategies of warfare, for organizing logistic supply chains, constructing fortifications, or drawing battle formations.

1.2.1 Endogenous Material Approaches

In much conventional IR scholarship the container schema image of the state is one of the primary assumptions from which theorizing develops (Morgenthau 1985; Waltz 1979). In this still-predominant understanding, the territorial state as a singular and coherent actor is first established and subsequently enters into relations with other states,¹⁰ which leads to the emergence of an anarchical international system that has to be ordered with the help of a balance of power. The international order is the direct result of unit-level attributes.

A number of other authors in the IR literature have used history to analyze how changes in unit characteristics affect international order change (Buzan and Little 2000; Spruyt 1994b; Teschke 1998). For example, Teschke sees domestic property relations as the crucial variable for international order change, and Spruyt focuses on the emergence of particular domestic coalitions that, coupled with comparative efficiency criteria for wealth creation, led to the emergence of the territorial state as the sole actor of the international order. These approaches certainly help to understand the formation of the units of the international system, but since there is no guarantee for a one-to-one transmission from unit-level attributes to the defining features of an international order, their capacity to explain international order change is limited.

1.2.2 Exogenous Material Approaches

Other authors have taken the inverse route and analyzed how features of an international order affected unit characteristics. A typical example is world system theory, for which the order, capitalism, exists prior to its units. The exchange relations between the different actors divide them into the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery (Dunn 1979; Wallerstein 1979). Another typical example of an exogenous-material approach is Tilly's (1990) classical *Coercion, Capital and European States*. "War makes states and states make war" expresses Tilly's central idea that the territorial state came into existence to be able to fight international wars in a hostile environment. The war-fighting effort put

10. Bull (1977) and Wendt (1999) share these theoretical assumptions with Morgenthau and Waltz, but are not materialist in outlook, see also March and Olsen (1998).

fiscal and manpower burdens upon the state, which required the state to increase its coercive apparatus to collect taxes and recruit men for the army. Initial resistance from the local population led to the gradual suppression of alternative power centres and to the establishment of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The territorial state's characteristics are hence the direct result of the anarchic international environment. Thomson also shows "that the impetus for state monopolization of extraterritorial violence" came from the international order; it emerged "from the collectivity of European state rulers" (1994, 4). The practices of extraterritorial violence then had an effect on unit type: "the national state is qualitatively different from the traditional state precisely because the national state has made good its claim to monopolize violence beyond its borders" (Thomson 1994: 4).

Other scholars, such as Strange (1996), Deudney (2007), and Gilpin (1981), have systemic characteristics of technology, violence, or the distribution of power as their explanans, which affects international order. According to Strange (1996), international order change is the result of technological change. For Deudney a change in the intensity of violence interdependence has an effect on the type of negarchy that will be adopted as an order-creating mechanism.¹¹ According to hegemonic stability theory, a hegemon will establish a hierarchical order if it is able to project its power sufficiently, which depends mainly on the distribution of power, a systemic characteristic (Gilpin 1981).^{12 13}

The available material approaches exclusively focus on the functional dimension of materiality. They allow us to see how new tools for order formation become available, but they omit how material changes can create new meanings. A focus on the representative dimension of materiality, by contrast, reintroduces an understanding of materiality's significative dimension.

11. Deudney (2007) coined the term *negarchy* to characterize an ordering principle that is located between hierarchy and anarchy. According to Deudney, anarchy and hierarchy both signify the unrestrained use of violence. In negarchy the elements of anarchy and hierarchy balance each other out so that their violent effects constrain each other.

12. For a dyadic version of this argument see Lake (2009).

13. At this secondary level, order is also for Waltz defined by systemic characteristics, as the distribution of power, defines the polarity of the system.

1.2.3 Endogenous Ideational Approaches

Some constructivist approaches locate changes in identities, norms, and/ or ideas at the domestic level and subsequently analyze how those changes spread from the domestic level into the international realm until they affect an international order. Thus Ruggie (1982)¹⁴ locates normative changes at the domestic level. He suggests that “the internationalization of domestic authority relations” together with the social purposes they reflect define the content of a given international order (385). Reus-Smit (2013a) demonstrates how the sovereign state became the universal form of political organization as a result of “subject peoples’ struggles for the recognition of individual rights” (207). Initially “the nascent sovereign states that emerged out of Westphalia were products of endogenous political struggles” (220), although in the last wave of the sovereign-state’s expansion newly independent postcolonial countries also made use of international forums such as the United Nations to tie the notion of self-determination to the emerging human rights discourse. In this sense Reus-Smit’s argument contains an exogenous dimension as well. And for Hall (1999) change in the domestic identities of the core actors leads to international order change. He finds, for example, that “an explicitly territorial sovereignty resulted in legitimate balancing behavior unique to that form of sovereignty” (Hall 1999, 103). The change of international order subsequently affects the domestic identities of weak/ peripheral states. In this sense Hall’s model incorporates both an exogenous and a material component, even though he sees endogenous ideational factors as the driving forces behind international order change. However, a focus on endogenous factors as the main driving forces of international order change runs equally into the difficulty that it cannot account for the disconnection between unit-level attributes and features of international order.

1.2.4 Exogenous Ideational Approaches

Other constructivist accounts have a more exclusively exogenous focus. Cynthia Weber’s (1995) work on the effects of international relations theory and intervention policies

14. Ruggie (1982) includes material and at times exogenous factors in his analytical framework, but ideational and endogenous aspects do the major explanatory work in his analysis.

on the conception of sovereignty is a typical example of how the territorial state can be created as an image from the outside. She seeks to “analyze how foundations and boundaries are drawn — how states are written (in logics of representation and logics of simulation) with particular capacities and legitimacies at particular times and places” (Weber 1995, 29). Biersteker and Weber’s (1996) collaborative work highlights the inter-relationship between state practices and the concept of sovereignty. They “consider state, as an identity or agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation. States can be defined in terms of their claims to sovereignty, while sovereignty can be defined in terms of the interactions and practices of states” (Biersteker and Weber 1996, 11). How the units of the international system interact with each other shapes the kind of international order that emerges. Alternatively, Philpott (2001) made a case for the causal significance of systemic ideas in his argument that new ideas bring about revolutions in sovereignty. Specifically he demonstrates well how Protestantism contributed to the questioning of a unified hierarchical order and thus sought limits upon the territorial extent of the power of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Ruggie, while admitting that material environments play an important role, nonetheless puts his major emphasis on broad social epistemes—“the mental equipment by means of which people reimagined their collective existence” (1993, 169) for defining the principles by which the units of the international system are differentiated from one another. Perhaps with some inspiration from world systems theory, Hobson and Sharman (2005) focus on the often-overlooked hierarchical orders in the modern system, rather than on the territorial state order. They demonstrate how norms, identities, and ideas internal to those hierarchies provided the rationale for their existence, while acknowledging that material power plays a necessary, if not sufficient condition for the emergence of hierarchies. While these approaches can, in principle, explain the discrepancy that can emerge between a given international order and unit-level attributes, they have often not paid much attention to the mechanisms through which ideational factors get instantiated at the daily, practical level of politics (Weber’s 1995 work is an exception in this regard). A focus on forms of representation can alleviate this difficulty—broad ideas find expression in concrete representative forms.

1.2.5 Ideational Approaches at the Intersection of Endogenous and Exogenous Perspectives

A number of mainly postmodern authors are interested in identifying how the boundary between inside and outside has been constituted, rather than focusing on how external or internal factors shape an international order and the units the order is composed of. Thus Walker offers “a reading of modern theories of international relations as a discourse that systematically reifies an historically specific spatial ontology, a sharp delineation of here and there, a discourse that both expresses and constantly affirms the presence and absence of political life inside and outside the modern state” (Walker 1995, ix). Similarly, Bartelson (2005) analyzes in his genealogy how the concept of sovereignty comes to establish both the order inside the territorial state and the anarchy on its outside; sovereignty is “hovering somewhere between them, but residing in neither” (46). He borrows Kant’s concept of parergon, the frame, to highlight the function of sovereignty. The frame is the element that makes an object of art recognized as such, even though the frame itself remains unnoticed. It is neither a part of the inside, nor a part of the outside, but delineates both.

As long as the authors do not move beyond the analysis of scholarly texts, they have no way to demonstrate how these texts gain practical effects. It could be the case that scholarly texts do not constitute a particular reality, but that their authors describe in them what they observe in the world. The empirical sections of this dissertation demonstrate that scholarly texts often developed important international relations concepts after they had already been expressed in forms of representation. Because forms of representation are more broadly visible in the daily lives of people and more directly accessible than complex scholarly treaties, their more immediate effects on political activity make sense.

1.2.6 Exogenous Approaches Combining Material and Ideational Factors

Some other theoretical approaches incorporate material and ideational perspectives, while focusing on systemic variables as their explanans. Phillips (2011) analyzed the combined

effects of legitimacy crises and Deudney's concept of violence interdependence on change in international orders. On the material side he found in his European case study that the invention of gunpowder, the use of mercenaries, and the new availability of credit increased violence interdependence, and put offence in the advantage. After significant turmoil in the short run, these changes ultimately favoured the emergence of centralized authority. On the ideational side, the Reformation resulted in a legitimacy crisis of the old Christian order, and after an extended period of searching, divine-right absolutism could be identified as a new legitimating principle for the emerging order. The material and the ideational factors are not merely cumulative: a symbiosis needs to prevail between the order's legitimating principle and the institutionalized practices of violence. One operates on the legitimacy side, the other on the coercive side of the same coin of international order. However, in Phillips's understanding the material and the ideational dimension remain two ontologically separate entities.

Ringmar's (2012) and Branch's (2011) work capture the profound interconnectivity between the material and the ideational. While Branch demonstrates how maps as artifacts, that is, material objects, had an impact on how people conceived of the state as a bounded territorial entity, Ringmar's theoretical framework analyzes international systems in terms of "quasi-theatrical settings" (Ringmar 2012, 3). Material reality, such as nuclear bombs or assembly halls of international congresses, as well as concepts, for example, non-intervention, provide the frame or the on-stage decoration that enables and constrains the actors' (alias statesmen and diplomats) staged performances, which establish a particular kind of international order. Through these embodied performances the spectators, fellow statesmen, and theorists can identify "which rules guide and constrain actors, how power is distributed, how space is defined, and on what terms recognition is granted and withheld" (Ringmar 2012, 3). At the same time, the audience is not purely passive but can evaluate the performance. Indeed, the audience's response to the performance is the purpose of the whole spectacle: "to be powerful is less important than to appear powerful" (Ringmar 2012, 19). Ringmar (2012) as well as Branch (2011) highlight the crucial role of representational forms (as material and simultaneously ideational phenomena that can be quite disconnected from unit-level attributes) for international

order formation and change. I build on their work.

1.2.7 Combining Endogenous, Exogenous, Ideational, and Material Accounts

An increasing number of authors seek to develop analytical frameworks that combine endogenous, exogenous, ideational, and material explanations together. Nexon's (2009) network approach, for example, operates at the frontier between endogenous and exogenous accounts because the inside is distinguished from the outside merely by a higher intensity of network ties. Changes in network ties lead to a reconfiguration of the type of order that emerges. Changing ideas and identities influence the changes in network ties, themselves a material feature. Nexon explains how, following the Reformation, territorial states replaced European composite states as "agglomerations of different peoples and territories divided by distinctive interests and identities" (Nexon 2009: 7). The Reformation allowed hitherto unconnected peripheries to develop social ties and hence coordinate their activities against the centre, which lead to the breakup of composite polities.

While Nexon provides an innovative theory of state formation, his approach has difficulties explaining a disconnection between unit-level characteristics and international order because both change simultaneously in his network analysis. His approach is very helpful in understanding the internal spatial organization of polities, but he cannot explain why many polities, which remained composite states after the reformation, operated internationally just as territorial states did, namely in search for a territorial balance of power, as Metternich's activities at the Congress of Vienna demonstrate. A focus on forms of representation has the potential to help us understand how the composite nature of entities like Austria could get lost behind unified representative forms of sovereign statehood.

Ikenberry's (2011) model, a combination of hegemonic stability theory with a liberal emphasis on domestic regime type, is located at the centre of [Figure 1.2](#). He characterizes the present international order as a liberal order, the democratic regime type of the most powerful state in the system. Liberal ideas spread from the inside out, but only if the

distribution of power, a systemic and material feature, is in their favour.

According to Murphy, Europe's geographical attributes provided favourable conditions for the emergence of boundaries that would frame territorial states. Concurrently, an ideal of sovereign territoriality developed in the writings of Bodin and later Grotius. "The political geographic importance of the ideal was no less than to crowd out competing conceptions of how power might be organized to the point where the sovereign territorial ideal became the only imaginable spatial framework for political life" (Murphy 1996, 91). In successive centuries, "sovereignty as a systemic notion was repeatedly thrown into crisis when social, technological, and economic developments challenged the theoretical and functional bases of particular territorial arrangements" (Murphy 1996, 82-83).

Inasmuch as Ikenberry's and Murphy's approaches combine several existing theories of international order change, their resulting theoretical models carry some of the difficulties of the theoretical approaches they contain. Thus Ikenberry (2011), just as Gilpin (1981), cannot account for the existence of a hierarchical order, such as the medieval notion of empire, in the absence of a hegemon. Murphy's (1996) focus on theoretical treaties in turn runs into the same difficulties of explaining the practical instantiation of the theoretical concepts, just as many constructivist scholars have similarly run into that difficulty.

1.2.8 Summative Critique

All of these theoretical approaches are useful to understand and/or explain specific components of unit formation, the arrangement of the units, or the practices and rules that are intended to maintain a given international order. The different theories are not all in contradiction to one another. In some cases scholars have combined different theoretical approaches together to gain more explanatory leverage (see, for example, Phillips 2011 and Ikenberry 2011), a tendency supported by meta-theoretical arguments of analytic eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010), which gain increasing currency in the field. At the same time, however, almost none of the analytical frameworks can explain the empirical puzzle of how a disconnection can occur between a type of international order and

the on-the-ground characteristics of the units that make up the system.

Endogenous approaches, by definition, can understand a disconnection where features of international order lag behind unit-level attributes, but they cannot explain the more puzzling observation that sometimes unit-level attributes can lag behind features of international order. Exogenous-material perspectives have difficulties explaining qualitative change (Ruggie 1982), mainly because existing material perspectives leave out the constitutive dimension of materiality from their analysis.¹⁵ Typically available material perspectives analyze the occurrence of more or less violence, the monopolization of violence, or violence interdependence in the system. Such approaches can therefore explain more or less centralization in a given order, but not a qualitatively different kind of order.¹⁶

Existing exogenous-ideational approaches and ideational approaches at the intersection of exogenous and endogenous perspectives, with the exception of Weber's (1995) work, have so far not sought to demonstrate how ideas are transmitted, become intersubjectively shared, and obtain systemic effects. Until now authors have usually focused on analyzing theoretical treatises, or broad social epistemes—mysterious ideational clouds that appear to be hovering above society. While theoretical texts have doubtlessly had an effect on scholarly debates and arguments, the transmission mechanism through which scholarly debates affect practical politics is usually not very clear. In the case of social epistemes, there is a need to operationalize and pin down in thorough empirical research how broad ideational structures emerge, change, and have effects.

Postmodern authors (Agnew 1994; Ashley 1987; Walker 1995; Der Derian and Shapiro

15. Material approaches do not necessarily have to be purely causal. Latour (2005) and Bourdieu (1977; 1990), for example, highlight the constitutive effects of materiality in their analyses.

16. Tilly's (1990) framework can explain a higher degree of centralization of violence and coercion of tax collection for the war-making effort, but he has difficulties explaining the transition from a hierarchically organized *Respublica Christiana* to a territorial state system where the ordering mechanism is a balance of power. Deudney (2007) explicitly states that he is interested in variations of negarchy, rather than in entirely different types of order. Thomson (1994) analyzes the transitions from a lower degree of monopolization of extraterritorial violence by states to its absolute monopolization, and Gilpin's (1981) analysis focuses exclusively on the establishment of hierarchy within a territorial state system, but hegemonic stability theory cannot analyze the transition from an order among territorial states to a different kind of order. This leads to some empirical challenges for hegemonic stability theory. For example, it is unable to explain the hierarchical order of medieval Europe — a world of little material power.

1989) have launched a critique against mainstream (at the time, mainly realist) scholars for reifying the territorial state; in Ferguson and Mansbach's words: "even the field's simplest concepts such as 'state' and 'power,' out of which our main theories have been constructed, are abstractions and are not directly observable. The concepts needed to build theory, necessarily had to be defined by theorists themselves" (2004, 39). While a critique of the territorial state's reification in traditional IR scholarship is a valid enterprise, it is simply not correct that concepts such as "state" or "power" are unobservable and pure theoretical inventions. Statesmen and policy-makers at least from the eighteenth century onwards have acted as if these concepts were real, materially existing entities, and in this sense traditional IR scholarship has not invented them out of the blue, but rather, albeit too uncritically, observed them in state practice (Guzzini 2013).

Theories located at the intersection of material and ideational approaches and exogenous and endogenous analyses combine a previously distinct ideational account with a material account. This combination alleviates some of the difficulties the two stories face when recounted separately. For example, qualitative change, backed up by material factors, now becomes possible. But some of the difficulties remain, precisely because the material and the ideational are not melded together into a single account, but run side by side as two distinct stories that ultimately come together in the type of order that emerges. Thus Ikenberry's model (2011) cannot explain an international order that is qualitatively distinct from the domestic structure of the most powerful state because the ideational arrow in his model runs from the inside out, from domestic regime type to international order. Phillips (2011), in turn, could have developed a more forceful account of how ideas are transmitted so that they become intersubjectively shared international structures that define a given order, had he established a tighter interconnectivity between the material and the ideational realms.

My goal here is to identify how concepts such as "state" or "power" obtained their materiality that statesmen and policy-makers acted upon. Cynthia Weber's (1995) analysis follows exactly these lines when she establishes a direct link between practices of intervention and the concept of sovereignty. Her linguistic analysis focuses on policy documents, which makes the transmission mechanism between language and practice

self-explanatory. Also Branch's (2011) work includes a material component when he demonstrates how material artifacts can have a particular meaning already integrated within them, which shapes the intersubjectively shared spatial imaginary of a given international order and simultaneously serves as a tool for rulership. The remaining question though is whether one single, isolated representative form, the Cartesian map, can have such far-reaching consequences as the emergence of the territorial state, and more acutely still, whether changes in mapping techniques really can be the single explanatory force to understand all past, present, and future changes of international order.

Ringmar's (2012) work is more comprehensive in its scope because he demonstrates not only how diplomats and statesmen enact theoretical concepts on the world stage of international politics, but also how material reality more broadly conceived acquires symbolic meaning. It functions like artifacts in a staged performance. Ringmar's approach is well designed to explain the possible disconnection between unit-level attributes and the appearances on the international stage as it becomes apparent in his distinction between being powerful and appearing to be powerful. However, the script together with the scriptwriter appears in his theoretical framework like a *deus ex machina*. The question of where the script for the theatre performance is coming from is also, in part, a question of how it can change. Ringmar does not address the question of international order change. In this sense my work takes Ringmar's and Branch's important theoretical advances about the relevance of forms of representation into account and expands on them.

1.3 Overview of the Project

The next chapter establishes the dissertation's theoretical framework. It first highlights the ontological significance of forms of representation as what drives change, rather than as observable proxies that permit us to evaluate or measure a reality that lies underneath them. The chapter proposes two mechanisms of change based on the fact that fields are partially open systems and that people as well as forms of representation can travel between fields.

Chapter 3 then develops a methodology for analyzing the intertwined ideational and material effects of representational forms. Despite the important theoretical achievements in IR scholarship to capture the profound interconnectivity between the material and the ideational through such concepts as practices, artifacts, and emotions, to date no methodological approach has been advanced that can do justice to these new theoretical developments. For these reasons the chapter develops a semeiotics of materialism based on a Peircean semeiotic approach that can capture the constitutive effects of material reality on par with those of language, but without losing the very materiality of material reality in the process.

The fourth chapter presents the first empirical case study, analyzing the changes in international order that occurred from the twelfth century to the Peace of Westphalia. The chapter begins with an analysis of how a temporal feudal field co-existed next to a religious Christian field, each with its distinct order, conception of space, and very specific forms of representation. A uniform and absolute Christian space co-existed next to a conception of spatial embeddedness in place; feudal heteronomy co-existed next to a hierarchical order with the pope/emperor at its head. In each of these fields different forms of representation were prevalent. For example, feudal castles, and nuncios (diplomatic representatives who functioned as living letters that could be sent between anybody and often served multiple principals at a time) marked the feudal field. Gothic cathedrals and papal nuncios, who were complete representations of the pope, defined the religious field (Queller 1967). Over time, however, technological progress led to more frequent interactions between rulers, which culminated in the hysteresis of kings when they were increasingly confronted with the hierarchical order of the religious field. As a result, struggles over forms of representation erupted, and led to changes in representative forms. The changes in forms of representation gave rise to new spatial arrangements and new understandings of international order. The Peace of Westphalia was a transitory moment when different understandings of international order and forms of representation overlapped. In particular the order in the Holy Roman Empire markedly differed from the larger European order.

The fifth chapter describes an additional path that contributed to the emergence

of a territorial balance of power by focusing on how the territorial state emerged as an actor in the international political field. It describes a process that was occurring parallel to the disappearance of universal monarchy as an ordering principle for medieval Europe. While the mechanism of hysteresis can explain how universal monarchy came to an end, how kings established their independence from the pope and the emperor, and how they simultaneously maintained at least nominal control over lesser lords, the mechanism of hysteresis cannot explain how territorial states, characterized by a clear boundary and a conception of homogenous control on their inside, became the dominant units of the international system. The chapter highlights that the discovery of geometry in the field of art led to numerous interconnected and largely unintentional changes in forms of representation, which in their accumulation brought about the conception of the territorial state, well before the territorial state actually existed as an entity. In particular, the chapter highlights the intertwined effects between single-point perspective in painting, Cartesian mapping, fortification design, practices of warfare, and garden and palace architecture.

Chapter 6 focuses on the further changes that took place from the second half of the seventeenth century to the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which definitively established a territorial balance of power as Europe's ordering mechanism. The chapter starts at the point at which the fourth chapter ends. It first describes the prevalent order in the second half of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century, namely a hierarchical order between territorial states that persisted in Europe even after it had become obvious that empire was no longer Europe's ordering mechanism. This transitory order was a "hierarchy without empire" to use Reus-Smit's (2013c, 183) term, which he developed in a different context. The Holy Roman Emperor, the French king, and the Spanish king were able to ensure their high standing in the European order thanks to the prevalent forms of representation of diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremony that infiltrated even the army and military practices. Yet, by the early eighteenth century several new actors marked their entrance on the European stage—Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia—who had not been fully socialized into the European field. Russia had obtained a high position in the Central Asian field, and Great Britain in its emerging overseas empire.

Yet statesmen in the European field considered these three powers inferior to France and Austria, despite Great Britain's, Prussia's and Russia's sustained efforts to establish a high position for themselves with the help of the prevailing representative forms. As a result of their inferior position in the European field, they started to experience hysteresis and began to question and ridicule matters of diplomatic precedence to devalue this particular form of representation. Simultaneously they made full use of the emerging developments in the military realm, which allowed rulers to exert a higher degree of control over their armies. As a result of these developments and the developments described in the previous two chapters the territorial balance of power emerged as Europe's new ordering principle. The Holy Roman Empire slowly disintegrated and its ordering mechanisms were increasingly replaced by a balance of power between Austria and Prussia. The Napoleonic wars sped up these developments, which had been under way for at least half a century. With Napoleon's defeat the ordering concept of empire was also defeated in Europe.¹⁷ The Congress of Vienna definitively buried the Holy Roman Empire and finalized one single form of international order in Europe: a territorial balance of power. New forms of representation had become operational that identified Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia as Europe's five great powers.

The last empirical chapter employs the findings from the three historical chapters to address the question of how far we are experiencing transformative change in the current international order. The case study focuses on the European Union as arguably the most advanced postmodern political form (Buzan and Waeber 2003; Ruggie 1993; Slaughter 2004; Castells 1998). The purpose of European integration was to prevent the recurrence of war on the European continent, but the form that integration took depended upon struggles between actors from different fields over the appropriate forms of representation. In the earlier stages of integration actors from the economic field won out against other actors and integration proceeded along the economic dimension and with the help of economic forms of representation. Such representative forms as national accounts, the circulation of price lists, the postmodern architecture of the European Union, the euro,

17. The concept of empire as an ordering principle for Europe found a short resurrection during the Second World War.

and an assembly-line-production of texts in the EU created a European space of flows that had to be governed with the help of liberal governance procedures — dissipated forms of governance that focus on enhancing positive flows and limiting negative flows under the full awareness that absolute control is impossible.

Economic integration had an ever-greater impact on the political field and some political actors mobilized to enhance political representative forms. They succeeded in establishing direct elections to the European Parliament, which led to the unequivocal creation of a European political field with European political actors. Once members of the European Parliament realized how little influence they had in relation to their experiences from domestic politics, they experienced hysteresis that they expressed in the form of a critique of a democratic deficit in the EU. They sought to promote democratic political representative forms centring on the elections to the European Parliament and various public votes in plenary sessions to eliminate the EU's democratic deficit and enhance their own standing, in particular against the opposition of actors integrated into the EU's space of flows and actors embedded within the classical international field of multilateral diplomacy. The EP's partial success resulted in its enhanced societal standing. It also made the European order resemble the domestic order of territorial federal states in some ways. The European Union continues to be a contested project with a multifaceted order that contains, among others, elements of a European space of flows, those of a federal state, and those of a traditional inter-state order. How this order will develop depends upon the outcomes of struggles over forms of representation, and on how the public at large will receive those forms of representation.

Given that all the dissertation's empirical chapters analyze historical developments in Europe from the twelfth century until the present, the conclusion seeks to “provincialize Europe” in Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2000) words. My aim is neither to universalize European order by suggesting that the European order is the global order, nor to generalize from the European experience by claiming that all other geographical regions should or will follow the European model. Instead I studied the European order as one among many possible cases. The last chapter demonstrates that scholars across a variety of disciplines ranging from anthropology and geography to linguistics and religious studies have con-

ducted fascinating empirical research in different geographical contexts and for different time periods, which supports the most basic claims I have developed here. Several other orders even share specific features with the European orders I analyzed, but they also differ in many regards. The evidence is nonetheless anecdotal. A necessary next step would be to take the theoretical arguments outside of the European context. One potential avenue for research would be to undertake a historical analysis of how European forms of representation and their embodied spatial conceptions confronted indigenous forms of representation during the processes of colonization. The findings from such historical projects could contribute to identifying forms of representation and “apparatus[es] of recognition for postnational social forms” (Appadurai 1993, 411) that would allow other, non-state polities, such as indigenous people or diasporas, to communicate their forms of political organization and order in an effective way (Havercroft 2008; Shadian 2010).

Chapter 2

Towards a Theory of Change of International Orders

The current literature analyzes international order change as resulting from either ideational shifts or changes in material structures. While in the first case we persistently encounter the difficulty of how (through which mechanisms) broad ideational shifts affect the practical interactions of policy-makers, in the second case we experience the difficulty that IR scholarship has so far analyzed materiality only in a very narrow, functional sense without taking into account the constitutive effects of material reality. As a result, material changes have been analyzed as quantifiable changes in degree, typically of more or less violence, or more or less concentration of power, but such quantifiable changes in degree cannot explain the emergence of a qualitatively different kind of international order (Ruggie 1982).

By contrast, a focus on concrete forms of representation helps us to understand how ideas take shape at the daily, practical level of politics, and it simultaneously adds a constitutive dimension to material reality without losing the very materiality of that reality in the process. For example, the introduction of modern mapping techniques has brought the image of the territorial state to life (Branch 2014), but it simultaneously had an effect on the planning and strategies of warfare: for the organization of logistic supply chains, the construction of fortifications, or the drawing of battle formations. Forms of representation characterize the units of the international system, they position them

in relation to each other and so they establish a particular spatial configuration. Thus Cartesian maps position different states horizontally next to each other in a relationship of equality. To be sure, the state depicted with the largest land mass appears to be the most powerful state, but no qualitative characteristics distinguish states from one another in this cartographic depiction. The state with the larger land mass is not a qualitatively different kind of state, just a bigger one. The spatial configuration establishes a given international order's deep structure, which shapes the practices intended to maintain that order—in the case of Cartesian maps, territorial balancing behaviour. Territory appears as the currency of power so states have to check each other's territorial expansion.

International order change can occur because multiple fields co-exist next to each other. Depending on the epoch, a religious field can co-exist next to a political field, which can co-exist next to an economic field. Each field has its distinct forms of representation, spatial configuration, and order. Given that fields are not closed but partially open, people and forms of representation can travel between fields. Thus new forms of representation can enter into a field, which can result in both struggles over forms of representation and adaptations in the field. Consequently, the arrangements in the field can change, which then leads to a change of international order.

2.1 Forms of Representation as the Micro-Instantiations of Macro-Phenomena

It is impossible for the individual to perceive the totality of a given territory, the entirety of the state, or the full reach of globalization (Cameron and Palan 2001; Coulter 2001; Ehrentraut 1994; Gottdiener 1995; Hartmann 1988; Klein 1974; Smith 2008). Cameron and Palan (1999) have described how globalization is curiously marked by its absence. Always spatially and temporally detached from us, it is located in the distance and in the future. How can we know that such abstract and enormous entities exist if they can never be encountered in their totality? How can we gain a complete picture of their nature if we only ever experience them in bits and pieces?

Conventional IR scholarship offers two possible answers to this question. On the one hand, constructivists, idealists, and interpretivists suggest that intersubjectively shared ideas, norms, and principles, either as normative structures or as the aggregate of individual thought processes, establish the existence of abstract concepts. Alternatively, materialists, such as realists and Marxists, pursue a functional logic. They hold that abstract concepts are unobservable material structures; they exist because they have material effects. In the first case there is the assumption that cultural values define how we conceive the world, “a world of surfaces on to which we project significance” (Graves-Brown 2000a, 4). In the case of realists and Marxists there is the understanding that the material world determines our cultural conceptions, that “the social only operates as an intermediary — transports material without changing it in any way” (Latour 2005, 84).

A third, and relatively new, alternative is to combine the two approaches into one, for example, by proposing a dialectics that operates between the intersubjective and the objective. While this new form of bracketing can be a useful heuristic device,¹ its ontological foundations are questionable. To use Latour’s (2005, 75) example, it does not make a lot of sense to imagine on the one hand a group of naked soldiers and on the other hand a mountain of military equipment and uniforms and to suggest that there is some form of interaction between the two.

Rather than relying on the power of invisible ideas or unobservable material structures, I suggest following an approach of cultural phenomenology that “restitutes embodiment and materiality within sociocultural contexts, combining the phenomenological focus on corporeality, perception, and modes of being-in-the-world with a constructivist, representational, or semiotic analysis” (Richardson and Third 2009, 148). More precisely, a focus on perceivable forms of representation—on specific language, artifacts, and practices—helps us understand how the abstract becomes concrete and hence imaginable. The distant becomes local, the enormous overseeable and hence conceivable because it can be sensually perceived in forms of representation. Unless performed in concrete

1. During the structuration debate there has been an extensive discussion among constructivist scholars about whether bracketing (the alternate analysis of structure and agency, during which the part that is not studied is bracketed, i.e., maintained constant) is a useful heuristic device to study the co-constitutive effects of structure and agency (Carlsnaes 1992; Gould 1998; Hollis and Smith 1994; Wight 2006).

forms of representation, it is hardly possible to make the intangible imaginable, and it is even less possible to create an intersubjectively shared foundation for its conception.² The macro-level, “as part of our structures of relevant orientation” (Coulter 2001, 34) becomes knowable through its micro-level instantiations. This requires a shift in focus away from the disembodied concepts of high politics and toward the concrete local and place-bound everyday manifestations of political activity (Agnew 1989; Bourdieu 1990; de Certeau 1990; Miller 2005; Shimazu 2012; Thevenot 2001), because “an understanding of the whole is necessarily distinct from an awareness of its parts, and while the local is present and available to the senses, the broader reaches of the globe are inevitably products of representation” (Smith 2008, 1).

It is not merely the case that without forms of representation we would have difficulties conceiving of the abstract, the enormous, and the distant. At least as importantly, without forms of representation, it would be impossible to maintain the reality and the existence of these entities. Forms of representation “bring these [macro] phenomena to life” (Coulter 2001, 34) because “social ties alone have little durability, and cannot extend very far in time or space, without being embodied in more permanent material” (Deudney 2007, 1939). Investigating forms of representation directs our attention toward the concrete materials that are necessary to sustain the abstract concepts often taken for granted in social science research (Latour 2000, 2005; Pouliot 2010b; Walters 2002). Only if “you believe social aggregates can hold their own being propped up by ‘social forces,’ then objects vanish from view and the magical and tautological force of society is enough to hold *every thing* with, literally, *no thing*” (Latour 2005, 70).

Quite paradoxically then, a focus on forms of representation permits the researcher to highlight the constitutive effects of visible things that would remain hidden in conventional social science research (Coulter 2001; Graves-Brown 2000a; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Shimazu 2012). When directing our attention to forms of representation it is unnecessary to rely on unobservable thought processes located in the mind of the individual³ or

2. A focus on forms of representation permits us to understand how the subjectively held beliefs of individual actors become intersubjectively shared social facts, a shift with which rational choice theorists and agent-based constructivists struggle because of their difficulties in marking the transition between agency and structure as well as different levels of analysis (Albert 2010).

3. Much of rational choice theory makes such assumptions though without realizing that rationality

on hidden structures located outside;⁴ instead we can focus on the visible and public ways through which forms of representation actively constitute intersubjectively shared reality (Barnes 2001; Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Pickering 2001; Skinner 2002; Thevenot 2001). As Clifford Geertz so famously said, “Ideas are not, and have not been for some time, unobservable mental stuff. They are envehicled meanings, the vehicles being symbols (or in some usages signs), a symbol being anything that denotes, describes, represents, exemplifies, labels, indicates, evokes, depicts, expresses — anything that somehow or other signifies. And anything that somehow or other signifies is intersubjective, thus public, thus accessible to overt and corrigible plain air explication” (1980, 135).

To avoid confusion about the word *representation*, which has been employed by numerous scholars in different senses, I’d like to clarify its meaning here. Rather than understanding representation as immaterial schemes located in the minds of actors (Castoriadis 1987; Gibbs 2005; Weldes 1999; Pouliot 2008) — as “the shared images and concepts through which we, as individuals, organize our world” (Merand 2006, 131) — representation is here meant to signify the public and outwardly discernible forms through which an otherwise unperceivable being is made perceivable to the senses (Cassirer 1969, 12; Hartmann 1988, 24; Marin 1988, 5), and thus made present, that is, brought into existence. In this sense, forms of representation transform the world itself, not merely how the world is perceived. Only in this sense is it inaccurate to conceive of representation as a mere mediation between the material world and the observer for “the opposite to appearance is not reality but disappearance” (Dewey 1931, 57). Forms of representation are an integral part of reality because they are “more things in the world” (Rouse 2001, 194); they are not made of “different stuff” than the world itself is made of.⁵ In

requires equipment that permits people to externalize at least some thought processes (Latour 2005; MacKenzie 2001).

4. For a similar critique see Latour (2005) and Nexon (2009)

5. Weber (1995) and Rouse (2001) prefer to employ the words *simulation* and *simulacrum* to highlight the distinction between representations —conceived as mere mediators between the observer and reality — and *simulacra* as things in the world on par with all other things in the world. I would like to retain the meaning of the term *simulacrum* as they employ it, but nonetheless stick to the term *representation* because I find *simulacrum* too narrow. A representation of a social entity such as the state does not necessarily have to be its simulation.

sum, forms of representation — language, embodied practices, and artifacts — are not neutral re-presentations of a reality that exists apart from them, but rather *are reality and create reality in the process of representation* (Palan 2012). This ontological argument about representational forms' constitutive role is the foundation on which I develop two mechanisms of international order change. Given their ontological nature, forms of representation are not proxies that help to operationalize or verify an independent variable, be it identity, norms, ideas or material power, but they are themselves what drives change; they are the explanans. Because of how they constitute reality, changes in forms of representation can have causal effects on international order change.

A number of scholars in the political science literature have already noted the constitutive impacts that forms of representation have in establishing shared collective identities and imaginings, interpretive frameworks, or material state structures. In 1967 Michael Walzer noted that “the state is invisible; it must be personified before it can be seen, symbolized before it can be loved, imagined before it can be conceived” (Walzer 1967, 194; see also Ashley 1984, 1988; Constantinou and Der Derian 2010; Hartmann 1988). Accordingly, people have studied how representative forms such as archives, maps, novels, newspapers, censuses, statistics, and national accounts create an image of the state (Bourdieu, Wacquant, and Farage 1994; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Scott 1998) and the nation (Anderson 2006), and how such things as fences create, rather than merely demarcate, its boundaries (Agnew 2009; Auchter 2013; Sack 1986; Sending and Neumann 2011). Other scholars have analyzed how the state has to be recognized externally to be sovereign, that is, how it is necessary to “fabricate effective symbols of legitimacy and representations of sovereignty” (Adler-Nissen 2008, 82; see also Agnew 2002, 2009; Glencross 2008), such as government buildings, flags, salutation ceremonies, and cultural and technical achievements presented in the form of diplomatic gifts (Hartmann 1988), or opt-out clauses in the European Union (Adler-Nissen 2008). Edelman (1971) went as far as saying that politics is less about decision-making and more about dramatic performance and staging. Taking the opposite route, Michael Shapiro (1988) analyzed the political in forms of representation such as biographies and photography. However, my most immediate inspiration stems from Jordan Branch's (2012) article, which shows

how changes in the representational practices of map making unintentionally and for non-political reasons had an impact on spatial conceptualizations. These changed spatial conceptualizations had effects on the cultural imagination—apparent, for example, in literary writings (Smith 2008)—but perhaps even more importantly, they were the driving force for changes in material practices that led to the establishment of the territorial state (Branch 2012).

2.2 The Ideational and Material Dimensions of Forms of Representation

In forms of representation the ideational, imaginary dimension and the material, technical, practical dimension are profoundly interrelated. “The two institutions mutually imply one another, they intrinsically inhere in one another, and each is impossible without the other” (Castoriadis 1987, 370). In some cases it is the practical dimension of forms of representation that the imaginary dimension arises from (Bourdieu 1990, 2007).^{6 7} In other cases, such as ritual and ceremony, an act might appear absurd and useless from a purely functional logic, but its symbolic meaning determines its functional purpose (Bourdieu 1990; Hartmann 1988; Vastokas 1994).

The ideational effects of representational forms are multiple. At the most abstract level, forms of representation create a particular imaginary, a particular way that “people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings” (Taylor 2004, 23; see also Duvall and Chowdhury 2011; Constantinou and Derian 2010; Skinner 2002). The imaginary differs from theory in that theory is more precise, the result of explicit and concentrated study and effort, and is known by only a small group of people who are usually highly educated in a

6. This practical dimension also implies that we cannot expect from these forms the same logic and coherence we would expect from a purely symbolic system. “Practice has a logic which is not that of logic” (Bourdieu 2007, 109), but rather that of practice itself, a logic of convenience and necessity.

7. At times Bourdieu appears to suggest the primacy of the economic dimension, for example when he claims that “economic and symbolic capital are so inextricably intertwined that the display of material and symbolic strength represented by prestigious affines is in itself likely to bring in material profits” (Bourdieu 1990: 119). Such a primacy of the economic dimension posits a universal human goal of profit accumulation, which is unnecessary, though, for nonetheless attributing a role to functional and material factors.

given subject matter (Taylor 2004). By contrast, the imaginary is more vague, hardly expressible in explicit terms, at least partly located in the unconscious, shared by larger groups of people, and mainly a by-product of being in the world. For instance, “image schemas” are unconscious “experiential gestalts”⁸ that develop out of our sensorimotor activity in the world (Gibbs 2005, 90; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). They represent basic spatial relations/structures with the help of “which we construct or constitute order and are not mere passive receptacles into which experience is poured” (Johnson qtd in Gibbs 2005, 91; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). One typical image schema, which incidentally characterizes the territorial state, is the container schema. The container schema is a bordered area in space that includes a boundary, an inside, and an outside (Lakoff and Johnson 1999).

At a slightly more concrete level, forms of representation frame a given situation. Like the frame of a painting, which makes us recognize a work of art as such, forms of representation make us recognize a given situation as a situation of a particular kind and we then behave accordingly (Clark 1997; Goffman 1974; Latour 2005; Ringmar 2012; Shields 1994). Miller coined the term “the humility of things” to highlight how artifacts that we barely notice “nonetheless determine what takes place to the extent that we are unconscious of their capacity to do so” (Miller 2005, 5). In particular, architectural environments have the capacity to frame a given situation based on the actors’ embodied being within them. For example, in the absolutist era the baroque staircase, as a central architectural element of the palace, framed a socially hierarchical interaction between those located on lower levels of the staircase and those located at higher ends. In the linguistic realm metaphors, as “one of the few devices we have for leaping beyond the essential privacy of the experiential process” (Fernandez 1972, 41) and thus “convey the inexpressible” (Danet and Katriel 1994, 27) lead to the framing of a given concept or situation (Skinner 2002; Swidler 2001). Metaphors anchored in daily language usage, such as “argument is war” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 5) systematically shape our understanding of what it is to lead an argument and they permit us to extend

8. The word *gestalt* here signifies that “the parts make no sense without the whole” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 32). It is a relational scheme for which the specific shape and size of the individual parts is irrelevant.

these understandings in particular directions and not in others.

The subject itself as a social actor is constituted in and through forms of representation (Gottdiener 1995). Forms of representation influence a person's actions and her interactions with others. They create and express the subject's identity (Riggins 1994a) which "is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results" (Butler 1990 qtd. in Franko 2003, 74), or in Duvall and Chowdhury's words, "there is no doer before the deed" (2011, 338; see also Jackson and Nexon 1999). The worker becomes constituted as a worker in the process of a strike; the king becomes constituted as king by his garments, crown, and sceptre. To suggest otherwise requires us to postulate a social reality that exists behind and apart from its material expressions—an invisible ghost that lurks behind observable phenomena.

If forms of representation constitute the individual, it holds even more true that they constitute collectivities and groups. Bourdieu coined the term *investiture* to define the practices through which a group designates a spokesperson by whose designation the group itself comes into existence. "The spokesperson is the substitute of the group which fully exists only through this delegation and which acts and speaks through him. He is the group made man, personified" (Bourdieu 1989, 24; see also Latour 2005, 31-38). To claim the opposite would mean undertaking "the fallacy of large numbers" (Coulter 2001; see also Bourdieu 1989) — asserting that a mere aggregation of individual features would be the same as a social ensemble. Accordingly I will demonstrate that the establishment of exclusive and unitary diplomatic representation (with one head of each mission who represents only one ruler) had an effect on the conception of the territorial state as a unitary actor in the international system. A group has to be performed (Goffman 1974);⁹ it requires criteria that define and delimit it internally and from other groups (Latour 2005). "The unity of the group is visible, therefore, only in the collective emblem reproducing the object designated by this name. A clan is essentially a reunion of individuals who bear the same name and rally around the same sign. Take away the name and the sign which materializes it and the clan is no longer representable" (Durkheim qtd. in Latour 2005, 38).

9. For an analysis of how international systems are performed, see Ringmar (2012)

More concretely still, specific ideas are expressed in forms of representation. Walters developed the concept of “inscription” to highlight “the material practices of making distant events and processes visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents, charts, forms, reports, signs and graphs” (2002, 84). For example, practices such as accounting techniques bring to life the concepts of costs and benefits and they have constitutive effects on reality by affecting the revenues of companies or the GDP of countries. It is “the circulation of universals” (Latour 2005, 229), the sum of the individual incarnations of given forms of representation, obtained through emulation (Holsti 2002), that makes up the idea as an intersubjectively shared phenomenon.

While even the ideational can be embodied in the sense that it takes material form and it can be sensually perceived and bodily experienced rather than merely cognitively conceived, the very same forms of representation that depict an idea equally function as a technology (Walters 2002). They are the material devices that structure our thought processes and through which our thoughts act upon the world. To solve convoluted problems we reduce the computational load of our brain by manipulating externally existing forms of representation (Clark 1997; Thevenot 2001). For example, maps do not only depict the territory of a given state and thus constitute it; they are also useful tools for military generals in developing war-making strategies. An army general draws his army’s marching routes or battle formations on a map. The solution for winning a given battle emerges from the manipulation of the map, rather than from a purely mental process. If the map did not exist, the general’s strategic tools would be more limited, and his battle formation might look quite different. “In what is unthinkable at a given time, there is not only everything that cannot be thought for lack of the ethical or political dispositions which tend to bring it into consideration, but also everything that cannot be thought for lack of instruments of thought such as problematics, concepts, methods and techniques” (Bourdieu 1990, 5).¹⁰

10. In this context Clark considers language as “the ultimate artifact” because language is “a tool that alters the nature of the computational tasks involved in various kinds of problem solving” (Clark 1997, 193). Language then does not operate as a medium that helps us express some pre-existing thought, rather it is in the medium of language that our thought emerges and hence the thought is limited by the possibilities a given language offers. We often even externalize language on a piece of paper, or on the computer screen, and physically manipulate it to facilitate our thought processes, or to store and search for information. “Language is not the mere imperfect mirror of our intuitive knowledge. Rather, it is

Forms of representation are things in the world and as such they have material/practical effects (Latour 2000; Law 1999; Merlingen 2006), and are subjected to some extent to material constraints, be they financial or resource based. This material dimension in the realm of constitution also means that constitution does not signify absolute relativism. Because material reality is implicated in the process of constitution, societal recognition is not as precarious as would be the case in a purely symbolic logic (Bourdieu 1990, 132, 140).^{11 12} To be sure, the surrounding context in which particular forms of representation are embedded, how they are placed within it (Miller 2005), and the arrangements which they themselves constitute in their juxtaposition (Heidegger 1971; Schatzki 2001b) matters and can shift their meaning and purpose (Graves-Brown 2000a; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Law 1999; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Richardson and Third 2009; Riggins 1994b; Skinner 2002; Wittgenstein 2001), but these shifts are constrained by the very materiality of forms of representation.

This also means that capabilities do matter for projecting power in and through forms of representation, but it does not mean that capabilities determine power, as Waltz (1979) would argue. “Power is power only in and through the representation it gives itself” (Marin 1988, 132-133). To have any effects power needs to be socially identified, that is, it needs to be expressed in forms of representation, though as I mentioned, there is no one-to-one relation between forms of representation and what those forms of representation represent.

Next to potentially expressing existing capabilities, forms of representation can also have material effects quite independent from the intent of their initial designers. Once artifacts have been created by their producer according to a certain logic, they will not necessarily be used in line with that logic (Bourdieu 1990, 97; Laffey and Weldes 1997). Entirely unanticipated by their designer, artifacts, like language and practices, develop a part and parcel of the mechanism of reason itself” (Clark 1997, 207).

11. For the opposite perspective see Parmentier (1994) and Ringmar (2012).

12. Castoriadis (1987), Bourdieu (1990), and Foucault (2008) draw a clear ontological, or at least epistemological distinction between a sign operating in the sign world and following a significative/subjective logic and an object operating in the natural world and following a functional logic; both logics standing in a dialectical relation to one another. In contrast, even though taking inspiration from these scholars, the present approach seeks to demonstrate the fundamental inseparability between the ideational-constitutive and the material-functional dimensions.

life of their own that has constitutive effects on their users; they simultaneously enable and constrain multiple possible uses (Gell 1998; Latour 2005; Pouliot 2010b). The “uses may not be those intended by their inventors or makers, but they must potentially exist, must be immanent, as affordances of those artefacts” (Graves-Brown 2000a, 6). For example, pots are designed for cooking, but during student demonstrations in Quebec they were used for banging. As a democratic, because easily accessible, musical instrument they made the protest marches more enjoyable and generated a feeling of collective cohesion. Artifacts can make people decide to act in a certain way because the object lends itself to a given action. They can inspire people to do things they would not do if the artifact was not there. That is, artifacts operate “in interaction with humans” (Pouliot 2010b, 298), and become part of an “actor-network” (Latour 2005).

The car can serve as an example to highlight the multivariate ideational and material effects of forms of representation. The car operates as a status symbol defining the character of the individual who owns it, providing us with a rough estimate of the financial resources at her/his disposal (although s/he could have temporarily borrowed it from a friend), but it also shapes the bodily experience of the self. As a means of transportation the car provides an experience of individuated mobility and freedom, to the point that people randomly drive around to get the “sense that things are happening in their lives” (Graves-Brown 2000b, 159). The embodied experience in the car shapes our perceptions of time and space, and the car’s technological characteristics have a very material effect on living and work arrangements, as well as on the design of cities and towns. These far-reaching effects were probably not anticipated by their first designers.

2.3 The Interlinkages between Artifacts, Language, and Practices

Language, artifacts, and practices as representational forms operate in a relationship of mutual constitution and dependency. Artifacts “enable and constrain practice as it is enacted in and on the world” (Pouliot 2010b, 300). Without artifacts many actions would

be impossible to complete (Latour 2005; Schatzki 2001a; Swidler 2001).¹³ The invention of new artifacts can lead to a change in practices (Grahame 1994) as, for example, the invention of new weapons can lead to a change in war-making strategies. “Thus the object in its materially and symbolically constructed aspects is not simply a new way of doing ‘the same thing’ as before — the field of practices itself changes” (Grahame 1994, 302-3).

Conversely, practices shape artifacts because practices can provide the inspiration that leads to the development of artifacts. For example, ritual requirements often had an effect on the architectural design of palaces (Hartmann 1988). Maintenance practices also shape artifacts. Even after an artifact has been developed, can the experience of using it lead to further improvements in its design (Langins 2004, 406; see also Graves-Brown 2000a; Schatzki 2001a; Thevenot 2001). Or, more subtly still, changing practices in the use of artifacts can change the artifact’s meaning (Berger 2009; Nair 2002; Riggins 1994a; Vastokas 1994).

Practices and artifacts often provide the embodied experience at the origin of language. Linguistic metaphors frequently make use of culturally dominant artifacts to communicate abstract concepts (Vastokas 1994). Practices regularly “constitute the unspoken realities upon which more directly symbolic or linguistically mediated activities are based” (Swidler 2001, 85, see also Lefebvre 2009; Schmid 2005).¹⁴ Thus Biernacki (1995) found in a comparative study of the emergence of the working class that the daily practices of interaction between workers and managers provided the foundations for the “system of verbal representations” (Swidler 2001, 85).

However, language can also affect practices and artifacts because it is sometimes inscribed into artifacts and can thereby influence their meaning. New and creative metaphors can change how we experience the world (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Given that metaphors often carry on into embodied practices, in particular in the form of ritual,

13. “Artifacts afford action in a different way from natural objects (such as water), because they already have practice embodied in them” (Knappett 2005, 175).

14. In fact, many metaphors in ordinary language usage find their origins in our embodied experiences in the world (Lakoff and Johnson 1980); George Herbert Mead (1934) has even developed a gestural account of the beginnings of language (Schatzki 2001a).

new metaphors can result in changes in embodied practices.¹⁵ More subtly, the language uttered during the performance of embodied practices can alter their significance. For example, in Denmark the meaning of the coronation as the initiating moment that established a king's legitimate right to rule changed under the influence of Protestantism. During Frederick II's coronation, the chancellor presented Frederick as the "lawful inheritor of the throne, and demand[ed] that he be crowned, and the minister replie[d] that in response to their demand he will proceed with the coronation" (Woolley 1915, 147). Thus the coronation transformed from an initiating moment establishing the king's right to rule to a performance that confirmed an already-existing divine right to rule given by birth.

Forms of representation, language, embodied practices, and artifacts are profoundly intertwined and it is hard to claim that any one of them has ontological priority over the others.¹⁶ Instead, depending on the concrete situation, artifacts can more clearly inform practices, or practices language, but in most cases the three forms of representation interact with each other in a relationship of complex co-constitution (Schatzki 2001a; Vastokas 1994). In this sense the context—the surrounding environment, the field itself—clearly matters for defining and specifying the meaning of a given form of representation (Bourdieu 2007; Law 1999; Riggins 1994a; Sinclair 1999). Forms of representation are rarely discerned in isolation but are embedded in their surroundings; we perceive them as part of a "flow of experiences which imply and explain each other both simultaneously and successively" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 328).

This interconnection, however, does not exclude the possibility of dissociation between the different forms of representation (Gottdiener 1995; Lefebvre 2009; Schmid 2005) that can result in the establishment of contradictory policies (Pouliot 2010b) and organized

15. At a more subtle level, languages' grammar structure can have effects on practices. Chen (2013) has demonstrated that native speakers of languages that have a future tense are less likely to save money than native speakers of those languages that do not have a future tense. Fausey and Boroditsky (2010) noticed that certain languages, such as English, put more emphasis on the acting subject. Native speakers of such languages are more likely to attribute blame and accordingly the penal system is more attuned to penalize perpetrators rather than compensate injured parties.

16. Neither technological determinism nor subjective relativism, although potentially useful heuristic devices, can be an accurate ontological standpoint; both appear to be the result of a historical "societal process of abstraction" that artificially created a separation between a material world and an ideational realm (Schmid 2005, 221).

hypocrisy (Lipson 2007). Perhaps the main reason for these dissociations is that those who create forms of representation are often removed in time and in space from those to whom they are addressed; they are often located in a different field (Harvey 1996; Lefebvre 2009; Schmid 2005).

2.4 The Field and its Spatial Configuration

Forms of representation and their interconnections have a constitutive impact on a given field (Bourdieu 1989, 1990, 2007) or lifeworld (Habermas 1984, 1987), where fields are “relatively autonomous social microcosms, spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). Fields concentrate around particular domains of human interaction, such as religion, economics, or academia, which the fields themselves contribute to defining. Within every field a specific order pertains. A concrete power structure positions the actors within the field in relation to each other, and particular rules of the game apply (Bourdieu 1990, 2007). The concept of the field emphasizes the relations between actors, rather than voluntaristic agents or deterministic structures (Bigo and Walker 2007). The field promotes a conception of order that is not based on a mechanistic repetition of the same, but rather improvizes upon a theme (Go 2008; King 2000; Schatzki 2001a). Individuals are “born into the game” (Bourdieu 1990, 67) and therefore they learn to navigate within its boundaries and mutually adapt to each other’s actions (Barnes 2001; Bourdieu 1989; Elias 1969; Goffman 1974; Thevenot 2001).

In contrast to the conventional Bourdieusian perspective in which a field is defined by a certain distribution of social capital,¹⁷ and struggles in the field are concentrated around the accumulation of that capital (Bourdieu 1989, 1990; Dezalay and Garth 1995; Go 2008; Neumann and Pouliot 2011), I prefer to focus on forms of representation as defining the actors, their position vis-à-vis each other, and the rules of the game within the field. Whereas an emphasis on capital highlights accumulation and quantitative shifts, a focus on forms of representation lets us concentrate on the qualitative changes that are

17. This is the structural and objective moment in Bourdieu’s analytical framework.

of interest for analyzing international order change. It remains the case, however, that the relational structures, which emerge from how the forms of representation position the actors towards each other, also define the power of each actor in the field in relation to every other actor in the field.

The field is experienced at concrete micro-sites, such as the church or the residential palace, and these places frame the interactions that take place between the field's actors (Latour 2005; Lefebvre 2009; Ringmar 2012; Schmid 2005). Any action is undertaken in a place. "Nothing we do is unplaced" (Casey 1998: ix; Harvey 1996; Merleau-Ponty 2002) though most international relations scholarship has not dedicated much attention to this place-boundedness of human activity (Agnew and Duncan 1989; Riggins 1994a). The places where international interaction takes place, although often unnoticed, shape that interaction. They functionally mediate some forms of interaction that would not be possible otherwise. For example, the plenary chamber of the European Parliament together with its equipment, such as microphones, headphones for interpretation, and the entire technical interpretation apparatus make the sessions of the European Parliament possible. When the Members of Parliament meet for a session, "most of what [they] need to act is already in place" (Latour 2005, 195).

However, the place of interaction also shapes the interaction in a phenomenological sense, through an embodied experience of being in place (Bourdieu 1990; Haraway 1991, 194; Elden 2001, 32-33; Heidegger 1971).¹⁸ By being in and moving through places we sensually perceive the social values that have been invested in them (Curtis 2011; Harvey 1996; Jöchner 1995; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Heidegger 1971). Places have a constitutive effect on social interaction (Shields 1994). Most famously perhaps, Foucault (1971) has shown how the architectural structure of the panopticon¹⁹ institutes a system of

18. Heidegger developed a connection between dwelling, building, and thinking, which has informed this analysis. Dwelling leads to the perception of space, building leads to its creation, and both dwelling and building should inform thinking (Heidegger 1971; Schmid 2005).

19. The panopticon is the ideal prison in a sense. The inmates' cells are located along a circular structure and in the middle is a watchtower. It is possible to see from the watchtower into each individual cell but it is impossible to see from the cell into the watchtower. The circular structure ensures that the inmates can mutually observe each other. As a result of the architectural structure the inmates have the feeling of being permanently observed, and self-adjust their behaviour accordingly, regardless of whether somebody actually is in the watchtower or not.

surveillance that shapes the behaviour of those who are caught up within the edifice (see also Johnson 1996). The interiors of the Catholic cathedral, in turn, create a divine space that requires reverence from those who enter it; courtly palaces were the foundation on which courtly ceremony was based (Schütte 1995; Polleroß 1995); the baroque garden set the scene for the incognito meetings between rulers and diplomats (Jöchner 1995); and a Wall street trading room creates a global space by providing the hardware that is necessary to make global transactions (Latour 2005; Law 1999; Sassen 2006), while simultaneously shaping the language, behaviour, and on-screen modes of socialization of those who make high-value deals within seconds (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002).²⁰

At such micro-sites representational forms not only establish the units of the international system as specific political actors but also position them vis-à-vis one another within a given field into specific spatial configurations that establish a certain distribution of power among the actors.²¹ As a result of the forms of representation and how they are assembled at concrete micro-sites (Curtis 2011; Knappett 2005; Sassen 2006) some actors are located in a hierarchically dominating or subordinate position. In other cases a relationship of equality is established (Bourdieu 1989).²² For example, the altar is the most sacred place in a church — it structures the entire church space into more and less sacred places and thus it spatially orders ceremonial practices. It is separated from the nave by stairs and benches; the various degrees of sacredness establish diverging degrees of accessibility, thus physically marking one's position in the hierarchy (Schütte 1995). During most of the coronation ritual, the king in medieval Europe was seated between the laity and the clergy. The *ordo* of Reims from around 1230 describes it as “a slightly elevated platform, accessible by a few steps, situated in the center, reaching the edge of the choir, that is, touching the line that separates the laity from the clergy.” Only when

20. The Cartesian conception of place, as site, a mere dot on the map, cannot capture these ways that place qualitatively shapes the spaces we live in. Spatial distance is a more complex value than geographic distance is capable of measuring. “In important respects the City of London is closer to Wall Street than it is to inner-city Salford” (Law 1999, 3).

21. See Elias (1969) and Ringmar (2012) for a similar conception.

22. There are some affinities here with a network approach, which sees “structures as networks composed of social transactions. It follows that structures exist by virtue of ongoing processes of interaction but simultaneously position actors in various structurally consequential positions relative to one another” (Nexon 2009, 14). The main difference from a network approach is that I put more emphasis on the qualitatively constitutive dimension of forms of representation.

the king received the unction and the coronation insignia did he approach the altar (Le Goff 1990, 51). Thus the church's spatial arrangements established a hierarchical power relation descending from the pope represented by the archbishop, to the king, the feudal lords, and the common people.

The spatial configuration in a given international field establishes the generative grammar of the international order in that field because the spatial configuration defines what needs to be ordered/governed.²³ The international system's modes of governance are influenced by, on the one hand, how we understand the entities of the international system to be spatially structured—whether as territorial states or as flows of finance, trade, and immigrants, for instance—and on the other hand how they are related to each other, for example, hierarchically in relations of subordination, or horizontally in relations of equality. By way of illustration, empire is an order where the entities are structured hierarchically in a unified and absolute space, whereas balance of power is an order in which the entities as clearly demarcated and distinct units of a unitary, but divisible space are positioned horizontally in relations of equality.

2.5 The Habitus and its Psychological Foundations

At the individual level the actors internalize the forms of representation, together with the positionings and the power structures these forms of representation create within a given field, in terms of “the habitus” (Bourdieu 1990; Mauss 1936).²⁴ The habitus is a phenomenological concept influenced by the works of Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Bourdieu 1989; Bourdieu et al. 1994; King 2000;

23. The understanding of space that underlies this analysis is not the conventional Newtonian understanding of space as an absolute, an unchangeable given, an object that exists among, but independently of other objects in the world. Rather, this analysis follows a conception of space based on Leibniz's and Whitehead's philosophy, which understands space as an order defined by the relations between things (Cassirer 1969; Harvey 1996). “The fundamental order of ideas is first a world of things in relation, then the space whose fundamental entities are defined by means of those relations and whose properties are deduced from the nature of these relations” (Whitehead 1916 qtd. in Harvey 1996, 256).

24. Mauss (1936) interpreted the habitus as a “technique of the body,” socially transmitted and historically developed. However, Cartesian dualism is still prevalent in Mauss's understanding of the habitus because he sees the body as the primary tool of the human being (Mauss 1936, 10).

Thevenot 2001).²⁵ It is made up of the durable dispositions resulting from the individual's accumulated past experiences in a world that is not naturally given, but rather socially created with the help of representational forms (Neumann and Pouliot 2011).²⁶ The habitus consists of the broad, and often unconscious, perceptual, cognitive, and embodied structures that constitute the ways in which we sensually perceive, bodily experience, and cognitively think about and react to the world (Bourdieu 1990, 53-54; Bourdieu 2007; Kauppi 2003; King 2000; Lefebvre 2009; Schmid 2005; Swidler 2001): "the cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized, embodied social structures" (Bourdieu 1984, 468).²⁷ Such cognitive structures "have conditioning and constraining effects on what people consider 'right' or 'wrong,' where they place their attention, and what expectations they develop" (Adler 1991, 59).

Cognitive and embodied structures frame a given issue; together with the surrounding environment, they create the realm of possibilities for action. It is on the basis of such internalized social structures that "individuals are formed as social individuals, capable of

25. Compare, for example, a quote from Merleau-Ponty with the typical Bourdieusian definitions of the habitus: "An initial perception independent of any background is inconceivable. Every perception presupposes, on the perceiving subject's part, a certain past, and the abstract function of perception, as a coming together of objects, implies some more occult act by which we elaborate our environment" (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 328-329).

26. Accordingly, people who are exposed to the same forms of representation and the same position in a given field will also have the same habitus, with minor variations depending on their concrete individual experiences (Bourdieu 2007, 80-86).

27. Material culture and embodied practices can influence perceptions and actions, and hence cognition, because they affect how we perceive, or rather what we perceive, and how we move in the world (Mauss 1936; Thevenot 2001). Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 235-236), for example, attribute a crucial role to rituals and works of art broadly conceived, including design, as bearing "new experiential gestalts." Art creates a new reality that leads to new forms of perception and hence new thoughts. Changes in ritual lead to a new embodied experience. For example, Husserl found that carpentry as a "geometrical praxis" had a direct effect on the emergence of geometrical conceptions of space without the intermediary of language (Vastokas 1994).

Artifacts can also lead to a new embodied experience as a person starts developing new bodily movements when using an unfamiliar artifact (Richardson and Third 2009). Following Merleau-Ponty, "our corporeal or body schema (which) is not determined by the boundaries of the material body but rather reflects the way that our corporeality changes its very reach and shape in its dynamic apprehension of tools and things in the world" (Richardson and Third 2009, 146). By way of example, Schivelbusch suggests that the emergence of railway travel led to a new form of perception for the traveller based on a visual experience that is entirely detached from other sensual experiences, such as touch or sound, and secondly based on panoramic viewing in which the immediate foreground vanishes (thanks to the relative speed of the observer) while the background is seen synthetically. As a result "translations between towns, countryside, and villages are grasped as a whole" (Pickering 2001, 167; Schivelbusch 1986).

participating in social doing and representing/saying” and thus communicating with others (Castoriadis 1987, 366). The habitus provides the basis of “regulated improvisations” (Bourdieu 2007, 78) and therefore permits adaptation to the concrete circumstances of a particular situation, while simultaneously contributing to the maintenance and reproduction of a given international order in a particular field (Bourdieu 1990, 55; Bourdieu 2007, 95; Jackson 2008; Neumann and Pouliot 2011).

Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus goes against many of the conventional psychological understandings that underlie much of social science research. The distinction between body and mind has played a significant role in Western thought for a long time (Gibbs 2005). Gradually “Cartesian dualism evolved into an epistemological tradition that separated the mind as rational, thinking, immaterial, and private from the body as an irrational, corrupt, and physical substance” (Gibbs 2005, 4).²⁸ In this perspective meaning, communication, or thought could not result from perception or bodily movement; they existed in a separate realm (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). Accordingly conventional psychology assumed that people carried all their knowledge and schemes of action encoded in explicit form in their brain. The brain was the central planner, and any decision for action originated in it (Gibbs 2005; Clark 1997). In this understanding, forms of representation cannot play a crucial role in shaping people’s thoughts and behaviours, whether in international relations or elsewhere.

However, more and more psychological research identifies difficulties with this model of human behaviour and thought. In fact, the brain’s requirements for data storage would be infinite, the response times to real-life events very long, the capacity to adapt to circumstances non-existent (Clark 1997; Collins 2001; Gibbs 2005). For these reasons, and often inspired by the phenomenological works of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Clark 1997; Gibbs 2005; Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Varela et al. 1991),²⁹ a new branch of psychological scholarship conceives of human beings as embodied actors whose

28. This distinction between body and mind is at the origin of many other binary oppositions that structure Western thought, such as objectivism and subjectivism, emotions vs. rationality, theory and practice, or the verbal and the non-verbal (Gibbs 2005).

29. The term *phenomenology* was established in 1764 to describe the analysis of sensual perceptions of physical occurrences (Casey 1998, 53). Much of the phenomenologists’ attention then went to study our embodied being in the world, how it leads to the emergence of thoughts, or a “preobjective” knowledge and how it adapts and responds to the surrounding environment (Casey 1998, 233).

bodies and minds form a tightly coupled system mutually informing each other, and both flexibly responding to and making use of the surrounding environment (Knappett 2005; Gibbs 2005). In this understanding the existence of internal encodings is acknowledged but they do not play the exclusive role they have been traditionally attributed (Clark 1997). They are often partial, at times more vague than traditionally assumed, and they are influenced by our perception of the world and our embodied being in it, not just our thoughts about it.³⁰ In this sense forms of representation play a significantly more crucial role in structuring our thoughts about and actions in the world than conventional psychology has assumed for a long time.

Substantive parts of the work that traditional psychology, and by extension much of social science scholarship, considered to be carried out by disembodied symbols and representations in people's heads can and often is carried out by a physical manipulation of real-world entities (Clark 1997; Gibbs 2005). Perception is not necessarily always mediated by explicit cognition; it can often be directly coupled with action in and feelings about the world. In other words, we do not perceive a world that exists apart from us, but we move and act in the world while being moved by it (Gibbs 2005; Knappett 2005). For example, we approach an object to see it better and inversely we often perceive artifacts according to the emotions they invoke in us (for example, aesthetically pleasing) or their affordances—that is, the opportunities of use specific to our body they provide us with (Clark 1997; Gibbs 2005; Gibson 1979; Williams and Costall 2000). Accordingly “our behavior is often sculpted and sequenced by a special class of complex external structures: the linguistic and cultural artifacts that structure modern life, including maps, texts, and written plans” (Clark 1997, 59; see also Thevenot 2001), that is, forms of representation. The brain operates as only one component in a complex system of embodied being in the world (Gibbs 2005).

In sum, two postulations distinguish this embodied view of being in the world from the conventional mind-body distinction, namely 1) that both artifacts and our embodied being in the world can play a role in social activity irreducible to cognition, and 2)

30. Not just consciousness, but also emotions appear to “cut across brain, body, and world, and are thus neither purely mental nor purely physiological phenomena” (Gibbs 2005, 273).

that our embodied being in the world and the artifacts that surround us influence our thoughts. Both of these claims have been supported by empirical research in various areas of scholarship (see, for example, Bourdieu 1990, 2007; Casey 1998; Clark 1997; Gibbs 2005; Haidt 2000; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Narayanan 1997; Reber 1993; Regier 1996; Swidler 2001). In the international realm where we can experience many phenomena (such as the sovereign state) only through their forms of representation because they are too big to grasp otherwise, this means that those representative forms can have a direct effect on the behaviour of international actors, without necessarily always having to run through cognition first. It also means that forms of representation and the embodied behaviours to which they give rise have a constitutive effect on the thoughts of international actors.

2.6 The Co-Existence of Multiple Fields

Within a given society usually numerous fields with distinct spatial configurations, entertained by specific forms of representation, co-exist next to one another (Hansen 2011; Harvey 1996; Lefebvre 2009; Merleau-Ponty 2002; Munn 1986; Thevenot 2001; Whitehead 1962). A field of law exists next to an economic field, which exists next to a political field, which exists next to a religious field, each with its own forms of representation, specific rules of the game, and a given spatial configuration and power structure. “Each distinctive social formation has its own characteristic spatial-temporal structure and its own distinctive laws of motion. And this will be so because it is ‘the difference in things’ (or, as I would prefer it, the difference in social practices and processes) which ‘brings a difference in spaces in its wake, even as it carries within it a difference of laws’” (Rescher 1981 qtd. in Harvey 1996, 253). Each field is held together by the mutual relations between its parts, by the linkages between the forms of representation. Where these linkages do not exist or are very weak, one field stops and another field begins (Harvey 1996; Rescher 1981). Different fields can co-exist next to one another without much disruption for lengthy periods of time, as long as either the interconnections between the fields are minimal, or there are linkages between them, termed “compossibilities,” that allow for

their harmonious coexistence (Harvey 1996, 285; Schmid 2005).³¹

The co-existence of multiple fields is not limited to the domestic realm of states; in the international arena multiple fields co-exist as well. The diplomatic field where interstate bargaining operates is by far not the only international field. For example, there might be a separate military field composed of military personnel, a separate economic field, or a religious field. Which kinds of fields exist in a given historical epoch is subject to empirical scrutiny. It depends on how people cluster into distinct social spaces with their own unique forms of social organization. Thus the military personnel and diplomats might well be part of one single international field in a particular historical epoch, they might be in two separate fields in another epoch, and in a third epoch some parts of military personal and some diplomats might be located in the same field, while others are stationed in entirely different fields. In other words, there is nothing ontologically unique about the military, the economy, or politics that always positions it within a distinct field. Which kinds of fields exist in a particular epoch and how they co-exist depends upon the historical patterns according to which individuals cluster internationally.

The co-existence of multiple fields, as well as the dissociation that can sometimes occur between the three forms of representation, create openings through which contestation, agency, and change are possible. Thus it is the very indeterminacy and overlap of co-existing fields with distinct international orders (Adler and Greve 2009; Adler and Pouliot 2011b) that creates room for international order change. The habitus, as the “durably installed system of dispositions” is “‘transposable’ in the sense that [it is] capable of generating practices in fields other than that in which they were originally acquired” (Thompson 1984, 53; see also Jackson 2008). These translations of representational forms can be the result of “crosstalk” (Clark 1997, 60), or a “‘confusion of spheres,’ as the logicians call it, resulting from the highly economical but necessarily approximate application of the same schemes to different logical universes” (Bourdieu 1990, 86). For example, in the processes of European integration we can see recourse to the symbolism of the nation-state with the introduction of such forms of representation as the flag, an anthem, the effort to establish a “constitution,” or to create a “Foreign Minister of the

31. Harvey (1996) borrowed the word *compossibility* from Leibniz to express this phenomenon.

Union,” all undertaken with the purpose to represent a European Union whose processes and institutions are far from the federal state model.

2.7 Two Mechanisms of Change

Bourdieu is commonly criticized for the alleged determinism, and hence the impossibility of change, inherent in the concept of the habitus. This criticism results mainly from his emphasis on the embodied and unconscious nature of the habitus (see, for example, King 2000). However, the critique omits two crucial factors. First, a given habitus always operates and reproduces the order of the particular field within which it emerged. Yet, once the actor enters into another field, the habitus is no longer aligned with the order of the new field. The possibility of change results from this misalignment between the dispositions of a given actor and her position in the new field. Second, the automatic correspondence that is drawn between embodiment, materiality, and determinism is an artificially created one. As I demonstrated earlier, material reality is just as much socially constituted as discourse is, and it is therefore subject to change. In particular, forms of representation can change as a result of contingency and/or dynamics external to the given field that they order. Those changed forms of representation can then become the trigger for the emergence of new social formations because “altering the way the world looks, alters the way people look at the world” (Smith 2008, 1; see also Taylor 2004). In sum, fields are not closed systems, but rather partially open (Cederman 2010). People as well as forms of representation travel between fields and these movements provide the impetus for new alignments in a given field.

2.7.1 Hysteresis

Over time interconnections between fields can increase significantly. In the international realm this can often be the result of underlying technological or economic changes that make, for example, transportation easier and thus lead to increased direct contact, but increased interconnections between fields can also result from broader societal shifts. If contacts between fields increase and possibilities are insufficient, hysteresis can oc-

cur. Bourdieu defined hysteresis as a situation when the dispositions of the individual actors and their position in a field are misaligned (Bourdieu 1990; King 2000; Neumann and Pouliot 2011).³² This mismatch is particularly likely to occur when actors who had an elevated position within one field are increasingly confronted with a lower position in another field. Under these conditions the actors can resign into their inferior role, or they can seek to adapt their position in the field to their disposition. This adaptation can either occur in mutually harmonious agreement among all the actors involved (Neumann and Pouliot 2011), or it can result in “symbolic struggles over the perception of the social world” (Bourdieu 1989, 20). Either way, the focus will be on changing forms of representation “meant to display and to throw into relief certain realities” to manipulate “the image of one’s position in social space” (Bourdieu 1989, 20). The potentially resulting struggles over forms of representation are struggles over defining what counts as being powerful. The observable and public staging of representational forms, and their repetitive character, is consequential because it is important “that ‘everyone can see’ that everyone has seen that things have changed” (Swidler 2001, 87). The effectiveness of “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Sewell 1996) is proof of this performative character of forms of representation.³³ With changes in the forms of representation, the positioning of the actors within the field adapts, their positions and dispositions realign, and the spatial structure of a given field changes. A new international order takes shape.

For example, as a result of technological progress and economic developments, contacts between rulers started to increase towards the end of the thirteenth century. Kings consequently entered into increasingly direct contact with the hierarchically ordered religious space, which had hitherto operated mainly as a mental construct. This direct

32. Bourdieu considered hysteresis to occur when a field changes but the actors’ habituses are still aligned with the past positionings in the field. That is, for Bourdieu hysteresis was the result of a time lag, where the habitus lagged behind changes in the objective conditions of the field (Bourdieu 1990, 62). By contrast, my sense of hysteresis is much broader because I suggest that it can result from an overlap between multiple co-existing fields. The concept also does more work in my theoretical apparatus. While for Bourdieu hysteresis is merely a possible result of change, I suggest it can be the driving force behind change.

33. Although invented, those traditions usually do not come out of the blue, but are made out of pre-existing material rearranged into new forms.




Figure 2.1: A Model of International Order Change.

confrontation with the superior position of the pope and/or the emperor led to hysteresis on the part of many rulers because their dispositions from the feudal structures mismatched with their subordinate position to the emperor and/or the pope. Thus they started to question their alleged dependence on the empire and the papacy. To establish their independent, yet divine right to rule, kings adapted the coronation ceremony to express their non-submission to the Catholic Church. For example, Frederick, King of Prussia, decided to crown himself and then his wife (Woolley 1915, 144) and when the unction was performed it was “not in the form of a cross” on his forehead as would have been usual, but rather in the form “of a circle as being the most perfect figure known to mathematicians!” (Woolley 1915,145).

Simultaneously kings transferred many of the initially papal and imperial forms of representation to the secular space to represent their own power. For instance, the

ceremonial practices of the Christian liturgy and papal courtly ceremonies were adapted to the princely courts to establish a hierarchically structured order of the realm within the palace walls that was bodily experienced on a daily basis by all the guests who entered the edifice and even more so by all those who permanently resided within its walls (Berns 1995; Brassat 1995; Schütte 1995). Not only was the imperial title transferred to the secular realm to establish singular and unified rule over a given people with the expression “*rex imperator in regno suo*,” “the king is Emperor in his realm,” but the concept of Rome as the actual or imagined centre of the one Christian community was also transferred to the secular realm in the form of the capital city as the one centre of the common fatherland (Kantorowicz 1957, 246-247).

In other words, new international orders do not emerge *ex nihilo* (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996, 2004; Sack 1986; Sassen 2006; Shapiro 1994; Thevenot 2001). They are “inserted in an historical continuum and, consequently, codetermined by what was already there” (Castoriadis 1987, 121). New international orders are often made up of old forms of representation that persist in altered forms and changed contexts now serving new purposes. Forms of representation can be transferred from one field and become effective in another field, potentially changing their connotations in the process as they become operational under new circumstances and with their form gradually adapting to the new conditions. Rearranged into new formations, the substance of old forms of representation forms the material, the building blocks, for new international orders.

The logic of change is transformative. “New forms must derive from old patterns. They can partly replace old forms, but by definition they must include residues or legacies of the old” (Holsti 2002, 31). As a result the transformations rarely appear as radical innovations (Ferguson and Mansbach 1999; Jackson 2008; Sassen 2006). In fact, they “may well have seemed, from the point of view of the participants, to preserve ‘sameness’ in the sense that was relevant to them. At no point, perhaps, did they have any sense of the ‘inaccessibility’ of the culture of their parents or teachers. If the past is another country, it did not become so overnight” (Turner 1994, 84).

2.7.2 Contingency, Complexity, and Positive Feedback Loops

Not only people but also forms of representation can travel between fields. New forms of representation can be discovered by contingency, or they can be purposefully produced in one field, according to the social processes applicable there, but then they start being applied in another field, where they both change the new field's dynamics as a result of the inflexible component of their material character, and simultaneously become adapted to new purposes thanks to their multi-valence (Castoriadis 1987; Gottdiener 1995; Sassen 2006; Sinclair 1999). For example, as a result of the re-discovery of geometry, Cartesian maps first emerged in the field of art, but gradually started being employed for military purposes where they had an effect on the conduct of warfare. The Internet, in turn, was initially supposed to serve US military purposes but eventually came to shape forms of representation in a wide array of domains (Law 1999, 3; Urry 2003). While it may appear as though there was a functional need for those innovations to occur, there is nothing that makes their appearance inevitable. It might instead be the case that they created their own demand (Prigogine and Isabelle 1984).

External forms of representation enter and start affecting a given field. This phenomenon combines together with internally irreversible processes to lead to a change of international order (Prigogine and Stengers 1984). Following Prigogine and Stenger's metaphor "the match is responsible for the forest fire, but reference to a match does not suffice to understand the fire" (1984, 206). A relatively minor change in one form of representation can trigger substantive and unpredictable changes in other forms of representation over time because of the complex and non-linear interconnections between different forms of representation and the operation of positive feedback loops between them (Cederman 2010; Prigogine and Stengers 1984; Urry 2003). It is hence necessary to study "the intermeshing of several parallel processes" (Guzzini 2012, 251) and their cumulative consequences, as well as the ways through which forms of representation not merely transmit those changes but transform them into qualitatively new formations. For example, the rediscovery of geometry had combined effects on the discovery of single-point perspective in painting, the emergence of Cartesian mapping, design changes

in architecture, as well as massive consequences on military engineering with impacts on the calculation of cannon fire's trajectory, the construction and renovation of military fortifications, the conduct of siege warfare, and the constellation of battle formations. These effects not only combined together but they also mutually influenced and shaped each other through numerous loophole effects to eventually lead to the conception of the territorial state as a bounded area in space inside of which power is distributed evenly over the entire territory.

2.8 Understanding the Success of some Forms of Representation and the Failure of others

Potentially any artifact, practice, or linguistic form can be or become a form of representation. There is nothing inherent in a thing itself that makes it a form of representation. If there were bird droppings on the Berlaymont building, which houses the European Commission, those bird droppings could become a form to represent the European Union. There are two important features that create the possibility for artifacts, practices, or language to fulfill the role of representational forms. First, the people they address need to be able to perceive them. So forms of representation have to have some kind of public display, otherwise they cannot act as forms of representation. Second, there needs to be a tie linking a form of representation to the object it is supposed to represent. For a form of representation to act as such, people have to understand what it represents. These two elements are the necessary, but not sufficient conditions for artifacts, practices, and language to operate as recognized forms of representation. Ultimately whether something is acknowledged as a form of representation depends upon societal recognition.

So how do some forms of representation succeed in having constitutive effects on a given international order, while others become entirely meaningless? The realist answer would be that the ones that manage to project force the best will define a given international order. Yet, such a claim does not fully withstand empirical scrutiny. As the empirical chapters demonstrate, material representative forms, which had nothing to do

with a projection of force, upheld several international orders. Such representative forms like gothic cathedrals, the coronation ceremony, or papal diplomatic practices constituted the hierarchical order of medieval Europe, and such representative forms as postmodern architecture or the assembly-line production of texts resulting in the flows of texts through various EU and member state institutions and agencies constitute the European Union's postmodern space of flows. This does not mean that military or economic force never plays a role. As chapter 6 demonstrates, military might was an important representative form in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when a territorial balance of power was Europe's main ordering principle. Yet, even then military force partly depended upon being recognized and accepted as a representative form, given that there is usually no one-to-one relation between battle victories and the diplomatic negotiations that determine the concrete contours of a given order.

Unlike realists, constructivist scholars focus their work on how ideational factors, be they identities, norms, or values, shape the ways in which we perceive the material world. Applied to the question of how specific forms of representation become important, while others fall by the wayside, constructivists might argue that valued representative forms play a role in defining a given international order, while the others remain unnoticed. Values, as "socially shared 'conceptions of the desirable'" (Rokeach 1979, 48; Williams 1979), make things appear and disappear; objects obtain their societal role according to what people value and whether they value them. Valueless objects cannot represent the units of an international system or a given international order as a whole. Because they are rubbish we do not notice them unless they are in the wrong place, in which case they become embarrassing (Thompson 1979).

Values and things are not distinct phenomena but are profoundly intertwined (see also Adler 1991). The forms of representation I analyze do not exist in nature — they were created by human beings — so their production is subject to societal processes of meaning making, just as maintenance practices express and retain an artifact's value. Some meanings are already internal to the representative forms themselves. For example, the palace of Versailles or gothic cathedrals have not become rubbish over the centuries of their existence. It is well understood that they were important representations of a

given international order, and they continue to be awe-inspiring to present generations. Even though the role they play today is different from the one they used to play, all the resources that went into their construction continue to leave their unique impression on the visitor. To be sure, such unique buildings and structures do get occasionally destroyed, but it is more often than not the case that their destruction occurs because of their importance for conveying a particular order, rather than because of their irrelevance. The palace of the Chinese emperor destroyed by the British and the French comes to mind, as do the destruction of the temple grounds in the Sri Lankan Kandy by the British colonizers (chapter 8), the destruction of Aztec pyramids by the Spanish colonizers, or more recently, the Taliban's destruction of gigantic Buddha statues. These structures were destroyed to make the end of an order visible. The destruction itself functions as a form of representation — as an act that visualizes the emergence of a new order precisely because these old representative forms are so pregnant with meaning. If values are inherent in the representative forms themselves, it would be tautological to claim that some forms of representation succeed because they have a higher societal value.

Because neither the standard realist answer nor the standard constructivist answer can provide us with fully adequate means to explain how some forms of representation succeed and others fall by the wayside, I propose a threefold answer in their stead. First, in line with the preceding discussion and quite unusually for IR scholarship, I suggest that the success of representative forms partly depends upon their inherent appeal, upon a certain “mystery” that resides in those representative forms, as Brunnée and Toope (2011, 352) suggest in a quite different context. Given that IR scholars are used to thinking in terms of functional or ideational dimensions that can be abstracted from a given practice or artifact, it is not easy for us to understand that there can be an immanent attraction emanating from an artifact or a practice that cannot be extracted from it. Consider the colour blue. Blue might be used for various functional purposes—perhaps it is a cheaper colour—or it can signify different things in different cultural contexts, such as water or the sky, perhaps calmness, but there is also something irreducible to the colour blue. Take Yves Klein's blue. The colour is unlike anything else, and it cannot be expressed authentically through any other medium. One needs to see the blue and acquire one's

own phenomenological impression of it.




Figure 2.2: International Klein Blue (IKB) 191. Yves Klein, 1962. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

However, the inherent appeal of some forms of representation cannot provide the full answer for why some representative forms are important and others are not. Forms of representation do not exist in a vacuum; they are embedded within sign systems and broader societal processes, as constructivists rightly suggest. Yet, instead of focusing on disaggregated values or other ideational dimensions, I propose to directly pay attention to the interrelations between different forms of representation. How they build on each other, and are in conversation with one another adds to their meaningfulness. This also often means that there is a need to maintain a certain historical continuity to ensure the effectiveness of representative forms. If representative forms mark a drastic break with their immediate historical past they can easily be out of place, and there is a danger that societies will not understand and accept them as representative forms. The dissertation demonstrates on two occasions that specific forms of representation were partly unsuccessful because they were not well understood. This was the case of the initial representative forms of Protestantism, which led Protestant rulers to partially backtrack on Protestantism's representative forms and adapt the representative forms of the Roman Church and the Holy Roman Empire for their own purposes ([chapter 4](#)). It is also the case today that the European Union's postmodern representative forms are not well understood in the population, which is the major reason for the EU's legitimacy

crisis ([chapter 7](#)).

Besides representative forms' inherent appeal and their interrelations with other representative forms, their functional role, which they perform by virtue of being objects-for-use next to representing certain realities, can also be important for establishing the relevance of specific representative forms, as realists partly suggest. For example, this functional dimension played a significant role in the success of maps and the military as representative forms ([chapter 5](#) and [chapter 6](#)).

The degree to which the inherent appeal of representative forms, their interrelations with other present and past forms of representation, and their functionality influence the importance of specific forms of representation varies depending on the individual representative form, but for most forms of representation at least two of these factors play an important role.

2.9 Summary

In this chapter I proposed a theory of change of international orders that is based on changes in forms of representation. I first highlighted the advantages a focus on forms of representation provides compared to alternative accounts, such as a focus on ideas and norms, or material structures. Forms of representation permit us to conceive of the abstract and the distant. Indeed, they bring such entities into existence. Focusing on forms of representation also allows the researcher to pay direct attention to the observable phenomena in the world that create intersubjectively shared understandings.

The material and the ideational dimensions are profoundly intertwined in forms of representation. They have an effect on the social imaginary, frame a given situation, shape actors' subjectivity, institute groups, and express ideas, but they are also subject to material and financial constraints. They are themselves things in the world, and they operate as technologies—that is, as material devices through which we act upon the world. They can even make people do things they would not do if those forms of representation did not exist.

Representational forms rarely operate in isolation; they are embedded within a par-

ticular context where the three types of forms of representation — language, artifacts, and practices — mutually shape each other through diverse mechanisms without any one of them having ontological priority over the others. Forms of representation and their mutual juxtaposition have a constitutive effect on a given field. A field is a social space through which a distinct domain of social interaction emerges, such as economics, politics, or law. Each field has its unique kind of order based on a certain spatial configuration defined by forms of representation and their interrelation, and maintained by specific ordering practices.

At the level of the individual, forms of representation together with the actors' positions in a particular field are internalized in the "habitus." The habitus involves the often unconscious perceptual, embodied, and cognitive dispositions that the individual has adopted through her past experiences in the social world and they affect how she responds to her environment. While this conception of the individual goes against the conventional mind-body dualism that has dominated psychology, and by extension much of social science research, some promising trends in psychological scholarship indicate that the human mind, the body, and the surrounding environment form a tightly coupled system in which the three parts are intimately interconnected with each other. More precisely, artifacts and our embodied being in the world can play a role irreducible to cognition in human interactions and both can influence our thoughts and thought processes. These findings support the claims about the constitutive role of forms of representation.

Considering that a field is a social space in which people interact, it is obvious that distinct societies will have distinct fields, each with their own unique order, but in complex societies different fields also co-exist next to each other. For example, academics interact among each other in the university setting and at conferences and their interactions follow entirely different patterns from the interactions among traders in banks and stock exchange markets. These two groups exist in different lifeworlds. Unique forms of representation and unique types of order define each field. Many fields are international in their outlook so different kinds of international orders coexist within those distinct fields. If there is not much interaction between fields, or compossibilities exist between the separate fields, it is possible to maintain those distinct fields next to each other for

extended periods of time. However, the overlap between fields also creates opportunities for change. Precisely because fields are partially open systems and people as well as forms of representation can travel between fields, a field's structure and hence its order can change.

The chapter developed two alternative mechanisms of change, one based on intentionality, and the other on contingency. On the one hand, change can happen when people with an elevated position in one field increasingly get confronted with an inferior position in another field, and as a result of this hysteresis seek and succeed to change the forms of representation in the given field. Consequently the positions in the field get realigned, power is redistributed, and the order of the field changes. Alternatively, forms of representation can travel between fields. If a sufficient threshold is met, a new form of representation in a given field can trigger a chain reaction that leads to a change of multiple other forms of representation through the operation of non-linear connections and positive feedback loops. As a result, the characteristics of the given field change, the positions of the actors are realigned, and the order of the field alters.

Among the myriad of possible objects, practices, and language, those that have an inherent appeal, are well interconnected with past and present representative forms, and/or come to serve important functional purposes will be the ones that succeed in becoming the order defining representative forms.

Chapter 3

Peirce's Semeiotics: A Methodology to Bridge the Material-Ideational Divide in IR Scholarship

Since I focus on forms of representation as explanans that lead to changes in international order, the explanandum, I require a credible methodology to analyze the effects of representational forms and to demonstrate that changes in forms of representation have led to changes in international order. Such an analysis necessitates a methodology that can analyze the constitutive effects of material reality on par with the constitutive effects of language, but without collapsing the former into the latter —without losing the very materiality of material reality in the process.

Positivist and post-positivist scholars alike seek ways to combine material and ideational accounts in their analyses of international relations. Recently the IR discipline has made important theoretical inroads with concepts such as practices, actor-networks, or emotions that do not merely cumulatively add material and ideational accounts together, but instead transcend those accounts (Adler and Pouliot 2011b; Adler-Nissen 2012; Best and Walters 2013; Bueger and Gadinger 2015; Hopf 2010; Jackson 2008; Ross 2006; Wendt 2006). Artifacts and embodied practices are material, but they already incorporate ideas within them—those that went into their initial design, and those that emerged from their subsequent usage and refinement. The material form of artifacts and practices of-

ten contributes to the meaning that they convey. Practices are embodied and socially meaningful forms of action in and on the world. Artifacts, in turn, are objects created by human beings. Once they have been constructed, they gain a life of their own. This means that artifacts shape people's actions in certain ways, and make some actions possible while precluding others. For example, nuclear weapons are not purely what states make of them, but have an inherent destructive potential already included in their design, which shapes, but does not determine, how people have handled nuclear weapons and the practices, such as nuclear deterrence, that have emerged from them. Thus, the nuclear weapons Russia and the USA were pointing at each other had a constitutive effect on the relations between the two states after the Cold War ended, despite the best efforts of the two sides to establish mutual trust (Pouliot 2010).

By now an impressive amount of empirical research has underlined these theoretical perspectives. Many of the scholars working with the new theoretical concepts (see, for example, Hansen 2011; Bueger and Gadinger 2015) find that the integrated material-ideational account also leads to new methodological challenges. Up until now, scholars have employed different methodological tools depending on whether they seek to highlight ideational or material factors. Scholars working in the realm of ideas use mainly interpretive methods such as discourse analysis or ethnographic research to understand constitution, whereas scholars working in the material realm intend to explain causation with the help of inter alia statistical analysis, process tracing, or agent-based modelling.

Many researchers have found methodological approaches that effectively combine the study of material and ideational phenomena and highlight the cumulative effects of symbolic and functional forces (Checkel 2005; Pouliot 2012; Sil and Katzenstein 2010), but such mixed-methods approaches do not do justice to the significant theoretical achievements obtained in transcending Cartesian dualism.¹ In this context Peirce's semeiotics is one possible way to eliminate the methodological gap that remains between materialist and ideational analyses.

I propose that we conceive of practices and artifacts as material signs that can some-

1. Very roughly, Cartesian dualism can be defined as the understanding that mind and body, the material and the ideational, are two distinct entities that can interact with each other, but are ultimately distinct categories.

times communicate more abstract concepts and structures directly, without the intervention of discourse or background knowledge. Peircean semeiotics can retain a sign's materiality, taking into account that how material things signify differs from the conventional understanding of how language signifies, namely by arbitrary social convention. To be sure, material things can signify by arbitrary social convention but they can also signify by similitude. Rene Magritte drew attention to this often-forgotten process of signification in his painting *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*. A painting of a pipe is not actually a pipe, but a sign that refers to a pipe (Foucault 1983). Furthermore, signs can signify by being causally connected to the object they represent, for instance, a bullet hole in a tree signifies that a bullet has been shot through the tree. In Peircean semeiotics the relation by which a sign represents a particular object is separate from how a sign is interpreted. The three forms of signification can be interpreted by provoking a thought in the person who notices them, but they can also provoke an emotion or an action, that is, they can provoke a response that has a material impact on the world.

While Peircean semeiotics provides a potential platform for integrating materialist analytical tools and discourse analysis approaches into a single framework, it also fundamentally differs from both. Different from discourse analysis, it suggests not only that language affects how we see the world, but also that what we see in the world affects our modes of communication. Peircean semeiotics deviates from materialists' typical understanding that signs objectively represent an independent reality by highlighting that even though there can be a direct causal relation between the signs we observe and the material objects those signs are supposed to represent, such a causal relation is not a necessity. Thirdly, a Peircean semeiotics includes a dimension of phenomenological perception that is missing from both approaches.

While available materialist and discourse analysis tools do have their own *raison d'être*, they have some limitations for analyzing specific phenomena. These limitations become particularly apparent in the analysis of artifacts — a seldom-studied phenomenon in IR, perhaps because an appropriate research apparatus has been lacking. Take the example of a gun. Following realist premises the possession of weapons exerts power because of their potential to kill, but guns can serve numerous other social purposes.

For instance, in the seventeenth century differences in rank (and wealth) within an army were expressed in the luxurious ways in which officers' weapons were decorated, not in their superior killing power. Many aristocrats established weapons collections to exhibit the honour and good taste of their family. In another case the very same weapons serve in an exhibition as the historical testimony of a bygone era. Thus the symbolic and functional purposes of a gun vary, and yet they are limited by its very materiality. A gun is not a useful device for learning how to swim, and it cannot symbolize the medical achievements obtained in cancer treatment. In Webb's words then, "the goal is to open up social analysis to the historicity and social power of material things without reducing them either to being only vehicles of meaning, on the one hand, or ultimate determinants, on the other" (2003, 411).

This chapter proposes Peirce's semeiotics as one possible way to systematically highlight the profound interconnectivity between the material and the ideational realms for social science research. It does not suggest that no other methods can accomplish the same goal or that research that does not employ Peirce's semeiotics is in any way invalid or inferior—large amounts of highly valuable empirical work have been conducted without employing Peirce's semeiotics. My goal is not to provide an authoritative account of Peirce's theory, but to demonstrate the usefulness of Peirce's semeiotics as a tool for International Relations analysis in general and for this dissertation in particular. Peirce's legacy consists of many unfinished manuscripts, correspondence, and lecture notes. In fact he never published a single coherent book that presented his thought in a concise manner. On the one hand this has led to a considerable neglect of his work (Hookway 1992; Short 2007; Short 2004). On the other hand it has contributed to significant disagreements among Peirce scholars about how to interpret the often incomplete and at times contradictory sketches Peirce bequeathed to posterity (see, for example, Liszka 1996; Short 1996, 2004). Instead of arbitrating between competing interpretations of Peirce's work, I highlight how a Peirce-inspired methodology can solve some of the emerging issues in IR scholarship.

3.1 IR Methodological Approaches Bridging Cartesian Dualism

Practice theory and actor-network theory have resulted in an impressive range of theoretical scholarship and empirical contributions that highlight the interconnectedness of the material and the ideational, but to date no sustained debate has taken place about the methodological foundations for such an undertaking. Some authors, in particular in Bourdieu-inspired practice theory, have developed methodological tools for combining the analysis of structure and agency, and subjectivism and objectivism, but the question of how to integrate the material and the ideational has not received as much explicit attention (Leander 2008; Pouliot 2007, 2012).

Many constructivists combine research methods dedicated to exploring agency with those focusing on structures (Klotz and Lynch 2007; Lupovici 2009). Along similar lines Pouliot (2007) has coined the term “subjectivism” to express a desirable combination of a “recovery of subjective meanings,” with the help of such methods as ethnography and qualitative interviews, and their intersubjective contextualization through discourse analysis. He sees discourses as “productive of the social realities they define” (Pouliot 2007, 371) and establishes a dialectical relationship between reality and discourse, in the sense that “discursive intersubjective structures falter unless constantly instantiated and reinstated through agents’ practices.” Pouliot’s work effectively demonstrates the interplay between materiality and discourses, but it does not fully address the question of how we can systematically study the meaning generated by practices and artifacts, which reaches beyond their discursive interpretation.

In a discourse analysis approach, signifiers do not relate to the signified, but rather to other signifiers. Intertextual relations are more important than a connection to objects in the material world (Doty 1993). The goal is to identify how language constitutes and produces power. Because language creates meaning, it directs the possibilities for action (Diez 1999; Hall 2003; Milliken 1999). In this sense discourses do have real material effects: “The words that [high-level officials] write and speak do have extraordinary power. With the stroke of a pen, people can get turned into friends or enemies, while

their villages are turned into targets or free fire zones” (Milliken and Sylvan 1996, 323). Speech act theory shares with discourse analysis the idea that language can result in real material effects because we can act through verbal utterances (Searle 1995). The speech act itself is an event, a material occurrence whose force depends to some extent on the place from which it emanates, and on the institutional backing it receives (Waeber 1995). This perspective is shared by Foucault in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* (2010).² So there are material elements in different branches of discourse analytical scholarship. However, while discourse analysis has developed a sophisticated toolbox, including predicate analysis, binary oppositions, and metaphorical analysis to study discourses, it does not provide systematic guidelines for how to study the material side of the equation or how to interrelate the material and the ideational.

Conventionally, scholars focusing on the material side of reality have automatically assumed an unequivocal causal connection between material reality and what that reality signifies or how it is being signified (Chase-Dunn 1979; King et al. 1994; Pape 2003).³ Under these circumstances the goal of research is to identify generalizable causal connections between dependent and independent variables with the help of either large-N studies, case studies, or both in the form of mixed methods approaches. With such premises, context-dependent meaning cannot be taken into account—only the functional dimension of material reality is being considered. More recently, it has become common for scholars to add an ideational component as an additional independent variable to the analysis (Nelson 2014; Nye 1990). However, such approaches analyze an ideational dimension next to material elements without considering the profound interconnectivity between the two. Quite frequently these approaches treat the ideational dimension in the same way they treat the material components in their analysis. That is, they focus purely on its causal and functional effects, as if ideas were another, independent, element of material reality that cannot be touched or seen.

2. Foucault’s understanding of the relation between the discursive and the material is very complex, and subject to sustained debates, whose elaboration would reach far beyond the scope of this chapter (Hekman 2009; Kelly 2009). It appears clearly though that, different from Derrida, for Foucault a non-discursive reality exists, and interacts in complex ways with discourses (see, for example, Foucault 2010, 175, 186). In some of his writings Foucault even appears to adopt a Peircean semeiotic approach (see Foucault 1983).

3. The literature is too prolific to list; the references cited serve merely as a few illustrations.

Alternatively other authors suggest that even the material world can be read like a discourse, or a text. In IR scholarship, for example, Neumann develops a discourse analysis toolkit, suggesting that “tool two would be an equalizer that makes other phenomena (for example, a semaphore, an ad, a body) into material to be analyzed on a par with texts. Tool three would be something like a herding dog that would group these phenomena together based on them being about the same thing. Tool four would be a slicer, cutting the phenomena into different representations of the same thing. Tool five would be some kind of optic device that would make visible the meaning dimension of the material phenomenon to its users” (2008, 75-76). Employing the same discursive tools used for the analysis of language to analyze material objects means that the sign an object represents is quite arbitrary from the materiality of that object, just as a word like *dog* is arbitrarily attributed to the barking being with four legs and a wagging tail. The problem with analyzing material objects as words incorporated in a discourse is that we lose their materiality, the functional effects they can have, the bodily perception and the component of pre-discursive practical knowledge that is attached to them. Thus, while material objects do form a code that has to be decodified to understand the meaning of objects and their constitutive effects, merely extending the linguistic model to all forms of signification is insufficient.

Peircean semeiotics is one possible way to systematically study practices and artifacts as material signs that partly incorporate discursive elements in them, but that can also communicate meaning non-discursively. Perhaps the main advantage of a Peircean semeiotic approach is that it provides a clearly structured framework to study the interpenetrated nature of the material and the ideational. While a few scholars in other disciplines, such as anthropology, archaeology, tourism studies, or communication studies have used a Peircean semeiotic approach (Lele 2006; Metro-Roland 2009; Mick 1986), to my knowledge in IR only Kangas (2009) used Peircean semeiotics for a study of popular culture as interpretants of International Relations. My work adds to Kangas’s by extending its reach, and suggesting that a Peircean semeiotic approach can provide a useful analytical framework for the new materialism emerging in IR scholarship.

3.2 Peirce's Semeiotics

Peirce's semeiotics is based on tripartite divisions, the most fundamental of which is his tripartite division between an object, a sign (which represents the object), and an interpretant, which is the potential for interpretation resulting from the sign. A sign represents an object thanks to a ground, which is the relation that links the sign to the object. Depending on that relation, we classify signs into icons (representing based on similarity), indices (representing based on a causal or contiguous relationship), and symbols (representing based on a social convention). The arrow (in Figure 3.1) between object and sign runs in both directions because at times the object leads to the creation of the sign, while at other times the sign creates its object. The sign brings about a particular interpretant, which is the possibility for interpretation. The interpretant can be classified into three possible forms of interpretation: emotional (resulting in feelings), energetic (resulting in action), and logical (resulting in thoughts). This figure provides an overview of these tripartite divisions.




Figure 3.1: Peirce's Semeiotics.

3.2.1 Peirce's Epistemology: A Compromise Between Scientific Realism and Post-Foundationalism

Peirce's ontology, epistemology, and methodology are all based on the fundamental premise that reality is always mediated by signs. While we know reality only via the mediation of signs, the connection between material reality and signs is not always ar-

bitrary. Precisely because reality enters into the sign system, albeit incompletely, it provides a check on the meanings attributed to signs. Furthermore, because every sign is by its nature interpretable — it can be interpreted by provoking an emotion, an action, or a thought — signs can have material effects; they can result in a change of material reality. At times signs can even create the reality they are supposed to represent (Peirce 1931, vol. 8, 178). For example, Branch (2011) makes a convincing argument for how changes in map-making techniques had an effect on the emergence of territorial states.

When it comes to IR scholarship, Peirce's epistemology provides a middle path in recent epistemological debates between various interpretations of pragmatism on the one hand and different perspectives of scientific realism on the other hand—all undertaken with the objective to identify a philosophical foundation for a form of cohabitation (Kratowil 2007), cooperation (Sil and Katzenstein 2010), or even synthesis (Hellmann 2003) between the various isms in the IR discipline. While scientific realists (Wight 2006; Wendt 1999; Patomaki and Wight 2000) argue that ontology, the real world, should function as an arbiter between theories, many pragmatists (Kratowil 2007), postfoundationalists (Pouliot 2007), and monists (Jackson 2008) claim that access to the world is always mediated by language. Claims to knowledge are nonetheless not arbitrary because the community of scholars in a discipline judges the appropriateness of method and theory with the help of intersubjectively shared rules (Kratowil 2007).⁴

While Peirce's epistemology agrees with pragmatist and postfoundationalist perspectives that reality is always mediated by signs, his conception of sign systems differs from the conventional understanding that focuses on language as the model for all other sign systems to follow (Doty 1993; Hansen 2006; Milliken 1999). With the exclusive focus on language we establish the arbitrariness of the relationship between the sign and the object it represents, since most words (signs) in any language are arbitrarily attributed to the material objects or concepts they represent. Words represent a given object because of an intersubjectively shared norm. Meaning then results from the relations between words (Shapiro 1988), rather than from the objects they are supposed to represent. Thus

4. While the controversies between different strands of pragmatism and scientific realism would deserve a more in-depth analysis, space constraints inhibit me from doing so.

two distinct layers are created: a layer of material reality and a layer of the ideational or linguistic realm.

By contrast, Peirce distinguishes between three types of signs, each of which has a different relationship to reality. The symbol is the typical linguistic sign; it represents reality by arbitrary social convention. However, reality can also be represented by either a relationship of contingency (index), or by a relationship of resemblance (icon). The function of the index is crucial for Peirce's semeiotics because the index establishes a bridge, a direct material/physical connection between a sign system and reality. With the help of the index it is possible to distinguish between the actual world and the world of imagination, between the shoot-out in the park and the murder in an Agatha Christie novel, because indices are those signs that demonstrate that the shoot-out actually took place. This distinction between reality and fiction cannot be undertaken by pure description, since with pure description we would effectively get caught up in the circle of infinite signification where one sign relates back to another sign, without ever directly relating to material reality (Short 2007). The invention of the index lets us establish a partial connection between material reality and the sign system. While reality is known to us only through mediation, reality itself, at least partly, becomes incorporated in mediation.

Signs need to be interpreted through emotions, actions, or thoughts, and in real life this interpretation depends on context and can be fallible. Even if all the signs were to unambiguously represent reality (which is not the case, because the relationships between signs and reality are considerably more complex), objective interpretation would still be impossible. According to Peirce it would be possible to have guaranteed accurate interpretation only after an infinitely long process of inquiry conducted by a boundless, democratic community of scientists driven by the sole purpose to identify truth because in an infinite and boundless space the situatedness of the individual researcher would disappear.⁵ Context would cease to play a role.

5. See, for example, Sil and Katzenstein (2010) for an application of a similar approach to IR theory.

3.2.2 Peirce's Ontology: A Rejection of the Dualism between the Material and the Ideational

Peirce's semeiotics is based on an understanding of the continuity between mind and nature. The effects of our thoughts are displayed in the environment so that we cannot discern a clear boundary between the two (Short 2007, 9). Clark (1997) notes similarly that we tend to externalize our mind onto the world. For example, we use a pen and a piece of paper to make complicated calculations, or when we write on a computer we move chunks of text around on the screen to organize our thoughts. Our thought processes are not purely ideational, but inextricably linked to the manipulation of material objects.

According to Peirce "it is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are in any copy of his book than they are in his brain" (Peirce 1931, vol. 6, 364).⁶ A book is neither purely material nor purely ideational, but rather a combination of the two, even though an excessive focus on "symbols, which signify via arbitrary convention, has led [scholars] to treat 'material qualities' of a sign, such as a word's letters, as entirely irrelevant to its signification" (Legg 2008, 225). In contrast, Peirce focused on the "concrete instances where the specific material quality of a sign enables it to function as the precise kind of sign it is, thus in turn enabling the precise kind of reasoning it makes possible" (Skagestad 2004, 251-252). For example, perspectival painting operated as a sign system that permitted Renaissance artists to identify new geometrical regularities, which then contributed to the development of modern mapping techniques with the help of which the territorial state could be represented (Branch 2011; Edgerton 1975).

In Peircean semeiotics material objects (and one might add practices) function as signs, but not as pure linguistic signs. If we are serious about maintaining the materiality of the sign as a thing in the world, we have to acknowledge that it can serve particular functional purposes, and that it can have a price aside from conveying a particular meaning (Gottdiener 1995). The meaning a sign communicates can then be related to

6. This differs from, for example, Bourdieu (1990) and Searle (1995) who conceive of the habitus and the background as the aggregate of individuals' dispositions and beliefs. Peirce and Popper share the perspective that ideas exist objectively, beyond individuals' minds. They disagree, however, in that for Popper (1978) thoughts are located in a World 3 that is causally linked to the World 1 of material objects, whereas for Peirce the material objects are inseparable from the thoughts they contain (Haack 1977). I thank Emanuel Adler for clarifying this point.

the functional purposes it serves as a thing in the world or to the price it costs, but a sign's meaning can also be partly independent from these factors and attributed by social convention. For example, somebody wearing a fur coat signifies on a functional level that the person is cold, but it can also signify that the person is rich, and on the level of social conventions it might signify that a person does not care about animal rights, is of an elevated social status, or is fashion conscious (Gottdiener 1995). Any thing can adopt numerous possible significations depending on social context, but not any signification is possible, since the very materiality of the thing puts limits upon its signification.

Recognizing the potential functional purpose a sign can serve as a thing in the world also means that we have to take into account the possibility of non-intentional signification (Gottdiener 1995). The security dilemma is a classical example from IR theory in which this logic plays a role (Jervis 1978).⁷ A state might acquire weapons to protect itself but to its opponents the acquisition can signal aggressive intentions. In Peirce's semeiotics in particular, the index allows for the possibility of non-intentional signification because it establishes causal and contiguous relations characteristic for the functional purposes a sign can serve. Non-intentional signification creates room for the possibility of non-intentional, yet non-deterministic change.

3.3 Towards a Method of Peircean Semeiotics

With these ontological and epistemological foundations, Peirce's semeiotics permits us to decodify material and linguistic forms of representation. We can trace how the combined effects of Peirce's tripartite division of signs into icons, indices, and symbols establish a rich sign system with a variety of communicational patterns.⁸ These in turn result in emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants that subsequently alter the reality that will enter the sign system.⁹

7. I thank James Patrick for suggesting the example.

8. In his later work Peirce distinguished between up to sixty-six categories of signs (for more detail, see Liszka 1996 or Short 2007). However, the distinction between icon, index, and symbol is generally considered the most significant of Peirce's classifications (Hookway 1992; Liszka 1996) and it is the most pertinent for our analysis.

9. Peirce's semeiotics can lead to a myriad of other methods (Liszka 1996; Skagestad 2004).

The first step of this method is to search for signs that represent the objects that interest us, in this case the units of the international system and the relations between them, by gathering qualitative data to serve as the raw material for the analysis. Any of the existing methods of data gathering can be useful, including participant observation (Burawoy 1991; Fenno 1990), qualitative interviews (Rubin and Rubin 2005; Soss 2006), archival research (Cameron 2002; Trachtenberg 2006), site visits, museum and exhibition visits (Yanow 2000), or secondary literature researches (Bueger 2014).

For the historical cases I combine a secondary literature analysis with a few supplementary site visits and museum and exhibition visits, as well as primary documentary analyses.¹⁰ The contemporary case of international order change in the European Union is based on two-and-a-half months of participant observation in the Council of Ministers of the EU, forty-six interviews with politicians and bureaucrats based in Brussels, and a supplementary literature and newspaper analysis.

Because I study developments from the twelfth century to the present in a wide variety of subject matters, it was impossible to conduct significant amounts of primary research for the historical cases. I include architectural analyses ranging from feudal castles and gothic cathedrals to postmodern architecture as well as analyses of medieval rituals, diplomatic practices, forms of address, early modern ceremonies, medieval and renaissance art, cartography, and warfare. It would be doing injustice to the forms of representation under review and to the scholars specializing in these disciplines to claim sufficient expertise in all of these subject areas to be able to make original contributions based on primary research. Instead I rely on the excellent work conducted by historians on everyday practices and artifacts to develop broader claims of international order change.

Even so, the available material is extensive and it might be impossible for a single person to review all of it. For these reasons I inductively identified “monuments” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Neumann 2008), that is, the most crucial representative forms in a given society around which other forms of representation tend to cluster. Some forms of representation are often anchoring in the sense that other representational forms depend

10. Wherever possible I have included visual material to illustrate the arguments. Depending on the subject matter, visual documentation can be more convincing than textual analysis, since it provides the reader with the opportunity to evaluate for herself the effects a given form of representation has.

on these primary forms for their significance and existence.¹¹ A typical example of such an anchoring form of representation is the coronation ceremony, on whose existence other forms of representation, such as coronation insignia, but also other ceremonies like the royal funeral, or the wedding depend. I applied a method inspired by “grounded theory,” which entails a study of available material up to a point when an analysis of further material does not lead anymore to a refinement of the argument, but merely confirms the already established claims (Charmaz 2006). Once one has collected sufficient confirmatory evidence and further analysis would merely result in unnecessary repetition, one can stop the data-gathering effort.

Once the data have been amassed, the next step is to identify the grounds upon which the collected signs represent their objects. The ground is the relationship that connects the sign to the object; it is the reason that a sign represents a given object. In other words, not every characteristic of the sign is important for establishing its representativeness. For example, many crowns in medieval Europe supposedly contained a thorn from Jesus’s crown of thorns to represent the king’s divine right to rule (Kantorowicz 1957). The ground in this case is a relationship of contiguity between the thorn and Jesus’s suffering during his crucifixion, but the colour of the thorn is irrelevant. Different signs can represent the same object, in each case focusing on a different ground (Short 2007). Thus while the thorn in the crown indexically links the king’s divine right to rule with Jesus’s suffering, an iconic painting of the king kneeling in front of the Virgin Mary represents the same divine right to rule based on a relationship of resemblance between the king and his depiction in the painting.¹² Peirce classified signs into icons, indices, and symbols based on the character of the ground that connects the sign to its object. This tripartite differentiation provides the researcher with a vocabulary that directs her attention to the different relations by which signs can signify a given object.

11. I translate the notion of anchoring forms of representation from Swidler’s (2001) concept of anchoring practices—fundamental practices that anchor other practices. See also Adler (forthcoming) for a further refinement of the notion of anchoring practices.

12. See, for example, Archbishop John Ocko of Vlasim’s votive painting, *Charles IV Kneeling before Madonna* (National Gallery in Prague, Convent of St. Agnes).

3.3.1 The Index

It is probably the easiest to first identify the indexical relations between signs and their objects because the index establishes a direct physical connection to its object (Skagestad 2004) that exists independently of any social convention (Atkin 2005). Index and object can be physically connected in two different ways. 1) The object and the index can be connected on the basis of spatial and temporal proximity (Goudge 1965; Liszka 1996: 38). For example, many religious sites derive their significance either from being the location of a particular event or from containing holy relics. There is a material and irreplaceable relation between the religious site and the holiness it represents, even though it is not a functional relation. 2) A causal relationship can exist between an index and its object, either based on the need for financial resources to obtain a particular sign or because of a functional link that connects the sign to its object. For instance, during the eighteenth century the display of splendour and good taste as a sign of a ruler's standing required sufficient financial resources.

Quantitative research makes use of the index when employing “proxies” as measurable variables that are causally related to potentially immeasurable phenomena, GDP as a measure of the size of the economy being a case in point. However, the causal relationship inherent in the index differs from the positivist understanding of causality since the indexical causality is merely a causality between an object and its sign—between reality and its representation in the sign system. It does not necessarily establish causality between a dependent and an independent variable as two phenomena of a real and unmediated world.

We can often identify the existence of an indexical relation between an object and a sign in language with the help of the rhetorical device of metonymy. Metonymy is a common linguistic practice that signifies the use of “one entity to refer to another that is related to it” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 35). “Metonymic concepts are grounded in our experience. In fact, the grounding of metonymic concepts is in general more obvious than is the case with metaphoric concepts, since it usually involves direct physical or causal associations” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 39). Lakoff and Johnson provide numerous

examples of daily usage of metonymy, such as “Wall Street is in a panic” or “the White House isn’t saying anything” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 35-38). The practice of feudal lords to adopt as their last name the name of their castle is also an instance of metonymy.

3.3.2 The Icon

Because the indexical relationship merely establishes a material connection between a sign and its object, it is subsequently necessary to deduce specific characteristics of the object from the sign at hand. One way of doing this is to identify an iconic relationship between a sign and an object (which can at times also exist independently of an indexical relationship). An icon represents an object because of a similarity in a particular characteristic the sign shares with the object. The resemblance that relates an icon to its object can be sensory, for example, a pictorial resemblance. The portrait of a king is an icon in the sense that it resembles the king. But Peirce also considered music as an icon because it incarnates musical feelings, which are its object (Short 1996).

Furthermore, the relationship between icon and object can be a structural resemblance, in which case “[the icon’s] parts should be related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves related” (Legg 2008, 207). For example, accounting techniques aim to be based on these structural resemblances. In more general terms, analogies are a typical example, because they establish a relational resemblance where the relation between A and B is the same as the relation between C and D (Liszka 1996). Diagrams are another category of icons that represent through structural resemblance; typical examples include the relation of a map to its terrain or a graph representing economic growth in a given country.

Icons as means of signification can be found outside of language and cognition; Peirce considered icons typical for the fine arts (Short 2007) where they can lead to emotional interpretants, that is, they evoke feelings rather than thoughts. It then becomes apparent that iconic representation can be material on two accounts. On the one hand the sign — the icon itself — can be material, an artifact, a practice, or a natural occurrence, but the icon can also be a linguistic expression, metaphors being a case in point. On the other hand the icon is material in the sense that in its pure form the icon represents its object

solely on the basis of similarity. Hence the object can be inferred from the icon through unmediated phenomenological perception, directly by the senses and through the body, without the need for intersubjectively shared rules (Kolenda 1977). The pure icon is a non-arbitrary sign, although we will see that few signs exist in this pure form.

3.3.3 The Symbol

To determine a symbolic connection between a sign and its object, we have to identify the intersubjectively shared understanding that underlies a symbol's signification. Symbols have the same characteristics as all signs in the conventional linguistic understanding of sign systems. They derive their meaning from social convention, from their relations to other symbols in a given sign system. It is therefore useful to apply the usual discourse analytical tools to the study of symbols (Doty 1993; Milliken 1999; Hansen 2006).

A symbol represents its object because of a general rule or habit through which the symbol can be interpreted as representing a given object. There is no reason why a symbol would represent a given object other than that it is understood by others to do so. Most, but not all, words are typical examples of symbols, but material artifacts or practices can equally be of a symbolic nature (Liszka 1996). For example, medieval paintings related the size of a person in a painting to their social status rather than to the rules of perspective. On the one hand the relation between the social status of a person and her size in the painting is symbolic because it is based on a social norm; on the other hand it is iconic because it establishes a relationship of similarity between the size of the person on the painting and her societal prestige.

3.3.4 Complex Signs: Combinations of Icons, Indices, and Symbols

The three categories of signs — icon, index, and symbol — are irreducible to each other; each fulfills a distinct function in semeiosis, which cannot operate if any one of them is missing. At the same time it is very hard to find a sign that is a pure icon, index, or symbol. It is rather common to find complex signs incorporating a mix of these three

categories (Atkin 2005; Hookway 1992; Legg 2008). In fact, Peirce considered the most perfect signs those that merge the iconic, indexical, and symbolic components into one sign as equally as possible (Legg 2008; Short 2007). Typical examples of signs that combine iconic and indexical components are a person's shadow, or a photograph (Savan 1987). These signs resemble the objects they represent, and there is a direct causal relationship between sign and object. Demonstrative pronouns as well as screams such as "ouch" are combinations of symbols and indexes because they are different in each language, and at the same time they incorporate an unmediated relationship to an object marked by spatial and temporal proximity (Atkin 2005; Savan 1987). Lastly, the just mentioned forms of representation in medieval paintings are an example of signs composed of symbolic and iconic components. Disentangling signs according to the different grounds based on which they represent an object can help researchers to identify the functional and symbolic connections between signs and their objects.

The combined effects of icon and index permit signs to simultaneously refer to an object, which is the indexical part, and to characterize that object, which is the iconic part (Liszka 1996). In Peirce's understanding the arbitrary connection between symbol and object can hinge on the non-arbitrary functions of index and icon (Sorrell 2004). Over time the connection between index and object can grow into general conventions and rules (Short 2004). Thus we might be able to establish a temporal sequence during which the sign changes its function from index to icon to symbol (Goudge 1965; Legg 2008; Short 2007: 227).

The dissertation process-traces such temporal progressions of changing forms of signification in order to demonstrate how social conventions can develop out of changing forms of representation. Thus the following chapter will show how the divine right to rule, the legitimate entitlement to sovereignty in *ancien régime* Europe, emerged gradually out of the coronation ritual, which in the medieval times indexically established the God-given entitlement to the crown. It was in the ceremony that the king obtained the power to rule from God via the archbishop or the pope. Without the coronation ceremony, the king was not a legitimate ruler. Efforts to merely proclaim the legitimate right to rule of a given ruler did not appear convincing in the Middle Ages and often

resulted in disobedience. Gradually the coronation rite lost its role as the initiating ceremony of rulership; the right to primogeniture was established as a norm following the centuries-old practice of crowning the king's oldest son during the king's lifetime. The coronation rite itself became a mere enactment of an already-existing right to rule. It transformed from an index to an icon. By the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, the coronation ceremony obtained a purely symbolic function that was highly vulnerable to fashion and aesthetic appeal (see [chapter 6](#)).

3.3.5 The Interpretant

The last step of the analysis is to identify the interpretant: the potential for interpretation or misinterpretation that is inherent in a sign (Skagestad 2004; Sorrell 2004). In Peirce's understanding signs are never completely determined but always stand in some relation to other signs (Gottdiener 1995; Joswick 1996). The context of a given situation matters for completing the meaning of a sign, as do the historical experiences and knowledge of the interpreter, "the collateral information" (Metro-Roland 2009, 274). Depending on context, a sign can stand for different interpretants (Short 2007). For example, the medal embossed with a scene in which the Spanish ambassador publicly apologized to Louis XIV signified humiliation for King Philip IV of Spain and an increased prestige for Louis XIV, both based on the background that such matters of prestige were crucial for establishing power.¹³

The researcher's task is to trace the connections between sign and interpretant and identify how particular components of a sign, given a specific context and collateral information, lead the actors to feel, act, or think in certain ways. My first approach was to draw on my own experience, that is, "the researcher-analyst's participative experiences as proxy for others' behaviors and actions: Through those firsthand, immediate experiences the analyst gains entry into understanding others' responses" (Yanow 2000, 64).¹⁴ I

13. The fact that a sign can stand for different interpretants does not negate the possibility of a causal and material connection between the sign and its object.

14. To some extent these experiences can be re-enacted in the reader, for example, by employing pictorial media in addition to textual analysis, although pictorial media engage only the visual senses and not touch, sound, or the whole embodied experience.

backed up these experiences with interviews in the European Union case study and with secondary literature analysis and documentary analysis in the historical cases. Wherever possible I sought to get direct quotes from the actors involved to identify their own responses to a particular sign in a given context and relate those responses to their historical experiences and knowledge (Yanow 2000).

The proposed method provides one way to highlight the profound interconnectivity of the material and the ideational. At the same time, other methodological approaches have different advantages and it is possible to combine Peircean semeiotics with other tools. One typical example would be to combine Peircean semeiotics with discourse analysis. One could also combine Peircean semeiotics with abduction—the process whereby we guess the most likely explanation for a particular phenomenon, usually by moving back and forth between theory and empirics. Peirce would not have considered his semeiotics incompatible with abduction, a concept he himself invented. One of several ways that he related abduction and semeiotics was to suggest that the semeiotic apparatus permits the analysis of signs that provide the empirical material from which abduction can develop.

3.4 Peircean Semeiotics as a Tool for Analyzing International Order Change

Forms of representation are the Peircean signs with indexical, iconic, and symbolic components integrated within them that characterize and even define their objects—the units of the international system and the relations between them. The indexical component creates an irreducible material and/or functional relation between a given form of representation and its object. It is thanks to the indexical dimension that we know which form of representation represents a particular unit in the international system. For example, in the case of diplomatic representation, the salary of a diplomat and his letters of credence mark the direct causal connection between the diplomat and the sovereign she represents. The Gothic cathedral defines the power of the Church, because the Church was capable of having this incredible monument constructed at a time when most people

lived in wooden houses. Feudal castles, in turn, defined the power of feudal lords because their defensive capacities were concentrated in the castle's structure. The functional purposes that signs serve as things in the material world and the monetary value they have often underlie the indexical connection between forms of representation and units of the international system.

The iconic and symbolic features of a given representational form then characterize the specific unit of the international system qualitatively. The splendour of a diplomat's garments, the decoration of the table, and the value of his gifts all represented not just indexically, but also iconically, the splendour, richness, and cultural, artistic, and scientific achievements of a given kingdom. At a time when GDP did not exist, these were the ways in which fellow diplomats and statesmen evaluated the progress and power concentrated in a realm.

Among other things, the iconic features of forms of representation can signify by resemblance the spatial structures that characterize the given entities of the international system, and the international order more generally. As I describe in more detail later, the Gothic cathedral, for example, marked the vertical axis and established a hierarchical order among its different architectural elements. The edifice indicated the Church's spatially universal and overarching authority with the pope as the earthly representative of Christ at the head of the structure. By contrast, the classicist palace, with the palace of Versailles as its prototype, marked the horizontal, the purely earthly dimension of the territorial state. Rather than establishing a universal and spatially infinite connection between heaven and earth, it denoted a geographically limited extension in space. The postmodern architecture in the European Union, on the contrary, leads to a sense of disorientation, and an experience of placelessness; it creates a space of flows that erases the clear separating lines between inside and outside. Forms of representation are signs that characterize the spatial arrangements of the units of the international system and thereby define the units of the international system and their mutual relations to each other.

The iconic and symbolic features of forms of representation relate the units of the international system to each other. Thus from the sixteenth century onwards the embodied

spatial practices of diplomatic precedence established a hierarchical ranking among rulers that was derived from the individual diplomatic representatives' relative positioning in ceremonial and ritual performances. The representative located the highest on a staircase, the first in a diplomatic procession, or the one seated in the centre during a theatre performance represented the unit with the highest prestige in the international order. Because diplomatic precedence played such a crucial signifying role, disputes over precedence were a common occurrence. In situations of an impasse, these disputes could result in ad hoc arrangements that would signify equality between representatives. It was not possible to merely agree that nobody would care about issues of precedence; it was necessary to develop spatial arrangements that would signify equality. Treaties took on a round shape so that it would not be possible to identify who signed a treaty first; negotiating tables became circular; and sometimes doors and mirrors had to be added to negotiating rooms so that multiple representatives could enter rooms simultaneously and no one had to fear being left out from specific honours.

Nonetheless, the forms of representation do not always have to adopt spatial characteristics to position the units of the international system vis-à-vis one another and thus define the international political space. For example, forms of address have a symbolic nature — they signify by social convention. At the same time it is in relation to other existing forms of address that they map the positions of the individual actors in a given political field. Addressing one actor as “father” and another as “cousin” contributes to the creation of a hierarchically structured political space with an inherent vertical dimension, rather than to a more egalitarian space with a predominant horizontal dimension. To identify such spatial arrangements, it is necessary to analyze given forms of representation in their relational context and to establish how they position the individual actors in relation to each other topographically (Bourdieu 2007; Pouliot 2012).

In sum, forms of representation operate as signs that constitute a given international space by a) characterizing the spatial make-up of the units in the international system and by b) positioning those units in relation to each other. Forms of representation have ideational and material constitutive effects on a given order, and they provoke feelings, actions, and thoughts among actors that can support the order's maintenance

or result in efforts to change it. For example, Horn summarizes the logical, emotional, and energetic interpretants of diplomatic precedence that maintained a hierarchical order in early modern Europe even after the collapse of the notion of Universal Monarchy:

The only safe rule was to adhere closely to precedents, to scrutinize with meticulous care any alterations in ceremonial and etiquette proposed by other parties and to exploit ruthlessly favourable political circumstances to secure recognition by other powers of your own disputed claims. An ambassador who, in negotiating a treaty, failed to secure the *alternat* was felt to have damaged his country's interests just as much as one who signed away a province unnecessarily at the end of a disastrous war. The consequent loss of "face" might well have practical political and economic consequences. A state which did not exert itself to secure and increase the respect of other states was clearly on the decline. Other powers would cease to regard it as an eligible ally while enemies might be encouraged to attack it politically, economically, and even on the battlefield. (Horn 1961, 205)

The situation started to change once England, Prussia, and Russia entered the European continental order more forcefully. As newcomers they did not possess the same habitus as the old established powers on the continent, and they were denied the standing they thought they deserved. As their frustrations mounted they decided to purposefully ridicule elements of diplomatic precedence, and simultaneously they put a higher degree of emphasis on the military and its representative forms. As the forms of representation changed the international order changed as well.

When seeking to understand change in international orders through changing forms of representation, the focus has to be on three different instances in the chain of signification. 1) As I just described, a change in the forms of representation themselves (i.e., in the signs) results in a change of international order. 2) The ground based on which a sign represents a given object can change and thus contribute to a change of order. Once the coronation ritual lost its indexical dimension and the king was king from birth, rather than because of the coronation ritual, the pope and the Church lost their position at

the top of the European hierarchy. The coronation ritual became an icon, an enactment of an already-existing right to rule; kings were effectively independent from the Church. 3) The interpretant can change, for example, as a result of a change in context. Thus whereas diplomatic precedence in the seventeenth century was a crucial indicator of a ruler's standing in the European hierarchy, in the late eighteenth century it became the annoying archaic leftover of a bygone era that withheld diplomats from the conduct of real business. The dissertation process-traces these three possible changes in the chain of signification and demonstrates their constitutive effects on changes in international order.

At times these changes in representative forms are the result of intentional communication, for example, when the French kings sought to manifest their *de jure* independence from the Holy Roman Empire by consciously changing established forms of representation that signified submission. At other times the changes can be the effects of non-intentional signification. For instance, armies started to employ new mapping technologies based on Cartesian geometry because they provided a better orientation in unknown terrains. Simultaneously, and unintentionally, the Cartesian maps also signified a change of how space was conceived of, namely as a flat and undifferentiated surface that could be divided into clearly demarcated territories (see [chapter 5](#)).

Chapter 4

Monarchia Universalis: From Ordering Principle to Threat of Order

Europe's transition from a medieval to an early modern order is certainly the most studied case of international order change in the international relations literature. Explanations abound and range from a focus on material factors such as changes in warfare, commerce, or tax collection, to ideational factors such as the emergence of Protestantism or the development of theories of sovereignty. However, the IR literature has, except for a few rare hints, so far omitted the possibility that forms of representation, such as architectural style, diplomatic practices, or ritual and ceremonial performance could have had any effect on the ordering mechanisms that were conceived and the ways in which they changed.

Given that some of the most respected medieval and early modern historians have highlighted the crucial significance forms of representation had in medieval and early modern society for transmitting meaning and establishing power and social order, a focus on forms of representation promises to provide new insights into the maintenance of medieval order and its transition to an early modern order. One of the major advantages of such a micro-level focus is that it is closer to the thinking of the time and emphasizes precisely those aspects that preoccupied the people on a quotidian and practical level. As

such, we will see that this perspective provides answers to some of the puzzling features of medieval and early modern European order, for example, how the concept of *Respublica Christiana*, a unified Christian world, could co-exist next to frequent feudal wars, or why Protestantism, arguably a crucial factor for the emergence of the territorial state system, did not lead to the establishment of sovereign states in the heartland of its sway, the German lands.

The analysis starts with an interpretation of the medieval period as consisting of two fields: a feudal/political one that was place bound and had overlapping authority structures and a unitary, religious, and hierarchically structured mental space. Concrete forms of representation bring each of these two spaces into existence. The analysis then highlights how, with increasing interactions between rulers, hysteresis emerged—a conflict between the dispositions of crowned heads marked by their experiences in the feudal arrangements, and their inferior positions in the hierarchically structured Christian space as they now started to experience them more directly. The hysteresis resulted in the kings' transfer and adaptation of representative forms from the religious mental space into the secular political space, where they could make use of them for enhancing their own power over local feudal lords while simultaneously declaring their independence from religious overlordship. The last section demonstrates how the arrangements of the Peace of Westphalia emerged from these by-then still incomplete processes. The year 1648 was not a new beginning that marked the emergence of an order based on territorial states but a hybrid arrangement that combined medieval ordering mechanisms with early modern ones.

4.1 Overlapping Feudal Authority Structures and Religious Universality

A strong degree of localism and decentralization marked the Middle Ages because as long as the economy was not fully monetized, it was impossible to accumulate sufficient material resources that would permit rulers to effectively control large stretches of

territory (Osiander 2001b). Most people were self-sufficient, commerce barely existed, communication was slow, precious metals were in short supply, the right to coinage was decentralized, and money was not even considered a means to accumulate wealth (Cipolla 1956; Pirenne 1962; Tilly 1975). The high degree of localism and self-sufficiency manifested themselves in a strong attachment to land. Land was not considered a private property disconnected from its owner: the land and its owner created an indissoluble whole where the “ownership of land remained the personal characteristics of the owners” (Gurevich 1985, 46). Contrary to expectation, this strong degree of localism and place boundedness did not establish an anarchical system of small independent units. Instead, a maze of overlapping authority structures appertaining to such diverse entities as kings, the church, individual bishops, towns, or guilds characterized the Middle Ages (Der Derian 1987b; Finer 1975; Fischer 1992; Harna and Fišer 1995; Wolf 1970).

And yet despite the localism and the overlapping authority structures, the fundamental ordering principle of the medieval cosmos was a hierarchical one based on the concepts of *Respublica Christiana*, *Monarchia Universalis*, and Empire, with the pope and/or the emperor at the head of the edifice (Hobson and Sharman 2005). Whereas a cursory glance at the Middle Ages would suggest that the emperor functioned as the temporal overlord and the pope as the religious master, a more in-depth analysis shows that the pope frequently made claims to temporal rule,¹ while the emperor claimed religious authority.² Perhaps as a result, disputes of preeminence between pope and emperor were frequent (Barraclough 1962, 208-211; Bosbach 1988; Ullmann 1949), particularly at a time when the concept of balance of power did not exist (Vagts 1948, 89).³ Different

1. For example, the pope claimed to be the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire and, by extension, other kingdoms at times of a vacancy on the throne (Hagender 1985; Kantorowicz 1957, 335) and to possess a veto power in the emperor’s election by virtue of his role as the emperor’s coronator (Berg 1988; Walther 1988). The pope was also a feudal lord in his own right in Italy and he functioned as the ruler of the papal states (Hartmann 1988; Walther 1988).

2. On the one hand the emperor’s superordinate position was partly a result of his role as the defender of the Church (Kantorowicz 1957, 213; Bosbach 1988); on the other hand he could play a guiding role during the schisms. For example, in 1159 Barbarossa invited all the bishops and archbishops from the Empire (England, France, Spain, Hungary, and Denmark) to the council of Pavia to decide on the papal schism between Alexander III and Viktor IV. He also ordered Alexander III to appear in front of the council (Hagender 1985).

3. These disagreements resulted not merely from theoretical disputes but were manifested in materialized forms of representation. Thus Koebner (1961) notes how a fresco in the Lateran portrays Pope Innocent II as Lothair’s feudal lord, while a fresco at Karlstein depicts Charles IV as a bishop, and

perspectives on the scope of the emperor's and the pope's responsibilities emerged concomitantly.⁴ Ultimately, however, imperial and papal authority were profoundly similar to each other.⁵

Both claimed to be universal in time and space; they were based on the concept of *Monarchia Universalis*, a hierarchical system that found its *raison-d'être* in its divine provenance, even in the secularized Roman law tradition (Bosbach 1988; Hagender 1985; Kantorowicz 1957, Malettke 1996; Ullmann 1949). The fundamental source of the emperor's and the pope's power was the same, not any form of tangible military might, but God's will. Both were at the apex of the hierarchically structured concept of Empire, or *Monarchia Universalis*.⁶

To make sense of the inherent contradiction between the strongly localized lives of the

Barracough describes the dispute over the meaning of the imperial coronation and unction in 1199 as the pivotal point of imperial independence (1962, 208; see also Bosbach 1988).

4. The monists suggested that the emperor had a subordinate, delegated power from the pope, who was the ultimate overlord in the secular and the religious realm; the dualists claimed that the emperor and the pope both obtained their power directly from God, but the emperor was subordinate to the pope in religious and a few secular affairs. Dante Alighieri later developed in his *De Monarchia* a theory of the complete independence of pope and emperor (Bosbach 1988, 27; Kantorowicz 1957, 457). Dante's theory might be the mature expression of a trend where from the twelfth century onwards a more secular, legal form of rulership started to replace its liturgical, Christo-mimetic antecedent. However, this legal rulership, based on conceptions of Roman law, still conceived of the emperor as a God-like figure who obtained his authority directly from God and represented God on earth (Kantorowicz 1957, 90-126; Harna and Fišer 1995). The theocratic values and concepts of Christo-mimetic rulership remained intact but were translated into a more secular legalistic language based mainly, though not exclusively, on the Justinian codex, the Roman civil law, rather than the Bible. "The Prince did not cease to be 'king and priest,' but he regained his former priestly character shattered, or at least reduced, after the Investiture Struggle — through the high pretensions of Roman legal philosophy which compared the jurists with priests" (Kantorowicz 1957, 118). While Kantorowicz's analysis of the medieval and early modern development of rulership is extraordinarily insightful, he uncritically equates the empire with the state and the emperor with the king. By doing so, his analysis overlooks the fundamental transition from empire as the ordering principle to a balance of power between territorial states.

5. This similarity was also marked in forms of representation: "Infinite cross relations between Church and State, active in every century of the Middle Ages, produced hybrids in either camp. Mutual borrowings and exchanges of insignia, political symbols, prerogatives, and rights of honor had been carried on perpetually between the spiritual and secular leaders of Christian society. The pope adorned his tiara with a golden crown, donned the imperial purple, and was preceded by the imperial banners when riding in solemn procession through the streets of Rome. The emperor wore under his crown a mitre, donned the pontifical shoes and other clerical raiments and received, like a bishop, the ring at his coronation. These borrowings affected, in the earlier Middle Ages chiefly the ruling individuals, both spiritual and secular, until finally the sacerdotium had an imperial appearance and the regnum a clerical touch" (Kantorowicz 1957, 193). Hartmann (1988) equally observes the similarities in the honours obtained by pope and emperor in matters of ceremony, ranging from the kissing of hands and feet, frankincense, and candles to liturgical bodily posture.

6. The notion of imperial world supremacy has been extensively studied in German medieval history. See, for example, Bosbach 1988; Holtzmann 1939 and 1953; Koebner 1961; Werner 1965.

people and the simultaneously existing conception of world order in the form of *Monarchia Universalis*, it is helpful to think of two coexisting systems operating in different spheres: a hierarchically structured overarching sacred authority coexisted with a politically fragmented and localized temporal authority.⁷ While “for the illiterate peasants that constituted the vast majority of Christendom, the boundaries of both economic activity and collective identification did not extend far beyond the local parish” (Phillips 2011, 139), the emperor (and the pope) operated as “distant, semi-mythical figure(s),” who “played an important part in the christian cosmos” (Osiander 2001b, 123). The legitimacy of feudal lords was based on religion, which found its ultimate personification in pope and emperor. The pope’s and/or the emperor’s benediction was an important component in maintaining local authority structures, but otherwise they barely interfered in local arrangements (Hagender 1985).

Two different spatial conceptions characterized and structured these distinct fields. A feudal spatial system defined by overlapping authority structures and an embeddedness in place “with authority radiating outward from centers rather than inward from linear boundaries” (Branch 2012, 281; see also Anderson 1993; Reus-Smit 1999, 2013) co-existed with a Christian conception of spatial infinity that was connected to the infinity of God’s power. The Christian uniform and absolute space was attached to God’s ubiquitous presence: “God (was) immanent to infinite space without being identical with such space in every respect” (Casey 1998, 111). For “if God is limitless in power, then His presence in the universe at large must also be unlimited. Divine ubiquity thus entails spatial infinity” (ibid., 77). The conceived space was not only unitary and absolute but also hierarchically structured. In spatial terms, the vertical axis was the dominant one (Burkhardt 1998, 104; Gurevich 1985) because it established the connection between heaven and earth. The most worthy subjects in the hierarchy were located at the highest levels, the closest to heaven, to the divine.

By contrast, the spatial embeddedness in place and dwelling is attributed to pre-Christian pagan origins that persisted even after Christendom had spread (Gurevich

7. For a similar perspective see, for example, Donnelly 2012b; Gorski 2000; Osiander 2001b; Reus-Smit 2011, 2013a; Phillips 2011.

1985). “Not entirely separated from the natural locus, remaining a part of it, man — precisely for this reason — did not convert nature into the object of his observation ‘from without’; before he could do that, the distance between him and his natural environment would have to increase” (Gurevich 1985, 67). With this lack of perspective, in the truest sense of the word, space was not conceived of as a unitary whole, but as a number of disconnected places that formed the condition of possibility for the emergence of overlapping and at times contradictory authority structures. While most authors have difficulties explaining how the idea of the *Respublica Christiana* could persist next to frequent feudal wars, leading them to emphasize either the former or the latter dimension (see, for example, Fischer 1992; Philpott 2001), the identification of two distinct, but co-existing dimensions of social space and social structures, two distinct fields, can help us understand the apparent paradox.

The two dimensions of space found their expression in and were constituted by different, co-evolving forms of representation. Artifacts, embodied practices, and language operated in a mutually dependent relationship where objects and architectural structures did not merely function as the backstage of embodied and linguistic practices, but actively shaped their performance, while language and embodied practice underlined each other to create a more powerful impression. Ritualistic, ceremonial, and performative expressions were so profuse in medieval society that it is impossible to elaborate on all of them but, based on historical analyses of the Middle Ages, the following section draws a detailed picture of medieval conceptions of international order as they emerged out of some of the most prominent medieval forms of representation.

4.1.1 The Forms of Representation of the Feudal Field

For the localized and decentralized authority of feudal lords, the medieval castle played a crucial role. It was a stronghold of defence in cases of attack and thus critically influenced war-making strategies and tactics, but it also functioned as the hub of feudal administration and the centre of justice, complete with a dungeon. The castle provided the material foundation where authority could spread outward from, gradually fading the further one distanced oneself from its walls (Barraclough 1962). The medieval castle’s

form depended on its environment because the castle was architecturally embedded within the surrounding countryside (Harna and Fišer 1995). Usually the castle was built on top of a hill or cliff for militarily strategic reasons, and numerous consecutive walls arguably served defensive purposes. In this sense a functional explanation can help understand the design of the medieval castle and can demonstrate how the castle structure itself had a constitutive effect on the type of socio-political space that emerged.

But the castle design also had a subjective experiential effect on the visitor who phenomenologically experienced the overlapping and nested spatial structures of feudalism once entering its walls. Reinle (1976) observes that there was no central view from where one could overlook the structure of the entire castle; single point-perspective was missing. Nor did the medieval castle have a symmetric ground plan. Referring to English castles, Johnson (1996) notes that the Great Hall was the architectural centre and the centre of the castle's social life. "It is at the centre of a series of nested spaces, surrounded by a huge artificial lake that is kept in place in turn by a series of embankments" (Johnson 1996, 124). To reach this centre, the visitor had to pass through a succession of gradually more impressive fortifications, with defensive design features occasionally serving purely decorative purposes. Admission to each guarded space depended on the visitor's social status. "The layout of Kenilworth Castle worked, then, to impress an idea of many different spaces, each signifying successive social gradations, on the visitor and observer. It did so by manipulating the subjective experiences of moving through its spaces through a series of impressive gates, well guarded by retainers in livery bearing the devices of the lord, through the need for angled turns at critical moments, through movement past already old and ancient buildings like the keep" (Johnson 1996, 126).

As an icon, the feudal castle expressed the overlapping authority structures of medieval feudalism. We can gather the central role of the castle for the authority of feudal lords from the newly emerging linguistic practices of metonymy. Feudal lords and their families started to adopt the name of their castle as their last name (Barraclough 1962, 141), thus making the castle's representative character even more explicit.

Embodied practices of interaction also help explain the place boundedness of feudal spatial conceptions. Up until the fifteenth century, diplomatic contact was rare among



Figure 4.1: Marksburg Rhein. Source: Kleuske (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0], http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMarksburg%2C_Rhein.jpg via Wikimedia Commons.

feudal lords and usually took place between people in close proximity to one another who could often negotiate with each other without the need of an intermittent (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011; Leguey-Feilleux 2009). Gradually the institution of the nuncius emerged. The nuncius was a messenger who could be sent between pretty much anybody: “whoever has been sent from another” (Durandus in Queller 1967, 6; Der Derian 1987b, 76). He functioned as a living letter, often representing numerous lords at the same time. There were no constraints on who could send such messengers. Just as only sovereigns have the right to wage wars (Bartelson 2010), “the modern notion that only a sovereign state could be represented by an ambassador was as inchoate in the Middle Ages as the concept of sovereignty itself” (Queller 1967, 69; see also Anderson 1998; Wight 1977).^{8 9}

8. Private citizens, cities, and all kinds of corporate entities could send ambassadors but princes also dispatched ambassadors to various entities. Thus it was quite common in Renaissance Italy to send ambassadors to one’s own army (Queller 1967).

9. Indeed, peace treaties signed prior to the peace of Westphalia included among the parties signing or granting the peace such various personages as “the pope, kings, dukes and Republics, as well as the imperial estates, but also other individual personalities, such as the mother of the duke of Lorraine, as well as various cardinals and their brothers and smaller rulers up to individual earls and their brothers [my translation from German]” (Steiger 1998: 45; see also Constant 1996).

The institution of the procurator arose in the thirteenth century. He was empowered to reach agreements on behalf of his principal (Queller 1967), but even then it was common to use the procurator of another prince to conclude an agreement that was of shared interest.¹⁰ The nuncius as well as the procurator could serve a number of different principals simultaneously. This non-exclusivity manifests the spatial conception of overlapping authority structures.

While medieval forms of representation were non-exclusive, they were also non-unitary. For example, an embassy usually consisted of numerous envoys with no single head of a mission (Anderson 1993; Queller 1967). Since various diplomats of equal rank were likely to speak with different voices, the practice of collective embassies made it more difficult to discern a singular principal behind potentially contradicting perspectives. Moreover, no fixed rule existed that would establish conclusive action; every case was handled differently. At times each of the representatives could act individually; at other times only specific representatives could act by themselves; and at still other times a few representatives had to act in unison (Queller 1967).

Similar to diplomatic practices, war-making practices were not only decentralized in the sense that everybody could wage war but they also made it difficult to discern a singular principal behind an army because the principals were not in full control of their armies (Heuser 2010, 85; Thomson 1994; Anderson 1998). In the feudal system a prince established his army in times of need on the basis of contingents provided by his feudal lords. In cases when a feudal lord refused to contribute to the army the prince had only one instrument available, namely make use of the contingents from other feudal lords to coerce him (Finer 1975). Even during the Thirty Years War it was still common to have feudal lords—such as Wallerstein for the emperor, Duke Christian of Braunschweig for the Protestant Union, or Prince Bernard for the French king—fight with their own armies. Often they pursued their own policies, occasionally in disrespect of their overlord's instructions (Hoppe 1998a; Lichtenberg and Their 1998; Wolf 1970).

10. The same non-exclusivity becomes apparent from the practice that the receiving principal paid for the accommodation and even provided an allowance to the envoy sent to him. Occurring up to the seventeenth century (Anderson 1998, 62), the practice expresses the conception that the envoy served a shared purpose, rather than the principal by whom he was sent.

Furthermore, it was not only difficult to recognize the soldiers as belonging to one single principal given the absence of uniforms; they were also hard to control, especially during the winter when they were dispersed in different lodgings. In small groups they often pursued their own goals of looting and private enrichment, in particular, but not only, if they were not paid.

We can easily understand the place-bounded and overlapping authority structures of the Middle Ages as resulting from the daily experiences of the people, which were conditioned by the degree of economic and technological development and the level of monetization and commerce in the economy. Because people were so dependent on their immediate environment, they did not yet clearly differentiate between themselves and their immediate surroundings (Gurevich 1985, 32); they were living in places, rather than conceiving of abstract and divisible space.

It is, however, considerably more puzzling how, under the same circumstances, the emperor, the pope, and the Church in general could maintain such a strong degree of universal authority that persisted for extended periods of time. How did they come to play such an important role in people's minds? What was the source of their authority?

4.1.2 The Forms of Representation of *Monarchia Universalis*

Conventional constructivist and realist perspectives each offer their own solutions to the puzzle. Realists suggest that the authority of emperor, pope, and Church was somehow unreal. These perspectives claim that the reality of medievalism was not the ordering mechanism of universal empire, but rather feudal fragmentation (Barraclough 1962; Fischer 1992; Walther 1988). All those who discussed and believed in the universal reach of empire, an observation that is not being denied, must then have been somehow collectively crazy. The conventional constructivist alternative would be to focus on thoughts and ideas, mainly by analyzing theological, legal, and philosophical treaties. But at a time when even many kings were illiterate (Chaloupecký 1946) the effects of these texts must have been limited. "The early and high Middle Ages" were "periods when gestures, insignia, and visible ceremonies played a more important role than political tracts or written agreements, if there were any" (Bak 1990, 8). The point is not merely that artifacts,

embodied practices, and the spoken word were more effective forms of communication, but that, in Gorski's paraphrase of Van Engen (1986), to "focus solely on doctrine and belief is to fundamentally misapprehend the nature of medieval religion, which centered on liturgy and ritual" (2000, 145). I suggest that specific forms of representation, such as church buildings, the Church's diplomatic practices, coronation insignia, rituals, and linguistic forms both represented an existing authority and also brought that authority into being.

Localized forms of representation established the universal reach of the pope's and emperor's authority at the head of the medieval Christian hierarchy. The paradox of the local production of universal power finds empirical confirmation in Gurevich's observation that "the universe appeared to [medieval historians] in the guise of a monastery, a feudal estate, an urban community or a university" (Gurevich 1985, 69). Thus even though they intended to write world history, they "paradoxically, produced provincial chronicles with very limited horizons" (Gurevich 1985, 68).

Regular and extraordinary religious ceremonial and ritual performances organized the family life of medieval Europe on a daily basis (Harna and Fišer 1995). The mass, conducted in Latin, helped to maintain the singular connection to the Church, Rome, and the Holy Roman Empire. Precisely because the mass was conducted in Latin, the overwhelming majority of the congregation could not understand what was being said, but the special locus, the gestures, bodily posture, actions, the smell of incense, the light of candles, and sacred music (Hughes 1990) compensated for this lack of understanding of the spoken word and conveyed a clear message of God's presence (Hartmann 1988; Schütte 1995). The Eucharist, the elevation of the Host, conducted at the moment when the wine becomes Jesus's blood and the bread his flesh, was the most important part of the mass, with many believers going from one mass to the next to see as many elevations of the host as possible; it was supposed to bring them luck (Gorski 2000). At the same time the Eucharist established a hierarchical division between laity and clergy because only the clergy was allowed to drink the consecrated wine (Cameron 2012, 96).

In the central Middle Ages the church used to be the highest and most majestic building in the town (Harna and Fišer 1995). Even today when we enter the building

of a gothic cathedral we feel reverence. The play of light from the sun passing through stained-glass windows inspires awe. It creates the impression of a boundless, infinite space. The sheer height of the gothic cathedral rouses humility if not obedience. Simultaneously it establishes an indexical connection to God's presence in the sky, where the cathedral domes point in a skilful use of the divine, vertical dimension, while the entrance doors materialize the "gates of heaven" (Gurevich 1985). All of these phenomenological experiences must have been multiplied in a medieval society accustomed to small, wooden houses and very modest arrangements. Indeed, "the symbolism of churches, their structure and lay-out, every detail in a cathedral and the religious ceremonies which took place therein — all of this was addressed to all Christians, and was designed to edify them in the mysteries of the faith" (Gurevich 1985, 84), while the learned scholastics could focus on the Latin scriptures.

For their part, feudal lords and rulers inscribed themselves in the hierarchical structure by functioning as benefactors for the construction of churches. Today we can find their images with a little miniature painting of the Lord's house on altarpieces and other paintings (PIS 2000b).¹¹ By doing so they established their connection to God and marked their place within the universal hierarchy, which in the thirteenth century became "articulated through an exact and systematic division of space" in religious art and architecture (Panofsky 1951, 39). In Gothic cathedrals the "principle of progressive divisibility" (ibid., 48) marked the entire building down to its smallest component. This spatial division is the physical expression of the principle of hierarchy within an absolute space; the cathedral symbolized the ordered universe by iconic resemblance (Gurevich 1985). The precise layout of the gothic cathedral with its exact division of space stands in stark contrast to the organic embeddedness of the medieval castle with its serpentine paths. It is the direct result of "a mentality which deemed it necessary to make faith 'clearer' by an appeal to reason and to make reason 'clearer' by an appeal to imagination, [and] also felt bound to make imagination 'clearer' by an appeal to the senses" (Panofsky 1951, 38).

11. Observation from the permanent exhibition of the National Gallery, Prague, Medieval Art in Bohemia and Central Europe, Convent of St. Agnes of Bohemia, visited on 23 December 2012.



Figure 4.2: Cathedral of Reims by Domenico Quaglio (1787-1837). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

While the gothic cathedral itself conveyed a precise message to its visitors, it also played an active role in ceremonies by framing the activities within and around it. Just like the main protagonists, it was dressed up for special occasions. “Walls, pillars, and floor [were] covered with tapestries, drapery, and carpets” (Le Goff 1990, 50). The altar as the most sacred place structures the entire church space into more and less sacred places and thus it spatially orders ceremonial practices. It is separated from the nave by stairs and benches; the various degrees of sacredness establish diverging degrees of accessibility, thus physically marking each person’s position in the hierarchy (Schütte 1995). For example, during most of the coronation ritual the king was seated between the laity and the clergy, only when he received the unction and the coronation insignia did the king approach the altar (Le Goff 1990).

The coronation insignia, most prominently among them the crown, played a crucial role in the coronation; as holy objects they increased the ceremony’s sacredness (Schuette

1995). The objects themselves contain a “holy ‘power’ (Hosius 1572) that is transmitted to their bearer” (Schütte 1995, 421)¹² via the verbal and embodied practices that constitute the ceremony. The coronation insignia obtained their sacredness through indexical and iconic features whose quality established a ruler’s standing in the hierarchy. Thus specific material objects, such as the nail from Jesus’s right hand in the relic cross, or a thorn from Jesus’s crown of thorns, institute a direct indexical relationship to Jesus.¹³ Alternatively the coronation insignia can be indexically related to a local patron saint. For example, the Czech coronation sword contains a relic from Holy Wenceslas (PIS 2000a), while the imperial crown together with the coronation clothing have been preserved from Charlemagne’s coronation (Woolley 1915). The imperial crown, the most worthy of all, is an iconic representation of the heavenly Jerusalem as it appears in the epiphany of John: “The twelve stones at the frontal plate with the orphan at the top, which in their coloured scale repeat the foundation stones of the heavenly Jerusalem, are not supposed to be anything but this city ... The imperial crown is then according to the number system, stone setting, coloured scale, probably even according to the number of pearls, nothing but an effigy of the heavenly Jerusalem ... Nothing of what the apostle describes has remained without replication on the crown” (Decker-Hauff qtd. in Ott 1995, 550).¹⁴ The bearer of the crown was entitled to unlimited worldly rule and to heavenly rule on Jesus’s side in the afterlife; the orphan was, in the words of an early thirteenth-century German poet, “the guiding star” of the princes (Hagender 1985).

The coronation was the crucial inauguration ritual of rulership in medieval Europe. Through the coronation performed in Rome, the emperor obtained his authority from God, mediated by the pope—who also had the right to reverse the act and depose the emperor or any crowned head by excommunication (Graham 1959). The coronation was an extraordinary spectacle that had the lords as temporal power in the audience and the clergy as well as the king or the emperor on the stage (Le Goff 1990). Any coronation was composed of several elements, among them the royal oath, including a promise to

12. My translation from German.

13. Both are contained in the treasure of the Holy Wenceslas established by Emperor Charles IV, while a thorn of Jesus’s crown of thorns was also in the French crown (Kantorowicz 1957).

14. My translation from German.

guard Church and people or even a submission to the papacy (Woolley 1915), unction with a holy balm, the bestowal of royal insignia with accompanying prayers, and the enthroning, usually followed by a mass and singing the *Te Deum* (Giesey 1990; Gieysztor 1990; Hartmann 1988; Woolley 1915).¹⁵ The special space of the church, the coronation insignia, the solemnity of the gestures and bodily posture, sacred music in the form of the *Laudes*, and incense (Hughes 1990) all worked together to transmit the magic character of the event onto the audience, which spread beyond those present at the coronation itself, first through oral accounts and later by media such as paintings, pamphlets, woodcuts, and etchings (Hartmann 1988).

In the early and high Middle Ages the coronation itself neither a pre-existing entitlement nor pre-existing material power, was the act that established the authority of the king and the emperor. Efforts to institute primogeniture, the right of the first-born son to succeed on his father's throne, were usually ineffective when they were merely declared, and they lead to frequent succession crises (Harna and Fišer 1995). The coronation and the unction, by contrast, visibly demonstrated the king's or the emperor's divine right to rule and thus positioned him above the other feudal lords. In an analysis of the Scandinavian countries Hoffmann comes to the conclusion that "the introduction of coronation and anointing was motivated in all three Nordic kingdoms by the same concerns: to narrow the claim to the throne from the entire *stirps regia* to a particular dynasty and even further, to secure the succession right of the oldest legitimate son of the ruler and so secure the stability of' the kingship" (1990, 142). For these reasons it was common not only in Scandinavia to crown the future kings during the ruler's lifetime to guarantee their accession to the throne (Giesey 1990; Harna and Fišer 1995; Hoffmann 1990). During the thirteenth and fourteenth century this tradition gradually faded out once the rules of primogeniture were fully established (Sedlar 1994) as a custom that developed out of the preexisting coronation practices:¹⁶ "It is noteworthy that

15. The exact progression of the event is known from the coronation ordines, which meticulously describe the movements that were supposed to take place, the prayers that should accompany each gesture, and the tones that should sound (Ott 1995; Woolley 1915).

16. In France the last king crowned during the lifetime of his father was Philip II in 1179, but Emperor Charles IV had his two-year-old son Wenceslas IV crowned king of Bohemia during his lifetime in 1363 and it was usual practice to have the next emperor elected during the lifetime of his predecessor well after the Peace of Westphalia (Osiander 1994).

the remedies introduced to neutralize the dangers of interregna and to secure the continuity of the royal head began to take shape far earlier in practice than in theory. The theories concerning the king's dynastic continuity, for example, served rather to explain and articulate existing customs than to create new ones, although admittedly it would often be difficult to decide accurately at what stage a developing practice may have been influenced also by the doctrines of jurists" (Kantorowicz 1957, 316).

Some historians suggest that towards the end of the thirteenth century, at least in France and in England, the coronation ritual ceased to establish the legal entitlement to rule (Giesey 1990; Hartmann 1988; Kantorowicz 1957).¹⁷ From then onward the beginning of a king's rule started from the day the previous king died, rather than from the day of the coronation as used to be the case.¹⁸ The king in these cases was a king by divine right, but the Church still "had to testify that the new king was the right king" (Kantorowicz 1957, 329). It had to solemnize the accession to the throne and "the belief in the sacramental power of the coronations continued" (Kantorowicz 1957, 321, also see Le Goff 1990).¹⁹ Thus a French ceremonial invention staged a sleeping king who was woken up by the clergy to perform the coronation (Giesey 1990), for only once the king had been crowned could he be fully awake. In other cases, such as Poland, the king did not have full powers until he had been crowned. For example, the king's jurisdiction entered into force only after his coronation (Gieysztor 1990). Similarly, the emperor had only a geographically constrained reign in Germany with limited powers prior to his coronation in Rome (Kantorowicz 1957, 324). Only if we acknowledge the indexical role of the coronation can we understand why some kings, such as Henry VII went through extraordinary pains to ensure their imperial coronation in Rome, and why others, such

17. When the French king Saint Louis died on a crusade in Tunis, his son Philip III had to assume power as a matter of expediency immediately after his father's death, but he could reach Reims for the coronation ceremony only more than one year later. Similarly, in 1272 when the English King Henry III died, his heir Edward I was on a crusade in the Holy Land and could perform the coronation ceremony only upon his return to England but had to start ruling immediately (Giesey 1990; Kantorowicz 1957).

18. Although according to Woolley (1915), until Henry VII the beginning of the reign of a king started with his coronation and only from Henry VIII onwards did the beginning of a new king's reign start on the day the previous king died.

19. It comes as no surprise then that contested rulers, such as Edward IV, Richard III, Henry IV, Henry V, or Henry VII in England, made full use of all the opportunities the coronation ceremony offered to provide an air of orderliness and legitimacy to their succession (Hughes 1990; McCoy 1990; Sturdy 1990).

as Philip IV, sought by all means available to them to inhibit the coronation from taking place (see Osiander 2001b).

The crucial role of the coronation for establishing a king's legitimacy testifies to the legitimizing power of Church, pope, and even emperor (Le Goff 1990). Only an archbishop could perform a king's coronation. The pope decided upon the distribution of archbishoprics (factors like possession of a saint's relics could play a role), and he also had to confirm the nomination of every archbishop. The emperor and the pope could both establish kingdoms. Thus the emperor provided a crown to the Czech lands in the form of a fief and the king elect had to come pick up his coronation insignia from the Holy Roman Emperor prior to the coronation (Harna and Fišer 1995). Until the time when the Czech crown possessed its own archbishopric it also had to borrow an archbishop from the empire to perform the act.

To communicate with the individual rulers, the pope made use of an extensive system of diplomatic representation. The title of the nuncius also existed in papal diplomacy. While the title was the same, its content differed considerably from the functions of secular nuncii. Whereas secular nuncii could serve different principals at the same time, papal nuncii were complete representations of the pope (Queller 1967). The papacy was the first to start systematically employing diplomacy in the thirteenth century (Blet 1996; Mattingly 1963). In his institution the papal nuncius, and perhaps even more so the *legate a latere*, a person of high social standing having gone through an elaborate ceremony (Barbiche and de Dainville-Barbiche 1996; Wynen 1922), represented the universal reach of the pope's power. In the thirteenth century only the papal court had a clear hierarchy of representatives and exclusive forms of representation.

A hierarchical order was also established in courtly ceremony, which was introduced in the fourteenth century when the pope resided in Avignon. The papal palace in Avignon was purposefully designed to meet ceremonial exigencies (Hartmann 1988; Kerscher 1995). While most ritual was of a religious nature, papal ceremonies already included many of the offices and features that would become dominant in the later courtly ceremonies of kings, whose purpose was to establish authority by developing a clear hierarchy and defining every single role within it (Hartmann 1988). Thus every person at the papal

court had an embodied understanding of his role in the system. “Page by page it is determined, who is supposed to behave in a certain way, where one is supposed to walk, to sit, to wait and who has the right to enter before another person or who has the right to be received first” (Kerscher 1995, 138) — a codification of practices that occurred only after they had already been established.

Comparably, the Golden Bull from 1356 codified a hierarchical order for the Empire’s festive occasions (Hartmann 1988). In 1548 Charles V introduced a strict, ever-present ceremony at the imperial court with the explicit purpose to establish a lasting, visible hierarchical order with the emperor at its head, as he acknowledged in his testament. Even the emperor himself had to follow extremely constraining regulations so that the order could be protected from the erratics of personal rule (Hartmann 1988).²⁰

Next to all the embodied practices and artifacts I have described, linguistic practices played a crucial role in establishing the universal and absolute space with pope and emperor at its head. The universal reach of Latin as the language of the educated classes and the Church created a singular linguistic space whose imagined centre was in Rome. An echo of the Roman Empire was also maintained in the title of the Holy Roman Empire and in the title “king of the Romans” for a ruler whose territory never actually encompassed Rome, but rather, at its heart, was located in the Germanic lands. The imperial title itself was reserved for the Holy Roman Empire and its ruler. Indexically, the title refers back to the year 800 when Pope Leo III bestowed it on Charlemagne whose successors became the German kings in 962. Thus the empire lived on in the language of the people and the educated classes. Across Europe, from Norway to Poland and further, the population felt allegiance to Rome and the Empire (Mattingly 1963). In part this might have been thanks to the vision of Daniel described in the second and seventh chapters of the Daniel prophecy in the Bible, according to which there were to be four empires and the last of these, believed to be the Roman Empire, would cease to exist with the coming of the Antichrist. It would signify the end of the world (Bosbach 1988, 27; Hagender 1985; Kantorowicz 1957, 292; Reus-Smit 2013).

20. A few other courts also had ceremonial rules established but those followed tradition and local culture rather than the explicit purpose to institute a clear hierarchical structure (Hartmann 1988; Hoffmann-Randall 1995).

Medieval theologians, lawyers, and authors such as Dante Alighieri or Engelbert express the same universal reach and hierarchical structure of universal monarchy and Empire in their literary writing (for example, the *Divine Comedy*) as well as in their political writings, in which they see the world organized in a hierarchy of communities moving from the household to the city to the gens to the regnum and ultimately to the imperium. Even authors who rejected the concept of *Monarchia Universalis*, such as Dubois, maintained the idea of a unified Christian commonwealth with the pope at its head (Osiander 2001b). Political and literary writing expressed the same “principle of progressive divisibility” that Panofsky identified in gothic cathedrals. It appears then that medieval society was marked by an image schema that ordered thoughts and experiences in top-down categories (Gurevich 1985).²¹

Some concrete effects resulted from the Christian hierarchical conception of space, most directly perhaps in the international reach of canon law. Canon law had “its own hierarchy of courts,” that maintained exclusive authority in the whole of Christendom, not only over religious matters but also such issues as the respect of treaties, the justness of war, and the maintenance of peace (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011; Mattingly 1963, 21-22). From the thirteenth century onward, most temporal rulers permanently maintained procurators in Rome to take care of pending lawsuits.²² Roman civil law represented the imperial counterpart to canon law; it supported the emperor’s claims to uniqueness since its framework provided for only one emperor, superordinate to all the other entities contained in the one Empire, which was created by God himself (Kantorowicz 1957). Both pope and emperor had legislative and jurisdictional powers that permitted them to function mainly as arbiters in disputes (Anderson 1994; Barbiche and de Dainville-Barbiche 1996; Bosbach 1988; Burkhardt 1998; Hagender 1985), but they also had the exclusive right to legitimate conquest in the form of the crusade, which could be declared by the pope only and executed by the emperor only (Berg 1988; Walther 1988). It was the emperor’s task to lead war against those Christian rulers who had offended the Christian

21. Image schemas are abstract, often unconscious schemes that emerge from embodied experience and mark the conceptual ways in which societies think (Gibbs 2005; Lakoff and Johnson 1999).

22. Some argue that the procurators in Rome were the predecessors of permanent representation (Koeberner 1961).

faith (Bartelson 2010).

A few examples demonstrate that the pope's and the emperor's authority were not mere chimera, as authors such as Barraclough (1962), Fischer (1992) or Walther (1988) suggest. Hagender (1985) mentions a letter sent by King Henry II of England to Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa in 1157, in which Henry II transfers the power of disposition to Barbarossa so that he brings the internal difficulties of the kingdom into order according to the will of the empire. Henry II writes that he will behave in obedience to the emperor because the emperor has a higher degree of dignity and authority. Hagender (1985) mentions a second source from the year 1214, in which the king of England, John Lackland, who found himself in political difficulties, requested Pope Innocence III to grant him the English kingdom as a fief. The relevant document states that by accepting his realm as a fief from the pope, who is the representative of Christ on Earth, the king has subdued himself and his realms to the pope in worldly and religious matters so that kingdom and priesthood can be united to a common purpose in the representative of Christ, just like body and soul (Hagender 1985).

Another example, which substantiates the possible real effects of the emperor's power, stems from the Czech lands, where Otakar II refused to accept his feudal rights from his competitor Rudolf Habsburg, who became Roman king. As a result, Rudolf decided in 1274 at the diet in Nuremberg to remove the feudal rights from the Czech king and to put an anathema on him. The anathema led to an open revolt of the Czech lords, culminating in the murder of Otakar II and a period of lawlessness and anarchy in the Czech lands (Harna and Fišer 1995, 104).

Nevertheless, the *Respublica Christiana*, the idea of a unified Christian world with a clear hierarchical structure, which sought its order-creating mechanism in the form of *Monarchia Universalis* (Bosbach 1988), was mainly a mental construct with a few real, material consequences attached to it. It was about the possibility of authority, about a de jure authority that could become an actuality, a de facto authority in a few rare instances (Hagender 1985). The *Monarchia Universalis* was far from ever becoming an actual political entity (Berg 1988; Bosbach 1988; Hagender 1985; Koebner 1961). We can best understand the distance between political reality and its imagination by

conceiving of the universal monarchy not as the draft of a constitution but rather as an aid for conceptualizing international dynamic processes (Bosbach 1988). Just like the balance of power, universal monarchy was considered a tendency toward an ideal-type goal, a reference-point for evaluation. “If we consider this intention of its usage, it is then possible to solve the apparent paradox between the actual unattainability of such a rule on the one hand and the political language and propaganda that seriously presented arguments of *Monarchia Universalis*’s validity on the other hand. *Monarchia Universalis* was a guiding principle for realistic explanations in the international politics of early modern Europe” (Bosbach 1988, 127).²³

Medieval overlapping authority rights and “the principle of hierarchical subordination gradually gave way to the principle of spatial exclusion” (Walker 1990, 10). The steady transition from medieval feudalism with *Monarchia Universalis* as its ordering principle to the territorial state system ordered by the balance of power required two concomitant processes: the up-scaling of local authority and the down-scaling of imperial authority.²⁴ For the territorial state to emerge as the principal actor of the international system three fundamental conditions had to be fulfilled: The territorial state had to be conceived of as a singular actor with one centre of authority, it had to be clearly distinguished, separated, and demarcated from the other states in the system, and an equality had to emerge between the units, in the sense that they had to be conceived of as being of the same type. These processes took shape over an extended period of time with their starting point in the fourteenth century and their point of completion located well in the nineteenth century.

4.2 The Hysteresis of Kings

Technological and economic developments resulted in improved possibilities for travel and commerce (Hagender 1985). More trade simultaneously led to an increased monetization

23. My translation from German.

24. The different timings authors attribute to the emergence of territorial sovereignty can be attributed in part to the fact that many authors have concentrated on only one of these two distinct foci of change (Branch 2011; Philpott 2001; Spruyt 1994; Tilly 1990; Wight 1977).

of the economy, which allowed for the accumulation of wealth and hence generated an expanding material power basis of crowned heads (Osiander 2001b). The territorial reach of princes' material power extended and the concomitant easing of travel engendered increased direct contact between rulers (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995).

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, once interactions between rulers increased, the practices of papal diplomacy and ceremonial transferred into the temporal realm (Bély 1996; Berns 1995; Brassat 1995; Hartmann 1988, 79-80; Leguey-Feilleux 2009; Mattingly 1963, 17; Neumann 2010). The distinction that only crowned heads were allowed to send ambassadors started to emerge in the sixteenth century, with the papal curia apparently being the place where the practice surfaced (Anderson 1993; Fubini 1996; Queller 1967). Grotius and Gentili provided the theoretical arguments that confirmed an emerging practice (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010). Also in courtly ceremonies foreign representatives increasingly played a role at the expense of the local feudal population (Schütte 1995). In sum, some of the representative forms of feudalism weakened, while the representative practices of princes strengthened. A clear indexical connection was established between a diplomatic representative and his ruler, which became more important as rulers travelled less themselves and thus direct contact between rulers decreased (Bély 1996). As a result the diplomatic representative came to personify the dignity of the ruler (Giry-DeLoison 1996; Mattingly 1963; Queller 1967).

The rules of papal diplomacy codified in canon law were adapted for secular use (Mattingly 1963, 22). True to its origins, diplomatic practice and ceremonial were filled with religious ritual (Anderson 1993; Constant 1996). It was common for embassies to include a chaplain responsible for religious ceremonies, but also to have delegates skilled in canon and Roman law. Special embassies with much decorum and splendour headed by delegates of high social standing were usually sent for swearing a solemn oath on a signed treaty, with the most attention dedicated to those ceremonial embassies sent to the papal curia (Anderson 1993).

Often in the Middle Ages diplomacy was encompassed with religious ceremonies. Negotiations were opened with religious rituals and the raising of prayers. Solemn acts were brought to conclusion in a church, chapel, Episco-

pal palace or abbey, sanctified by the performance of Mass and the sound of organs, chants, and songs. Censers smoked, the Te Deum sounded, and relics were brought forth to solemnize diplomatic acts. If possible, the most important acts were performed on feast days. Even the dress of an ambassador ought to reflect the solemnity of the occasion and the dignity of his master. Prelates, of course, took advantage of full pontifical garb. Lay diplomats, also, sought to impress by their appearance. (Queller 1967, 191)

With the transfer of diplomacy from the religious to the temporal world, the conception of a unified and hierarchically ordered space was also transmitted. The hierarchically ordered Christian space, which had hitherto operated mainly as a mental construct, increasingly found expression in the concrete practices of diplomatic precedence, and thus started to shape the social space more tangibly. Rome appeared as the centre of ceremonial life and thus where the hierarchical ordering among rulers was inaugurated (Mattingly 1963; Neumann 2010). By 1504 Paridem de Crassis, the Master of Ceremonial in Rome, had officially systematized this hierarchical ordering by publicizing a table that ranked diplomats at the papal court for the reception of an English embassy (Berns 1995; Hartmann 1988, 80-81), which presumably corresponded to the ranking of the princes whom the diplomats represented (Bély 1996). This table became the guideline for precedence and its contestation for the following two and a half centuries.

Diplomatic precedence was manifest in language, for example, in the order that kings appeared in treaties or dispatches and in the titles they were attributed. A hierarchical structure of inferiority and superiority can be identified in diplomatic dossiers, which often contain precise tables of how somebody is supposed to be addressed, depending on his rank in the universal hierarchy. By way of example, Autrand's (1996) analysis demonstrates that documents from France from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries established the following hierarchy. The pope was at the top, followed by the prelates: cardinals, archbishops, bishops. Next in line was the emperor, the king of Spain, the king of Aragon, the king of Scotland, the duchy of Milan, and the duchy of Bavaria, followed by strangers of a lower rank. Next were domestic relations inside the kingdom: duchies, royal family members, chevaliers, and cities. A precise system of superiority and

inferiority emerged. Equality was established by greeting the addressee at the top of the letter and again before the dispatch of the letter. This right was exclusively reserved for the pope, the emperor, and other foreign kings. The pope was addressed as the father, the emperor as the brother, and foreign kings and dukes were cousins. Inferiority was expressed with the formula “from through the king” and by using before the date the word *given* instead of *written*.

Next to linguistic formulations, diplomatic precedence also found expression in symbolism, such as the number of horses a diplomat was allowed to pull his carriage (Pötter 1998), and in diverse embodied spatial practices, for example, seating at dinner tables, or the ranking in processions (Anderson 1993; Queller 1967).²⁵

4.2.1 The Hysteresis of the French Kings

The direct confrontation with the hierarchically structured international order led to hysteresis on the part of many rulers because their dispositions from the feudal structures mismatched their positions in the international political field. The discrepancy was the most marked for the kings of France. Popes Innocent III and then Boniface VIII recognized “the French king’s de facto independence of the empire, but asserted his de jure dependence on the empire” during the thirteenth and at the beginning of the fourteenth century (Ullmann 1949, 2). Indeed, the French king started to question this juridical dependence on the empire and the papacy, in particular once the emperor and the pope sought to transform mere words into actions, for instance, by limiting the French king’s right to just war or by asserting universal supremacy in the papal bull *Unam Sanctam*

25. Some scholars have dedicated much attention to the emergence of permanent diplomacy as a sign of the establishment of a territorial state system (Mattingly 1963). However, permanent diplomats were for a long time low-key figures. They were very few in numbers and they were of a lower social rank (Anderson 1998; Berenger 1996; Giry-DeLoison 1996; Queller 1967). Hamilton and Langhorne claim that “in the early sixteenth century, occasional complaints could be heard about the quality, even the odour, of resident envoys” (2011, 40). Initially they did not fulfill any ceremonial functions and they did not have a mandate to negotiate even minor treaties, also because they were not well informed about the situation at the sending court (Mattingly 1963). Their initial purpose was not representation but gathering information about the receiving court (Anderson 1993; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011; Leguey-Feilleux 2009). Thus, over time they certainly contributed to the establishment of an image of the other (Der Derian 1987a, 106) and they had a significant effect on the diffusion of art, taste, culture, and practices of interaction, but until the early seventeenth century they could not play a significant role in personifying the state.

from 1302 (Bartelson 2010; Cameron 2012; Hagender 1985; Koebner 1961). According to Ullmann “there is thus no doubt that this king did not feel himself to be legally and politically subjected to the emperor” (1949, 11).

However, while the French kings claimed independence from the Roman emperor (and from the pope) for themselves, they nonetheless recognized that the emperor was the *dominus mundi*, the lord of the world, as is apparent from the response of the French King Philip IV to the imperial coronation of Henry VII in 1312 (Osiander 2001b). Although the general formula “*rex in regno suo est imperator*”—the king is emperor in his realm—had already emerged towards the end of the thirteenth century, it would be inappropriate to claim the end of the universal monarchy concept at this time because the pope and the Church maintained their overarching authority. “The papal right of demanding submission from everyone” was not challenged “because that right was derived directly from God, and has also been instituted by Christ Himself,” claimed Andreas, who was a fierce opponent to the supremacy of the emperor (in Ullmann 1949, 21). The concept of an imperial *Monarchia Universalis* maintained strong appeal in popular, legal, and theological writing, as well as in political correspondence (see Bosbach 1988; Ullmann 1949), and actually surged with the empire of Charles V, which included large stretches of Europe. While it is doubtful that the unified hierarchical structure of Christendom broke down in the fourteenth century, the French kings were the first who freed themselves from that structure without questioning its validity for the rest of Europe.²⁶

They did so using various different forms of representation. One way of denying the hierarchical arrangements was to refuse naming the emperor first in a document that addressed him. Autrand’s (1996) analysis of French diplomatic dossiers from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries shows how the French king stopped adhering to the strict guidelines of addressing rulers according to their place in the Christian hierarchy.

26. Some scholars have conceived of the controversy between King Robert of Naples and Emperor Henry VII as establishing the beginning of sovereign rule and the end of universal hierarchy (Bartelson 2005, 93-94; Koebner 1961; Ullmann 1949). However, King Robert of Naples was a vassal of the pope and thus under his control. By not obeying the emperor he did not maintain his sovereignty, but merely his exclusive allegiance to the pope. It was not uncommon at the time to consider the Church as the true *Monarchia Universalis*. In this sense I consider it more appropriate to interpret the incident as one among many ruptures in the relations between emperor and pope rather than as *the* nail in the coffin of *Monarchia Universalis*.

He addressed the emperor only rarely as “brother,” but usually addressed other kings with the term, especially after they had signed a peace treaty with him.

French kings also used the etymological origin of the word *francus*, which they claimed meant “free from the empire” to assert their independence (Kantorowicz 1957, 237; Ullmann 1949). They further bolstered their special position by emphasizing the meaning of the holy ampulla, and in it the holy chrism “brought down from heaven by an angel for the coronation of Clovis” (Woolley 1915, 103). The ampulla and the chrism were specifically French coronation insignia; a centerpiece of the French coronation, they guaranteed the entry of the supernatural into the ceremony (Le Goff 1990). Thus in an illustration of a French coronation, the unction with the normally invisible oil left a red cross traced by Jesus’s blood on the king’s forehead. The sacralization of the French king—his priestly, miracle-bearing, potentially even christomimetic nature originated directly from the holy chrism (Brassat 1995; Cameron 2012), which consequently formed one of the cornerstones for grounding the independence of the French crown from the Universal Monarchy. Hence “Philip argues that the christian religion had always been so secure in France that that realm had received from Christ himself the ‘unique privilege’ (singularis prerogativa) of exemption from imperial suzerainty: ‘For it is widely and generally acknowledged by all and everywhere that from the time of Christ onwards the kingdom of the Franks [French] has only had its own king, under Jesus Christ as king of kings and lord of lords ... knowing or having no other temporal superior, no matter which emperor was reigning’” (Osiander 2001b, 134).

Nonetheless, the French kings still needed the Church to perform the unction with the holy chrism during the coronation. And here it is possible to see some modest modifications in the coronation procedure itself to curtail the ceremonial power of the clergy (Woolley 1915). In an analysis of a manuscript’s illustrations describing the coronation ritual of French kings, Bonne finds “if the ordo of 1250 in its entirety succeeds in demonstrating a remarkable balance between the different modes — sacred ritual versus spectacular ceremony, ecclesiastical authority versus royal power on the path to autonomy, national spirit versus shared ideas of Christendom — the images also contain hints at the source of future tensions between these poles by placing value on the earthly, the

spectacular, the French, and the powerfully royal aspects” (1990, 70). Le Goff observes a similar balance in the description of the coronation ceremony but notes that “only at the moment when the king takes his place on the throne does he finally outweigh the prelates and lay lords. The archbishop doffs his miter before the crowned king and respectfully kisses him, and the peers follow suit. When the king leaves the church, the unsheathed sword borne before him overshadows the croziers of the bishops and abbots” (Le Goff 1990, 56).

By adding other inauguration rituals to the coronation, such as the *lit de justice*, the funeral rite with the effigy, and the royal entry into Paris (Giesey 1990; Kantorowicz 1957), the French kings could establish a higher degree of independence from the Church and its crucial role in the coronation for transmitting indexically the divine right to rule to the king. Thus the royal entry into Paris established an iconic, and hence unmediated, relationship of similarity between God and the king. For example, the entry of King Louis XI in the fifteenth century resembled Christ’s birth in Bethlehem. Later allegorical representations included King David in Jerusalem, and, well after the Reformation, Hercules and the god Apollo (Bryant 1990).

Not only did other inaugural ceremonies remove some of the significance from the coronation ceremony and the Church’s role in it, but the king also managed to curtail the power of the Church by bringing the clergy under closer royal scrutiny. Philip IV brought the entire Gallican church under the rule of the French king, but without provoking an open rupture with the Roman Church (Kantorowicz 1957, 258). In the early fifteenth century the French King Charles VII then suspended the pope’s right to appoint Church prelates. Although the pope’s right was theoretically restored, the suspension remained in effect practically (Cameron 2012, 58). The concordat of Bologna then finally confirmed in 1516 the French king’s unchallenged right to name all the major French Church officials. More than three centuries after the French kings started to assert their independence from the pope, article VI of the Liberties of the Gallican Church, published under the reign of Louis XIV, expressed this independence explicitly:

The Most Christian anointed King, eldest son and protector of the Catholic Church, when sending his ambassadors to the newly elected Pope to congrat-

ulate him on his elevation and to acknowledge him as spiritual father and head of the militant Church, has not been accustomed to employ terms of such precise obedience that many other princes employ, who have some special duty or obligation to the Holy See of Rome, as vassals or under tribute, but they only recommend themselves, the kingdom which God has given to them in sovereignty and the whole Gallican church to the good favour of his Holiness. (in Graham 1959, 161)

This unwillingness to submit to the higher authority of the pope or the emperor found expression in numerous practices of interaction. The pope could no longer automatically expect that the French king would respond positively to the call for a crusade (Walther 1988), and when the French kings accepted the arbitrage rulings provided by the pope or the emperor in their dispute with the English, they always made it explicitly clear that they did so out of their own will, rather than as a result of submitting themselves to the rulings of a higher authority. Thus Pope Clement IV had to state in his arbitrage in 1344 between France and England that he was acting “non ex auctoritas nostra, sed ex potestate attributa nobis a partibus,” not out of his own authority, but out of the power attributed to him by the parties (Autrand 1996, 208). Similarly the king of France, Jean le Bon, affirmed in 1364 that he accepted the arbitrage by Pope Urban V “not because of his subjection, but out of his pure will, out of his consent and authority” (Autrand 1996, 208).²⁷ The French King Charles V even had the diplomatic protocol changed for the occasion of the visit of his uncle, Emperor Charles IV, to make it clear that he was not subordinate to the emperor and that the emperor did not figure as a supreme judge in his dispute with England. At times disputes over diplomatic precedence could turn violent, such as in 1488, when the French orator claimed precedence over the king of the Romans, the king of the German lands, who had the entitlement to become emperor, but had not yet been crowned as such:

The French orator claimed precedence over the orator of the king of the Romans, since his master was the first king in Christendom and ought to

27. My translation from French.

cede only to the emperor. It was decided against him on the grounds that the king of the Romans was the future emperor. The dispute continued, however, when another orator of France requested through Burckhard that he not be required to stand at mass below the orator of the king of the Romans, and he was allowed another position removed from, though not as high, as that of the German. Less than a month later the quarrel became violent when the French orator, the bishop of Lescaur, occupied the first place after the cardinals in a papal procession. Georgius de Turre, the German orator, demanded his rightful place. The bishop, unwilling to cede, rode upon the German with his horse. The latter grabbed the bishop by his hood and mantle, and threw him out of the coveted spot, occupying it himself with the other German orators. The bishop subsequently demanded the pope at mass that Georgius de Turre be excommunicated for laying violent hands upon him. The pontiff replied that he would allow the offender to remain for mass and would consider the matter afterwards, but while he was speaking the German orators walked out. (Queller 1967, 201-202)

All of these described changes in the forms of representation lead to the conception of an independent kingdom of France, free from papal and imperial interference. Most of these changes were well under way or even fully established before Bodin had developed his theory of sovereignty. Following Quentin Skinner's (2010) argument it appears appropriate then that Bodin, arguably the father of sovereignty, theorized what he observed in practice, that is, in existing forms of representation. Rather than being the motor of change, his theoretical arguments were a reflection upon emerging changes in forms of representation at a time when the sovereign state was not yet established as a functioning institution. In this sense I would agree with Eulau who said that "the Bodinian definition was the result of the struggle of the French king against the Holy Roman Emperor, the Catholic Church and the feudal nobility within France" (1942, 5).

4.2.2 The Hysteresis of Protestant Kings

Whereas France managed to establish its factual and juridical independence from the emperor and the pope while maintaining its Catholic religion, other crowned heads became independent only with the advent of Protestantism. The kings might have felt all the more desire to clearly establish their juridical and factual independence, once Charles V, elected emperor in 1519, appeared to intend the full materialization of the *Monarchia Universalis* under his rule (Bérenger 1994). Even though some suggest that the empire had already lost its appeal by the fifteenth century (Spruyt 1994), analyses of contemporary sources indicate that the concept of universal monarchy remained topical and was hotly disputed for some time. Charles V's chancellor, Mercurino Guattinara, advised him in 1519 "Sir, since God has conferred upon you this great grace of raising you above all the kings and princes of Christendom to a power which hitherto only your predecessor Charlemagne has possessed, you are on the path to universal monarchy. You will unite all Christendom under one scepter" (in Bérenger 1994, 145); "and there were many contemporaries who hoped, and many others who feared, that these words might be a statement of fact" (Anderson 1998, 102). In an analysis of theoretical tracts, political pamphlets, and internal correspondences and records of those who acted politically, Bosbach came to the conclusion that Charles V

adopted with his accomplishments a very decisive position on the topic that was in his time an object of dispute not only among the humanists. Rather, the Universal Monarchy directly touched upon the political thought and action of the time and gained in 1519, with the election of Charles V as the Roman king, a high degree of concrete presentability. The up-to-then mainly theoretically developed conception of universal rule obtained now a direct connection to European power politics. With Charles V the construction of a system of universal rule became a real possibility. Relying on the resources of his Spanish, Burgundian, and Habsburg inheritance he not only appeared in the position to actually perform the tasks of the entrusted imperial rule in the whole of Christendom, but also the path to universal rule seemed accessible

for him. (1988, 35).²⁸

The period of Charles V's reign was precisely the time when the question of universal monarchy and resistance to it rose to the foreground because it was the era when three conditions occurred concomitantly: 1) the idea of *Monarchia Universalis* was firmly embedded in contemporary thought and 2) the power position of Charles V provided him with the opportunity to deduce concrete rights of action from this idea and to enforce those against other rulers. This 3) provoked the resistance from those rulers (Bosbach 1988, 63). Other rulers experienced hysteresis and sought to change representative forms to limit the power of the emperor and the pope.

After it appeared impossible to unite Christendom in a crusade against the Turks (mainly because of French resistance), the ailing Charles V resigned in 1556 and divided his kingdom into a Spanish and an Austrian branch because his Austrian relatives were unwilling to accept his son Philip as emperor. The Austrian branch, under Ferdinand, bore the imperial title and reigned over the Austrian hereditary lands, the central European domains, and the Germanic lands, whereas the Spanish branch under Philip II obtained the "three finest regions in Europe," the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain, as well as the American overseas lands, and was therefore "the senior branch" in terms of material power (Bérenger 1994, 153; Anderson 1998; Bérenger 1996). The Austrian branch with the imperial title became too weak to establish any credible claim to universal monarchy. Some would thus argue that the concept of *Monarchia Universalis* and empire ceased to exist with the division of the Habsburg lands (Bérenger 1994).

Yet, by this time contemporary thought conceived of the papacy as the bearer of universal monarchy in temporal and spiritual matters, with the task to maintain peace within Christendom, and to defend Christendom from the Turks on its outside. The overall image of the pope and papal power strongly resembles the one of the emperor and imperial power, as it existed in the time of Charles V (Bosbach 1988, 69). The pope could pick any ruler as his aide to fulfill tasks and the Spanish King Philip II and later his son Philip III appeared to be the most suitable candidates owing to the fact that they were the most powerful monarchs in Europe (Anderson 1998; Bérenger 1994; Bosbach

²⁸. My translation from German.

1988).

The emergence of Protestantism provided rulers and political elites with a means to substantively curtail the power of emperor and pope. Thus Henry VIII, under the influence of his second wife, Anne Boleyn, and her leanings toward French Protestantism (Giry-Deloisen 1995; Ives 1995), decided to declare himself head of the Anglican church and deny the pope's authority so that he could divorce his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, the aunt of Charles V (Cameron 2012; Collinson 1988), and rid himself of the Catholic Church's overlordship. Similarly the Scandinavian kings took control of the newly emerging churches, made the protestant belief uniform in their realm, and outlawed dissent (Grell 1988). In other cases, notably, the Netherlands and Switzerland, animated by a less-orchestrated and more spontaneous and popular movement of dissent, the Reformation nonetheless permitted political elites to establish their *de facto* and *de jure* independence from pope, empire, and/or Spain (Scribner 1994).

The destruction of the Catholic Church's forms of representation was the crucial mechanism through which the Roman Church lost its position in the Protestant lands. Martin Luther conceived of the Justinian legal codex and ceremonial as the two main sources of papal power (Berns 1995). In Luther's conception ceremonial included not just ritual practices, but also the church building, dress, and people (Berns 1995, 163). He described the "pope as the Antichrist and the Roman curia as a devil's court who need the implementation of unified ceremonial, a ceremonial centralism and imperialism, to bind the Christians of all countries to their power and to soak the soul out of their bodies and the money from their pockets" (Berns 1995, 163).²⁹ The mass formed a central component of Luther's ceremonial critique, which he combined with a critique of the Old Testament in favour of the New:

because it is not part of the new testament to designate certain days for fasting and others not, as it does the law of Moses. And it is not appropriate to take certain meals and differentiate between fish, eggs, etc., as again Moses does; and it is not appropriate to declare certain days as festive and others as unfestive. And it is not appropriate to build this or that Church or to decorate

²⁹. My translation from German.

it in certain ways or to sing in certain ways; and by the way neither organs nor altar decoration, nor vases, nor paintings, and all of that which now is in the Lord's house. Since all of these are merely shadows and schemes of the things themselves and puerilities. Namely every day is festive, every meal permitted, every place holy, every time is fasting time, all dress is permitted; everything is free, but one should proceed in modesty and with love, as the apostle taught. (Luther qtd. in Berns 1995, 166)³⁰

In place of all ceremonial and all forms of sensual perception, Luther preferred the primacy of the spoken word. Not conceiving of language as a sign system, he located it above ceremonial sign systems for its alleged spiritual character. He considered the spoken word so powerful that it alone could provoke all the religious imagination that was previously attached to the entire ceremonial apparatus (Berns 1995).

Accordingly Church images, statues of saints, altars, and crosses were destroyed or removed either in an organized manner by state authorities or in riots by spontaneously formed mobs (Anderson 1998; Béguin 1995; Bergsma 1994; Cameron 2012; Christensen 1982; Collinson 1988; Nexon 2009; Philpott 2000). All forms of stage plays disappeared; masses were abolished and succeeded by communion services, which were reduced in number. Saints' days vanished and monasteries were shut down (Bergsma 1994; Collinson 1988). Bibles were translated into vernacular languages and the services were held in the vernacular (Collinson 1988; Sturdy 1990). "The physical layout of the liturgy was decisively and visibly altered across the country for perhaps the first time. Vestments and ornaments were drastically simplified, leavened bread was given in place of communion wafers into the laity's hands, and tables in the body of the church replaced altars in the chancel" (Cameron 2012, 288). The hours-long sermon became the main component of the mass. Interior church design and the conduct of the service were adapted to each other. Simple windows replaced stained glass. The walls were whitened and sometimes a Bible passage was written on them. The pulpit and the surrounding benches replaced the altar as the liturgical centre of the Church (Gorski 2000).

Most IR scholars who address the effects of the Reformation note the significance of

³⁰. My translation from German.

these changes in forms of representation (Nexon 2009; Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 2013), but assuming a one-to-one correspondence between ideas and forms of representation, they tend to theorize ideas at the expense of representative forms. However, the overall effects of these changes in forms of representation on the population appear to have been considerably stronger than any complex theological arguments, and often they followed a logic of their own, at times independent of the ideas that underlay them, or sometimes even guiding them. Thus in an analysis of available documents from the Italian inquisition, Menchi found that

which penetrated most deeply in people's memories, was opposition to veneration of the saints (36 mentions). In descending order come opposition to dietary restrictions (20 mentions), denial of the real presence in the Eucharist and resistance to such cultic manifestations thereof as adoration of the Host (16 mentions) and dismissal of the doctrine of purgatory (13 mentions). The fundamental doctrines, the keystones of systematic theology, which had inspired philo-Protestant preaching in the first phase are virtually absent from my sample. In this dossier justification by faith alone is referred to only once, in a rather unspecific way, and there are two even vaguer allusions to the bondage of the will ... In Italy, too, then, the people selected from the Protestant message the elements they considered most relevant to their lives and reshaped the Reformation according to their own needs. (Menchi 1988, 192)

While changes in representational forms were the most powerful and effective means to weaken the reach of the Catholic Church and hence the associated ordering mechanism of universal monarchy, they were also the most contested in the population at large. Even in countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, or Germany, where Protestantism spread “from below” (Philpott 2001), the new religion was unpopular among the majority of the population (Anderson 1998, 140; Bergsma 1994, 76; Cameron 2012, 390; Kittelson 1982, 367), let alone countries such as England, Denmark, or Sweden, where it was imposed “from above” (Anderson 1998, 140; Cameron 2012, 279; Collinson 1988; Roberts 1968;

Saever 1982, 278). The people did not understand the theologically abstract arguments of the reformers very well, but they cared about their images of Jesus and Mary to whom they could pray for miracles, about the elevation of the Host which was supposed to bring them luck, about the confession that would free them from their sins, about the bishops and monks who would assure them, and about the street plays that would entertain them. In brief, they cared about the representative forms they were used to (Bergsma 1994; Cameron 2012, 309; Grell 1988; Roberts 1968).

The discontent with the Reformation went at times so far that, for example, Swedish King Gustav Vasa had to appease the masses by promising that “all good old Christian customs may be confirmed and maintained, and the Lutheran heresy and the evil communications that go with it be clean done away” (in Roberts 1968, 87), even though eventually he did not have to keep these promises. In England, in turn, so many of the old Catholic practices were maintained or readopted that historians until the early twentieth century were unsure whether the Reformation had taken place at all (Collinson 1988; Saever 1982, 272). The popular contestation, in general, has not led to a backtracking of Protestantism per se, but rather to an adaptation of some Catholic forms of representation for Protestant purposes and their combination with purely Protestant forms, which ultimately resulted in numerous regional variations of Protestantism (Cameron 2012, 283-290; Grell 1988; Kittelson 1982; Roberts 1968, 120; Sturdy 1990).

Even though Luther had initially rejected the appropriateness of ceremonial in the religious realm, over time, as a result of popular opposition, he came to change his opinion and established the utility of ceremonial for three purposes: first, to appease the people who were still attached to the traditional ordering elements and signs of the pre-reformation mass; second, as a mechanism to maintain order, although the traditional signs were supposed to be gradually replaced by new, Protestant ones; and third, to sensually stimulate children and the uneducated, who needed special attention to remain focused (Berns 1995; Cameron 2012).

Accordingly, many Lutheran churches kept altars, paintings, and statues of saints in their buildings, and the priests often elevated the Host during mass and continued to drink all the consecrated wine (Grell 1988), thus retaining the hierarchical structure in the ser-

vice and the distinction between laity and clergy. The rewritten Protestant prayer books often preserved some of the Catholic mass practices (Cameron 2012; Collinson 1988; Roberts 1968). In England Henry VIII decided to maintain the hard-line-Protestant-despised cathedrals (Collinson 1988), while English Protestant bishops under Elizabeth I's reign feared being dismissed for complaining about the elaborate clerical vestments and the crucifix and candles forming a little altar in her chapel (Cameron 2012; McCoy 1990). Protestants also used pictures, stage performances, and songs to convey their own message "for seeing was still believing" (Collinson 1988, 89). Ultimately then, the newly national churches could at times use the same symbolic apparatus as the Catholic Church did, but now to maintain a regionally constrained power, independent from Rome, albeit still internally hierarchically structured.

Following practical experiences, Luther had to not only renege on his abstract ideas that the religious kingdom was to be known and experienced by words alone, but he also had to backtrack from his strict theoretical separation between the religious and the worldly kingdom when his doctrine needed worldly protection from imperial opposition. Consequently the power of the princes in the newly emerging national churches rose (Barraclough 1962; Cameron 2012; Gagliardo 1991; Kittelson 1982; Reus-Smit 2013). In some cases, most notably England and Sweden but also in Denmark, the rulers purposefully employed the new religious teachings and created state churches as "departments of state" (Cameron 2012, 180) to establish their independence from Rome (Grell 1988; Kantorowicz 1957; Roberts 1968; Saever 1982). Even in Calvinist regions, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, the connection between church and state was very tight. Although this connection was not institutionally established, in practice local political elites controlled the Calvinist consistories that, in turn, presided over the Church (Bergsma 1994; Gorski 2000).

Eventually the connection between the temporal and the religious realm also tightened in the Catholic lands. Because the Church feared the effects of Protestantism it was willing to strengthen the power of Catholic rulers and provide them with rights in the religious realm to gain their support for the counter-reformation (Gagliardo 1991; Gorski 2000; Kann 1974), manifested mainly in the sponsorship of art and architecture

to convey the Catholic message (O'Malley 1982),³¹ although Spain also had a state-led inquisition (Kamen 1988). Overall “the differentiation of the three major churches (Lutheran, Reformed, and Catholic) during the Reformation era went hand-in-hand with a de-differentiation among church, state, and society at the territorial level” (Gorski 2000, 143). Thus Protestantism helped to create kingly divine-right absolutism, and hence signified a crucial step in the direction of the modern conception of sovereignty — more for the changes in the forms of representation it founded than for the new ideas it circulated.

The newly national churches became the legitimating force for the new rulers; through them the rulers obtained their legitimacy directly from God, without the need for mediation by the pope or the emperor (Philpott 2000; Saever 1982). In Reus-Smit's words, “rejecting the transnational authority of the Church did not entail a rejection of Christianity per se, rather the natural and social universe was re-imagined to invest territorial monarchs with authority direct from God” (Reus-Smit 1999, 93). France could so easily adapt to the Reformation because it had already sought this independent sovereignty prior to the Reformation.

With the advent of Protestantism the Catholic Church lost its power to function as the transmitter of God's will in the ritual of the coronation. This indexical connection between the king and God via the Catholic Church transposed almost unnoticed to the national level, first into the hands of the Protestant churches from whence it could be transferred to the secular sphere. In fact, having the possibility of naming their own archbishop was one of the main reasons that secular rulers were so eager to promote the Reformation (Roberts 1968). Once in Protestant hands the ritual itself lost its initiating meaning. Thus Anglican Archbishop Cranmer proclaimed during his sermon at the coronation of Edward VI that kings “be God's Anointed, not in respect of the oil which the bishop useth, but in consideration of their power which is ordained . . . and of their persons, which are elected of God and indued with the gifts of his Spirit for the better ruling and guiding of this people. The oil, if added, is but a ceremony: if it be wanting, that king is yet a perfect monarch notwithstanding, and God's Anointed as well as if

31. In this regard baroque architecture was “the grandiose expression of the twofold triumph of Counter Reformation and princely absolutism.” It signified “the rise and expansion of a secular power, able to reinstall and at the same time to control the revival of the Catholic Church” (Kann 1974, 151).

he was inoiled” (qtd. in Kantorowicz 1957, 318; McCoy 1990, 218).³² While the sign remained the same, the principle of transference had changed. From now on, by the very latest, the king was king by divine right from the moment of his birth.³³ Even so, the coronation ceremony remained an important spectacle to visualize the king’s legitimacy, and his sacred right to rule. The indexical relationship of the coronation, where the king obtained his power from God via the Catholic Church, was replaced with an iconic relation. By employing splendour, magic, and skilful staging, the king himself started to resemble God. The king could rid himself of the superior papal and imperial authority while maintaining a crucial advantage over other lords, thanks to this historical and regularly reenacted connection to the sacred and the divine. From now on kings did not have to subject themselves to Rome for the performance of this and other crucial spectacles, such as the royal wedding or the funeral.

The coronation ceremony itself was located between continuity and change. Perhaps the most clearly Protestant coronation was that of Frederick King of Prussia at Königsberg in 1701, even though, or maybe precisely because he had just obtained the monarchical title from the Holy Roman Emperor. Frederick decided to crown himself and subsequently his wife, and when the unction was performed it was “not in the form of a cross” on the forehead as would have been usual, but rather in the form “of a circle as being the most perfect figure known to mathematicians” (Woolley 1915, 145).

Usually, though, the crowning and the unction, the core of the coronation ceremony, remained intact, whereas the surrounding ritual, such as prayers, sermon, or Bible reading could be more or less adapted to the Protestant teachings (Hoffmann 1990; Sturdy 1990).

32. Also see Frederick II’s coronation in Denmark, where the chancellor presented him as the “lawful inheritor of the throne, and demands that he be crowned, and the minister replies that in response to their demand he will proceed with the coronation” (Woolley 1915, 147).

According to Kantorowicz (1957) the coronation gradually lost its indexical character; the process started prior the Reformation, but the Reformation was certainly a considerable stepping-stone.

33. With the full establishment of hereditary monarchy, the king did not lose his dependence on forms of representation. It now proved increasingly important to demonstrate the royal descent of one’s ancestors. Thus the burial practices in Tudor and Stuart England changed significantly as the kings and queens dedicated special attention to the tombs of their ancestors at the expense of their own. They located and relocated the tombs in Henry VII’s chapel at Westminster Abbey because based on the position of a tomb in the chapel, deductions were made about royal descent and rightful rule. For instance “the placement of Lennox’s tomb assisted King James in demonstrating his authoritative claim to the Kingdom of England” (Sherlock 2005, 193).

In some instances, such as Elizabeth I's coronation, the question of continuity and change is so blurred that it is impossible to know exactly how the coronation proceeded. Only a few sources describing the event are available and they contradict each other (McCoy 1990; Sturdy 1990). In McCoy's (1990) view the ceremonial difficulties—the need to decide between Catholic continuity and Protestant change—were so protracted for the queen that she deliberately left the entire coronation ceremony as opaque as possible and focused instead on the civic procession the day prior to the coronation as the big public spectacle of her succession to the throne. Whereas not a single picture commemorates the coronation proper, “there are several pictures of Elizabeth's civic progress, and these also project an image of hierarchy and harmony” (McCoy 1990, 223). While there was a real danger that the coronation would become a mere side event of secular ceremonial practices, time would show that the coronation maintained its central position even as crowned heads resorted to an ever-increasing number of ceremonies to stage the divine legitimacy of their right to rule, independent of pope or emperor.³⁴

To establish that right more firmly, many of the initially papal and imperial forms of representation were transferred and adapted to the secular space for the purposes of hereditary monarchies. Together with these forms of representation the concept of a unified hierarchically structured space was transposed to the national level. Thus the ceremonial practices of Christian liturgy and papal courtly ceremony were adapted to the princely courts to establish a hierarchically structured order of the realm within the palace walls. All the guests who entered the edifice and even more so all those who permanently resided within its walls bodily experienced this structure on a daily basis (Berns 1995; Brassat 1995; Schütte 1995). Parts of the palace's architecture are structured similar to churches (Hartmann 1988; Schütte 1995). For example, the throne or the bed in the palace fulfills a similar function to the altar in a church. It equally forms the centre around which all ceremony develops, and establishes a gradation of spaces and allows differential access to them. It also requires bodily subjugation in the

34. For example, Sturdy commented on the attention Elizabeth's successor James II dedicated to his coronation with the words “such are the inconsistencies of human nature that this man, who, from a fanatical zeal for his religion threw away three kingdoms, yet chose to commit what was little short of an act of apostasy rather than forego the childish pleasure of being invested with the gewgaws symbolical of kingly power” (Sturdy 1990, 241).

form of kneeling and genuflection when one approaches the elevated throne, even if it is momentarily unoccupied.

This imitation of papal and imperial ceremony was aided by Luther's critique of ceremonial, which approved of and even advocated for princely ceremonial while fiercely denouncing its religious counterpart. The worldly hierarchy was for Luther a given; by honouring those higher up in the hierarchy, Luther argued, one was honouring God himself. In reference to a Bible passage Luther confirms the princes as "earthly gods"—a highly welcome statement because it provided the necessary legitimacy for rulers to stage themselves as pagan gods — Apollo, Heracles, Venus, or Jupiter — without having to fear committing blasphemy (Berns 1995; Marin 1988; Sommer-Mathis 1995). "Royal performances enabled the public to visualize the religious aspect of monarchy" (Franko 2003). Henceforward the prince himself could be a deity because representative forms portrayed him as such (White 1964; Wolf 1951).

Blaise Pascal, a contemporary of Louis XIV, remarked how this divine image of the king depended on representative forms: "The custom of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and all those things that bend the machine toward respect and terror, causes their face to imprint on their subjects respect and terror even when they appear by themselves, because one does not separate in thought their persons from the retinues with which they are ordinarily seen. And the world, which does not know that the effect comes from this custom, thinks that it comes from a natural force; and from that come these words: 'The character of Divinity is imprinted on his face,' etc." (qtd. in Marin 1988, 14).³⁵

Linguistic forms were also transferred from the religiously ordered space into the secular realm. Thus in 1533 Henry VIII terminated "papal jurisdiction on the grounds that 'this realm of England is an Empire' " (qtd. in Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 38) "governed by one supreme head and king, and having the dignity and royal estate

35. Many others remarked the importance of representative forms for the king's position (Gestrich 1995; Rahn 1995), among them, for example, the eighteenth-century legal theorist Christian Wolff: "the ordinary man, who is attached to the senses and can make little use of reason, can also not understand what the majesty of the king is: but through the things that fall into his eyes and touch his other senses, he obtains a vague yet clear understanding of his majesty, or power and might. And from here we can understand that a splendid royal household and courtly ceremony are not superfluous, and even less reprehensible" (in Hartmann 1988, 10; my translation from German).

of the imperial crown of the same” (qtd. in Kantorowicz 1957, 228). To provide the necessary legitimacy to this invented imperial crown, Henry VIII had the Italian historian Polydore Vergil write a history of England, the *Anglica Historia*, in which he stated that England’s imperial title was of ancient standing, directly transmitted from the emperor Constantine (Koebner 1961; Cameron 2012). Even though across Europe only the Holy Roman Empire was to be called *empire* for some time to come — only it was considered the legitimate inheritor of Constantine’s imperial title — in England proper the English imperial title did gain recognition, and the slogan “rex imperator in regno suo”—the king is emperor in his realm—was the motto that grounded the independence of kings. Not only was the imperial title transferred to the secular realm to establish singular and unified rule over a given people but the concept of Rome as the actual or imagined centre of this one community was also transferred to the secular realm in the form of the capital city as that one centre of the common fatherland (Kantorowicz 1957).

Meanwhile other changes in forms of representation marked the gradual decline of Rome as the uncontested centre of the medieval international order. Latin progressively ceased to be the language of international interaction. Even though the Münster treaty was still drafted in Latin, the negotiations were conducted in French, Italian, Latin, and Spanish. These languages were often used indiscriminately, at times even in a single discussion (Anderson 1993), perhaps because the understanding emerged that an ambassador should communicate in his mother tongue, since he was the most eloquent in it and it represented an honour for his master if the vernacular was heard as widely as possible (Mattingly 1963). As aristocrats progressively replaced the clergy and lawyers as the most prominent group of diplomats, the knowledge of canon law and Roman law receded into the background (Queller 1967). Religious ceremonies were “replaced by more explicitly contractual and legal enactments, others discarded because their Roman origin was unsuitable for Protestant monarchies” (Bak 1990, 8). In the course of the seventeenth century the oath was replaced by the exchange of ratifications (Constant 1996). The pope, in turn, deployed increasingly fewer *legates a latere*, the highest category of diplomats, to reduce the visibility of his diplomacy, and minimize the possibility of a loss of face (Barbiche and de Dainville-Barbiche 1996).

As a result of these developments the unitary Christian space started to disintegrate; criticisms of the concept of *Monarchia Universalis* emerged. In the sixteenth century the term *universal monarchy* was highly contested; it could be used in a positive sense, usually by the supporters of the Habsburgs or the pope, or it could be used in a negative sense, for example, when Richelieu found that the Habsburgs endangered Europe with their hegemonic policies.

4.3 The Peace of Westphalia

Unlike the traditional perspective of IR theory, which conceives of 1648 as the beginning of the modern territorial state system, a more careful analysis of the negotiations and the treaties demonstrates that the peace of Westphalia actually combines many of the traditional medieval attributes with a few modern trends. Thus the peace mirrored the characteristics of its time, rather than representing a radical, new beginning. In particular the medieval order-creating mechanism of Empire was now clearly confined to the German territories; the Holy Roman Empire had not disappeared yet, but it no longer represented the ideal to which a European-wide system aspired. In that sense the global imperial monarchy had failed as an order-creating mechanism, but also as an idea (Bély 1996). The concept of universal monarchy remained in use, but it lost its medieval signification in the Christian-religious field and came to express the hegemonic power exercised by a single state on the continent; the term gradually gained a strictly temporal meaning. It was evoked as a criticism of Habsburg efforts to reunite Europe under singular rule (Malettke 1996). In the second half of the seventeenth century Louis XIV's policy started to be criticized for aspiring to *Monarchia Universalis* (Bosbach 1988). Rather than being conceived of as an order-guaranteeing concept, *Monarchia Universalis* appeared increasingly as a threat of supremacy.

However, this does not mean that the rest of Europe was already formed into a clear territorial state system. Balance-of-power thinking was emerging in France, but it was by no means a universally accepted order-creating mechanism. Clearly demarcated boundaries did not yet exist and feudal regimes still held in significant parts of Europe

(Reus-Smit 1999; 2013). While rulers might have gained their independence from Church and Empire, on a local level they did not have full control. Neither had they established an effective state bureaucracy, nor were they the masters of the organic outgrowths of customary law that continued to feed partial and overlapping authority structures in which local lords, but also cities and towns, often maintained jurisdictional and executive authorities (Bérenger 1994; Wolf 1970). The international order was still conceived in terms of some form of hierarchical structure (Davis Cross 2007; Steiger 1998), articulated in pictures and paintings of the time (Burkhardt 1998), vividly exemplified in the hierarchical organization of the Roman Church (Bosbach 1988),³⁶ and mainly expressed in the crucial role attributed to diplomatic precedence. At least in this regard, the emperor and the pope retained their position at the apex of the hierarchy, although they lost their function to operate as guarantors of peace treaties. This function befell to the units in the system collectively, or to any one of them that was interested (Steiger 1998).

4.3.1 The Holy Roman Empire: A Functioning Medieval Subsystem in the Heart of Europe

The Thirty Years War could have resulted in the complete abolition of the Holy Roman Empire, but that did not happen. While worldly rulers heavily contested the position of the emperor at the top of the hierarchy, the emperor's legitimacy inside the Holy Roman Empire remained largely untouched, to the big surprise of the French delegation at the peace negotiations in Münster (Osiander 1994). The recent wave of scholarship that suggests the Reformation had a crucial impact on the territorial state system's emergence (Nexon 2009; Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 2013) has not come to terms with the puzzling fact that the Reformation did not lead to the establishment of a territorial state

36. Burkhardt (1998) notes some remarkable shifts in the way peace is pictorially depicted. While we find allegorical illustrations of the personified Pax, Victoria, and Iustitia alluding to peace, victory, and justice as a single, and undivided condition for the whole of Christendom, we also occasionally find personified states or rulers shaking hands as a sign of peace. Even these illustrations usually contain elements of hierarchy. For example, in a depiction of the Peace of Westphalia the emperor is the only one seated on an elevated throne and appears larger in size next to the Swedish queen and the French king. Only with the Congress of Vienna did it become common to have peace depicted in the form of rulers of equal rank signing a treaty (Burkhardt 1998).

system in one of its main hotspots, the German territories.

We can understand this puzzling observation as resulting from the absence of hysteresis on the part of German rulers. The estates of the Holy Roman Empire were well acquainted with and accustomed to the hierarchical structure of the Holy Roman Empire, which had a tangible impact on their rule for centuries. In the German territories the problem of a *de facto* independence and a *de jure* dependence on the empire never emerged; the princes were both *de facto* and *de jure* dependent on the empire's order. Thus they had not experienced a mismatch between their dispositions and their positions, as the rulers outside of the empire did.

The cases of Switzerland and the Netherlands are different from the German territories. Both, it is commonly argued, obtained their independence from the empire as a direct result of the Peace of Westphalia (Gagliardo 1991, 86). However, the Low Countries as well as Switzerland had for centuries been only nominally attached to the empire—without that there would have been much *de facto* control. In the case of the Low Countries Charles V even had them formally removed from the empire's jurisdiction in 1548; in 1648 they merely gained official independence from Spain (Anderson 1998; Croxton 1999).

The German estates, by contrast, were committed to the empire, as is demonstrated in official statements, for example, the Resolution of the Council of the Electors, which was presented in the plenary session of the estates at Osnabrück on 16 April 1646: “his Majesty the Roman Emperor, the electors, and estates, in their dignity, honour, lands, and population, should as far as possible be kept together and maintained, without any separation or dismemberment, and that, above all, the entire edifice of the Empire be handed down to dear posterity” (qtd. in Osiander 1994, 31). The behaviour of the estates underlines these words. They did not attempt to establish their juridical independence, as the French expected, but instead sought to reestablish their ancient rights under the empire's constitution, which they felt the emperor had violated.³⁷ At first the French had difficulties understanding the estates' behaviour. Osiander (1994) cites a report by the

37. Despite Puffendorf's derisive remarks describing the empire as a monstrosity, the overwhelming majority of intellectuals, among them, for example, Leibniz, supported it (Bérenger 1994; Evans 1979).

imperial delegates at Osnabrück to Emperor Ferdinand III from 16 February 1645 that recounts a conversation between the French negotiator d’Avaux and the Mecklenburg envoy:

... whereupon Monsieur d’Avaux embarked upon a discourse concerning the intention and eagerness of the King of France to preserve the liberty of the Germans, saying that necessity required the estates of the Roman Empire — as the ones who were principally concerned, on whose behalf the war was being fought — [to make every effort] once and for all to convert the servitude in which they had hitherto found themselves into a permanent freedom, whereby the crown of France would be the more encouraged to attend to their affairs with proper determination. On the subject of this discourse, he, the Mecklenburg envoy, pointed out that the purpose of this assembly was to negotiate so as to achieve peace, to put an end to the war and to talk about ways of removing the foreign troops from the soil of the Empire; for in this consisted above all the freedom of the estates, so that they might at some point be saved from the intolerable and cruel burden of the war ... By means of the peace, the estates would be restored to their ancient freedom, but not by means of troops. (qtd. in Osiander 1994, 37)

Collective weakness cannot explain the position of the estates. During the Thirty Years War some of them, such as the elector of Bavaria, were quite able to maintain an independent policy at the European level. Bavaria or Saxony, for example, were as populous as the kingdom of Sweden, but they were more economically developed than Sweden (Osiander 1994).

Not only did the estates explicitly maintain their allegiance to the structures of the empire and the emperor during the negotiations but the institutional structures also remained overall functional in guaranteeing peace and stability in the empire long after the Peace of Westphalia had been signed (Bérenger 1994; Croxton 1999; Evans 1979; Nexon 2009). Figuring most prominently among them were the Diet (with representatives from all the estates deciding upon such issues as coinage, tariff regulations, and

guilds, but also warfare and taxation), the Reichskammergericht, and the Aulic council (Reichshofrat) (the empire's two supreme courts that functioned as the last instance of appeal in the lands of the empire) (Bérenger 1994; Evans 1979: 276). Despite the estates' rights to external representation and external warfare, they were never conceived to be sovereign precisely because they were subjected to these institutions and the authority of the emperor, whose approval they needed, for example, when ceding territory (Steiger 1998).

Inside the empire warfare between estates was officially prohibited and the regulation was generally accepted. Disputes between estates were supposed to be submitted to adjudication to one of the two supreme courts. In cases when wars did occur it was possible to take coercive measures to reestablish the respect of the constitution. The so-called Reichsexekutionen were usually ordered by the emperor, who was acting on the advice of either of the two supreme courts; the neighbouring estates were supposed to execute them. The instrument was quite common and often functioned successfully. For example, in 1702 the entire empire aligned with 120,000 troops to join the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, with a few exceptions. Thus Duke Anton Ulrich of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel decided to join the French side. He had to flee following an imperial execution implemented by Brunswick-Celle, Hanover, and Prussia (Gagliardo 1991, 261).

Within the empire the estates did not rely on balance-of-power thinking for maintaining order, but rather on the respect of the Imperial constitution and the institutions that were designed to protect it. Through the institutions of the circles and the Kreistage the estates contributed to the defence of the empire, financially by the levy of special taxes, and militarily by recruiting soldiers for the imperial army, with the emperor still functioning as the prime protector, supreme judge, and foreign policy leader of the edifice (Bérenger 1994, 129, 285; Croxton 1999; Evans 1979, 277). Thus it is difficult to argue that the empire was either nothing more than an alliance system between independent states (Philpott 2001) or "a vast and populous area" (Gagliardo 1991, 89) that could only be acted upon, but was incapable of action itself. If the empire continued to function as a viable sub-system within Europe, the claim that "institutional eclecticism" ceased to exist after the Peace of Westphalia (Philpott 2001, 99; Spruyt 1994) cannot stand either.

The medieval heteronomous structures that persisted in the empire found their expression in forms of diplomatic representation of the empire, and in the language and arrangements of the peace treaties. Different from the sovereign conception of diplomatic representation, where each diplomat represents one state and each state is represented by a coherent delegation with a single head, the empire was represented at the negotiations with a delegation for the emperor and delegations for the estates. Neither the emperor nor the estates, collectively or individually, could function as independent negotiators (Steiger 1998). The estates did not represent their own private interests at the negotiations, even though in a few rare occasions they could, but overall they functioned as a collective organ, as “foederates et adherentes” representing, together with the emperor, the interests of the empire as one entity (Croxtton 1999, 574; Steiger 1998, 36-43). They collectively picked a group of fifteen representatives that signed the treaties for the estates as a whole and as a result the treaties became binding for everybody included in the empire, even those who decided not to participate in the process. The Austrian diplomats in fact represented two, potentially even three different entities. On the one hand they represented the Austrian ruler by virtue of the Austrian territorial possessions. They also represented the empire as a whole, and by virtue of the Madrid-Vienna connection they could potentially also function as representatives of the House of Habsburgs (Bérenger 1996). The interests of these three entities could sometimes contradict one another so the diplomats might not have always acted in a coherent fashion.

Article 64 of the Treaty of Münster states that the estates can conclude alliances outside of the empire as long as they do not harm the empire. Contrary to the common perception that the Peace of Westphalia established with this right of representation the external sovereignty of the estates (Philpott 2001), article 64 demonstrates the heteronomous, medieval conception of the Holy Roman Empire, which was not a unitary actor precisely because it was not a territorial state and so it did not have a single external representation. The article upheld medieval diplomatic practices, according to which a variety of different actors, not just sovereign entities, could have diplomatic representation.³⁸

38. Stirk (2012) makes a similar argument. Gagliardo (1991, 85) and Steiger (1998, 36) also observe

The medieval character of the treaties also becomes obvious from the observation that the overwhelming majority of the treaty text addressed the concrete arrangements of particular localities with the specific rights, the so-called “Regalien,” that were to be transferred from one entity to another. The sum of Regalien, the rights to which a lord was entitled on a given land, was called *Landeshoheit*, in the German translation of the Latin term *ius territoriale* (Stirk 2012; Bérenger 1994, 284). The *Landeshoheit*, at least in the sense in which it was applied inside the empire, cannot be equated with sovereignty precisely because its concrete content always depended on the individual land to which it was tied. Thus the peace treaties were set with particular, place-specific arrangements that enlisted the concrete towns, castles, monasteries, abbeys, forests, lakes, and pastures over which the respective rights were to be exercised (Croxtton 1999).

The medieval structures lived on inside the Holy Roman Empire, which constituted a sub-system in the larger European system (Osiander 1994). But at the same time the peace negotiations demonstrate the at-first discursive distinction between an inside and an outside of the empire, a distinction that would have been nonsensical in the medieval notion of space. The emperor himself recognized that he was emperor of only a specific locality, not of Europe, or even the world at large. The idea of *Monarchia Universalis* had indeed come to an end. The demarcation of an interior of the empire and an exterior that was composed of independent kingdoms is noticeable in the previously cited conversation between the French delegate d’Avaux and the Mecklenburg envoy, but also in the emperor’s instructions to the Münster delegation:

We had since commencing our Imperial reign, sought and desired nothing more eagerly, in order to prevent the shedding of so much innocent blood and restore the old trust between the Holy Roman Empire and the neighbouring crowns, than the means to preserve, between, on the one hand, the Holy Empire and the electors, princes, and estates that faithfully serve and belong to it, and on the other, the foreign crowns that, at present, are found with their troops on the Holy Empire’s soil, good agreeable neighbourhood, to re-establish trade between the subjects on either side and to restore the old

that these arrangements for the diplomatic representation of the estates were not new.

trust to its previous state. (qtd. in Osiander 1994, 26)

Despite this noticeable discursive distinction that is particularly stark regarding France, numerous remnants of feudalism still blurred the clear demarcation. For example, the Swedish crown obtained a part of Pomerania as fiefs from the empire and became by virtue of these possessions a member of the empire with a seat in the Reichstag, as well as a seat in several regional assemblies (Kreistag) (Osiander 1994). A similar arrangement also applied to the English crown, on account of her rights in Hanover but not to France. Imperial representatives preferred that France did not become a member of the Empire (Croxtton 1999; Osiander 1994). Perhaps France was considered too powerful and/or the territorial statehood of France was already too perceptible to make such an arrangement plausible.

4.3.2 Diplomatic Precedence: The Remnants of the Unitarily Structured Hierarchical Space

While it was generally accepted by the time of the Peace of Westphalia that the pope and/or the emperor were not at the head of a *Monarchia Universalis* and that they had direct de jure suzerainty only in a territorially limited area, they nonetheless maintained their symbolic predominance by enjoying diplomatic precedence before everybody else. The emperor was also the party first listed in the peace treaties (Osiander 1994; Steiger 1998).

Many have argued that the pope lost his position as the father of Christendom following the peace treaties, exemplified by the fact that he was not even mentioned in the treaties. However, during the peace negotiations the papal nuncius maintained his role as the mediator between France and the Holy Roman Empire (Davis Cross 2007). Graham comes to the conclusion that “the Treaty of Westphalia excluded the papacy from a direct role in the great decisions of the European political community but it did not entirely laicize diplomacy” (1959, 163). The pope’s significance was not expressed in his diplomatic precedence only (which was obviously a result of his religious role rather than his temporal position as head of a rather small stretch of territory in Italy) but also in the fact

that well into the eighteenth century Rome remained the diplomatic capital for Catholic rulers where Catholic Europe discussed issues of concern. The pope still functioned as the main arbiter for disputes between Catholic powers (Steiger 1998). For Graham (1959) the main difference is that whereas papal legates used to dictate the pope's will, they now had to persuade by argument. At times they could be extremely successful, for example, when prior to the Spanish wars of succession and the Peace of Utrecht the Spanish king Charles II followed the pope's advice to choose a French royal member to inherit the Spanish throne. The admittedly short-lived alliance between France and Spain was one of the greatest successes of pontifical diplomacy in the seventeenth century (Blet 1996).

The diplomatic preeminence enjoyed by the emperor and the pope was not a mere formalism; the pursuit of honour and glory were crucial endeavours at the time (Lebow 2008). The peace negotiations themselves provided an opportunity to establish one's rank in international society: "Münster in those years was nothing less than a vast theatre of statecraft in which Europe's princely courts and republics displayed their status, legitimacy, and pretensions to grandeur, and rivalled each other in splendour, and the quest for reputación, as well as diplomatic finesse," which were expressed through various media "including décor, fine cuisine and art from all over Europe" (Israel 1997, 93). Under these circumstances ceremonial issues played a prime role and the parties argued for months over precedence, which eventually postponed the official opening of the negotiations for half a year (Anderson 1994; Gagliardo 1991; Reus-Smit 1999; Stirk 2012). Eventually the peace negotiations took place at two different locations, namely Münster, where the main negotiating parties were France and the emperor, and Osnabrück, with Sweden and the imperial delegation as the main protagonists, because the allies, Sweden and France, could not agree on issues of precedence. Sweden demanded parity with France, which France was unwilling to grant (Davis Cross 2007).³⁹ For the same reasons the two delegations could not officially meet in 1644 to discuss their negotiation strategy (Croxtton 1999).

France's negotiation position also worsened as a result of its unwillingness to concede

39. The second reason was that the papal nuncio refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of Protestant crowns.

ceremonial parity to its Dutch ally. The Dutch delegation decided to arrive in Münster only once the question of precedence was solved in her favour, and for France's obstinacy this meant that they reached the city more than a year after the inauguration of the conference (Lademacher 1998). Partly for France's stubbornness in ceremonial matters, the Dutch decided to sign a separate peace treaty with Spain more than nine months prior to the official Peace of Westphalia (Croxtton 1999). Recognition of ceremonial rank, as a sign of their independent position, was the prime achievement for the Dutch delegation in Münster and they had commissioned the painter Gerard Ter Borch to document the honours they received. Two main paintings resulted from this work: the entry of Adriaan Pauw, the mayor of Amsterdam and the prime negotiator of the Dutch delegation, into Münster, and the signing of the peace treaty with Spain (Israel 1997, 93; Lademacher 1998). *Adriaan Pauw's Arrival in Münster* already foretells the independence of the Netherlands by the special symbolism involved in the painting:

Pauw alone was a non-noble representing a republic, his position was a visibly exceptional and delicate one. While Ter Borch's painting does not attempt to depict him as if he were a noble, it does imply that, as Holland's representative, Pauw possessed all the prestige and dignity of the most aristocratic of his colleagues at the peace congress. Ter Borch highlights the ambiguity of the "entry" by contrasting Pauw's deliberately sober attire, the costume of a Dutch burgher, with the brilliance of the setting and splendid outfits of the accompanying coachmen and guards. Although, in reality, the event took place in the bleakness of January, when there would have been no leaves on the trees, Ter Borch made full use of the bright spring light and exuberance of foliage, prevailing at the time, in the spring of 1646, when he was actually working on the picture, to enhance its impact. (Israel 1997, 97)

Ter Borch's painting of the Spanish-Dutch treaty of independence in turn indicates, quite unusually for its time, parity between the two signatories — a hint at Dutch aspirations for equal status. Engravings were commissioned of Ter Borch's paintings and hung in public buildings across the Netherlands to mark the moment of Dutch independence



Figure 4.3: *Adrian Pauw's Arrival in Münster*, by Ter Borch (1646). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

and pride (Israel 1997, 104).

4.3.3 Emerging Conceptions of Balance of Power and Sovereignty

From the second half of the sixteenth century onward, by the time when a few kingdoms had established their *de jure* and *de facto* independence from papal and imperial authority, the concept of balance of power found some mention, although it was still ill defined with unclear policy implications. It was also far from being a universally acknowledged principle for maintaining international order. In the sixteenth century Cardinal Richelieu, Louis XIII's adviser, had developed the concept of *raison d'état* and the principle of continuous negotiation (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010), two of the necessary precursors for the balance-of-power ordering mechanism. Richelieu did not, however, employ the word *equilibrium* nor did he formulate a theory of balance of power. The Peace of Westphalia did not institute a balance-of-power system on a European scale. The balance of power was certainly not recognized as a concept inside the Holy Roman Empire proper and it was still quite alien to the rest of Europe. While the treaties es-

tablished an ordering principle for the Holy Roman Empire, the ordering mechanism of the European-wide system remained in limbo (Durchhardt 1989; Osiander 1994).

4.4 Synopsis

My characterization of the Peace of Westphalia as establishing a hybrid order between a medieval heterarchy and a modern territorial state order is in line with the interpretations of a recent wave of IR scholarship that ranges across different theoretical perspectives (Krasner 1993; Nexon 2009; Reus-Smit 1999; Stirk 2012). Krasner (1993) says, “the Peace of Westphalia was not a decisive break with the past. It codified existing practices more than it created new ones. Only in retrospect did Westphalia become an icon that could be used to justify further consolidations of the sovereign state against rival forms of political organization” (Krasner 1993, 246). Stirk (2012) suggests that the work of Leo Strauss has had a decisive effect on establishing the “Westphalian myth” (Osiander 2001a), whereas Steiger (1998) and Durchhardt (1989) remark that the Peace of Westphalia was already being re-interpreted as a constitution of Europe in the international treaties of *ancien régime* Europe, apparently because as a guarantor France derived a right to intervene in the German territories from the treaty.

The hybridity of the Peace of Westphalia was the outcome of a long trajectory that started in the form of two co-existing spaces. A medieval feudal space of overlapping authority structures cohabited next to a hierarchically structured religious space that operated mainly as a social imaginary. With increasing contact between rulers, the dispositions that crowned rulers inherited from their location within the feudal system conflicted with their positions in the hierarchically structured religious space as they now experienced them ever more directly. The discrepancy between a *de jure* dependence on the Empire and the Church and a *de facto* independence created a cognitive dissonance, most marked in the case of the French rulers. They questioned their *de jure* dependence on emperor and pope by employing linguistic strategies and by changing practices of submission. Other rulers had to wait for the emergence of Protestantism to free themselves from the dependence on Church and Empire for the legitimation of their rule. However,

Protestantism was neither necessary for external independence, as the French example demonstrates, nor was it sufficient, given that almost all the German Protestant princes proclaimed their adherence to the empire.

The Peace of Westphalia was signed at a time when crowned heads outside of the empire's direct sphere of influence had already established their independence from imperial suzerainty, whereas the princes in the direct sphere of the empire's influence did not experience the same cognitive dissonance; whether Protestant or Catholic, they wanted to maintain the emperor's suzerainty. Thus the Peace of Westphalia marked the end of European-wide imperial suzerainty while the medieval system lived on inside the empire. At the same time the forms of representation that were transferred from the religious realm into the secular realm still maintained many of their initial characteristics, the hierarchical structure apparent in diplomatic precedence being a case in point. Only slowly and incrementally was a new kind of order emerging on the European continent.

Chapter 5

Conceptualizing the Territorial State: Geometry and the Intertwined Effects of Perspectival Painting, Map Making, Warfare, and Architecture

While the previous chapter highlighted how kings obtained their independence from the pope and the emperor and how the ordering concept of universal monarchy came to an end, the mechanism of hysteresis did not help us to understand how the territorial state came to be conceived of as the dominant unit of the international system. At a time when the territorial state did not actually exist as a material entity on the ground, the conception of the territorial state as the main unit in international politics was a crucial precondition for the establishment of a territorial balance of power as the new ordering system for Europe. This chapter posits that a reignited passion for geometry had a series of interrelated effects on multiple forms of representation, in particular painting, map making, warfare, and architecture, which in their combination led to the conception of the territorial state. The qualitative changes in forms of representation that occurred were

largely the side effects of unintentional processes. Once the new forms of representation were established, rulers actively promoted them to enhance their power and standing. By promoting these new representative forms they also promoted, partly unwittingly, the image of the territorial state. To analyze these developments I use a mechanism of change inspired by complexity theory. A relatively small change in forms of representation had interrelated loophole effects that, over time, resulted in the emergence of a new type of international actor, and thus shaped the international order.

While I have been inspired by Branch's (2012; 2014) work on the effects of map making on the emergence of the territorial state, my argument substantively differs from his empirical analysis precisely because it posits that maps were merely one component within a complex web of several interdependent forms of representation, whose cumulative effects eventually resulted in the conception of the territorial state. Unlike Branch, I do not aim to explain the emergence of the territorial state as a material entity but rather to explain its conception, which formed a crucial pre-condition for a new type of order in Europe: a territorial balance of power - my explanandum.

Authors differ substantially about when the territorial state came into existence. Although it is a matter of degree to say that at a particular moment the territorial state emerged (Finer 1975; Fischer and Lundgreen 1975) most authors agree that the territorial state's development was a protracted process that reached its completion in the first half of the nineteenth century, even in such cases as France or Spain (Anderson 1961; Black 1990; Branch 2012; Bruun 1967; Osiander 2001a; Palan 2002; Revel 1991; Sahlins 1989: 198; Sheehan 1989; Teschke 2003). Prior to this date other polities, including the Holy Roman Empire, the papal states, independent cities, and city leagues still survived. Most monarchies resembled composite polities that shared a common monarch as opposed to territorial states with clearly demarcated boundaries, a continuous territory, a unified bureaucratic apparatus and legal system, and centralized tax collection (Bérenger 1994, 155; Branch 2014; Breuilly 1993; Kann 1974; Nexon 2009; Osiander 1994; Tilly 1975).¹

1. Various political entities could share one single monarch, such as the monarch of the House of Austria, or the monarch of the House of Spain. It then became common practice to speak about the Austrian monarchy or the Spanish monarchy. But "to refer to Austria is inaccurate because the German-speaking hereditary countries closely corresponding to the modern Republic of Austria did not annex Bohemia and Hungary and, moreover, the different states were freely associated on an equal footing"

Until the end of the eighteenth century, monarchs commonly ruled over discontinuous territory, enclaves of a foreign ruler within one's own land were numerous, and frontier zones were marked by a haze of overlapping jurisdictions and intersecting rights pertaining to different rulers and local communities (Anderson 1993; Anderson 1998, 97-100; Branch 2014; Sahlins 1989; Wolf 1970). Several legal and administrative regimes could apply within the territories ruled under one monarch with considerable local variation, following the variances in local historical developments (Anderson 1998; Branch 2012; Breuilly 1993, 98-99; Gagliardo 1991; Kann 1974; Osiander 2001a, 138; Sahlins 1989).² Various taxation regimes co-existed under the rule of one monarch, and internal customs could also be applied (Branch 2014, 162; Sahlins 1989, 78). In some cases a foreign ruler taxed the local population, in other cases there were tax exemptions, such as for the church in many countries under Catholic rule (Kann 1974, 189), and in still other cases, for example, Hungary at the time a part of the Austrian monarchy, the local estates were so strong that the monarch could barely excise any taxes from the land (Breuilly 1993, 98-99; Gagliardo 1991, 273-279; Kann 1974, 119-131). Gagliardo notes for the case of the Austrian monarchy in general that the situation was so protracted that "nothing even faintly resembling a comprehensive overview of the monarchy's finances was possible: income could not be predicted (or even properly accounted for), [and] budgeting was a wild guessing game" (1991, 273). Similarly for the case of France, Langins says "it takes a foolish temerity to claim anything close to a precise knowledge of government budgets during the Old Regime" (2004, 49). The monarch did not have a unified and even control over the entire territory under his or her rule and the acquisition of new land did not necessarily lead to a calculable material increase in wealth, or an enhanced geostrategic position (Sahlins 1989, 60), and even if it did, there was no way to know that.

From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, rulers nonetheless started to conceive of the territorial state as the main unit of international relations and of European order in terms of a territorial balance of power (Anderson 1998; Gulick 1967;

(Bérenger 1994, 156).

2. In the example of the Austrian monarchy, precisely the two chancelleries, which represented the state externally, were the ones which were centralized and unified over the whole kingdom, namely the chancelleries of diplomacy and warfare (Gagliardo 1991, 274).

Luard 1992; Murphy 1996; Schroeder 1994). Monarchs considered an expansion of the territorial extent of rule as a threat to the balance of power, and as a possible reason for military intervention. In fact, territory was the most common cause of war (Holsti 1991, 49). By contrast, an increase in the weapon arsenal, the number of soldiers, wealth from tax reforms, a growth in commerce, or enhanced administrative efficiency — all components that could increase the material capabilities of a state — did not appear to influence the balance of power (Anderson 1998; Holsti 1991; Schroeder 1994). Purely functional factors cannot explain the focus on territory as an indicator of capabilities, given that the connection between territory and capabilities was not straightforward but influenced by a whole series of other factors, which statesmen did not consider in their calculations.³

We can explain the apparent paradox by focusing on forms of representation and on the kinds of information that the available representative forms could convey. At a time when reliable statistics were not available (Black 1990), it was difficult to conceive of and communicate many of the potential sources of material capabilities. By contrast, a series of intermeshed processes starting with a reignited passion for geometry led to the conception of the territorial state as a unit in international relations and territory as a conceivable source of power, at a time when full control over that territory was not possible.

Conventional material explanations cannot account for the peculiar form the territorial state took (namely a bounded area in space on whose inside authority is evenly distributed) mainly because they exclusively focus on the functional side of material reality, and do not consider its constitutive dimension. For example, Tilly's (1990) argument about the consolidation of states based on the need for taxation to enlarge the size of the army, which then had to fight those revolting against an increase in taxation, can help us understand how particular rulers could accumulate power, but it does not help us understand the specific shape the territorial state took, namely a bounded area in space. Different rulers could have taxed the same population, they could have left out particular

3. Ardant (1975), for example, claims that France and Austria had roughly the same territorial extent and roughly the same population in the early eighteenth century, and yet Austria was significantly less powerful than France.

pockets of territory for a number of reasons, including inaccessibility of terrain, and they could have taxed discontinuous regions. Additionally, the material signs that represented the territorial state developed between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries, well before the territorial state emerged as a material entity on the ground, which suggests that those material signs might have guided the development of the territorial state, rather than emerging from it.

Purely ideational factors exemplified in developments in political theory have similar difficulties explaining the conception of the territorial state, given that the theoretical elaboration of the territorial state with linearly demarcated boundaries appeared in only the 1750s (Branch 2014; Elden 2013; Krasner 2009; Sahlin 1989). Thinkers such as Emerich de Vattel, Christian Wolff, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant started to clearly theorize the territorial state only when several material signs already portrayed its image. It is thus likely that the directionality went from the emergence of the territorial state's forms of representation to its theoretical conception and not vice versa.

The discovery of single-point perspective in painting, thanks to new developments in geometry, led to the emergence of a new conception of singular, unified space, as opposed to the heteronomous space of feudalism. Employing very similar projection methods as perspectival painting, modern map making gradually developed, which led to the portrayal of the territorial state on a two-dimensional surface. The new geometrical knowledge acquired in perspectival painting and map making also found applicability in the military realm, where it could serve the projection of cannon fire, the constellation of battle formations, and the construction of new fortifications. As a result of these new developments in warfare, which incidentally increased the demand for maps, the primary feudal form of representation, namely the medieval feudal castle, became indefensible. Instead, kings had new fortifications constructed along the frontiers of states. The new geometrical knowledge also served the construction, design, and decoration of the royal palace and its gardens—the miniature representation of the kingdom, visible and experienceable for diplomats and the aristocracy in general. The combined effects of these highly place-bound and specific forms of representation permitted rulers to express inter-

nationally an absolute control over a clearly demarcated uniform territory that did not actually exist on the ground.⁴ Philosophers only started to clearly theorize the territorial state at a time when international politics was already conducted in its name, while its boundaries still needed to be fixed and the control over its territory unified (Branch 2014, 32; Elden 2013, 328-329; Sahlins 1989, 93).

5.1 The (Re-)Invention of Linear Perspective

The Renaissance is usually considered a break from the medieval Christian world and a return to the humanist ideals of antiquity but such an interpretation omits many of the continuities and gradual transformations that took place in the arts. In particular, the invention of linear perspective, inspired by geometry, was a continuous process that originated in religious paintings centuries before emerging in paintings with antique and secular/political themes (Edgerton 1975; White 1987).⁵ The initial goal of linear perspective was to celebrate God's creation (Mukerji 1997). "Whatever the beliefs or disbeliefs of individual practitioners, perspective was essentially, at its deepest levels, a search for the divine, for ideal harmony and perfect beauty" (White 1987, 284). By studying geometry and proportion, "man could come to know God's plan and emulate it in his own 'arts'" (Cosgrove 1989, 118). With the invention of perspectival painting a new conception of space emerged. Instead of the feudal space of overlapping authority structures, space came to be thought of as uniform and measurable. From here it was only a small step to conceptualize political authority as being evenly spread over a given land.

The absence of a singular and immovable viewpoint from which a detached spectator could oversee a scene was typical for medieval art. Artists painted objects from many different angles, as one would experience them when walking through a particular place,

4. Other forms of representation also contributed to this image of the territorial state as a clearly demarcated entity, among them the developing linguistic practices of talking about "the Austrian monarchy" or the "Spanish monarchy," as if such a unified singular entity existed (Bérenger 1994, 156).

5. Field notes from visits to the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1 January 2013; the Prado, Madrid, 15 June 2011; the National Gallery, Permanent Exhibition of European Art from Antiquity to the end of the Baroque, Sternberg Palace, Prague, 27 December 2012; and the National Gallery, Permanent Exhibition of Medieval Art in Bohemia and Central Europe, Convent of St. Agnes of Bohemia, Prague, 21 December 2012.

from many different points of view (Edgerton 1975, 9; Rees 1980, 66). This form of art expressed the place boundedness and physical anchoredness of the human being in a concrete locality (Sack 1986, 129; Panofsky 1980). However, the Aristotelian locatedness in place, with its containedness and its focus on “limit and boundary” (Casey 1997, 77), fell into disgrace with the Church because the assumed finiteness of the universe, which went hand in hand with it, could not account for God’s infinite power. Where was God supposed to be if the cosmos was limited (Edgerton 1975, 159)? People reasoned that “if God [was] limitless in power, then His presence in the universe at large also [had to] be unlimited. Divine ubiquity thus [entailed] spatial infinity. It further [followed] that the physical universe itself [had to] be unlimited if it [was] to be the setting for God’s ubiquity as well as the result of His creation” (Casey 1997, 77). Artists and theologians accordingly went on a search for visual means to express infinite space. Euclid’s *Optics*, a comprehensive geometric study of vision, supplemented by Arab and European medieval optical studies, became one of the backdrops against which a new perspectival approach emerged (White 1987, 129).

Already in the second half of the thirteenth century the Franciscan monk Roger Bacon remarked that geometry could provide a sought-after divine harmony and order to paintings (Edgerton 1975, 16-19) because geometry could supply the technical means to express the size of objects in proportion to their distance (White 1987, 129). In the fourteenth century Italian painters such as Duccio, Giotto, Ambrogio Lorenzetti, and Altichiero were exploring ways to develop a unified form of perspectival representation, but they could not quite reach the set goal (Panofsky 1951; Kline 1953, 130-132; White 1987, 109-110). Only in the first half of the fifteenth century did the architect Brunelleschi invent a unified system of perspectival representation in two panel paintings (White 1987, 113-120). Brunelleschi’s contemporary Alberti then formalized it as a derivation from Euclidean geometry in his treatise *Della Pittura* (White 1987, 121-125). A geographical projection method intended for map making contained in the recently discovered ancient manuscript of Ptolemy’s *Geographia*, and reflections in flat-surface mirrors, probably inspired Brunelleschi and Alberti when they developed single-point perspective as a precise and unified geometrical system with its characteristic vanishing point (Edgerton 1975;



Figure 5.1: *Frankfurt Garden of Paradise*, Upper Rhenish Master, around 1410. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Rees 1980).

Perspective was now “lending visual expression to the concept of the infinite; for the perspective vanishing point can be defined only as ‘the projection of the point in which parallels intersect’” (Panofsky 1951, 17), like the rail tracks that seem to meet at the horizon. The vanishing point is the central element that orders the proportionality of all the other elements in the painting into a singular, unified, and abstract space with the help of a grid system. The exact location of the elements in the painting, their spatial relations to each other, and the distance between them all become discernible to the viewer. “Painters who adopted the scheme were able to create an illusion of depth in which each object was related to the viewing point of the beholder and was in scale with every other object in the painting. In other words, space in a perspective painting was

uniform and measurable” (Rees 1980, 67).



Figure 5.2: *The Last Supper*, by Leonardo da Vinci (1495-1498). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

We cannot interpret the invention of linear perspective in painting as the discovery of the correct way to paint realistically (Panofsky 1980), but the invention of a geometrical system helped painters to express a mathematical and allegedly divine harmony and order within a unified and infinite space (Edgerton 1975). Linear perspective does not express faithfully what or how the bare eye sees — we usually see with two eyes rather than one and we do not tend to stand still but move through the places we see and hence experience them from many different angles (Kline 1953, 139). No other civilization but the ancient Greek civilization and the European early Renaissance discovered linear perspective, nor does it appear to be the innate way in which children learn to draw (Edgerton 1975, 5). In short, linear perspective is not the natural way that humans see, but a cultural invention that has effects on how people conceive of space. These changed conceptions of space had profound impacts on political organization, but also on the sciences, map making, and civil and military engineering, among others.

While linear perspective in painting emerged as a form of representation that was supposed to express God’s ubiquity, and hence the universal power of the Church, over time this form of representation entered the political, feudal field. Next to the Church,

kings became the most important patrons of the arts in early modernity, perhaps as a result of their efforts to promote religious art to enhance their relation to God and their position in the Christian hierarchy. They acquired large art collections that expressed their high cultural standing and international prestige (Canaday 1972; Danet and Katriel 1994; Holsti 1991; Kline 1953).⁶ The content of paintings also gradually included more secular themes. Paintings and images became a crucial medium in diplomatic interaction from the sixteenth century onward. They decorated buildings and they were among the most important diplomatic gifts that kings gave to foreign representatives and rulers (Brassat 1995; Richefort 1996).⁷ These images served to transmit the cultural, artistic, architectural, and military achievements from a given kingdom (Béguin 1995), and hence diffused its prestige and image abroad. At times a painting could even replace the presence of a person for the performance of a ritual, such as a wedding, or an oath on a treaty (Polleroß 1995).⁸ Gutenberg's invention of movable type further enhanced the circulation of linear perspective as a universal. "Linear perspective pictures, by virtue of the power of the printing press, came to cover a wider range of subjects and to reach a larger audience than any other representational medium or convention in the entire history of art" (Edgerton 1975, 164). Kings started to make use of printed images to disseminate the splendour of their initiation rituals, such as the coronation, the funeral, or weddings, to an ever-wider audience (Bepler 1995).

Once the pictorial space of linear perspective entered the political/ feudal field that was characterized by heteronomy and overlapping authority structures, the conception of a new spatial organization of politics became possible. The new spatial organization

6. Field notes from visits to the Imperial Armory, Military Historical Institute, Schwarzenberg Palace, Prague, 26 December 2012; the National Gallery, Permanent Exhibition of European Art from Antiquity to the end of the Baroque, Sternberg Palace, Prague, 27 December 2012; and the National Gallery, Permanent Exhibition of Medieval Art in Bohemia and Central Europe, Convent of St. Agnes of Bohemia, Prague, 21 December 2012.

7. Apparently Pope Benedict XIII interrupted a procession to regard the tapestries of Le Brun's *Histoire du Roi* decorating the walls of the French embassy in Rome (Brassat 1995, 378).

8. Although Marin's observation about how a king becomes a king refers to the role of forms of representation in general rather than exclusively to portrait paintings, his eloquent comment nonetheless deserves being recalled: "What then is a king? He is a king's portrait, and that alone makes him king, and besides that he is also a man. To which it is appropriate to add that the 'portrait effect,' the effect of representation, *makes the king*, in the sense that everyone believes that the king and the man are one, or that the king's portrait is only the king's image. No one knows that, on the contrary, the king is only his image, and that behind or beyond the portrait there is no king, but a man" (Marin 1988, 218).

would have a singular, unified, and absolute space at its foundation. This new spatial understanding expressed in the paintings that decorated the walls of kingly palaces and diplomatic residencies was a critical precondition from which the territorial state could be conceived of as an entity in which the ruler's power extends evenly and completely over a given land (Curtis 2011; Ruggie 1993). The vanishing point uniformly governs and controls pictorial space, and the ruler was assumed to control a given political space accordingly.⁹ Marin found in a textual analysis that Louis XIV's historian Pellison structured his official history of the king's reign like a painting, situating the king "on the horizon of the perspectival field" (Marin 1988, 58). The representative form of linear perspective in painting operated like an icon; it represented by similarity/analogy an even control over a given territory, although that even control did not exist on the ground.

Even though linear perspective brought a unified and geometrical spatial conception to life, which informed the understanding of a unified control over land, it could not have any effect on the conception of the second characteristic feature of the territorial state, namely its demarcation by linear boundaries. Other forms of representation would eventually lead to the image of the territorial state with its linearly demarcated territory. The developments in art also influenced these other forms of representation. Artists such as Piero della Francesca, Uccello, Leonardo da Vinci, or Albrecht Dürer used the opportunities that painting (as a particular, material form of signification) offered them to search for hitherto undiscovered geometrical regularities. Their findings led to general advances in mathematics, in particular the foundation and development of projective geometry, which also influenced other forms of representation such as cartography or the design of fortifications (Kline 1953, 133-150; Pedeo 1976; White 1987, 203-278).

9. The geometrization of space (Casey 1997) and the resulting conception of infinite, absolute, and uniform space structured in the form of a grid were also the foundation from which the work of, among others, Descartes, Galileo, or Newton could develop (Edgerton 1975). Given that Descartes's major works were published in the seventeenth century, whereas linear perspective emerged in the fifteenth century, it is likely that the visualization of a homogenous, unified, and measurable space in the form of a grid had an impact on its theoretical conceptualization in the form of the Cartesian coordinate system. According to Elden (2013), the singular measurable space of the Cartesian coordinate system, in turn, influenced the emergence of territoriality and the conception of an absolute space, where the concreteness of place is reduced to the location of the site in the coordinate system (Casey 1997).

5.2 Cartography and the Emergence of Linearly Bounded Space

In its initial stages cartography and linear perspectival painting developed hand in hand. They both expressed the same spatial conceptions. Like medieval paintings, medieval maps could depict individual geographic features, directions, and angles accurately, but they did not represent the sizes of those features or the distances between them proportionally (Edgerton 1975; Rees 1980; Smith 2008; Woodward 1985). In other words, maps and paintings did not portray space as a unified whole, but as a collection of disconnected places. Similar to paintings, many maps served primarily decorative purposes—they were a kind of painting (Branch 2014; Smith 2008). In fact according to Rees, “the approaches of mapmaker and painter and the forms of maps and paintings were often so similar that no clear distinction could be made between practitioners or their products” (1980, 65), an observation that finds confirmation in the fact that usually the same terminology was employed when referring to either maps or paintings.

It does not come as a surprise, then, that those artists most fascinated by perspectival painting and geometry would also become the first modern cartographers. Inspired by Ptolemy’s ancient manuscript on employing projection methods for map making, Alberti was the first person to write a theoretical treatise on linear perspective in the early fifteenth century. Several decades later he developed a mapping technique that proceeded from Ptolemy’s *Geographia* (Edgerton 1975). Some painters, such as Pieter Brueghel, entertained close ties with cartographers, which might be one of the reasons for “the map-like character of some of his paintings” (Rees 1980, 62). Other renowned painters like Albrecht Dürer and Leonardo da Vinci made valuable theoretical and empirical contributions to cartography. Leonardo da Vinci was allegedly the first person to design a modern map (Rees 1980; Sack 1986; Smith 2008).

It appears that modern maps developed gradually out of perspectival paintings, in particular city views, rather than from a single event like the discovery of Ptolemy’s *Geographia*, as Branch (2011) suggests.¹⁰ Out of a fascination for linear perspective,

10. Field notes, visit to the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, 7 January 2013.

artists started to draw city views from an oblique elevation as bird's-eye views. Initially these oblique positions were actually existing views of the city, for example, from a hill. Once the city view became an imagined view, such as in da Vinci's drawing of Milan, it was necessary to perform "an abstraction based on the principles of mathematical perspective in an effort to preserve accuracy" (Rees 1980, 69). From here it was only a small step to draw a city view from an entirely vertical perspective. Because such a vertical view from directly above the city did not exist at the time, painters had to extrapolate it with the help of geometrical calculations similar to those used for the imaginary oblique perspective. But a city view drawn from a position vertically above the city and in line with the rules of linear perspective is nothing other than a modern map. Smith traces these developments on concrete maps, including in-between examples of maps that combine "an ichnographical rendering of the streets with a bird's-eye view of the topography that shows the churches, houses, and other structures with at least an attempt at architectural detail" (Smith 2008, 61).

The concrete method employed to depict the world on a two-dimensional map, or on a canvas, was the division of the world into longitudinal and latitudinal axis, that is, into a grid that could then be "projected on a flat surface" (Rees 1980, 67) with the help of projective geometry, an area of study that emerged from perspectival painting (Edgerton 1975; Kline 1953,151-157). This grid is the form of representation that established the uniform and measurable geometric space of modernity that was the precondition for the division of political space into abstract lines, sometimes regardless of natural or cultural features (Edgerton 1975; Sack 1986).

Throughout the sixteenth century surveying techniques became ever more advanced, which made the trained eye of the artist less necessary (Smith 2008). As conventionalized symbols replaced the actual shapes and appearances depicted, the artist's dexterity was no longer needed. "For some time after the establishment of systematic, scientific surveys in the seventeenth century, the techniques of landscape sketching, so useful to natural scientists, engineers, and soldiers, kept alive the direct relationship between cartography and art" (Rees 1980, 63). However, from the eighteenth century onwards, "maps were no longer pictures but symbolic abstractions, with losses in decorative effect balanced

against gains in clarity and accuracy” (Rees 1980, 71; Smith 2008). In other words, the causal link of surveying that related the countryside to the map and ensured the accurate depiction of distances and the proportionality of sizes became more important. Symbols decided by social convention (such as little red squares for houses and blue lines for rivers) replaced efforts to accurately draw the landscape.

Even though Ptolemy’s *Geographia* had been introduced to Florence at the beginning of the fifteenth century, it took until the early sixteenth century for the modern type of maps to spread throughout Europe because, despite *Geographia*’s wide circulation, “what in retrospect ended up as the book’s most important contribution — Ptolemy’s instructions for map projections — was not emphasized by many fifteenth-century scholars” (Branch 2014, 51). Once modern maps emerged, the invention of the printing press facilitated their diffusion across the continent (Branch 2014, 54; Revel 1991; Smith 2008), so that by the 1600s millions of maps were in circulation. However, for quite some time these new ways of depicting space co-existed next to older forms of mapping. Initially, private individuals commissioned the new maps for commercial purposes, and the maps usually represented small areas. Only later in the sixteenth century did rulers occasionally use maps. The first rare maps of entire realms appeared around this time. It was also at this time that the first atlases emerged, which “gradually adopted an increasing number of discrete boundary lines and homogeneously color-filled spaces” (Branch 2014, 148), thus depicting territorial states that did not exist on the ground. In the seventeenth century rulers used maps representing territorial states with linearly demarcated boundaries on a regular basis, and later in the century they commissioned their first large-scale mapping projects (Branch 2014, 71-75; Revel 1991), with France’s King Louis XIV one of the main precursors whom others imitated (Branch 2014; Mukerji 1997).

Given that modern maps initially developed without rulers’ input, the resulting effects in terms of spatial conceptualizations emerged unintentionally. The colouring of maps, which even further highlighted the homogenous nature of territory, was also initially undertaken for purely aesthetic reasons to make maps into more beautiful artifacts (Branch 2014). In other words, maps’ colours resulted from their functional purpose to serve as decorative items, but had the unintended side effect of conveying the king’s



Figure 5.3: *Livoniae et Curlandiae* by Frederik de Wit/Pieter Mortier (1710). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

power at the expense of the feudal lords's power. Only once the representative form of modern maps fully developed—once the qualitative change in forms of representation had already taken place—did rulers use them instrumentally to further their own interests. Thus they could ask their cartographers to draw a particular territory as located inside the kingdom to increase the legitimacy over their claims to the land, or they could request that their military campaigns and conquests be made visible on a map to enhance the king's glory (Revel 1991). In general, maps helped rulers portray their power as they made the alleged extent of their rule visible, while the remaining power of feudal lords and estates became invisible because the modern map could not display overlapping jurisdictions and authority rights. It was to the kings' advantage that modern maps spread throughout societies. Children learned about them in schools, aristocrats hung them on the walls of their homes as aesthetic objects and collectors' items, and they became generally ubiquitous by being displayed on a range of artifacts. For example, they "were also printed on playing cards, woven into tapestries, engraved on medals, and used in

biblical illustrations” (Smith 2008, 67; see also Rees 1980; Revel 1991). Gradually the image of the territorial state became engrained in society because “one will say without preparation and offhandedly of Caesar’s portrait that it is Caesar, and of a map of Italy that it is Italy,” as Arnauld and Nicole already remarked in the seventeenth century (qtd. in Marin 1988, 229).

Given the geometrical relations that indexically link the map to its terrain (and provide the map with its authority), the map appears as an accurate and objective representation of the land it portrays. The map is understood to resemble the terrain as an icon of the land. For example, Gomboust, an engineer of Louis XIV and one of the designers of a map of Paris ordered by the king, wrote in his dedication to Louis XIV: “The other maps of this same city that have appeared up to now have been scorned as entirely false, or at least without measure and proportion; there is room to hope that this one, having been made according to the rules of geometry, will be esteemed not only because of the great advantages that can be derived for the very service of Your Majesty but also in order that, in the most distant countries, those who have believed the reputation of Paris to be above the truth may admire its greatness and beauty” (qtd. in Marin 1988, 174).

To be sure, even mapping technologies based on geometric projection methods cannot avoid some form of distortion in proportionalities and are therefore not *the* accurate way of representing land, but only one among several options (Edgerton 1975; Kline 1953; Smith 2008).¹¹ However, seeing the map of Paris appears like seeing Paris. By virtue of the indexical and the iconic relationship between the map and the terrain, the person seeing the map makes the assumption that everything portrayed on the map also exists on the land, and thus does not necessarily realize the map’s constitutive effects, especially if that person does not have any first-hand experience of the land in question. Given that in the seventeenth and eighteenth century travel was more difficult than it is today, rulers,

11. The distortions introduced by different mapping techniques vary but cannot be avoided because portraying the surface of a hemisphere on a plane will always lead to some distortions. These distortions range from distortions in angles to distortions in areas. Thus, in the Mercator method, the most common method of projection, “Greenland appears almost as large as South America though actually it is one-ninth as large. Canada appears twice as large as the United States; it is one and one-sixth as large” (Kline 1953, 157).

aristocrats, and diplomats depended on forms of representation to make themselves an image of the respective kingdom. Maps then introduced several changes to this image.

First, on the map, especially if it is all filled with the same color, the land of a particular kingdom appears as “homogenous and continuous” (Revel 1991, 158); local distinctions and particularities disappear from view. “Through [the] imposition of a unified representational structure the diversity of the countryside coalesced into the imposed order of the mapped country” (Smith 2008, 63). It seemed that the ruler’s control was evenly distributed over the extent of the territory demarcated as belonging to that ruler; the two-dimensional surface could not represent complex authority structures. Even more curiously, map makers pictured entities such as Italy, which had no form of political institutionalization, in the same way as entities like France or Spain, which had some degree of centralization (Branch 2014, 83).

Second, once the map depicted uniform, geometrically defined space, it lent itself to demarcate the territory of one kingdom from another by drawing a clear line separating them. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries more maps had linear boundary demarcations on them. Thus it appeared on the map that clear boundary lines delimited a ruler’s authority (Branch 2014). Maps depicted the container schema with a clear boundary, an inside, and an outside, and this affected how people conceived of the spatial organization of rule. A Jesuit theologian, Father Fabri, remarked in 1669, “I have seen children of good birth, who were given a map of Italy, Germany, France, or Spain and could immediately indicate the major divisions using their ruler as a pointer. They traced the borders with the end of it” (qtd. in Revel 1991, 154). Rulers themselves came to use cartography frequently. Even the conception of natural frontiers, first rivers and later mountains, might have well emerged from the use and diffusion of maps (Black 1990; Sahlins 1989). A river drawn on a map strongly resembles a boundary line, and cartographers used to depict mountain ranges at frontiers in a different colour, thus effectively demarcating boundaries.¹² The appeal of natural frontiers was apparently so strong that

12. Branch (2014) notes that linear boundaries came to demarcate the territory in the New World before they demarcated territory in Europe. Given the lack of historical knowledge and lived experience from the New World, European rulers could conceive of it more easily as empty space than they could of Europe, where they were well aware of all the traditional authority structures that were in place. While the experiences from the colonization of the New World might have reflected back on European

a cartographer could trace “a line of mountains where there were none” (Sahlins 1989, 60). In general the colouring in maps was the strongest around the boundary line (Branch 2014), which visually highlighted the boundary as the map’s central element.

Third, countries on the map are located horizontally one next to the other, rather than vertically in a hierarchical relationship (Burkhardt 1998, 86-90). To be sure, a country that takes up more space on the map, and hence allegedly possesses more territory, appears more powerful than a country that takes up less space on the map. However, the distinction between countries based on the amount of territory they possess is a measurable difference in degree, rather than a qualitative difference between kingdoms. It is this horizontal depiction of countries on a map that formed a fundamental precondition for the establishment of a territorial balance of power as a new ordering system for Europe, and maps served as a tool that statesmen used to balance each other. For example, “Torcy [told] his British counterpart in 1712 to look at a map in order to see the strategic threat posed by Victor Amadeus’s alpine demands. In 1750 Puysieulx, a successor of Torcy, remarked that a simple examination of a map would show that it was in the interest of the elector Palatine to be always united with France” (Black 1990, 195).

5.3 Geometry’s Role in the Military Revolution and its Effects on Conceiving of the Territorial State

The army and the prevailing practices of warfare are forms of representing a given political entity, just as much as paintings or maps. In this sense I do not think of the military exclusively as a tool of the state, as realists do, but at least as importantly as a form of representation that characterizes and defines the state—that even brings the state into existence. Diverse actors, such as soldiers, military generals, the aristocracy (from whose ranks the generals and the diplomats came), as well as the heads of states, made

practices, I do not think that the colonial experience was a necessary condition for the conception of linearly demarcated boundaries in Europe proper, in part because there were some very early examples of linear boundary demarcation on the European continent that preceded the developments in the New World, such as the longitudinal line that was established as a linear boundary between Milan and Florence during their wars in the 1420s (Edgerton 1975, 114).

assumptions about the state's type and character from prevailing practices of warfare. Thus, while I analyze similar phenomena as realist scholars do to explain the emergence of the territorial state, my focus shifts from an analysis of a measurable concentration of power in the hands of particular actors, that is, from quantifiable changes in degrees, toward an analysis of the constitutive effects that qualitative changes in military practices had on the conceptualization of the territorial state.

Paintings, maps, and the military are not only all forms of representation that brought the conception of the territorial state to life—they also mutually influenced each other's development. The military was among the prime initiators of map development, which it needed for constructing fortifications, organizing defence, launching military attacks, establishing battle formations, and organizing supply chains in times of war (Anderson 1998; Branch 2014; De Leon 1996; Duranthon 1978; Elden 2010; Guerlac 1986; Hale 1985; Langins 2004; Mukerji 1997; Revel 1991; Sahlins 1989; Smith 2008). Especially once cannons were used in warfare, it became necessary to have accurate maps so that soldiers could know on which routes to transport them (Krippendorf 2000). Accurate maps were also necessary for the new demands put on fortifications arising from the need to resist cannon fire (Smith 2008). Military engineers often made the maps with the help of their training in geometry and projection techniques (Israel 1997). Thus Gombous, Louis XIV's engineer, and M. Petit, an intendant of fortifications (who was the student of Girard Desargues, one of the founders of projective geometry and a member of the Academy of Painting), designed the previously mentioned map of Paris (Marin 1988, 169; Pedeo 1976: 193).

These tight connections existed not only between mapping and the military, but also between painting and military innovation. Well-known Renaissance painters were among the first to calculate the trajectory of cannon fire or to envision new forms of fortifications that would be able to withstand cannon fire. "It is no exaggeration to state that the Renaissance artist was the best practicing mathematician" (Kline 1953, 127), and thanks to the invention of perspective, artists had the depth perception to draw new military designs to scale. Thus Dürer wrote a treatise on fortifications (Argan 1969; Pedeo 1976) and Leonardo da Vinci regularly offered his services as "an engineer, skilled in the

arts of war” (Pedeo 1976, 91; see also Guerlac 1986, 68), as did Michelangelo. Filippo Brunelleschi, the inventor of linear perspective, was primarily an architect and engineer rather than a painter (Bennett and Johnston 1996; Edgerton 1975; Langins 2004; Panofsky 1951). In the eighteenth century a person like Paul Sandby could still exemplify the connections between art, mapping, and the military, all linked to each other by the language of geometry. He was “a distinguished eighteenth-century watercolorist, worked in the map and survey office of the Tower of London, and from 1768 to 1779 he was drawing master at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, the training school for British military surveyors and draftsmen” (Rees 1980, 63). According to a Spanish training manual for military officers, “a knowledge of arithmetic, geometry, and perspective is the foundation on which the perfect artillery officer will develop a more specialized understanding of the use of cannon in warfare, from sieges to pitched battles” (de Leon 1996, 72). These interconnections between warfare, mapping, and art existed on both a personal level and persisted institutionally well into the eighteenth century. Thus military engineers were trained in the Berlin academy of arts, whose major focus was on “painting, sculpture, and architecture,” until Frederick II, King of Prussia, established the academy of architecture in 1799 (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975, 552).

The particular skill that linked the military engineer to the artist was “the knowledge of disegno.” “Disegno, which relied so much on the science of perspective, was therefore both highly technical (requiring a knowledge of the liberal arts of arithmetic and geometry) and indispensable in the depiction of new kinds of structures and artifacts. Here was a strong link with mathematics and theory that enabled the painter as well as the architect to claim a higher status than that of a mere artisan” (Langins 2004, 23). Drawing was very important for the military engineer because it helped him to identify possible design flaws before the building was executed, to communicate clearly with his subordinates, and to coordinate their activity. And, not least, it provided him with a concise and eloquent way to communicate with government officials (Langins 2004, 148).

The introduction of gunpowder first brought geometry’s indispensability for the conduct of warfare to light because to aim, either with a cannon or with smaller weapons, it was necessary to calculate the trajectory of the bullet (Bennett and Johnston 1996;

Cosgrove 1989; Heuser 2010). Guerlac goes as far as claiming that “perhaps it would not be too much to assert that the foundations of modern physics were a by-product of solving the fundamental ballistical problem” (1986, 70). A new method of triangulation was developed to measure the distance to a target that an army could not reach directly, and it was also necessary to calculate the elevation of the cannon to hit the target.¹³ However, even with the help of geometry, cannons and other firearms did not prove very useful on the battlefield for quite some time to come because they were so hard to manoeuvre and would miss their target more often than not. This problem stemmed from a range of variables that could not yet be calculated, including air resistance (Howard 2009).

Although cannons did not prove very useful in battle, they turned out to be highly effective in siege warfare, where they could easily destroy the key representative form of feudal lords and a fundamental basis of their power, the feudal castle (Barraclough 1962; Langins 2004). The feudal castle’s high walls, which protected well against raiding bandits, were particularly vulnerable to cannon fire (Bennett and Johnston 1996; Howard 2009). Over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, cannon fire destroyed many of the feudal castles across the countryside (Langins 2004; Wolf 1970). The French were the first to employ the newly found artillery power in siege warfare, which they used toward the end of the Hundred Years war against the English and with even more power and efficiency at the end of the fifteenth century in Italy (Howard 2009; Langins 2004).

Consequently, a new type of fortification developed in Italy, the so-called *trace italienne*, which better withstood cannon fire (Argan 1969; Guerlac 1986; Heuser 2010). This “new genre of fortification rested in a geometrical formalism” (Bennett and Johnston 1996, 12; Cosgrove 1989; Finer 1975; Fischer and Lundgreen 1975), which engineers used to develop structures that were as resilient as possible to cannon fire and that would simultaneously provide the most strategic conditions for attacking a besieging army (Ar-

13. The application of geometry to military affairs led to the further development of geometry, just as the application of geometry to perspectival painting had led to advances in geometry, which found their application elsewhere. Among these innovations were, for example, mathematical theorems developed for the projection of cannon fire. The usefulness of geometry for military affairs also becomes apparent from the fact that a figure like Napoleon Bonaparte had geometrical theorems named after him (Pedeo 1976).

gan 1969; Heuser 2010; Langins 2004, 15-59), such as avoiding areas in front of the castle walls that gunfire could not reach, or increasing the opportunities for crossfire. Aesthetic appeal, in particular the beauty of symmetry and geometrical figures, played at least as important a role in the design of new fortifications (Langins 2004). It is no coincidence that this new type of fortification developed in Italy at the end of the fifteenth century and became common by the middle of the sixteenth century, given that the Italian cities had all the necessary preconditions, such as mapping techniques, drawing skills, and geometrical knowledge for the new fortification designs to emerge. Such prominent figures as Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and Niccolo Tartaglia were involved in their development (Elden 2013). Given that many Italian architects started to work for other European courts, the new type of fortification quickly spread to the rest of Europe. These fortification designs dominated in Europe for the next three centuries (Anderson 1998; Langins 2004).



Figure 5.4: Seventeenth-century plan of the city of Palmanova, Italy. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The role of fortifications increased all the more as generals were ever more reluctant to stage battles, and the main form of warfare became a positional warfare concentrated on sieges, manoeuvring and logistic supply chains (Fischer and Lundgreen 1975; Holsti 1991; Howard 2009; Langins 2004; Roothenberg 1986: 33-46). From the sixteenth century until the French revolution generals avoided battles, in part because battles tended to depend on chance, could hardly be staged if the opposing general decided to avoid battle, and were often indecisive (Heuser 2010; Palmer 1986; Wolf 1951). The increasing number of fortifications in frontier areas also rarely left any other choice but the conduct of a siege, which often lasted for several months, so that a general could not hope to conduct more than one or two sieges per season (Guerlac 1986; Howard 2009). Siege warfare itself required the presence of engineers skilful in geometry because they had to set the lines of the trenches at certain angles so that the fire coming from the fortress could not hit the besieging soldiers (Howard 2009). For example, in Louis XIV's army the main engineer of fortification, Vauban, was responsible for directing sieges (Guerlac 1986).

Even for the occasionally occurring battle, geometry was crucial to organize the marching formations of soldiers and to manoeuvre them from marching formations to battle formations and subsequently to organize their movement throughout different military manoeuvres (Cosgrove 1986; Elden 2010). "Elaborate geometrical patterns such as those depicted in the *Encyclopédie* illustrate the various combinations of maneuvers that became part of the standard drill manuals and officially accepted battle orders. Even though simple, the various combinations of these geometrical patterns provided one of the reasons for the study of mathematics by military officers" (Langins 2004, 197). De Leon provides a sixteenth-century citation from Valdes, a Spanish cavalry general who considered arithmetic important for generals. "Because one primary responsibility of the sergeant major is the organization of his troops into marching or fighting formations, his ideal officer must be 'skillful in arithmetic,' for without such knowledge it would be impossible to create the perfect squares that were the pride of the tercios" (1996, 69). Over time, as the frequency of infantry fire increased, those perfect squares gradually transformed into long thin lines, the so-called "*ordre mince*," which were only two to three ranks deep (Finer 1975; Howard 2009; Palmer 1986). "The classic pattern of

eighteenth-century warfare, with lines of soldiery delivering continuous volleys, was fully established by the War of the Spanish Succession” (Wolf 1951, 11). The long thin lines must have appeared like linear boundaries; once breached, the territory behind them became available.



Figure 5.5: *The Battle of Poltova* (1709) by Denis Martens the Younger, painted 1726. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

It was from the *ordre mince* that the French military engineer Sebastian Le Prestre de Vauban got the idea to develop a continuous line of fortifications designed to protect the territory of France from foreign attack, thus effectively creating a fortified frontier (Guerlac 1986, 88; Heuser 2010, 79; Howard 2009, 35; Sahlins 1989, 68). In a letter to Louvois, Louis XIV’s minister of war, Vauban wrote “the frontier would be very well fortified if it were reduced to two lines of fortifications, just like lines of soldiers in battle” (qtd. in Langins 2004, 71). For his defence system, Vauban used natural geographic features, such as mountain ranges and rivers, and the already-existing fortifications in the frontier zone, many of which had been built by his predecessor Pagan (Guerlac 1986; Langins 2004). However, he complained about the overall arrangement of the fortifications (Anderson 1998, 99). In a letter of 20 January 1673, he wrote to Louvois,

“seriously, my lord, the king should think seriously about rounding out his domain [songer à faire son pré carré]. This confusion of friendly and enemy fortresses mixed up pell-mell with one another does not please me at all. You are obliged to maintain three in the place of one” (qtd. in Guerlac 1986, 86; Wolf 1970, 75).¹⁴ Vauban’s and Louis XIV’s main contribution was to form these independently existing fortifications into two lines, eventually becoming one line that strongly resembled the establishment of a linear boundary for military affairs. This meant that Vauban had to strengthen some fortifications, abandon others, and establish some form of barrier between them. If it was not possible to use waterways and canals, he constructed field fortifications (Wolf 1970; Guerlac 1986; Langins 2004).¹⁵ Vauban’s linear system of fortifications and waterways became so popular and successful throughout Europe that others imitated it, including Coehorn in the Netherlands, and military leaders in Britain, Prussia, and Spain (Holsti 1991; Howard 2009; Langins 2004; Palmer 1986; Roothenberg 1986; Sahlin 1989; Wolf 1951).

Once the fortified frontier was established, the main focus in warfare became defending the fortified line that formed the frontier: “In 1676 and 1677 the war on the frontier between the Spanish Netherlands and France was primarily aimed at establishing a rational frontier line, and the war ministry detached troops from one army to another to maintain superior power over the enemy at every point that might be threatened. Thus

14. The Pré carré is a reference to a square duelling meadow. According to Mukerji (1997, 56) Vauban “worked to make France into a great square shape (the pré carré) because he felt that the simple geometrical form would give the physical state a kind of abstract legitimacy.” “The oceans and the Pyrenees mountains, which marked most of France’s borders, gave it a fundamentally natural form. The geometrical shape of this territory underscored France’s place in a larger, natural order. According to this perspective, the actions of the military along the northern and eastern borders of France simply filled out the form, and gave the country its rightful shape” (Mukerji 1997, 259).

15. Branch (2014, 155) does not consider Vauban’s frontier fortifications to have played a role in the conception of the territorial state for two reasons. First, he says that Vauban was pursuing purely practical military goals in his fortification of France and did not have any pre-existing conception of either sovereignty or territoriality in mind. Second, Branch claims that by focusing on individual fortifications, Vauban was focusing on individual places, and not on a linearly confined space. Branch’s second claim appears to be incorrect, given that numerous military historians highlight that Vauban’s main contribution lay in establishing a system of fortifications, along two, and eventually one line, including continuous military protection between the individual fortifications. Regarding Branch’s first claim, a clear pre-conception of sovereignty or territoriality is not a necessary condition for such a conception of territoriality to result from Vauban’s system of fortifications. In other words, intentionality is not a necessary pre-condition for a particular action to have effects; there are non-intentional effects, as Branch himself observed when he highlighted the effects of cartography on the conception of the territorial state.




Figure 5.6: Vauban’s lines of fortifications. Source: Rebel Redcoat (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0. Wikimedia Commons.

by maneuvering detachments behind a fortified semicircle, the French could take advantage of their interior lines of communication” (Wolf 1970, 59). At least in the case of the Franco-Spanish frontier zone in the Pyrenees, this military frontier was then also what “dominated all other boundaries throughout the French and Spanish struggles that lasted until the 1720s. Initially, the control of the military frontier ignored the political division of territories but, over the course of several decades, the territorial division made its appearance at the heart of that frontier” (Sahlins 1989, 62). The boundary lines drawn on military maps were located in the places where soldiers positioned the military frontier in the terrain (Sahlins 1989, 63-73). To be clear, the fortified military frontier did not immediately establish a legal linear boundary. Overlapping authority rights and jurisdictions continued to exist until the end of the eighteenth century, but the fortified frontier provided the representation of a linear boundary. As real material entities the fortifications had a functional effect on the conduct of warfare, which co-existed next to them, operating, albeit unintentionally, as the representative forms of the territorial

state.

All of this changed during the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon divided his soldiers into small, detached divisions that could move at high speed through the countryside. They simply bypassed fortifications without undertaking any sieges. Napoleon's soldiers could live off the country and so did not depend on the slow movement of logistic supply chains (Finer 1975; Howard 2009; Palmer 1986). Napoleon would then search for major field battles to win his wars. His strategy worked for some time because nationalistic zeal highly motivated his soldiers so he did not have to fear their desertion. For a few years, Europe's perceived boundaries seemed to have disappeared from the continent; the ordering concept of Empire made a brief comeback (see also [chapter 7](#)). Eventually, however, Napoleon's strategy was bound to fail. For one, his entire strategy depended on winning major battles. If he lost a battle, which was in part contingent on luck, he could not feed his army from the enemy's magazines. Second, Napoleon's opposing generals made use of his supply difficulties, which resulted from his fast movement through the land (Heuser 2010; Howard 2009). The nineteenth century then brought a partial return to the boundary-focused warfare of the previous century, although, due to technological innovations, siege warfare played an ever-less important role in overall military strategy (Finer 1975; Howard 2009; Langins 2004). By now, however, the territorial state in Europe was a fully established entity that found its forms of representation in a myriad of other ways (Sahlins 1989).

5.4 The King's Palace and Its Gardens: A Miniature Replica of the Territorial State

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the king's palace represented the kingdom and the king's power, as well as the stage on which the king reigned; it provided the backdrop for his rule. According to Elias "the king's rule over the land was nothing but an affiliation and an outsourcing of the prince's rule over the court and the house. . . The absolutist king affected his country only via the intermediary of the people living in

the court. The sociology of the court then is also the sociology of the kingdom” (1969, 69).¹⁶ Around 10,000 people used to live in the palace of Versailles during Louis XIV’s reign, including the high nobility (Elias 1969, 125). The spatial arrangements in which these people interacted shaped and reflected their societal relations and structured their thoughts through image schemas.

Following its antecedents in the medieval feudal castle, in *ancien régime* Europe the house and the adjacent gardens defined the prestige and social standing of its owner; they functioned as an icon of a person’s position in society. The indexical relationship between the house and the person or the house and the country finds expression in metonymic language. It was common across European languages to refer to “the house,” such as “the house of France,” or “the house of Austria,” when talking about a particular monarchy, which highlights the crucial identifying role the house played. The key identifying role of the house in *ancien régime* Europe also follows from the clear rules that guided the decoration of a person’s house depending on one’s profession, and one’s social standing in society (Elias 1969). The *Encyclopedie* refers to five architectural styles, each of which is related to the particular social standing of a person. The *Encyclopedie* further describes how the concrete decoration of a house depends on one’s profession, and that nobody’s house was allowed to overcome the magnificence of the king’s palace (Elias 1969, 90-93). The house’s name was contingent upon a person’s social standing. Thus in France the house of an aristocrat of high social standing was called “hotel” or “grand hotel,” the house of a prince “palais.” To maintain the high standing of the family as expressed in the magnificence of the house, many aristocratic families eventually went bankrupt (Elias 1969), and on his deathbed Louis XIV himself regretted his passion for building as one of two vices (the other being his passion for warfare) that had caused suffering to others (Mukerji 1997, 1).

As the previous chapter discussed, the court also served as the scene where practices of precedent developed, which established a clear social hierarchy (Wolf 1951). Particular features of the architecture were even adapted to suit ceremonial and ritual performances, such as the layout of the individual rooms, the exact number of antechambers, or the

16. My translation from German.

crucial role of the baroque staircase (Elias 1969; Hartmann 1988). While the papal court in Avignon likely served as the antecedent of this new court culture, the gardens adjacent to the palaces had their roots in the Italian garden, which originated from cloister gardens (Mukerji 1997). However, at the French court of the seventeenth century these medieval representative forms found a qualitatively new expression. The changes in military engineering, perspective, and geometry in general ultimately conveyed a new meaning. The king's palace and his gardens, the places where the overwhelming majority of politically meaningful interaction took place, came to serve as a material illustration of the territorial state.

Nicolas Fouquet, Louis XIV's first finance minister, a man very well versed in the arts and a patron for French artists, was the first person to have a palace built at Vaux-le-Vicomte with adjacent formal gardens that made use of a geometrical layout and the new developments in military engineering, all in a particularly French style. Once he completed the edifice he invited Louis XIV and Colbert to a garden party to show his new residency. Immediately after the garden party, Louis XIV had Fouquet arrested for graft, and transferred all the artists (among them Le Vau, Le Brun, Le Notre, and La Quintinie) and artisans who contributed to the construction of Vaux to Versailles, together with most of the pieces of art Fouquet had amassed in Vaux, as well as his citrus collection (Adcock 2010; Brassat 1995; Mukerji 1997, 107-113). "For some reason, the political message of the style at Vaux, while wrong for Vaux, must have been right for Versailles" (Mukerji 1997, 113). In 1661 an extensive renovation and expansion of the palace of Versailles started.

Much in the gardens of Versailles was in some way or other linked to the engineering skills necessary for the construction of fortifications.¹⁷ "Making terraces and counter-scarps, planting trees or palisades, or sculpting a glacis or a grove had much in common in execution and purpose" (Langins 2004, 69). The same surveying techniques and geometric methods used for the projection of cannon fire, siege warfare, battle formations, map-making, and perspectival painting were used for architectural construction and gar-

17. In the Renaissance the architects responsible for building palaces and churches were also responsible for building the fortifications that would protect them (Argan 1969).



Figure 5.7: Vaux-Le-Vicomte.

den design,¹⁸ as exemplified in a didactic book for surveying techniques written by Le Clerc, which made use of illustrations from all of these fields (Cosgrove 1989; Mukerji 1997). The training program for gardeners developed by Jacques Boyceau, Le Notre's teacher (Louis XIV's gardener), included components used for military engineering, in particular geometry books designed for the conduct of sieges and the building of fortifications (Mukerji 1997, 41-42). At one point military engineers and soldiers became directly involved in garden design itself. Vauban, Louis XIV's master of fortifications, was consulted for the hydraulic work necessary to bring water to the gardens (Langins 2004). Up to 30,000 soldiers participated in a massive engineering project that sought to bring water from the Eure River to the gardens of Versailles. However, Louis XIV had

18. Cartographers often drew the parterre designs in gardens (Mukerji 1997, 349). Mukerji also finds that "seventeenth-century French formal gardens were much like the new maps of the period. They consisted of measured areas, organized internally, carefully bounded, marked by waterways and walkways, and filled with lines that simultaneously marked divisions and defined meeting points" (Mukerji 1997, 9).



Figure 5.8: The gardens of Vaux-Le-Vicomte.

to abandon the project after several years because too many soldiers had gotten sick or died under the harsh conditions (Mukerji 1997, 190-193; Thompson 2006).

Despite this failed project, we still find some of the same elements in the garden design of Versailles that we find in the fortifications at the borders of France, among them terraces, or wall systems, as exemplified most clearly in the great wall and the *jardin potager* (the kitchen garden), which is the element in the garden of Versailles that most strongly resembles a fortification (Johnson 1996; Mukerji 1997, 63-64). The resemblance must have been even more striking when, on special occasions, the king's guards and the Swiss guards, both stationed at Versailles (while many other soldiers were stationed along the frontiers), marched on top of these walls. The trees and bushes in the gardens were "reproducing the style of planting used on the barricades of French towns. These long lines of trees constituted a kind of symbolic standing army, guarding garden features, just like trees that stood sentry along barricades, guarding and standing in for French soldiers along the walls of French fortresses" (Mukerji 1997, 79).

Given that lumber was a crucial resource for warfare, the display of trees and forests at Versailles was a display of French military power. Numerous statues commemorating military victories, as well as statues of gods of war, such as Apollo, Hercules, or Diana, functioned as a celebration of warfare. These statues were made of gilded lead or cast bronze — the same materials used for producing cannons. Their manufacture might have served as a training ground for cannon making; it was certainly an indexical reminder of French technical proficiency to the gardens' visitors. The gardens themselves functioned at times as testing grounds and showrooms for the development of new engineering skills (Mukerji 1997).

The nobility identified itself strongly with the military and had military training because “it was a rooted tradition that the proper occupation of a nobleman was to serve as officer in the army” (Dorn qtd. in Holsti 1991, 107; Anderson 1993). Diplomats came from the aristocracy as well and up to two thirds of them had actually pursued a military career (Bechu 1996; Roosen 1976). One can therefore assume that the high society of *ancien régime* Europe was able to interpret and identify the military signs spread through the gardens of Versailles. “Like Vauban’s fortified towns, the gardens at Versailles presented to the world marvels of French engineering that spoke directly to the might of France and its ability to control its territory” (Mukerji 1997, 65).

Next to the effects of military engineering, geometry also affected the design of palaces and the adjacent gardens via the intermediary of linear perspective (Bennett and Johnston 1996; Cosgrove 1989; Jöchner 1995; Johnson 1996). The newly emerging architectural system established a primary role for the gaze (Jöchner 1995). It was important to create a central view from where the visitor could get a clear visual image of the entire edifice. It was also necessary to build straight paths so that the eye could potentially see the infinite, the perspective vanishing point, and foresee over longer distances the movement the body would undertake. At every instance the visitor could undertake quick rule-of-thumb surveying calculations to locate her/his own position in space. Straight paths and clear lines of visibility came to replace serpentine walkways and partial visual impressions resulting in the embodied immersion in a given place. The palace had to be located in its surroundings in such a way that it would be clearly in sight “along definite



Figure 5.9: *Street view of Versailles castle.*²⁰Source: Peter Stehlik PS-2507 (Own work) [GFDL] or CC BY 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

lines of perspective” (Johnson 1996, 140), rather than hidden between forests and hills. It had to “so dominate its surroundings as to suggest the obedient submissiveness of its entire external environment. Thus, formal gardens, paths, fountains, garden houses and arbours, portals and so on, were constructed and placed with a careful eye to the creation of a vast unity to which the palace, as the centrepiece, alone gave meaning. The open space required by such grandiose designs often did not exist in the middle of crowded older cities” (Gagliardo 1991, 208).

From the street view the palace of Versailles has the shape of a cone with a clear centre of gravity towards which every body is drawn. Louis XIV’s bedroom was the central ceremonial location in the castle, and all the other rooms are arranged in relation to it, whereas the ballroom was the central location in the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg tradition (Hartmann 1988). While the perspectival field provides the crucial framework to observe the palace from the street view, with all the converging lines meeting in Louis XIV’s bedroom, the perspectival field is equally important when admiring the gardens from inside the castle (Johnson 1996). The gardens of Versailles are based on geometrical forms that “are aligned, directly or indirectly, along the central axis that originates in the royal chambers of Louis XIV, continues through the Basin of Apollo and the longer arm of the great canal, passes over grottoes, and extends finally to the vanishing point on the horizon. This royal axis, itself the concrete symbol of the Sun King’s absolute power, both collects and disperses all of the subsidiary axes and their attached plots, fountains,

20. GFDL: <http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>, CC BY 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APeter_Stehlik_2013.04.22_Panorama_1A.jpg.

bouquets, and quincunx” (Casey 1993, 159).

The gardens of Versailles were set with perfectly straight paths and regular geometrical figures that gave the impression of a uniform space confined by gates and statues at the end of many trails.²¹ Symmetries and proportionalities were crucial for aesthetic reasons, but the regular and ordered design was also an expression of power, of a clear order imposed upon nature and territory that was evenly distributed and visually emanated from Louis XIV’s bedroom (Brassat 1995; Casey 1993; Cosgrove 1989; Elias 1969; Johnson 1996; Langins 2004; Mukerji 1997). “The geometrical reduction of complexity into a singular system of order was a wonderful model of state power that naturalized precisely what was being challenged by traditional notions of legitimacy” (Mukerji 1997, 269). The canal, through which the major visual axis of the gardens ran, played a crucial role. It was in the shape of a cross. Like the Cartesian coordinate system, it structured the spatial arrangements of the garden. The cross was also a religious symbol, indicating the presence of God. As a horizontal, rather than a vertical scheme, the still water reflects the heavens on the land, instead of pointing upwards to the sky. In this sense the canal provides divine legitimacy to territorial rule (Mukerji 1997, 291).

Next to all of these abstract and universal symbols portraying the divinely sanctioned territorial order of the kingdom, there was simultaneously an effort to demonstrate in the palace and the gardens of Versailles the culturally and topographically unique characteristics of French territory. Thus the different materials used for the palace’s construction came from all corners of the kingdom so that by this indexical connection the royal palace was “like the condensation of the kingdom” (Marin 1988, 192). Plants from different parts of the kingdom found their way into the gardens (Thompson 2006). For example, the Orangerie contained an extensive citrus collection from the Mediterranean. This area in the garden was tellingly called the “parterre de Midi”— *Midi* specifically refers to Southern France (Mukerji 1997, 180). Other parts of the gardens represented particular geographical areas considered to be a part of France, and at times French coats of arms decorated these sections (Mukerji 1997).

21. Apparently Le Notre taught Descartes’s works to his students, while Descartes consulted Le Notre’s garden designs (Casey 1993, 163).




Figure 5.10: *Plan of the Palace of Versailles and the Adjacent Gardens* by Nicolas de Fer (1700). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The palace and the gardens also displayed a particularly French aesthetic. Initially there were some inclinations toward the baroque style, which celebrated papal and imperial power. Louis XIV even requested Brenini, the master architect of Rome, to suggest a design for Versailles, only to reject it in favour of a more solid and orderly, typically French style: classicism (Mukerji 1997). Even the French sense for fashion found its way

into the garden design at Versailles. The “parterres de broderie,” the figured floral patterns in the garden beds, were the same as those used on French textiles (Mukerji 1997, 124-139). Overall, the palace and the gardens of Versailles displayed France’s technological and cultural accomplishments. “The French capacity to measure, know and govern its own territory through the state apparatus was not a matter of debate in the garden, but of demonstration” (Mukerji 1997, 257)

The focus on the palace and gardens of Versailles is not surprising given that many scholars have considered the French state the precursor and model for the development of the territorial state in Europe (Branch 2014; Elias 1969; Reus-Smit 1999). In the seventeenth century the French court also set trends in fashion, art, aesthetics, manners, and good taste in general. Courts across Europe sought to imitate French style; rulers and aristocrats sometimes even stopped speaking in their own languages, and spoke French instead (Horn 1961). Versailles inspired the construction of similar palaces across Europe. Thus the Prussian King Frederick the Great had Sanssouci and the Neues Palais with their adjacent gardens built in Potsdam (Elias 1969), and the Habsburg monarchs had the palace of Schönbrunn and adjoining gardens constructed at the outskirts of Vienna with the explicit desire to imitate Louis XIV’s magnificence (Bérenger 1994; Gagliardo 1991; Kann 1974). Versailles inspired The Palacio Real de Madrid and the Royal Palace in Stockholm, the latter perhaps via the intermediary of the Swedish ambassador in Paris who was stationed there from 1693 to 1718 with the sole purpose to follow French developments in arts and inform the Swedish royal architect about them (Walton 1986). Even smaller Italian and German princes sought to imitate Versailles, as well as such distant rulers as the Russian tsar (Gagliardo 1991; Zielinski 2009; Wolf 1951). Rulers who favoured a different government model, and were Louis XIV’s archrivals, among them William III of Orange, who was Stadtholder of the Netherlands and — against Louis XIV’s best efforts — King of England from 1689, also adopted some of the elements from Versailles in his own palaces (Höpel 2012). While in some cases, especially in the German lands, there was an effort to imitate Versailles quite precisely; in most cases the goal was to develop a culturally unique reinterpretation on the theme of Versailles that would result in similar phenomenological experiences for the people wandering on the

palace's grounds (PIS 2000c).



Figure 5.11: Street View of Schönbrunn Palace.²³Source: Simon Matzinger (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0], via Wikimedia Commons.

The palaces and the gardens were not meant to serve the private enjoyment of the monarch. Instead they functioned as public places that demonstrated the characteristics of the kingdom; they were also where political interactions took shape (Wolf 1970). Kings conducted state rituals and ceremonies in the palaces to which they invited foreign diplomats and aristocrats, while the incognito encounter, a less-formalized encounter between diplomats or statesmen that left issues of precedence aside, usually took place in the gardens (Marin 1988). Thus in 1697 Emperor Leopold I met the Russian tsar Peter the Great in his garden, as if by accident, when he went there for an afternoon walk (Jöchner 1995). The gardens were also used for performances and official entertainment. For Louis XIV the walk through the park played a special role; he hand-wrote routes his visitors were supposed to take through the gardens, together with specific instructions for which directions they were supposed to look. Queen Marie d'Este, wife of the deposed king of England, James II, made use of these manuals while she was waiting for her

23. CC BY-SA 3.0 <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>, Wikimedia Commons https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Schönbrunn_palace.jpg.

husband's expedition to regain the English throne (Jöchner 1995; Langins 2004; Mukerji 1997).

Even those who could not directly observe and experience the gardens and palaces could still get a hint of their magnificence thanks to the many tapestries, engravings, books, and illustrations around the edges of maps that were given as gifts to foreign rulers and diplomats. The image of splendid palace structures spread throughout Europe (Brassat 1995; Marin 1988; Richefort 1996) and with them the image of territorial states with their unique characteristics. The complexes left strong impressions upon their visitors (Mukerji 1997); at times they even provoked fear of cultural and military supremacy. In the case of Louis XIV, a cultural counter-propaganda developed that sought to decrease his glory (Richefort 1996). More importantly still, the gardens and the palace of Versailles “projected a false French unity and well-being that turned out to be all too effective. The exorbitance of the French court ironically helped frighten French enemies into joining military forces to forestall the formation of a new empire. Exquisite goods and their ostentatious display were clearly taken seriously as an expression of geopolitical power” (Mukerji 1997, 100). They informed the creation of a balancing alliance against Louis XIV.

5.5 Conclusion

In a famous painting by Leclerc, Louis XIV and Colbert are visiting the Academy of Sciences. The visit did not actually occur, but the image is important for its evocative suggestions. The painting “has in the background a formal garden and an observatory under construction and shows Louis perusing a ground plan of a fortification; a map lies on the floor. In very significant ways, all these objects were related” (Langins 2004, 66).

I have highlighted how multiple loophole effects linked all of these different forms of representation to each other in complex ways, with geometry as the unifying element that they all shared. As a result of an emerging passion in geometry, first in painting and later more broadly, four forms of representation, namely painting, map making, practices of warfare, and the architectural design of palaces and gardens changed. The cumulative

effects of these changes resulted in the concept of the territorial state at a time when such an entity did not actually exist on the ground. This conception of the territorial state formed the precondition for the emergence of a new international order in Europe, namely a territorial balance of power.



Figure 5.12: *Louis XIV Visiting the Royal Academy of Sciences*, by Sebastien Leclerc I (1671). Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Chapter 6

Balance of Power as Europe's Order-Creating Mechanism

The goal of the present chapter is to demonstrate how changes in forms of representation led to a change in Europe's international order after the Holy Roman Empire no longer provided Europe's ordering mechanism, all the while the international order was still understood in hierarchical terms, and based on the representative forms of diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremonial. Over the course of the eighteenth century, "the machinery of international relations in Europe combined old and new in the way inevitable in any form of organization undergoing slow and unplanned change" (Anderson 1998, 96). By the time of the Congress of Vienna a territorial balance of power had unequivocally become Europe's ordering mechanism, and statesmen distributed and redistributed territories on maps to establish a viable European equilibrium between formally equal states. The change I describe in this chapter is in some ways in line with Bull's (1977) observation that matters of status and precedence lost their role in a European order that was no longer hierarchically defined, and that considerations of relative power gained predominance. However, rather than interpreting this change ontologically to signify the loss of importance of ideational factors and their replacement with material forces, we can understand the shift as a change in forms of representation that integrate material and ideational elements in them. Thus instead of opposing a materialist-functional account to an account of intersubjective understanding (see, for example, Neumann and

Sending 2010; Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 1999), or trying to reconcile the two approaches (Phillips 2011), I argue that the army and territory are not purely functionalist-material phenomena, but contain important symbolic elements in them. They are representative forms based on which statesmen defined great power status.

I complete the previous two chapters' analysis of how a territorial balance of power emerged as an ordering mechanism on the European continent. Chronologically the chapter begins in the second half of the seventeenth century, after the Peace of Westphalia, at the point at which [chapter 4](#) ends. [Chapter 5](#) provides the background for how the conception of the territorial state emerged, and it chronologically overlaps with [chapter 4](#) and the present chapter.

The change in European order toward a territorial balance of power was the result of changes in forms of representation, which were crucially animated by the emergence of three new actors on the scene of continental Europe: Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. These actors (with the exception of Prussia) had gained high social standing in other geographical areas—in political fields that were different from the European political field. Thus, once they fully entered into the European political field, they experienced hysteresis when the two predominant powers, the Holy Roman Emperor alias the ruler of Austria, and the French king refused to grant them the high standing they were used to. As a result they challenged and ridiculed diplomatic precedence and ceremonial, the forms of representation that ensured the Holy Roman Emperor's and the French king's position at the top of the European hierarchy. At the same time the three powers seized the opportunity that an increasing monetization of the economy, and a related increase in the control of the military provided to rulers, to fully develop the army as the crucial form representing the territorial state. These developments combined with the developments described in the previous two chapters —namely the rejection of empire as an ordering mechanism for Europe ([chapter 4](#)), and the conception of the territorial state ([chapter 5](#)) —to establish the balance of power as Europe's ordering mechanism to avoid the reemergence of empire. Given that diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremony lost their importance as forms of representation, Europe's hierarchical order gradually gave way to the conception of sovereign equality. At the same time though, the military's rise

to prominence as a crucial form of state representation also led to a two-tier differentiation between those states that could afford large-scale warfare (the great powers), and those that could not.

A focus on forms of representation helps us understand the apparently contradictory co-existence of, on the one hand, the emerging principle of sovereign equality, and on the other hand the development of great power status. In their reflections on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, scholars have persistently struggled with the paradoxical concurrence of these two phenomena (see, for example, Branch 2014; Donnelly 2009; Stirk 2012; Waltz 1979), and they often tend to highlight one at the expense of the other. A focus on forms of representation and on the mechanism of hysteresis reveals that their troublesome co-emergence is in fact the result of one single process, namely a struggle of Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia against the Holy Roman Emperor and France over forms of representation to obtain as newcomers a high standing in the European order.

Before delving into the detailed argument, three counter-arguments deserve consideration. First, on the realist side, scholars inspired by Tilly's (1990) work, for example, might suggest that instead of focusing on forms of representation, we can direct our attention exclusively to the materialist-functional side of the argument by looking at how, thanks to an increasing monetization of the economy, rulers were able to develop an extractive state apparatus that allowed them to centralize rulership and gain increasing control over their armies. Those rulers who were better at extracting taxes, who had richer territories, or had higher military skills simply became more powerful. As a result of their increased power, other rulers had no other choice but to accept their preeminent status.

My claim is not that this argument is incorrect, as much as that it is incomplete, and so can capture only one part of the story. At a time when no ruler had full control over his territory but ruled from his palace and through the relations existing in the palace, there often were no direct mechanisms to translate distant battle victories into diplomatic palace negotiations. So the direct coercive force resulting from battle victories was more limited in international relations than realists would like to acknowledge, and the power that battle victories could have depended at least to some extent on their recognition as

forms of representation. In other words, the military was not a purely indexical form of power but contained important symbolic elements. This is underlined by the behaviour of statesmen who spent considerable amounts of time on the symbolic dimensions of their military — on designing uniforms, holding military parades, or selecting particularly handsome men into the ranks of the army, regardless of their fighting skills. The army is not the ultimate source of a ruler's power, but one among several forms of representation that are subject to change. In this regard constructivists have unfortunately more often than not followed suit and left the army and the military in the realist domain (notable exceptions are Adler and Pouliot 2011a and Thomson 1994). Constructivists usually develop their explanations in opposition to a realist military explanation, and rarely highlight how military forms can play a constitutive role.

Classical realists included with their notion of prestige an ideational element emerging from military might that, in addition to material capabilities, shapes international order. Gilpin (1981) picked up on this role of prestige and further developed it. For him prestige includes an element of legitimacy and shared interests that make weaker states accept the role of a dominant state. Ultimately, however, “prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular” (Gilpin 1981, 31) because it is primarily achieved through victories in wars (see also Thompson 2014). Prestige is the perception of military power, on which much of the day-to-day interactions in international relations are based. While Gilpin to some extent acknowledges the representational dimension of the military, his notion is too narrow to account for the dramatic changes in representative forms in general and even in military representation in particular. He does not consider the possibility that the military does not have to be the dominant representative form in every historical epoch, nor does he acknowledge that changes in the practices of warfare can have a constitutive dimension on a given order, which reaches beyond their functional effects in changing the distribution of capabilities among the actors. Through qualitative changes in the military realm, statesmen and diplomats can perceive the characteristics of the units of the international system differently.

A new literature on status expands on the range of representative forms that states can make use of to establish their status. The authors of an edited volume on *Status in*

World Politics (Paul et al. 2014) highlight the crucial role visible representative forms play in shaping a given international order, but it might be useful to add a more explicitly historical dimension to their analysis. For one, the authors exclusively focus on how forms of representation create hierarchies, and thus omit that they can also create relations of equal standing, as I will demonstrate in the example of diplomatic precedence's abolition. Second, the authors do not concentrate on how some forms of representation play a role in defining status in certain historical periods, while others do so in other times, which is the fundamental explanatory mechanism of this chapter to understand international order change.¹

A third counter-argument focuses on purely ideational shifts. In this line of argument the enlightenment played a crucial role in burying the old hierarchical European order (White 1964) and de Vattel's thinking established the notion of sovereign equality (Stirk 2012). While enlightenment thinking unquestionably inspired rulers at the end of the eighteenth century, such as Frederick II of Prussia, the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II, or Catherine II of Russia, these rulers' reforms continued along the path set out by their predecessors who did not yet have enlightenment thought at their disposal. Peter I of Russia, or Frederick William I of Prussia had already questioned and ridiculed diplomatic and courtly ceremonial (the very representative forms that upheld divine-right absolutism) and established military reforms, order, and discipline of the kind that would later be associated with enlightened absolutism. With this temporal sequencing in mind, it seems unlikely that enlightenment thought was a necessary or a sufficient condition for the breakdown of Europe's hierarchical order, but it certainly played a facilitating role. Similarly, representative forms of sovereign equality expressed in concrete diplomatic practices, such as diplomats' simultaneous entering rooms in order to eliminate one's privileged standing in relation to another, occurred well before de Vattel published his work so they might have inspired de Vattel, rather than vice-versa.

1. For an exception see Pouliot 2014, who highlights the significance of practical struggles over status markers, which is quite similar to my approach.

6.1 The Hierarchical International Order during Absolutism

Even after the Peace of Westphalia the conception of a unified, hierarchically structured space had not yet entirely disappeared; it lived on in the form of diplomatic precedence, which established a ranking among rulers (Anderson 1993; Burkhardt 1998; Lebow 2008; Reus-Smit 1999; Roosen 1976; Stirk 2012). Diplomatic precedence visually created a hierarchical international order. A ruler's reputation depended on how his diplomats were received, how they were addressed, where they were seated, what their order was in processions, and how ostentatious their public entry to the capital city was. The cultural, artistic, architectural, and military achievements of a country, usually transmitted via its diplomats and diplomatic gifts, also served to indexically (as an expression of wealth) and iconically (as an expression of splendour) represent a ruler's prestige (Black 1996; Richefort 1996). Guarding the public standing of their sovereign and following the host country's cultural and artistic achievements with the aim to send luxury items (including furniture, clothes, and paintings) to their domestic courts, were some of the diplomats' most important tasks (Black 1996; Mori 2010), if not "the most fundamental of all his duties" (Anderson 1993, 41).

Perhaps the most immediate indicator of a particular sovereign's rank was the spatial positioning of his diplomatic representatives at social occasions. The position of a diplomat in processions, the sequence of entering a room, the seating at dinner tables and spectacles, the precise timing of who had to remove his hat first, all served to iconically establish the rank and power of a sovereign in the international order (Anderson 1993; Mori 2010; Queller 1967). Social events functioned as political performances that displayed power and the distribution of power (Elias 1969; Gestrich 1995).² For example, during theatre performances the ruler was located exactly opposite the focal point of the stage (Sommer-Mathis 1995). The other spectators were seated according to their rank, and had to accept corresponding minor or major perspectival distortions.

2. The word *theatre* was commonly used in a figurative sense as in the "war theatre," the "peace theatre," "the state theatre," or the "world theatre" (Sommer-Mathis 1995).

In line with their rank they had a right to an armchair with or without a back, or they had to sit on a bench. Even the colour of the armchairs varied according to ceremonial rank; whether there was a carpet underneath the chair or a baldachin above it equally differed according to one's position in the social hierarchy. Everyone took note of the participants' social rank according to these visual clues. The spectators were on stage as part of the performance or maybe they were the actual performance (Elias 1969): "The culture of the baroque court was shaped by the assumption that political power and social hierarchy could not be taken for granted but had to be expressed over and over again, with ceremonies and symbols, architectural monuments and festive display. Theatricality, therefore, was the essential characteristic of the courtier's world" (Sheehan 1989, 150).

The public display of wealth and good taste were an important function of any ambassador. His public entry, which usually occurred a few weeks after his incognito arrival, was a big public spectacle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was an occasion to demonstrate the significance of the sovereign and the spectators judged the aesthetic appeal and success of the performance. Their criteria included the diplomat's clothing style (and that of his household), the number and size of his carriages, as well as the number and beauty of the horses (Roosen 1976). Sometimes merchants would swell the ranks of the procession to create a more impressive spectacle. Programs indicating the time when individual carriages and specific costumes would enter were sold in advance, and engravings of the processions served to distribute the splendour of the event beyond those who were present (Anderson 1993). La Vauguyon, France's ambassador in Madrid, described his public entry in a letter to Louis XIV from 1682 like this:

I can assure Your Majesty that no ambassador has ever arrived with such brilliance at Madrid. My carriages are magnificent as they have retained the luster which they had at Paris . . . and the horses are more handsome and in better condition than when I accepted them from the sellers. Their harnesses, topknots, and reins were garnished with gold and silver. My livery was a very beautiful yellow cloth, covered with a four inch braid in bands colored like fire and dark separated by gold and silver; all had beautiful linen and lace with

ribbons of different colors. The footmen wore tall plumes while the pages had bunches of feathers. All in all the whole made a marvelous effect, much better than I had imagined it would. (qtd. in Roosen 1976, 115-116)

Diplomatic presents equally played a crucial role in the diffusion of the image of the king and his kingdom, and in the salary of diplomatic representatives. Rulers gave tapestries, engravings, books, paintings, snuff boxes, and medals of very significant value as gifts to sovereigns, diplomats, and clerks at foreign offices (Horn 1961; Middleton 1977; Anderson 1993; Richefort 1996). The goal was to portray the qualities of the sovereign as a conqueror, but also as an able diplomat and negotiator. As much emphasis was put on the intellectual and cultural achievements of the kingdom. Royal palaces and castles, magnificent buildings, manufactured goods, sculptures, and great artistic and scientific achievements were among the most dominant motives of these presents (Richefort 1996).

One of the most common gifts were medals that served to propagate the glory of the king and his achievements. They could simultaneously function as money for making diplomatic payments to obtain specific goals. Louis XIV, for example, sent a cycle of medals to the ambassador of the United Provinces to prevent the re-establishment of the triple alliance against the Sun King. A “secret Commission of five over which Colbert,” Louis XIV’s finance minister, presided, decided which events should be imprinted on the cycle of medals (Marin 1988, 132). The king himself dedicated a considerable amount of time to the medals, demanding corrections to each one. The medals represented the king’s military victories, the signing of peace treaties, and important diplomatic events; the events depicted on the medals became the important events of Louis XIV’s reign (Marin 1988; Richefort 1996).

The domestic court itself served to portray the ruler’s high standing. (The palace of Versailles together with its imitations throughout Europe was described in the previous chapter.) In the Habsburg lands, baroque architecture expressed the imperial grandeur of the Habsburg dynasty with an appeal to the senses (Bérenger 1994; Kann 1974). The baroque staircase in particular played centre stage in the architectural design of palaces and in ceremonial performances in the “dramaturgy of the staircase.” The arrival, reception, and departure of guests were crucial events in diplomatic life, and the staircase

allowed the participants to phenomenologically experience the differences in rank within their own bodies: “changing positions on the staircase represented changing positions of power” (Hartmann 1988: 57).³ Architectural spaces framed diplomatic encounters (Schütte 1995).

The very materiality of the practices and artifacts associated with diplomatic ceremony meant that rulers had to spend significant financial resources on diplomatic representation. While other diplomats and sovereigns could not directly evaluate the amount of money lavished on palaces and their decoration, diplomatic receptions, the public entry of a diplomat, clothing, and diplomatic gifts, they would perceive the splendour and pomposity of diplomatic representation. These expenditures were not luxuries but necessary forms of representation to mark a ruler’s power and wealth.

Paradoxically, the requirements of diplomatic representation could be so strenuous that they occasionally resulted in rulers’ impoverishment. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rulers and the aristocracy did not adapt their expenditures to their income, but to the requirements of representation that their (desired) rank and social standing demanded (Bourdieu 1990; Dewald 1993; Elias 1969; Horn 1961; Mukerji 1997). Several smaller German rulers went bankrupt because they were unable to meet the expenses needed for maintaining their position (Gagliardo 1991; Hartmann 1988; Sheehan 1989), but even Louis XIV’s finances were severely strained. “The odd fact that the king was spending huge sums of money when in financial trouble was not a personality flaw, but part of aristocratic culture” (Mukerji 1997, 345). Similarly, Frederick I, the first Prussian king, did not act like a spoiled child when he spent the money his father, the Great Elector had so laboriously amassed, as several historians have suggested—he was exactly in line with the habitus of his epoch. He gained the royal title for Prussian kings, he had great buildings built in Berlin to transform it into a European capital, and he established an opulent court life filled with arts and aesthetic appeal because those were the representative forms that rulers were judged by at the time (Gagliardo 1991; White 1964; Wolf 1951). Rulers calculated the gain and loss of prestige, not income. “With

3. My translation from German. The antechambers in palaces equally served ceremonial purposes. In fact rulers had them built for precisely these reasons. Depending on their rank, diplomats had access to antechambers closer to the throne room.

the exception of the Netherlands and Britain, few decision-makers were overly concerned with economic goals as ends in themselves” (Roosen 1976, 53).

Diplomatic and courtly representation were so important in the early modern period because the court culture was trained to analyze every gesture and every accessory in terms of a loss or increase of prestige (Elias 1969; Rahn 1995). Diplomatic precedence functioned as a barometer of a ruler’s power. Those who managed to raise their ceremonial standing were increasing their influence; those who lost their ceremonial position or could barely maintain it were declining (Roosen 1976). Diplomats were conscious about issues of precedence not because high diplomatic standing was an honour bestowed upon powerful rulers but because rulers became powerful through the honours their diplomats received. A commentator from the early seventeenth century noted that “princes and sovereign states often hold more dear the conservation of their rank and dignity than that of their lands and possessions” (Anderson 1998, 65; see also Stirk 2012), partly perhaps because, according to Count-Duke Olivares, Spain’s chief minister from 1622 to 1643, “reputation can many times triumph without arms and resources” (Anderson 1998, 64). Conversely, if a state was not attentive to its diplomatic position, others would have interpreted it as a sign of weakness. “Other powers would cease to regard it as an eligible ally while enemies might be encouraged to attack it politically, economically, and even on the battlefield” (Horn 1961, 205).

Precisely because the honours bestowed upon diplomats were such a crucial expression of a ruler’s power, disputes over precedence were very common and could at times end violently. The goal of those disputes was not to ensure equal standing, but rather a ruler’s higher status in comparison to others. The most prominent example is the dispute between the French and Spanish ambassadors that arose on the occasion of the Swedish ambassador’s public entry into London in 1661. Both delegates sought to have the place of honour directly behind the Swedish carriage and prepared well for the anticipated encounter. The result was a violent battle during which about twenty people died. The French lost the encounter because their horses’ traces were cut, but Louis XIV threatened Philipp IV of Spain with war unless he publicly recognized the French right to precedence for all times to come (Anderson 1993; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011; Holsti 1991; Roosen

1976). The scene in which the Spanish ambassador in Paris publicly apologized to Louis XIV has been one of the most popular motifs on French medals offered as diplomatic gifts (Richefort 1996).⁴ However, to avoid humiliation, Spanish representatives stayed away from public events at which a French representative was present. Only in 1761 could the two crowns finally solve their disputes over diplomatic precedence in the Family Compact—a treaty that the two sides signed only several years after Louis XIV’s grandson had succeeded to the Spanish crown (Roosen 1976).

Of course if rulers wanted to avoid difficulties of precedence, they could find ways to do so, but it involved finding solutions in forms of representation that would indicate equal standing. Statesmen had to find solutions within the existing system of representation. It was not possible to simply agree that no one would care about matters of precedence; diplomats and rulers had to be inventive and sometimes spend considerable resources to not offend anyone: “special rooms, or even, as at Carlowitz in 1699, temporary wooden buildings were arranged, so that the number of doors could equal the number of delegates. Entry could be at the sound of a trumpet, so that no one entered first. Treaties were either signed on individual copies so that each took home the copy he had signed first; or the document was written on a round sheet, so that no one appeared to have signed first, or last. The order of precedence, when seated, was solved, apparently at Nijmegen, by meeting at round tables, where no one was above anyone else” (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 72). Other solutions to issues of precedence were incognito participation at social events and “accidental encounters” (Jöchner 1995). For example, following a diplomatic dispute between the French envoy in Vienna and Prince von Lichtenstein, the French envoy requested a formal apology from the prince in his house, which would have damaged von Lichtenstein’s reputation. At the same time the Austrian court was anxious about jeopardizing its peace negotiations with France. Several court meetings took place to find

4. Disputes over diplomatic precedence were too common to name them all. A few additional examples include a dispute between France and Russia in 1768 (Horn 1961; Roosen 1976), between England and France in the mid-eighteenth century (Horn 1961), between the Holy Roman Emperor and the other delegations at the Peace of Utrecht (Osiander 1994; Reus-Smit 1999), between England and the Holy Roman Emperor throughout the eighteenth century (Horn 1961), between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Russian queen Catherine II in 1781 (Schroeder 1994), between Sweden and Poland in 1660, and between the Scandinavian crowns and Poland on the one hand and Spain on the other throughout the seventeenth century (Roosen 1976).

a way out of the impasse. The papal nuncio, as well as the Spanish, the Savoyan, and the Venetian ambassadors had to intervene in mediation, and collectively they found a solution: von Lichtenstein's sister, in whose house the French envoy was living, organized a game night to which she invited the prince von Lichtenstein. As if by accident von Lichtenstein and the French envoy could meet in the envoy's residence and the envoy could accept a formal apology from von Lichtenstein (Sommer-Mathis 1995).

Diplomatic precedence and ceremonies as representational forms that indicated a ruler's position in the hierarchy advantaged some rulers over others. The Holy Roman Emperor and the pope were able to maintain their positions at the top of the international hierarchy without much contestation, although they were not the rulers who possessed the largest amount of material resources. The Holy Roman Empire itself was an intact, functioning structure within the existing hierarchical order precisely because it was founded on ceremonial and ritual performances (Stirk 2012). "The Reich was, first of all, a symbolic community, which provided its members with a set of symbols and ceremonies through which they could escape or extend the bounds of particularism" (Sheehan 1989, 18). The emperor's power inside the empire emanated to a large extent from his authority to nominate new nobles, which bestowed a special honour upon individuals and positioned them above their fellows, while simultaneously providing an opportunity for a ceremony that visualized the reach of the empire (Sheehan 1989). On the international stage only the Holy Roman Empire could make use of the title *empire* throughout the seventeenth century and parts of the eighteenth century (Koebner 1961).

Next to the pope and the emperor, several other rulers could profit from the important role that diplomatic precedence played for establishing a ruler's power. Among them the French and the Spanish crowns traditionally enjoyed a high standing—the French because of its sustained efforts to establish its rank since the fourteenth century, and the Spanish because of its historical ties to the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire (see [chapter 4](#)). Military strength was not the most important reason why these two polities were powerful. It is true that in the second half of the seventeenth century France was wealthy, populous, and Europe's cultural leader. It also had a strong army, but "in organization and discipline its army had not been notably superior to some of those

which opposed it” (Anderson 1988, 168), and Spain’s was even less so.

Other rulers were disadvantaged by the primary role diplomatic precedence and ceremony played. Thus the Netherlands was one of the most prosperous European countries in the mid-seventeenth century, and yet the Dutch never played a significant role in European affairs; as a republic they were having a hard time improving their diplomatic standing despite their numerous, sustained efforts. The British, Russian, and Prussian crowns were also struggling to establish their rank, despite their rising military capabilities. Their rulers had historically not played a leading role on the European continent, and as relative newcomers they could not gain access to the top of the European hierarchy. The imperial court in Austria refused to grant the British the title of majesty in the Spanish war of succession (Horn 1961). Similarly, Tsar Peter I adopted the emperor title in 1721, but it took a few decades for Austria, France, and Spain to recognize the new title (Anderson 1993).

6.2 The Changing Role of Warfare in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

Of course a ruler’s power depended on more than diplomatic display. Warfare was an important form of representation that shaped rulers’ prestige and social standing (Holsti 1991). Winning a war enhanced a ruler’s reputation (Brassat 1995; Elias 1969). Material gains or an increase in physical force only rarely animated warfare, although the effort to increase one’s territory as it was displayed on maps often did (Anderson 1988; Black 1990). Rulers sometimes spent exorbitant sums of money on conducting a war that neither improved their security nor enhanced their income but functioned as a form of representation designed to enhance their reputation. “In such a scheme of values, to campaign in splendid force was itself an achievement, a display of princely magnificence comparable to the construction of a palace” (Gunn 1995, 34). Alluding to Clausewitz, Marin wrote that “war is the fete continued by other means” (1988, 197).

Warfare was obviously a material phenomenon, but many of its early modern features

do not make any sense if we conceive of warfare in purely functionalist terms and thus omit its representative nature, as much of IR scholarship, especially realism, tends to do. In particular we cannot understand the strong focus on appearance, conspicuous consumption, and ceremony — at times to the detriment of efficiency — unless we conceive of warfare as a form of representation and not merely a tool to exert force. For example, in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, armies insisted on recruiting tall, good-looking soldiers to the point that the soldiers' salaries could depend on their height, or they could be dismissed after several years in service “when it was belatedly decided that they were not tall enough” (Anderson 1988, 189). Another phenomenon highlighting the representative nature of warfare is the emphasis it put on ceremonial performances. Specific rituals introduced every phase in the conduct of siege warfare (Wright 1934). On special occasions the army fired salutes that resulted in an expensive waste of gunpowder.

The army was an integral part of aristocratic court culture. Nobles, usually of high birth, led armies, often without any appropriate training. A common understanding existed that their high birth predisposed them to military affairs, although “the undoubted courage of such officers seldom made up for their incompetence” (Doyle 1978, 243). Aristocratic army officers brought their habitus defined by their manners of conspicuous consumption and the performance of societal rank with them onto the battlefield. Saint-Simon took thirty-five horses and mules to carry his belongings with him on his military campaigns, as well as scores of servants, among them his tutor and his mother's steward (Anderson 1988). War appeared as “an aristocratic game played according to gentlemanly rules” (Anderson 1988, 135). Only with this background in mind can we understand behaviours similar to the one exposed by the French naval commander Sourdis, who offered to his Spanish counterpart in the Franco-Spanish war from 1635 that he would use only some of his ships in battle to equal out the playing field, given that the Spanish admiral's fleet was considerably smaller than Sourdis's own.

Another crucial element that distinguished early modern armies from modern ones was that rulers were not in full control. Armies were still built on feudal features, which meant that feudal lords supplied their own contingents to a king's army, and those contingents were loyal and responsible to the feudal lord who raised them. Feudal lords

consequently had a high degree of control and power over their contingents, which they occasionally used for their own goals, and potentially in opposition to the interests of the king (Braun 1975; Finer 1975; Wolf 1951). Sometimes feudal lords did not appear for the fighting, and at other times they could decide to fight on the side of another government to increase their profits (Anderson 1988). If army generals could switch sides, it was even more common for individual soldiers to do so. Governments recruited their soldiers from various different lands, occasionally even from their enemies' territories. The regiments that resulted from these recruiting practices were multinational, multilingual, and quite difficult to control. They lacked uniformity, even in their dress, their weaponry, and their drills and manoeuvres because standardization was difficult to accomplish under the existing organizational patterns (Anderson 1988).

The difficulties many governments experienced in paying their soldiers further exacerbated the lack of control over the soldiery. Rulers were regularly in arrears paying the salaries of soldiers, who consequently frequently deserted and looted the countryside to sustain themselves. At times they did so even if they were paid because looting provided them with a rare opportunity to become rich. Occasionally armies organized mutinies and refused to fight or even move until they were paid. In one instance German soldiers of the Swedish army held the Swedish chancellor Oxenstiern as a hostage until he promised that the soldiers would be paid, and if they were not, they obtained the right to come to Sweden to collect their pay (Anderson 1988).

Given that the indexical link, the direct connection of control, between a ruler and his army was not fully established, it was often not entirely clear exactly whom one should attribute a particular battle victory or a siege to, and rulers could have a hard time translating victories on the battlefield into clear diplomatic gains (Black 1990). Thus, although the military loomed large in the early modern period, it did not play as crucial a role as it would come to assume over the course of the eighteenth century, and diplomatic ceremonial and precedence could play quite a significant independent role in ensuring a ruler's standing. In many ways ritual performances even infiltrated and shaped the conduct of warfare.

Towards the end of the seventeenth century and in the first decades of the eighteenth

century rulers gradually tightened the indexical connection between themselves and their armies, just as they had done earlier with diplomatic representation (see [chapter 4](#)). They did so mainly by sidestepping the military entrepreneurs and feudal lords who used to be responsible for recruiting soldiers. Increasingly centralized forms of recruitment emerged. Clear and fixed military hierarchies were established with unequivocal chains of command running up to the war ministry, or occasionally directly to the ruler himself. Military training schools spread throughout Europe, and gradually the understanding took hold that capability and skills, rather than high birth, were crucial for military promotion (Anderson 1988; Doyle 1978). Just like permanent diplomatic representation replaced special missions (see [chapter 4](#)), standing armies emerged that would no longer be dismantled after wars (Doyle 1978; Finer 1975; Wolf 1951). Rulers monopolized military power (Anderson 1988; Thomson 1994) and established the principle that waging war was a representative form that defined sovereignty.

Increasing administrative efficiency, as well as a well-developed money economy that allowed the extraction of larger amounts of taxes, were necessary preconditions for this development (Nexon 2009; Wolf 1951; Wolf 1970). The connection between an army's need for financial resources and its task to curtail revolts against tax collection were certainly important phenomena of state formation (Ardant 1975; Finer 1975; Sheehan 1989; Tilly 1975),⁵ but we should not assume that the army could have the same extortive force in international politics. Palace negotiations were far removed from the battlefield, and statesmen had to acknowledge and recognize the representative role of the military for it to play such a crucial role in international politics. We should therefore not omit armies' representative dimension: they "were at once the expression of the authority of the central government and the instruments for increasing its power" (Wolf 1951, 8).

A gradual increase in the size of armies (Doyle 1978; Finer 1975) went hand in hand with the growing indexical connection between a ruler and his army and an increasing uniformity of soldiers within an army (Wolf 1951). The army started to operate more clearly as a representation of the state. Governments standardized the weapons sol-

5. I do not address the question of state formation in terms of the development of domestic state apparatus. I look only at how states became the units of international politics ([chapter 5](#)). According to my theoretical argument, these two processes are two separate phenomena.

diers were using, their drills and manoeuvres, as well as their uniforms. These factors improved battle efficiency, but they also established the iconic and symbolic features of armies. “The complex drills to which eighteenth-century armies devoted so much time . . . certainly had tactical value, but they were also metaphors for organizational coordination and political mastery” (Sheehan 1989, 63), expressing the central authority of the ruler. Sheehan likens the army’s iconic characteristics to the ones of the palace of Versailles and its copies spread over Europe (see [chapter 5](#)).

Earlier in the seventeenth century “there was still a feeling at least in some countries that a soldier’s morale and fighting qualities would be impaired if he were not allowed to indulge himself and advertise his aggressive masculinity by wearing fine clothes” (Anderson 1988, 62). Over time however, governments provided soldiers with uniforms. The importance of these uniforms for representing the state becomes clear when we take into account that rulers such as Frederick William of Prussia “could devote himself wholeheartedly to rules and regulations about the length of an infantryman’s pigtail and the proper position of his buttonholes” (Sheehan 1989, 63). The colours and emblems of those uniforms turned into distinct dynastic, if not yet national symbols that were increasingly extended to and replicated on flags. Pearl grey became the colour of the Empire, red of England, orange was for the Dutch Republic, white for France, and the black double-headed eagle for the Austrian Habsburgs (Anderson 1988). The symbolism made armies internally uniform, and externally it differentiated one ruler’s army from another’s, so that the army could provide a more coherent image of the ruler, his characteristics, and his power. The increasing importance of the army also depended on its improved capacity to represent the state.

Russian and Prussian rulers most markedly promoted these changes in the military (Anderson 1988). Because these two countries were newcomers to the European system, it had therefore been extremely difficult for them to establish their rank in the European hierarchy in terms of diplomatic precedence. By contrast, rulers who enjoyed a high ranking in the diplomatic hierarchy, such as the Holy Roman emperor, the Spanish king, or a little later even the French king, tended to fall behind in military terms (Anderson 1988; Kann 1974). Thus Russia, Prussia, and England could profit from the changes that

were taking shape in the military realm, while they were simultaneously directing them.

6.3 The Emergence of Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain on the European Stage

Up until the 1750s France and Austria dominated the European order, but in the background the British, Prussian, and Russian rulers, who had hitherto not played an important role in Europe's order, were already making their entrance on the European stage. The ties between Russia and the European order had historically been very weak (Anderson 1988; White 1964). Muscovy, the polity with Moscow as its centre, was subservient to the Golden Horde, itself a part of the Mongol Empire. Once the Golden Horde disintegrated, Muscovy emerged as its major successor, and thus established for itself an imperial position in this geographic region, underlined by such forms of representation as the title "tsar," a Slavic translation of Caesar (Neumann 2011). Diplomatic exchanges with Europe had been very rare so Europe knew very little about Russia, while Russia knew even less about Europe (Anderson 1998; Black 1990; Dukes 1990; Neumann and Sending 2010). However, perhaps as a result of technological progress that made long-distance travel easier, the ties between Russia and its European neighbours gradually increased (Wolf 1951). To the emerging relations with the European powers, Russia brought a perception of its own cultural supremacy, which it had inherited from its historical position in Asia. To European eyes Russia was a backward country with curious mores (Neumann and Sending 2010). Despite Russian rulers' and their diplomats' heightened awareness of ceremony, and a sustained effort to establish their high rank in terms of diplomatic precedence, Russia was consistently unsuccessful in achieving a high standing for itself in the European hierarchy (Anderson 1998). Europe's rulers refused to acknowledge Russian status. Because Russian rulers' historical dispositions of supremacy stemming from Russia's Asian past did not match with their inferior position in the European order, a sense of hysteresis emerged among them (Neumann and Pouliot 2011).

Prussia was also initially outside of the European order, not because it was geograph-

ically distant, but because it had not existed. By coincidence Gregory William of the house of Hohenzollern inherited a set of disparate territories, some inside the Holy Roman Empire, others outside (Finer 1975; White 1964). Frederick William, the Great Elector, probably in response to the day-to-day necessities of his rule rather than with a clear vision of the whole, consolidated these disparate territories into the embryo of a polity (Sheehan 1989), mainly by rationalizing the army and administration. However, in his will, the Great Elector decided to split his possessions among his sons, which demonstrates “that Frederick William regarded his domains as a family estate which he could dispose of at will” (Wolf 1951, 139) rather than as a state. Frederick William’s son, Frederick III, sidestepped his father’s will and inherited the entire land. Inspired by his Saxon neighbour who acquired the Polish crown, and his Hanoverian neighbour who succeeded to the throne in England, he dedicated his reign to establishing Prussia as an internationally recognized state by focusing on the forms of representation that were common at the time (Gagliardo 1991): acquiring a crown for Prussia from the emperor, building palaces and statues, and establishing a court life together with the appropriate ceremonies. While these representative forms made Prussia a recognized state in the European order, it was far from the top of the European hierarchy.

Subsequent Prussian rulers developed the ambition to acquire a high rank in the international order, which the concept of hysteresis cannot help us explain. Having never been a major power, they could not have developed the habitus of great rulers, and according to my theoretical claims they should have been content with their moderate position, just like all the other princes and estates in the empire were, even those who had a larger population and more wealth than Prussia (Barraclough 1962). But two Prussian rulers in the eighteenth century were different. Perhaps personal ambitions or their education led them to strive for more. The Prussian case is an interesting outlier in the history of European state formation, and it continues to fascinate and puzzle historians for this very reason.

While Britain had never been outside of the European order, for a long time Britain was placed at its margins. Perhaps because of its geographic location, Britain did not play a central role in the European order until later in the eighteenth century, and it was

generally considered a minor power (Horn 1961; Horn 1967; Jones 1966; Middleton 1977; Mori 2010). It had also been a relatively weak state because of civil wars. However, over the course of the eighteenth century Britain became a major colonial power and the leading maritime power (Black 1990). The habitus its rulers acquired from the emerging colonial empire sat uneasily with Britain's inferior role in the European continental hierarchy.

Given that these three powers had a hard time establishing for themselves a high rank in the European hierarchy, they resorted to two concomitant strategies. On the one hand they made use of the changes in military organization, and further advanced those changes to establish the army and warfare as the primary form of state representation. On the other hand they developed strategies to downgrade the role of diplomatic precedence as a form of representation. Their strategies were successful and by the time of the Congress of Vienna, Europe's rulers were formally equal because the diplomatic forms of representation established sovereign equality. The one thing that differentiated European states into great powers and the rest was their military potential.

6.3.1 Changes in the Military

In Russia Peter I, who came to power in 1689, introduced the main changes in Russia's military organization (Doyle 1978). He realized very soon that Europeans knew more about the art of warfare than Russians did. Early on he made use of the skills and knowledge of the Europeans based in Russia to restructure and train his army (Wolf 1951). He also sent nobles to Europe to acquire mathematical and navigation skills, and upon their return he established schools for artillery and engineering (White 1964). Unlike his Western counterparts, who focused as much attention on the development of arts, architecture, fashion, and fine manners, Peter I dedicated all his attention to developing a modern military power that no one would be able to neglect. All the changes that Peter I introduced into Russia were "products of his attempt to reorient Russian society so as to heighten its military potential and enable it to play a role in European politics" (Wolf 1951, 161). On the surface Peter I's army started to resemble a European army — dressed in European clothes and without the traditional Russian beard

— to the point that Peter I wondered “why should I spend money on foreigners when my own subjects can do so well?” (qtd. in Wolf 1951, 155). However, his attack against the Swedes at Narva taught him that iconic military resemblance was not sufficient to ensure battle victory, so Peter I further refined and modernized his army. In his efforts he went well beyond what was the common standard in Europe at the time. Thus while the armies of other European powers did not have a common drill, unified commands, and a single system of tactics, “in Russia . . . the sort of state control and state-enforced uniformity achieved under Peter I gave much less for this sort of variation: in this respect the Russian army was more modern than those of most of the wealthier and more developed states of western Europe” (Anderson 1988, 106). Peter I was among the driving forces of military modernization.

Peter I’s victory against the Swedish king Charles XII at Poltava in 1709 in the Great Northern War was the first time that Europe took note of the Russian king and started to take him seriously (Doyle 1978; Kennedy 1987; Neumann and Sending 2010). Further victories in the Great Northern War, and in the Russo-Turkish war (1768-74), and the resulting territorial acquisitions, brought Russia the reputation of being the “greatest European power” (Black 1990, xiv).

Neuman and Sending (2010) and Neumann and Pouliot (2011) have argued that Russia might have acquired military power throughout the eighteenth century, which made it hard for other European powers to ignore it, but that Russia did not become a great power in the eighteenth century because its diplomatic practices did not fall in line with the rest of Europe and Russia therefore lacked recognition.⁶ From the perspective developed in this chapter, the authors omit the deeper system-wide changes in forms of representation that were occurring at the time, and from which Russia was both profiting

6. Neumann and Sending (2010) have also argued that other European powers did not recognize Russia because of its regime type, which was based on the form of a police state with a stronger focus on the direct control of territory, without a respect for the individual freedom of its citizens, and without recognizing a differentiation between the state and society. According to Neumann and Sending, other European states instead focused on maximizing wealth by indirectly controlling the population. Their analysis might be more accurate for the nineteenth century than the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century Europe was scattered with numerous other political regimes, many of which did not have any conception of individual freedom, and only a few, such as England and the Netherlands, had wealth maximization as an explicit political objective.

and whose development she was animating. Russia developed military might because it became aware that it would not have been able to gain recognition in terms of diplomatic representation. At the same time, Russia purposefully ridiculed diplomatic precedence as part of its struggle over forms of representation. The argument that other European powers did not recognize Russia throughout the eighteenth century omits how, as a result of changes in representational forms, the balance of power had become the crucial order-creating mechanism in eighteenth-century Europe, and Russia became a sought-after alliance partner in the balancing endeavours of other great powers (Anderson 1988; Schroeder 1994). Its apparent lack of diplomatic skill had become less relevant under these changed conditions.

Like Russia, Prussia also focused all its attention on acquiring a strong military force. There was “a clear understanding that, to secure any measure of respect and consideration from the greater powers which dominated German politics, a strong military organization was requisite” (Barraclough 1962, 399). To obtain the resources necessary for the development of a sizeable army, Prussia developed a strong extractive apparatus, taxing its population double the amount that French people were taxed (Braun 1975; Finer 1975). Between 50 and 80 percent of that income financed the army (Black 1990). This allowed Prussia to acquire the fourth-largest army in Europe by the time Frederick II came to power in 1740. Prussia’s army was as large as Austria’s, although Austria had a population around six times bigger than Prussia (Finer 1975). This demonstrates the extraordinary attention Prussian rulers dedicated to their army. With its territory scattered throughout the empire and beyond, Prussia’s army functioned as the crucial form of representation to define and identify the state (Barraclough 1962; Wolf 1951).

However, because this army had not fought any significant wars, the other European powers were not fully aware of its potential, or even perhaps of its extent. Frederick William I “was too genuine a militarist to risk in battle the highly trained and rigidly disciplined force on which he lavished so much attention” (Anderson 1988, 157). It required his son Frederick II to demonstrate its potential to Europe. Only with the victory against Austria in 1740 did Prussia gain recognition of her military might from the other European powers (Barraclough 1962; Doyle 1978). “Frederick’s own (and later

self-admitted) desire to win instant glory for himself and his house” was an explicit motive for his attack of Austria (Gagliardo 1991, 313). Frederick’s victories in Silesia also had a crucial effect on shaping his image as a ruler throughout Europe. His contemporaries started to call him “the Great.” He defined Prussia’s image as a great power, although neither the size of its population nor its richness or the extent of its territory would justify such a designation (Schroeder 1994). Prussia’s status as a great power was based solely on military efficiency at a time when the army started to become the most crucial form of representation of the state. Prussia’s “status, more than that of Russia, was a work of art, the handiwork of her rulers” (Anderson 1988, 168).

While England never developed a strong army or an interest in territorial acquisitions on the continent because of its geographical position, by the early eighteenth century its navy was without any rivals and it became the dominant power on the seas (Black 1990; Doyle 1978; Finer 1975; Holsti 1992; Wolf 1951). Toward the end of the seventeenth century, England focused on developing a modern navy with clear command structures and a merit-based system of promotions (Anderson 1988), which was a rarity in a Europe marked by aristocratic privileges. England’s well-developed financial system was a further advantage that allowed it to never run out of money. As a result “the wars of 1739-63 made her the most successful and dynamic imperial power in the world” (Anderson 1988, 183), while France fell behind. With its military achievements Britain actively sought to become a great power on the European continent. Thus, at the end of the Napoleonic wars the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh reported that Britain’s effective contributions to the war effort were not matched by any other power, and he added: “This, I trust, will put an end to any doubts as to the claim we have to an opinion on continental matters” (qtd. in Middleton 1977, 25).

Throughout the seventeenth century and in the first part of the eighteenth century, aristocratic society permeated the army. Ceremonial performances, ostentatious consumption, and societal rank were important factors in military life. Russian and Prussian efforts to gain high standing in the European order by focusing on the army as the primary form of representation led to a significant change: where aristocratic ways of life permeated the army, now the military permeated societal life. Russia and Prussia

subordinated all forms of societal organization to the military's needs (Anderson 1988).

Once other powers were losing out against Russia and Prussia (a phenomenon that was considerably more transparent after the indexical link between a ruler and his army had tightened), they realized the need to establish reforms to maintain their standing (Sheehan 1989). "The Prussian army became for much of the continent a model to be admired, even slavishly copied, in a way that none had ever been in the past" (Anderson 1988, 157). For example, Joseph II took Frederick II's Prussia as his model for the reforms he established in Austria (Ardant 1975). The Habsburg army adopted Prussian-style uniforms, and it copied the Prussian army's drills and tactics. Joseph II announced on his deathbed, "the development of the strength, courage, and prestige of the army [was] the principal object of my life" (qtd. in Sheehan 1989, 46).

"This admiration of Prussia was an important aspect of the growth of militarism in eighteenth-century Europe. This was a new development, one of the most significant of the period. Over most of the continent there can now be seen a growing tendency to regard armies not merely as essential tools for the defence and possible expansion of the state, and for the equally necessary maintenance of internal order, but as something to be valued in and for themselves" (Anderson 1988, 170). With Russia and Prussia in the lead, militarism spread throughout Europe (Finer 1975), which crucially affected forms of representation. With increasing frequency statesmen used soldiers as diplomats, even, or maybe especially, on the most important diplomatic posts. While at the time of Louis XIV it would have been a breach of ceremonial procedures had a nobleman worn a uniform at court, in the second half of the eighteenth century rulers themselves started to wear military uniforms instead of crowns and sceptres (Anderson 1988; Anderson 1993).⁷ This fact alone indicates that the army played a crucial symbolic role as a representation of the state that reached well beyond its functional effects in terms of exerting brute force (Sheehan 1989).

There were a few telling exceptions who did not follow this trend toward militarization. At the French and Spanish courts it was very rare to see people in military uniforms, and aristocratic manners still permeated the army. The French army was filled with officers

7. Amsterdam Historical Museum, visit on 7 January 2013.

of high birth, including princes, dukes, marquises, and counts (Anderson 1988). France also spent a considerably smaller portion of its budget (25%) on the military than other powers did (Black 1990). In short, the French and the Spanish armies did not undergo the same transformations that were taking shape elsewhere, and in the second half of the eighteenth century they were more often than not on the losing end.

6.3.2 Diplomatic Changes

Concerns over issues of precedence and ceremonial performance were considerably more pronounced in the ancient monarchies that had been historically located at the top of the international hierarchy, namely the Habsburg monarchy, Spain, and France, than in the newly emerging powers on the European continent, that is, Britain, Prussia, and Russia (Anderson 1993; Black 1990). Especially France, and the Habsburg monarchy with its quasi-inherited title of Holy Roman Emperor, insisted on their right to diplomatic precedence. At the Peace of Utrecht the emperor requested precedence over everybody else, and obtained an honourary place in front of a big mirror. Even in 1781 the Habsburg emperor still demanded precedence to Russian Queen Catherine II, who requested equal standing (Black 1990).

Like Russia, Britain also had difficulties obtaining formal recognition from the Habsburg emperor. Earlier in the eighteenth century Britain sought to fall in line, and diplomats — none more so than those based at the French and Imperial courts — frequently commented in official letters to their home court on whether their status had been respected. The diplomats appointed to the French, Spanish, and Habsburg courts received more money than the others (Horn 1961), probably out of an awareness that representative splendour mattered at these courts more than elsewhere. But British diplomats continuously felt that their French colleagues outmanoeuvred them (Mori 2010). Britain's insularity, as well as its historical withdrawal from the continent, meant that British diplomats did not share the same manners as continental diplomats. "To what extent Britons were ill-equipped by birth and upbringing for the representation of their king abroad was debated by diplomats throughout the period" (Mori 2010, 18).

Their efforts to uphold Britain's rank were without much avail. Because the Austri-

ans refused to give Britain the title of majesty, Britain only rarely sent a diplomat at the rank of ambassador to the court in Vienna. Bolingbroke, British Secretary of State for the Southern Department, expressed his frustrations about Austria's insistence on supremacy: "That house of Austria has been the evil genius of Britain. I never think of the conduct of that family without recollecting the image of a man braiding a rope of hay whilst his ass bites it off at the other end" (qtd. in Horn 1961, 22-23). For the next half century almost every British secretary of state expressed similar frustrations about Austria's unyielding stance regarding ceremonial issues, and these frustrations led repeatedly to brief disruptions of diplomatic ties (Horn 1961). British diplomats encountered similar difficulties during their missions to Ratisbon, where the Imperial diet was located. Because of matters of precedence Britain's envoy Stanhope was never officially received, and his successor obtained a letter from an experienced diplomat, saying "Your post at R[atibon] is full of ceremony. You cannot spit out of the window without offending the head or paraphernalia of an Excellence. You are all so, that Ceremonial there is looked on as essential and subject to contests" (qtd. in Horn 1961, 24). From 1756 onwards Britain had its diplomatic representative for the imperial diet located in Munich, rather than in Ratisbon, partly perhaps to avoid difficulties of precedence, but the change also signified a decline of the empire's importance in British eyes.

The matter was not just that British statesmen were unfamiliar with the habitus of continental diplomacy—they were also ever less interested in adapting to the mores of etiquette. While the empire had an unyielding stance in matters of precedence, Britain was also impatient with ceremonial issues (Anderson 1993), perhaps because its statesmen had little success in upholding their rank. Simultaneously they were gaining confidence and pride, maybe in part from British colonial conquests. In short, they increasingly experienced hysteresis, a mismatch in their position in courtly ceremonial and their disposition, and they set out to delegitimize matters of precedence. Thus a diplomat based in Denmark complained about the "nonsense of etiquette" that complicated his communications with the Danish king, another diplomat apologized for having to bother the Earl of Suffolk "with a greater detail concerning the ceremonial of the Diet of Ratisbon than so trifling a subject deserves" (Mori 2010, 92), and a third one commented on the

inefficiency of France's insistence on her precedence at the less-formal European courts.

George III of England then decided to abolish diplomatic precedence at court balls all together, and Britain increasingly appointed army officers to diplomatic posts, in line with its policy to reduce the relevance of etiquette and enhance the military's visibility. The British also became increasingly unwilling to make the usual diplomatic gifts. For example, "Auckland Was writing to Undersecretary of State James Bland Burges that he could not bring himself to make gratuitous gifts to courtiers or heads of state" (Mori 2010, 34). Even George III's coronation, that most ceremonial of all occasions, "was reduced almost to a shambles as one mishap followed another; on that occasion even the sermon scarcely could be heard above the clatter of cutlery and popping of corks as the congregation used the opportunity to take lunch!" (Sturdy 1990, 243). Nor was George III's coronation unique in that regard. In short, the British actively promoted the decline of ceremonial and diplomatic precedence, and so it is not too surprising that they were more comfortable interacting with French republicans than with French courtiers (Mori 2010).

Similar to British diplomats, Russian diplomats had a habitus (partly influenced by Asian diplomatic practices) that sat uneasily with the habitus of their Western European counterparts (Neumann and Pouliot 2011; Nicolson 1954). From the sixteenth century Russian statesmen and diplomats sought to establish equal standing with the Holy Roman Emperor and gain the title of tsar, without much avail. European rulers refused to recognize Russia's high standing. Russia's counterparts interpreted its claims to superiority expressed in exotic costumes, and through unfamiliar manners, as little more than curiosities. As a result, the diplomatic encounters with Europeans led to a sense of hysteresis on the Russian side (Neumann and Pouliot 2011).

This sense of hysteresis might have caused Peter I to develop his army while he simultaneously purposefully set out to ridicule European ceremonial during his visits to European courts. Peter I was the first Russian ruler to travel to occidental Europe, and he did so four times during his reign. During his trips he neither behaved in line with traditional Russian customs (Wolf 1951), nor with Western etiquette. He shocked Europe with his spontaneous actions and his ridicule of diplomatic protocol. His disregard for

courtly manners was accompanied by a profound interest in European warfare skills and technology. For example, he worked in a shipyard in the Netherlands to learn how to construct ships (Wolf 1951), despite the fact that manual labour was unsuitable for a king.

Almost everywhere in Europe the rulers and state representatives were relieved when his visits ended without too much emotional arousal. “Nobody was very sorry to see the departure of a guest who amused himself by getting drunk, smashing furniture, and extracting his followers’ teeth” (White 1964, 98). In preparation for Peter I’s second visit, King Frederic IV of Denmark removed all the precious artifacts and paintings from the small castle of Blagard, where the tsar intended to stay. When Peter I changed his mind and decided in favour of the castle Charlottenburg, the Danish king did the same. Eventually the tsar chose the residence of Wilhelm Edinger. After the Russian delegation left, half of the furniture had been destroyed — a clear sign of Peter I’s disrespect for the conspicuous consumption typical of *ancien régime* court culture. The tsar’s outfit further underlined his distaste for proper royal appearance. He wore an old jacket mended with simple cloth, brown pants, sailor shoes, dirty gloves, and a green, waxed bonnet, whereas the Danish king was dressed very elegantly, in line with the court culture of his time (Mieck 1996). Peter I’s visit to France was also shocking in his disrespect of ceremonial. He did not take the foreseen route to arrive in Paris, so the solemn reception could not take place. When he then met Louis XV, who was still a child, he lifted the boy to the height of his head, hugged him, and kissed him a number of times, “which had not been foreseen by the ceremonial” (Mieck 1996, 326).⁸ He also refused to eat an honourable dinner that had been prepared for him and commented that, as a soldier, he would be happy with bread and water and stopped in a village to eat a farmer’s meal. Even so, Peter I’s stay in Paris turned out to be extremely costly because of all the destruction it caused. At Peter I’s departure, the French court, one of the most ardent defenders of ceremonial matters, decided to leave out the ceremonial all together. Perhaps that was the victory that Peter I had hoped for.

At the same time as Peter I was ridiculing Western ceremonial, he set out to adapt his

8. My translation from French.

subjects' appearance to European standards. He ordered the men to shave their beards and to smoke tobacco. He also abolished the flowing robe and replaced it with the shorter robes that were fashionable in Western Europe (Wolf 1951). All of this indicates that he was not simply unaware of the effects of appearance and representation, but rather used them strategically to convey his message. Peter I was the first Russian ruler to develop an effective diplomatic machinery and establish permanent diplomatic representation in the major European courts (Anderson 1993; Doyle 1978). He spent significant sums of money on maintaining the diplomatic apparatus, and even subsidized foreign journals to write favourably about Russia and its ruler (Wolf 1951). It appears that Peter I had developed a thorough strategy to position Russia among the primary European powers.

His strategy was successful because Russia gained ever more recognition from other European powers throughout the eighteenth century. It played an active role in the European order, was a sought-after alliance partner, and contributed to peace settlements (Schroeder 1994). My claim is that this is due to the change in forms of representation that took place in the course of the eighteenth century, away from a focus on issues of diplomatic precedence and ceremonial, and toward a more exclusive focus on military power, which Russian rulers since Peter I put all their emphasis on.

Unlike Britain and Russia, Prussia could not have had a historical experience of high societal rank because most of her territories were part of the Empire, and the rulers of those territories had therefore been subjugated to the overlordship of the Holy Roman Emperor for centuries. Yet, inspired by his Hanoverian and Saxon counterparts, Frederick I sought and obtained a crown from the Holy Roman Emperor for his territories that lay outside of the empire, thanks to the military support he had provided the emperor during the War of Spanish Succession. Frederick I also took painstaking care to increase the image of his court by building palaces and churches, upholding courtly ceremonial, and financing the arts (Sheehan 1989). His efforts might have been to little avail, as Madame de Stael, an influential Parisian intellectual remarked in 1804 "one sees [in Berlin] no traces of earlier times . . . an entirely modern city, beautiful as it is makes no impression" (qtd. in Sheehan 1989, 56). And a British diplomat remarked how his Prussian colleague "complains that he is not treated as Excellent, that the Ministers have not visited him in

form, and that the Soldiers, when he passes by a Guard, do not salute him” (Mori 2010, 92).

Perhaps because Frederick I’s strategy could succeed to only a very limited degree, but would have never elevated Prussia to the rank of France and Austria, subsequent Prussian rulers minimized their expenditures for palaces, courtly ceremonial and diplomatic life, to concentrate all their resources on the army. With Frederick William I, Frederick I’s son, “draconian cost-cutting in the court and household was initiated: overall expenditures dropped by three-quarters within a year, while two-thirds of the court officials were either cashiered or sent off to the army. The coronation ceremony in Koenigsberg was a penurious and perfunctory affair, much unlike the lavish and incredibly expensive celebrations of 1701” (Gagliardo 1991, 304). Frederick William actively opposed the promotion of culture to the point that he nominated his court buffoon as Leibniz’s successor to lead the Berlin Academy (Sheehan 1989). As with Peter I, it is impossible to assume that Frederick William simply did not care about outward appearances because he spent a considerable amount of time refining his soldiers’ uniforms. His goal was rather to purposefully minimize the role of courtly ceremonial and diplomatic precedence as a form of representation, and instead enhance the role of the army.

Frederick William laid the groundwork on which his son Frederick II could then develop a Prussian model that other rulers sought to emulate, just as the French model had been replicated at other courts throughout Europe (see [chapter 4](#) and [chapter 5](#)). Frederick II inspired “by his simplicity of manner and ‘air of iron confidence’” (Sheehan 1989, 65). He disliked ceremonial matters just as his father did. He slept in a simple camp bed and wore military uniform at court (Beetz 1995). His diplomats actively ridiculed elements of diplomatic representation. Thus, at Joseph II’s imperial coronation in 1764, the electors’ envoys and other representatives sought to outperform each other in pyrotechnic illuminations, and the Prussian delegate did not want to be left behind: “He most splendidly illuminated his shabby and age-old accommodation in the Saalhof. The malicious Prussian delegate puts with this ‘masterly enlightenment’ in the two senses of the word the sad architectonic state of construction of the Staufens’ castle and the king’s

palace in the brightest light” (Beetz 1995, 596).⁹

Enlightenment thought certainly helped Frederick II in his endeavours, and Frederick II provided refuge to Rousseau in the Prussian enclave of Neuchatel (Sheehan 1989). However, previous rulers throughout the eighteenth century developed strategies to eliminate the significance of courtly ceremonial, well before enlightenment thinkers published their work, and for that reason enlightenment thinking does not appear to be the fundamental cause of eliminating *ancien régime* court culture but merely one of its contributing factors. It is also clear that Frederick II’s primary motivations for his actions were not to “leave all men free to use their own reason in all matters of conscience,” as Rousseau put it (qtd. in Sheehan 1989: 67), but to expand his own position by eliminating matters of diplomatic precedence as an indicator of social rank, and by further developing his army and conquering foreign territories to mark Prussia’s position among the great powers. Frederick II’s fascination for the army was the main stumbling block in his friendship with Voltaire.

6.3.3 The Response to Prussia’s, Russia’s, and Great Britain’s Strategy

The traditional archrivals Austria and France responded to the rise of Russia, Prussia, and Britain by insisting on their right to precedence (Anderson 1993) but they also established an alliance between themselves to defend the old order. The “Reversal of Alliances” that took place in 1756 was intended to balance the emergence of new powers on the continent, as realists might suggest, but it also maintained the old hierarchical order based on old customs and ceremonial procedures. Bernis, France’s foreign minister at the time, explained that the reasons for the reversal of alliances were to maintain France’s high rank and her preeminence in Europe based on her ancientness, dignity, and greatness (Bosbach 1988). Similarly, for Maria Theresa, the ruler of Austria, the matter was not one of rationally calculating power differences. “Frederick II of Prussia was not just an adversary but the enemy, who had wronged her twice between 1740 and

9. My translation from German.

1745 and had betrayed his obligations as prince of the empire to the memory of her father and to the future imperial mantle of her husband” (Kann 1974, 159). While other forces inside the empire opposed her during the Seven Years War, such as the elector of Bavaria and the elector of Saxony, none except for Frederick II of Prussia questioned the very foundations on which the empire, Austrian power, and the old European order were based. “The ambitions of the great atheist and heretic shook all that was sacred in Europe, in Maria Theresa’s eyes” (Kann 1974, 159).

The Reversal of Alliances was not as successful as Austria and France might have wished. Maria Theresa had to painfully realize that she would not be able to regain Silesia from Prussia, and that Austria was having serious difficulties keeping up with the emerging challengers. This bitter realization led her to develop a modest reform program. It was her son, Joseph II, who then set out on a radical reform course. He admired Frederick II of Prussia and sought to imitate his style. Joseph II became the first emperor to wear military uniform at court and to sleep in simple bunk beds (Beetz 1995; Sheehan 1989). He eliminated the traditional courtly gown, abolished many ceremonial procedures, and reduced all courtly ceremonial events, including birthdays and name days, to one single day, namely New Year’s Eve. The theatre became accessible to bourgeois society who could buy tickets. It was no longer societal rank but the tickets and their price that determined seating in the theatre (Sommer-Mathis 1995). In short, Joseph II minimized or eliminated “ceremonial expressions of royal power, those rituals and displays that had been so central to Habsburg rule in the age of the baroque” (Sheehan 1989, 49). By abolishing ceremonial procedures Joseph II also abolished the hierarchical order at whose apex he was positioned. Once the ceremonial props had disappeared, the emperor lost the divinely ordained right to rule. His own god-like nature disappeared and he became an ordinary man. Joseph II minimized ceremonial performances to direct attention to the army as the primary form of representation of the state, and to free resources for its rationalization and expansion.

France also had difficulties maintaining face in the military realm. “The years 1757-62 were disastrous. The rout of a French army by the Prussians at Rossbach in 1757 was the most humiliating defeat suffered by any power during the century” (Anderson

1988, 158). Old aristocratic habits were permeating the French military to an extent that was unheard of elsewhere. For example, the French army employed 1,200 generals, many of whom were aristocrats with little military experience. Even the Austrian army employed only a fraction of that number, while the Prussian army was almost as large as the French, but had only eighty generals. France's inefficient military structures resulted in significant losses that led to a profound feeling of shame and "outraged national and professional pride" (Anderson 1988, 197). Demands for far-reaching reforms ensued. Large sums of money were invested into improving the army, but without that Louis XVI would have scaled back the ceremonial apparatus. An already severely strained budget reached its breaking point, and the resulting needs for increased taxation contributed to the French Revolution, while the French army remained unsuccessful. When it came to representative forms the revolutionaries did not behave much differently from Joseph II: quite quickly they directed their attention to the military as one of the primary forms of state representation, and they abolished French ceremonial. For example, they destroyed the coronation insignia, including the ampulla with the holy chrism (Österle 1995), that most crucial French coronation insignium that had ensured the entrance of the supernatural into the coronation, and had been one of the cornerstones of French claims to independence from the Holy Roman Empire (see [chapter 4](#)).

The emerging powers (Russia, Prussia, and Britain) were then successful overall in asserting their claims to a high position in Europe's order. In the very process they changed Europe's order. They successfully managed to challenge the hierarchical order expressed in forms of diplomatic precedence. From the second half of the eighteenth century, diplomatic precedence aroused fewer and fewer concerns (Anderson 1993), and the final solution to issues of diplomatic precedence was found at the Congress of Vienna (Leguey-Feilleux 2009).

Simultaneously, the second half of the eighteenth century was also when the term *great powers* started being used (Horn 1961). The understanding emerged of a "Europe of independent sovereign states, equal in rights status, and security, if vastly unequal in power, responsibility, and influence" (Schroeder 1994, 504; Klein 1974). The army and the ability to shape military conflicts on the continent defined great-power status. Given

that the army became the primary representative form of states, and that the costs of armies and warfare had grown so massively, only a few states could afford to play a role in Europe's order from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards. Whereas previously there had been a continuum from those powers at the top of the hierarchy, namely the Holy Roman Empire, France, and Spain to those at the lower levels, such as the Dutch Republic, and Denmark, down to the Hanseatic city states, and the Italian principalities, now there would be five major powers (France, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Britain)—the others were essentially relegated to irrelevance (Anderson 1993). Formerly medium-ranked powers such as Denmark, Sweden, and the Swiss confederation declared neutrality and significantly downsized their diplomatic personnel.

6.4 The Territorial Balance of Power as Europe's Order

As the hierarchical conception of order was vanishing from the European continent, ceremonial performances lost their meaning, and rulers were increasingly seen as equal to each other, the army became the primary representation of the ruler and the state, and international order was increasingly conceived of in the form of a territorial balance of power. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries peace was no longer illustrated in a single figure — the allegory of Pax as an iconic representation of universal monarchy — but rather as a compact agreed upon by several statesmen of equal standing surrounding a peace altar, or the holy flame of world peace (Burkhardt 1998). “Fantasies about a universal empire had all but vanished and what had emerged was a Europe governed by a balance of power between great military states. Kings by divine right, who ruled within the limits set by medieval constitutions, had been replaced by princes who were the chiefs, or at any rate the titular chiefs, of great military and civil bureaucracies” (Wolf 1951, 1).

The concept of a balance of power already existed prior to the eighteenth century. The symbol of a balance was prevalent in ancient Greek and Latin allegorical images of

Justice, who evaluates the competing claims of opposing parties objectively by weighing them on a scale. From here the concept probably entered into governmental political arrangements. Very early images illustrated the efforts of the pope and the emperor to maintain a balance between themselves (Vagts 1948). Not surprisingly the concept of a balance of power first emerged in Renaissance Italy in the fifteenth or sixteenth century (Butterfield 1966; Vagts 1948). By the second half of the sixteenth century the phrase *balance of power* appeared on rare occasions in political pamphlets, but it remained unclear how the concept would translate into specific policy implications (Anderson 1993; Black 1990; Malettke 1996), and throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries some authors still thought of universal monarchy as the ideal form of international order. Prior to the eighteenth century “it had been natural for one power to be rated above the rest and impossible for that Power’s pretensions — resisted though they had always been by other states — to stop short of the control and protection of Christendom” (Wight 1977, 150).

Only during the eighteenth century did the balance of power become “clearly the organizing principle in terms of which international relations in general were seen” (Anderson 1998, 162). The Anglo-Spanish treaty, a part of the Peace of Utrecht from 1714, was the first major international treaty that identified in the preamble the establishment of a balance of power in Europe as one of its main goals. However, it took several further decades to conceptually develop what it meant to have a balance of power as Europe’s main ordering principle (Reus-Smit 1999), and some European rulers, in particular the French king and the emperor, maintained older hierarchical conceptions of European order that also found expression in the iconography of the time (Burkhardt 1998). As the role of these rulers decreased over the course of the eighteenth century, the balance of power became Europe’s main ordering principle. It remained so at least until the First World War (Anderson 1998; Wight 1966).

The emergence of the balance of power as Europe’s ordering mechanism resulted from three processes: 1) the transformation of universal monarchy from an ordering principle to a threat of order ([chapter 4](#)); 2) the removal of diplomatic precedence and ceremonial as a crucial form of representation of the state, and its replacement with the military;

and 3) the conception of the territorial state ([chapter 5](#)).

Once rulers won their autonomy against the Holy Roman Emperor, they sought to prevent the rise of other potential universal monarchs. Thus alliances emerged against the further increase of Louis XIV's power with the express purpose of preventing the threat of universal monarchy (Bosbach 1988; Anderson 1993; Osiander 1994). Out of a singular effort, gradually emerged the balance of power as an order that seeks to prevent the occurrence of Universal Monarchy in general. In part the balance of power emerged as a reaction to universal monarchy—as the order that should prevent universal monarchy or empire from occurring (Holsti 1991; Schroeder 1994). The increased control kings gained over their armies heightened rulers' concerns about the potential for complete annexation and subservience, and therefore made a preventative ordering mechanism against universal monarchy all the more desirable.

In opposition to universal monarchy, an order based on a balance of power mechanism is a horizontal order of like units positioned next to each other. The principles of autonomy and equality are at its foundation because in the balance of power every unit is an autonomous entity that is like every other unit. The units differ in only their respective powers and the balance of power seeks to even those powers out to ensure the order's continuation.

The principles of autonomy and equality were engrained in several forms of representation, among them the reformed diplomatic practices that established equal standing among representatives, but also territorial maps, which positioned states on maps horizontally next to each other with clearly demarcated boundary lines separating one state from another. On a Cartesian map states appear as like-units; the only factors that differentiate them from each other are their territorial extent and their geographical location (see [chapter 5](#)).

The balance in the image of the scales ensured that the might of the great powers would be objectively measured without recourse to any preferences or preconceived rights (Anderson 1993, 159). The territorial extent of states as portrayed on maps provided an easily accessible measure for evaluating states' power. It became the fundamental resource that rulers set themselves out to balance under the new international order.

This was so because at the time other potential measures of power were not easily accessible, given that the relevant forms of representation did not yet exist. Thus statistics were difficult to come by (Anderson 1998; Black 1990), whereas it was comparatively easy to measure territory (Elden 2013; Revel 1991). As a result of the available forms of representation, the balance was not defined in terms of the possession of economic resources and development, the size of armies, the possession of weapons, or administrative efficiency (Anderson 1993). Paradoxically, “the differentials of armed might were not . . . a matter of great concern beyond some sentiments of envy, and did not suggest threats to the balance of power. Increments of military capabilities seldom caused crises or significantly raised perceptions of threat” (Holsti 1992, 53). Given that they could not be adequately represented, it was probably difficult to evaluate them.

As statesmen defined the balance of power in territorial terms, clear guidelines for action emerged. The great powers had to intervene against the territorial expansion of others, and they had a right of compensation in the sense that others’ territorial gains had to match similar territorial gains for oneself (Luard 1992; Schroeder 1994). Territory became a commodity that was traded to uphold the equilibrium (Holsti 1991). It was a “departure from previous eras, when territorial ownership was deeply rooted in legal rights, family compacts, ancient marriages, and feudal titles” (Holsti 1991, 90). Rulers could break treaties to uphold the territorial balance of power, or they could be required to seize territory to which they had a legitimate title (Anderson 1998; Osiander 1994). To achieve equilibrium “territories were shuffled around, swapped and bartered in unscrupulous fashion” (Luard 1992, 202). Typical examples of these kinds of activities are the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795 (Schroeder 1994). Although the balance-of-power approach did not necessarily create stability and peace, statesmen considered it an appropriate mechanism to establish order and to maintain their autonomy (Schroeder 1994).

6.5 The Gradual Demise of the Holy Roman Empire

At the time when the balance of power was taking shape elsewhere in Europe, inside the Holy Roman Empire a medieval form of order prevailed just a little longer (Tilly 1975), and the “imperial crown as prestige-forming institution” maintained its importance for some time (Kann 1974, 55). Within the Holy Roman Empire feudal rights and various authority structures were tangled so the concept of sovereignty made little sense (Gagliardo 1991; Sheehan 1989; Stirk 2012). According to the principle of *Landeshoheit* (territorial supremacy) “a prince of the Empire enjoyed supremacy within his territories according to established right and custom, but had to share the exercise of governmental authority in varying degrees with other holders of authority (*Herrschaften*) within his domains and beyond them — the Emperor and the Imperial Court Chamber, the Imperial Diet, the Church and its bishops, the immediate princes of the Empire, even Imperial knights” (Schroeder 1994, 72). Ceremonies of investiture were crucial in determining the feudal arrangements; changes in the ceremonial expressed changes in the feudal arrangements (Schütte 1995).

These arrangements in the empire also had far-reaching effects for the empire’s individual princes’ relations to other European powers. Thus Frederick William I signed peace treaties with France and Spain during the war of the Spanish succession while he maintained a contingent in the imperial army, which was still at war with France. Similarly England’s Queen Anne invited the elector of Hanover, the successor to the English throne, to the peace negotiations at Utrecht. He responded that he would be able to participate at the negotiations only once the emperor had also agreed to attend them (Osiander 1994). Loyalty to the empire was still strong.

However, several members of the empire increasingly played a role on the European stage. Most prominently the Prussian kings, the electors of Hanover (who became the kings of England), and the Habsburg monarchs (who not only possessed the imperial crown but were also the rulers of Austria), were progressively positioned between two different fields: on the one hand the European field was increasingly defined in terms of a balance of power, and on the other hand the German field was still based on the

ordering mechanism of empire. Even smaller rulers, such as the elector of Saxony, who obtained the Polish crown, were active on the European stage (Gagliardo 1991; Kann 1974; Krasner 1993).¹⁰

As rulers inside the empire obtained their own crowns and were ever more exposed to the wider European order and its forms of representation, they equally developed the representative forms that go with sovereign statehood. France, and its forms of representation—the palace of Versailles perhaps most prominently—came to shape the representative forms of the medium-sized German courts (Evans 1979; Hartmann 1988), and thus influenced developing the image of territorial states with clearly demarcated boundaries and a uniform and absolute power extending evenly over the entire territory (see [chapter 5](#)). “Expenditures on what one might call the emotive infrastructure of princely rule — the palaces, parks, public edifices, the visual, literary and musical arts, cultural events and so on — which powerfully reinforced the image-building of princes and were far more important to such degree of absolute rule as was actually realized than is perhaps commonly appreciated” formed a significant portion of German princes’ budgets (Gagliardo 1991, 291). Princes also invested in the establishment of standing armies. These changes in representative forms occurred well before German rulers “began to draft sets of uniform laws designed to override both local custom and imperial jurisdiction” (Sheehan 1989, 20), while the on-the ground state-building activities often developed in only the nineteenth century.

With the emergence of territorial states’ representational forms inside the empire proper, the forms of representation of the Holy Roman Empire started to fade away by the middle of the eighteenth century. Rulers of the medium-sized German states no longer sought to obtain their feudal rights from the emperor in the traditional ceremony. Even the imperial coronation ceremony got hollowed out from the inside as the ancient traditions gradually disappeared (Beetz 1995). The coronation rite became a pseudo-tradition that maintained only a superficial resemblance to the medieval ceremony. It now clearly emerged as a theatrical performance. The spectators had to buy tickets

10. While King George I still maintained for Hanover a policy that was independent from Great Britain, his successors tied Hanoverian policy closely to the interests of Great Britain (Horn 1961).

to see the spectacle and the main protagonists wore costumes from a different epoch. According to Goethe's description, even the young King Joseph II felt amused about the ancient outfit of Charlemagne that was several sizes too big for him. If the king himself was not taking his initiation rite too seriously, the spectators must have responded in a similar fashion (Beetz 1995).

With the empire's forms of representation vanishing, and those of territorial and militarized states on the rise, the empire was losing its *raison d'être* in the eyes of its members. It could no longer stand for an alternative European order, but had to become an object in the broader balance-of-power game on the European continent (Durchhardt 1989). In particular the rivalry between Austria and Prussia became detrimental for the empire (Schroeder 1994; Webster 1963). The two powers engaged in territorial disputes—Prussia to balance the power of Austria, and Austria to ensure its preeminence. In the process the Habsburg rulers gradually got dragged into the territorial power game, and increasingly lost sight of their responsibilities as emperors of the German sub-system (Barraclough 1962). “Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the two roles united in the emperor's person often came into conflict. Increasingly, the Habsburgs were inclined to use their imperial authority to enhance their own power and to further their dynastic ambitions” (Sheehan 1989, 16). For example, this was the case when Joseph II sought to obtain Bavaria after the last of the Wittelsbachs had passed away. A defensive alliance formed against him under the lead of Prussia and composed of the electorates of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Hanover with the goal to restore the balance of the empire (Stirk 2012). Similar activities on the part of the Habsburgs weakened their imperial title, and allowed Prussia to attack the Habsburg monarchy without having to worry about severe retributions from the empire. Balancing practices entered the empire as new ordering mechanisms. The recurring wars inside the empire demonstrated the imperial institutions' inability to function effectively. The imperial order was crumbling, while “residua of German loyalty to the Reich constitution” (Schroeder 1994, 29) protected smaller German principalities, free cities, and states for a few more decades from being redistributed in the balance-of-power game (Osiander 1994).

The final collapse of the Holy Roman Empire occurred during the Napoleonic wars.

Napoleon defeated Austria and Prussia while the second-rank German powers collaborated with him, and obtained in exchange the many small ecclesiastical states and imperial knights in the empire with the argument that this would restore the inner-German balance. The Reichsdeputationshauptschluss of 1803 rationalized the empire's structures so that the empire was composed of several medium-sized territorial states (Barraclough 1962). In the process 112 independent estates of the empire disappeared. These changes effectively destroyed the order of the empire, which by that point had already been hollowed out from the inside. In 1804 Francis II declared himself emperor of an Austrian empire (Kann 1974). In 1806 Napoleon created the Confederation of the Rhine, which included most of Germany except for Austria and Prussia. He dissolved the Holy Roman Empire and Francis II had to abdicate the imperial crown (Breuilly 1993). Henceforward he would be an Austrian emperor only.

Almost no resistance emerged against the end of the Holy Roman Empire. Barely anybody bemoaned its disappearance, or even noticed its demise (Schroeder 1994). For example, the end of the Holy Roman Empire, of an order that had existed for eight-and-a-half centuries, was not mentioned in Goethe's autobiography (Beetz 1995). It was as if it had already ceased to exist before it disappeared. The fact that nobody lamented the empire's demise when it formally vanished indicates that the main changes in international order do not necessarily result after major wars, as many scholars suggest (Hall 1999; Phillips 2011; Wight 1977), but instead can be slow, incremental processes that develop in mundane interactions. Especially the middle-sized German states celebrated their territorial increases and the newly gained independence. It comes as little surprise then that after Napoleon's defeat, not many were interested in reinstating the Holy Roman Empire. The middle-sized states set out to complete Napoleon's work and effectively built territorial states with a constitution, a notion of citizenship, national assemblies, singular tax systems, and a unified law (Breuilly 1993).

On the surface these events appear to confirm a realist perspective according to which the Holy Roman Empire came to an end because it was an ineffective polity and therefore could not survive in the international power competition (Krasner 1993, 2009; Spruyt 1994). However, from a realist perspective, the Holy Roman Empire should have already

vanished at the Peace of Westphalia. In purely realist terms the Peace of Westphalia even provided more conditions than the Congress of Vienna for the dismemberment of the empire. After all, it was the emperor who lost the Thirty Years War, whereas Napoleon lost the Napoleonic wars, and the emperor was on the winning side. The empire could have been reestablished at the Congress of Vienna but it was not because its members no longer espoused the dispositions of actors inside an imperial order and refused to return to such an order. The empire had become an empty shell well before the Napoleonic wars (Beetz 1995). As its forms of representation vanished, and its members adopted the representative forms of territorial states instead, they also developed the habitus of independent territorial states, even though they had not yet been territorial states legally, or effectively.

6.6 A Brief Resurgence of Empire in the Napoleonic Era

The ordering mechanism of empire found a brief resurgence on a European scale during the Napoleonic period. Napoleon overthrew the balance of power as the ordering principle of Europe and sought to establish his empire on the continent (Barraclough 1962; Butterfield 1966; Schroeder 1994). He became the emperor of the French in 1804 but “between the Senatus-Consult of 18 May 1804 which proclaimed him Emperor of the French, and the Coronation of 2 December which demonstrated the reality of this dignity, his title had, in his own mind, taken on a new character” (Koebner 1961, 282). He no longer considered himself merely the emperor of the French, but the successor of Charlemagne, as he announced to Pope Pius VII. Napoleon started to talk about his empire, which extended beyond the French territory, and included the annexations of Holland, Italy, and parts of Germany. For Napoleon his empire was both the polity that he had established through successive annexations and a hierarchical ordering mechanism for Europe as a whole, in many ways similar to the one that existed in medieval Europe. Napoleon considered himself at the top of Europe’s hierarchy, as was apparent from his

complaints about Russia's Tsar Alexander: "He was defiant, and unspeakably obstinate. He wanted to treat with me as between equals" (qtd. in Schroeder 1994, 337). Napoleon furthermore put an ultimatum to Francis II to abdicate the crown of the Holy Roman Empire or else Napoleon would invade Austria and force Francis II's abdication. The incident illustrates Napoleon's understanding that his empire was the successor of the Holy Roman Empire, and that at any one point there could exist only one such empire on the European continent.

Napoleon's resorting to Charlemagne's empire as his predecessor was a tactical move that allowed him at once to base his title on ancient, and arguably French traditions to strengthen French national sentiment, while simultaneously extending his claims to rulership beyond the French nation-state, and eliminating any reference to the *ancien régime*, which the French revolution had just overthrown (Österle 1995).

To establish his claim to the succession of Charlemagne Napoleon made use of old forms of representation, which he had to adapt in several ways to not appear to be re-installing the order that the revolutionaries had rejected. The ceremonial had to remain in continuation with the French revolution, while simultaneously installing a hierarchical societal order (Österle 1995). Some of Napoleon's closest aides undertook detailed scientific studies and historical research to meet these needs. The coronation became a special event whose preparations took several months. Given that the ceremonial could not base itself on immediate tradition, they needed recourse to aesthetics and fashion to avoid the spectators' potential boredom. For this purpose Napoleon brought the most prominent architects and artists of the time, such as Pierre Fontaine, Charles Percier, and Jacques Louis David to the French court. Every single movement of the emperor and empress was calculated with exact mathematical precision; the choreography was planned like a ballet. Incomprehensible and aesthetically displeasing ceremonial elements had to be removed; others were added, such as musical elements reminiscent of the opera. The costumes had to impress. The empress's dress was literally brilliant; it was covered with silver and diamonds. The belt, the necklace, the diadem, and the crown were all made of diamonds. The carriage was made of glass. The spectacle had to be awe-inspiring.

Napoleon was very careful to avoid any gesture of subservience to the pope. French

Foreign Minister Talleyrand, one of Europe's ablest diplomats at the time, spent four years negotiating with the pope every single gesture and the precise language that would be employed during the coronation. Thus Napoleon did not travel to Fontainebleau to meet the pope there but, according to the newspapers, went hunting and met the pope by coincidence in Fontainebleau. During the coronation itself, the pope did not "elect" the emperor, but "had to anoint him," and did not "grant" him the sword, but "offered" it to him (Österle 1995, 645). The pope agreed to crown Napoleon under the condition that he would conduct the anointment as well as the coronation, while Napoleon would make the oath separately from these two acts. In the end a resigned pope had to watch Napoleon crown himself. In direct opposition to medieval coronations (see [chapter 4](#)), and on account of the French revolution, the consecration in the choir was clearly downplayed in comparison to the oath on the constitution, which Napoleon took on a big throne in the church's nave.

Although the role of ceremonial for establishing the basic symbolism for society as a whole, for creating the imaginary of society, was fading away, Napoleon sought to make use of it one last time to ground his empire, though he also deployed other representative forms, such as a newly emerging mass propaganda machinery, and his army. Napoleon's army had several unique characteristics that turned it into a representative form of empire, rather than one of a territorial state operating within a balance of power. Because Napoleon's soldiers were animated by a strong nationalist zeal, he did not have to worry about their desertion as much as *ancien régime* commanders had to worry about their mercenary troops deserting in times of low pay (Anderson 1988). Napoleon's soldiers could roam the countryside in small groups and live off the land (Heuser 2010). They could easily bypass fortifications, rather than having to worry about besieging them, which explains the speed at which Napoleon could conquer Europe. The boundary lines that demarcated territories from one another disappeared; Napoleon could control with his omnipresent army a unified imperial space, if only for a short time. Napoleon was eventually vanquished by a balance of power that formed against him. The Napoleonic wars ended with the Congress of Vienna when the great powers sought to establish a balance of power with all the more zeal because they had just been reminded that universal

monarchy was a serious possibility.

6.7 The Congress of Vienna

When studying the Congress of Vienna, IR scholars usually focus on how it established the Concert of five great powers as a peace-creating mechanism in an anarchical international system (Mitzen 2005, 2013; Morgenthau 1985) or on how it functioned as a conservative entente that managed to postpone the advent of liberalism and modernity (Reus-Smit 1999). Another set of issues interests me: the definitive disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire, the final resolution of diplomatic-precedence issues, and the effort to establish a territorial balance of power on the European continent. The Concert did emerge out of the Congress of Vienna, but it was a relatively short-lived phenomenon, a special guarantee added to the broader ordering mechanism of the balance of power. “Concert and balance are not opposites, but are complementary. In the minds of the peacemakers in 1814-15, the Concert could not work unless there was a balance, defined in territorial terms” (Holsti 1992, 43).

Although the Congress postponed the emergence of liberalism and nationalism, that does not mean that it confirmed the hierarchical order of *ancien régime* Europe and divine-right absolutism. It solidified an order that had gradually developed over the eighteenth century, and that was based on a rationally calculated territorial balance of power and militarism. The delegates at the Congress of Vienna spent the overwhelming majority of their time defining who is a great power, distributing and redistributing territories on the European continent, and finding a solution to the German question. These were their most important concerns for establishing a European order, all the more so as the Napoleonic wars had demonstrated the imminent threat of empire. The order that emerged out of the Congress of Vienna completed the processes I described earlier, namely a gradual decline in the role of diplomatic and courtly ceremonial and a concomitant rise in the role of military forms of representation that resulted (in connection with other phenomena) in the emergence of a territorial balance of power maintained by several great powers as Europe’s ordering mechanism. The Congress of Vienna did not

establish a radically new beginning after a cataclysmic war, nor did it uphold the old hierarchical order of the *ancien régime*.

6.7.1 Defining the Great Powers

Even before the delegates from across Europe congregated in Vienna, the four major powers that fought against Napoleon (Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia) had concluded an alliance at Chaumont. They agreed that they would together settle the peace arrangements after the Napoleonic wars because they bore the major war burden (Anderson 1993; Hamilton and Langhorne 2011; Holsti 1992; Klein 1974; Osiander 1994) and in any case it was impossible to have structured deliberations with delegates from all the European states. The “Memorandum upon the measures to be adopted preparatory to the meeting of the Congress in form for the dispatch of business, Vienna, September 1814” states “it appears clear, upon the first assembling of a body so numerous as the plenipotentiaries deputed to the Congress of Vienna, that no effectual progress can be made in business till some plan of European settlement can be prepared and ready to be submitted for their consideration . . . the Powers most competent to frame for consideration a project of European settlement, at once likely to meet the views and interests of the several States, are evidently those who have borne the principal share in the Councils and conduct of the war” (qtd. in Webster 1963, 170).¹¹ Based on their military efforts, they called themselves “the Great Powers”.¹² These four powers organized what form the negotiations at Vienna would take, and they discussed the specifics of the peace settlement.

11. This particular dispatch refers to six great powers. Where to exactly draw the line between the great powers and the others changed in the course of the Congress. At different times and for different topics, there could be four, five, six, or eight great powers, but the criteria for evaluating whether a power was a great power remained essentially the same all along.

12. On a few occasions we can already see that the reference to population size starts to play a role. The French negotiator Talleyrand explained that out of 170 million inhabitants in Europe, 110 million were located in the eight signatory states of the treaty of Paris, while another 30 million were on occupied territories, which had not participated in the war effort and therefore did not have a say in the peace arrangements. The last 30 million were spread over forty states, which would make it impractical to include them in the negotiations, and in any case each of the great powers had more inhabitants than the forty states combined (Osiander 1994). Talleyrand’s argument about population sizes depended on the population census as the first manifestation of a larger trend toward the increasing significance of statistics.

France, as well as Spain sought access to this exclusive club, mainly on the basis that their armies were strong enough to deserve a spot among the first-rank powers. Thus, Ferdinand VII of Spain had agreed to participate in the anti-Napoleonic coalition only if Spain was to be recognized as a great power. “Spain belonged in the first rank, the king said, because of its size, dignity, and military weight” (Klein 1974, 25). Austria, Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia disagreed though. In a letter to the British parliament Castlereagh, the British negotiator, explained that only the four powers should decide upon Europe’s future order because they were the ones who bore the principal responsibility in defeating Napoleon.

By contrast, France was eventually included in the club of four. The chief French negotiator’s diplomatic skills certainly played a role in propelling France among the great powers, but had France not possessed a powerful army, Talleyrand’s efforts would have been to no avail (Schroeder 1994). The Russian tsar “had asked Talleyrand about the French army. Talleyrand told him of its complete loyalty to the king: one hundred and thirty thousand Frenchmen he said, were under orders; three hundred thousand more, at the very first call, would be able to join them. ‘I do not know,’ said Talleyrand, ‘if your Majesty counts France in the rank of the [Great] Powers.’ With an army of that size there could only be one answer ‘Yes, certainly’ Alexander replied” (qtd. in Klein 1974, 25).

The five great powers then agreed among themselves on Europe’s new territorial arrangements. A committee of the eight major powers (Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden) who had signed the Treaty of Paris to form an alliance against Napoleon and to establish the Congress of Vienna had a more modest role, and was responsible for a few more general questions, such as the free navigation on European rivers, the abolition of the slave trade, and diplomatic precedence. Several sub-committees addressed specific issues; among them an independent sub-committee consisting of the major German powers addressed the German question. The official congress never formally convened. The overwhelming majority of the delegates who came to Vienna were not heard at all—they functioned as the expensive background for the actual negotiations and in the end they could sign the Final Act of the Congress of

Vienna by accession. Although many smaller powers initially refused to sign onto the document, eventually almost all of Europe agreed to the new order based on a territorial balance of power (Osiander 1994; Webster 1963).

6.7.2 The Territorial Balance of Power

The great powers spent the overwhelming majority of their time discussing the substantive issues of the peace settlement, namely the distribution of territories to establish a territorial balance of power on the continent that would prevent the recurrence of empire (Holsti 1992; Klein 1974; Murphy 1996; Osiander 1994; Webster 1963). The memorandum on the treaties of 1814 and 1815 submitted by the British plenipotentiaries at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in October 1818 also states, “these transactions, to which all the States of Europe (with the exception of the Port) are at this day either signing or acceding parties, may be considered as the Great Charte, by which the territorial system of Europe, unhinged by the events of war and revolution, has been again restored to order” (qtd. in Webster 1963, 187).

The four allied forces’ major objectives were of a territorial nature: a German confederation, an independent Switzerland, an Italy containing several independent states, a free Spain under Bourbon rule, and an enlarged Holland with the Prince of Orange as her sovereign. The thorniest issue turned out to be the Polish-Saxon question, which territorial arrangements in Germany also depended on. The Russian tsar wanted to have a unified Poland under his control, and in exchange he was willing to acquiesce to Prussia obtaining Saxony, while Austria and Great Britain objected to the deal. They would have been willing to let Prussia have Saxony, but under the condition that Poland got partitioned between Austria, Prussia, and Russia (Klein 1974; Osiander 1994; Webster 1963).

To find a way out of the impasse, the four agreed to establish a statistical committee that would calculate the population numbers of the territories to be redistributed so that they could use those numbers as a basis for the territorial settlement.¹³ Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand noted that a person living in Poland was not “worth” as much

13. The population census contributed later in the nineteenth century to the conception of the nation as the people living within a given territory (Anderson 2006). “Nationalism as an ideology was premised on the link between people and territory. The histories, songs, poetry, and paintings of Romantic nationalists were replete with territorial imagery... With the rise of nationalism, however, sovereignty came to be understood as resting with the nation. By extension, it became important to see political territories as reflections of nations” (Murphy 1996, 97). A footnote obviously cannot do justice to the development of nationalism but it briefly illustrates that nationalism did not fundamentally change Europe’s deep-rooted ordering principle.

as a person living in the Rhineland, simply because the Rhineland was considerably more developed, but the statesmen at the time did not know how to measure these differences, that is, they did not have the appropriate representative forms. To ensure they did not resort to arbitrary measures they simply left them unaccounted for (Webster 1963).

The final agreement on Europe's territorial arrangements could then be reached with the help of the information provided by the Statistical Committee, and Talleyrand's diplomatic engagement. Russia did not obtain all of Poland, but had to concede a part to Prussia, and a small portion of Poland became an independent kingdom. Prussia did not obtain all of Saxony, but only two fifths, and instead received compensation in the Rhineland, while Austria acquired compensations in Italy.

Reus-Smit (1999) interprets the fact that Poland, Saxony, and Naples were preserved as independent, albeit truncated, states as highlighting that the principle of dynastic legitimacy still played an important role next to balance-of-power considerations in guiding Europe's order. However, I would argue that the principle of divine rights was already extremely weak at the Congress of Vienna. Many other rulers were not able to maintain their statehood. Venice and Genoa, for example, disappeared as independent states, and 112 independent estates of the Holy Roman Empire were also eliminated (Schroeder 1994). The protests of these potentates "at Vienna were unavailing. The Congress, in fact, found it necessary to accept the *faits accomplis* of the Napoleonic regime; and this meant the suppression of a number of small States, republics as well as monarchies — on the whole the great good of Europe" (Webster 1963, 166). Territories and entire provinces of various monarchs were redistributed without consideration of traditional rights, or the wishes of the population and its rulers. Thus Norway wanted to remain in a union with Denmark, but came under Swedish rule, while Russia gained Finland from Sweden (Oslander 1994). Holland obtained Belgium from Austria, and Austria was compensated in Italy. In short, the great powers redrew the boundary lines on the European continent without much consideration of ancient place-bound rights, and mostly on the basis of highly abstract principles.

The peacemakers approached the task of order-building with mechanistic rather than organic metaphors in the backs of their minds. They assumed

that once the system of territorial balances and counterweights was in place, it would last permanently. Great care was taken, therefore, to contrive it scientifically and empirically. Based on the careful enumerations of the Statistics Committee at the Congress of Vienna, the planners allocated territories taking into consideration populations and strategic lines. New frontiers were to reflect defensibility and population concentrations. Considerations of nationality (so close to Alexander's early concerns) and economic rationality were notable mostly for their absence. The drafters anticipated conquest and war as the only likely methods of changing the system. Changes through population dynamics and economic development were not yet imagined. It was assumed that the polycentric features of power in Europe would last forever, and in fixed ratios. (Holsti 1992, 40)

Holsti's analysis of the order that emerged from the Congress of Vienna makes perfect sense if we look at the forms of representation that were available to rulers and that they recognized at the time: Cartesian maps, population censuses, and armies. Rulers could not yet take economic dynamics into account because their representative forms did not yet exist. They did not yet know how to measure GDP. Nor did statesmen consider the effects technological change would have on the destructive potentials of armies. "Armaments levels and numbers of troops in 1815 and subsequently [already] varied substantially, and yet European policy-makers regarded the continent in terms of a stable and enduring equilibrium" (Holsti 1992, 53). Only once these factors were expressed in readable signs and became unequivocal forms of representation of the state could statesmen start to consider their impact on the European order, and therefore only at that point would they come to have a constitutive effect on the international order.

6.7.3 The German Question

The German question tied into broader balance-of-power considerations. By the time of the Congress of Vienna, it was obvious that the Holy Roman Empire had become an anachronism. The medium-sized German states had long adopted the representative

forms of territorial states and vehemently rejected returning to any form of suzerainty. The ecclesiastical principalities, and independent knights who relied on the empire, had been surrendered for the sake of a German and European balance of power. Even the Habsburg monarchs thought of themselves more as rulers of Austria than as Holy Roman Emperors (Schroeder 1994). But if the Holy Roman Empire was no longer going to provide the ordering mechanism for the German subsystem (Koebner 1961), it was necessary to find a suitable substitute, especially since some, such as Castlereagh, feared that a shapeless mass of medium-sized states in central Europe could easily fall prey to one of the great powers, and thus result in an imbalance on the continent (Schroeder 1994). Eventually the German Bund was created — a confederation loosely modelled on Napoleon’s confederation of the Rhine from 1806. The agreement alluded to the future establishment of a confederal army for the whole of Germany; it specified several elements that member states should include in their constitutions; and the diet of the confederation was supposed to develop the confederation’s fundamental laws at a later point (Webster 1963). However, these stipulations largely remained dead letters (Breuilly 1993; Kann 1974). The German Bund did not play a significant role in ordering German affairs and its individual members set themselves up to complete the infrastructure of territorial states with unified tax systems, and a centralized bureaucracy — decades after they had adopted the representative forms of territorial states.

6.7.4 Abolishing the Significance of Diplomatic Precedence as a Form of Representation

Lastly, one of the very few non-territorial issues addressed at the Congress of Vienna were matters of diplomatic precedence. The Congress definitively regulated the issues of diplomatic precedence that had caused so many tensions in Europe over the course of the eighteenth century by effectively rendering diplomatic precedence meaningless. The great powers established the general rule that diplomatic precedence would be arranged according to seniority. Among equally ranked diplomats the person who is at her post

for the longer time takes precedence.¹⁴ Furthermore, the congress instituted that potentates should sign treaties in the alphabetical order of countries' names in the French language (Graham 1959; Horn 1961; Wight 1977). These arrangements markedly differ from the eighteenth-century efforts to find ways to establish equal standing in ceremonial matters. By developing entirely arbitrary criteria for matters of diplomatic precedence, the potentates agreed that diplomatic precedence had no significant meaning. Which diplomat enters a room first no longer tells us anything about his sovereign's standing, but merely how much time the diplomat has spent in his post. Diplomatic precedence lost its iconic and indexical features.

6.8 Synopsis

After the Peace of Westphalia the European order was still largely defined in hierarchical terms through such forms of representation as diplomatic precedence, and palace and court culture. Although the Holy Roman Empire was no longer the ordering mechanism for Europe, it was still at the top of a European hierarchy of mostly independent states, closely followed by France and Spain. However, as other powers, such as Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia, who had hitherto largely been absent from the European stage, marked their entrance on the European scene, they started to experience hysteresis. Their previous experiences in other geographical settings (that is, from other fields where they had an elevated status) sat uneasily with their inferior position in the European order. Once they realized that they were unable to ensure a higher standing for themselves with the existing forms of representation, they started to question and ridicule these forms. Diplomatic precedence gradually lost importance as a representative form of the state, and the European hierarchy was concurrently flattened. With the development of a more monetized economy, rulers could gain a higher degree of control over their armies and thus the indexical connection between the army (as a sign) and the state (as the object that the army represents) tightened. This development created room for transforming

14. The only exception to this general rule was the papal nuncio, who had precedence over everybody else, even at Protestant courts. Protestant courts might have consented to this regulation only because diplomatic precedence had lost all significant meaning.

the military into one of the most crucial forms of representation of the state. Russia, Great Britain, and Prussia made full use of these developments to their own advantage. They developed the most efficient armies, while the three traditional powers, Austria, France, and Spain, comparatively weakened. The result of these changes in forms of representation was the concomitant establishment of the principle of sovereign equality (as diplomatic precedence lost its meaning), and the foundation of great power status on a military basis.

The strong representative role of the military combined together with the developments described in the previous two chapters—namely the rejection of universal monarchy as an ordering principle for Europe (chapter 4), and the conception of the territorial state based on specific forms of representation (chapter 5)—to constitute a territorial balance of power as Europe’s natural ordering mechanism. The Congress of Vienna then fully accomplished these developments by definitely abolishing the Holy Roman Empire and eliminating its rival, the Napoleonic Empire, by declaring the representative forms of diplomatic precedence as irrelevant, and by establishing the territorial balance of power as Europe’s ordering mechanism.

The balance of power remained Europe’s ordering mechanism until the end of World War I, although its nature shifted in the course of the nineteenth century (Anderson 1993). Towards the end of the nineteenth century the balance of power was no longer defined in exclusively territorial terms. “Size and defense of territory is no longer the privileged index of power. Equally, if not more important within the calculations of political power are questions concerning the condition of the population: its wealth, vitality, mortality, morale and so on” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 108). We have seen the beginning of this interest in the population at the Congress of Vienna with the emergence of the census. Statistics developed more fully in the course of the nineteenth century and started to play a crucial role both as a technology of power, and as a form to represent the state (Elden 2007; Foucault 2008; Hewson 1999; Rabinow 2006; Revel 1991).

Chapter 7

Liberal Governance and Its Contestation in the EU's Space of Flows

The previous empirical chapters showed how forms of representation played a crucial role in shaping international order from the medieval time until the Congress of Vienna. The reader might find the argument convincing for the historical analysis, but wonder how forms of representation can still shape international order today. The enlightenment is long gone and, with it, the assumed decline in symbolism's importance. However, even rationality requires forms of representation to be effective because our brain depends on the manipulation of external tools to function at its full potential (MacKenzie 2001). Rational cost-benefit calculations, for example, are more often than not too complicated to be conducted without software programs, or at least a pen and a piece of paper. Without that we notice, all kinds of visible signs make our rational calculations possible, and shape our rationality as they represent it. Forms of representation still play a crucial role in today's world—only the types of representation have changed and so the message they convey is a different one. This chapter focuses on understanding the European Union, arguably the most postmodern political form (Ruggie 1993), and the dynamics that have shaped its development. The chapter's research involved over two months of participant observation in the Council of the EU and forty-six interviews with EU

policy-makers, diplomats, and functionaries.¹

The question of what kind of an entity the European Union is and what animates its development is at the heart of the central debates in the literature on European integration (Caporaso 1996; Diez 1996; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Majone 1993; Scharpf 1994). Authors define the European Union as a neo-medieval system (Zielonka 2007), a composite state (Ansell 2004; Nexon 2009), a form of multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Scharpf 1994), a supranational institution (Sandholtz and Sweet 1998; Weiler 1981), a traditional international organization based on inter-state bargaining (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1991), a federal state (Weiler 2001), or a postmodern political form (Ruggie 1993). The number of different concepts that have emerged to describe the EU already indicate a certain fluidity and uncertainty on the part of scholars and policy-makers to fully grasp what the EU actually is “precisely because the EU as an object and a project has no modern historical antecedent, and no cultural template or political form with which people have become comfortable through long-standing enculturation” (Bellier and Wilson 2000, 5).

My theoretical framework provides one way to empirically anchor these debates in the concrete material practices, symbols, and language that constitute the European Union on a daily basis in the microcosm of the Quartier européen in Brussels and elsewhere. Based on a study of these forms of representation, I propose that the processes of European integration that take shape in the economic field constitute the EU as a space of flows that is ordered with the help of liberal governance. Among the many different avenues European integration could take, an economic vision promoted by figures from the economic field gained the upper hand, in particular against political actors who wanted to establish a Federal Europe primarily based on a European Assembly. Instead, actors with a habitus from the economic field developed specific forms of representation and made use of existing economic forms of representation to materialize a liberal project. Today such representative forms as the EU’s postmodern architectural style, the euro, or the EU’s assembly-line-production of texts create the flows that EU bureaucrats set

1. The interviews were conducted in four languages, namely Czech, English, French, and German. Wherever necessary the translations are my own.

themselves out to govern in their daily work in Brussels and elsewhere.

As economic integration increasingly interferes with the political field (without that it would adopt political forms of representation), hysteresis emerges on the part of political actors. A subsection of those actors expressed their hysteresis in the form of a critique of a democratic deficit in the EC and later the EU. In particular Members of the European Parliament, aided by their national parties, national parliaments, and at times even government leaders, sought to establish political forms of representation (such as practices surrounding the direct elections to the EP and various forms of votes in parliamentary plenary sessions)² at the European level to improve their standing in the social hierarchy. As a result, the European international order has adopted some of the features of the domestic territorial federal state order. If the territorial federal state order found its full expression at the European level, the European Parliament would be one of the supreme actors, if not the supreme sovereign of this order. However, the establishment of a European federal state has never fully succeeded because of a backlash from those actors who are deeply nested within the EU's space of flows, especially the Commission and many parts of the Council, and those actors who are embedded within the traditional procedures of multilateral diplomacy and seek to maintain the political dimensions of integration under their control. Struggles over the political forms of representation that define the European Union as a federal state, those that define it as a venue of inter-state bargaining, and the economic forms of representation that create the European Union as a space of flows have shaped European integration since its inception and continue to define, together with other developments, the open-ended nature of the European project.

2. I see "political representation" as it is used in its conventional sense of the term, namely as the parliamentary representation of a people, as one specific form of representation (in the sense in which I use the phrase throughout this dissertation) next to others, such as diplomacy, architectural buildings, flags, maps, etc. I am not the only one to interpret political representation in this light— others have written about parliamentary elections as theatrical performances (Edelman 1971), about plenary sessions as symbolic acts (Abélès 2000c, 2007), and about how the demos only gets constituted in the process of elections (Diez 1996).

7.1 The Single Market: A Space of Flows

The European Union's main governmental focus is on the economic realm, on establishing and maintaining the single market, and in particular on the promotion of the free movement of capital, goods, services, and people across the EU member states (Urry 2003; Walters and Haahr 2005; Zaiotti 2011). We can conceptualize the internal market as an economic field that is structured as a "space of flows" (Castells 2000; see also Agnew 2009; Abélès 1996; Abélès 2000a; Abélès 2008; Barry 1993; Biddulph 1994; Caporaso 1996; Curtis 2011; Diez 1996; Ferguson and Mansbach 1999; Palan 2002; Schmid 2005) because concrete forms of representation establish it as such. Among multiple visions of European integration that circulated in the post-World War II environment, actors with a background from the economic field gained the upper hand in establishing their idea of European integration in the form of liberal governance procedures that would enhance positive flows and reduce negative flows. They developed specific representative forms and made use of existing economic representative forms to succeed in their goal. Today it is the concrete local and tangible arrangements, in particular in Brussels, but also in the other EU capitals—the buildings, the embodied practices of diplomats, politicians, functionaries, and business people, the artifacts they make use of, and the language they employ—that create the EU's internal market as a space of flows. In other words, the EU is, quite paradoxically, created as a placeless space, or a "non-place" (Augé 2008) through very concrete and localized forms of representation (Bellier 2000; Sassen 2006).

7.1.1 The Historical Origins of European Integration in the Economic Field

The horrors of the Second World War resulted in a range of initiatives that sought to establish a new European order to prevent the reoccurrence of war on the continent. This was the purpose of European integration, but the concrete shape European integration took depended upon struggles between actors from different fields — economic, political, military, or academic — over the representative forms that were to guide processes of European integration. Many of the initiatives failed. Initially the most comprehensive

and successful effort was the Congress of Europe, which included wide portions of societal elites. Its goal was to create a universally elected European assembly as the representative form of a European people. Once the Congress of Europe signed the Statute of the Council of Europe, however, it became clear that only members of the national parliaments were to sit in the European assembly. This led to disillusionment and frustration on the part of non-political actors, and rival initiatives spread (Cohen 2013).

The Schuman plan, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was one of these initiatives. A handful of people around Jean Monnet, all of whom came from the economic field and shared a distrust for politics, were at the project's origin (Cohen 2013; Walters and Haahr 2005). They shared an economic habitus and based their strategy on it.³ Monnet made full use of existing economic representative forms, such as national accounting and statistics techniques, for his own vision of Europe. The

3. The economy had emerged between the nineteenth century and the interwar period as a distinct social field thanks to concrete forms of representation that defined it as a placeless space of flows that had to be governed with the help of a liberal governance apparatus (see, for example, Foucarde 2007; Mitchell 2002, 2005, 2008; Polanyi 1944; Suzuki 2003). The "introduction of a single national currency," which provided "the critical means to imagine and to format, the twentieth century economy" formed the crucial starting point of this field (Mitchell 2002,98). In the early twentieth century, governments started to produce and disseminate tables of the circulation of banknotes, which were supposed to measure economic activity. "The circulation of statistics among a 'public,' like the newly visible circulation of currency enabled them to take on the form of an 'objective culture,' something with a solidity or substance of its own" (Mitchell 2002, 103). These circulations of universals, invented by a handful of academics, provided "a gestalt picture of the macroeconomy" (Suzuki 2003, 507): "the Diagrammatic Representation(s) of National Income Flows" were effective "pictures of the macroeconomy as flows (that) provided instant and intuitive understanding of the economy, which may have contributed to the present understanding of the macroeconomy as a system of financial value flows (Thompson, 1998)" (Suzuki 2003, 503; see also Coyle 2014). National accounts brought the "the circulating force of capital" into being in that they visibly demonstrated how "capital can circulate and, by combining with further forces, go through metamorphoses into other forms—from money into property and labor, property and labor into sugarcane, sugarcane into processed sugar" (Mitchell 2002, 33). By definition and since its inception, the economic field was a space of flows created through specific forms of representation. Initially the flows were confined within the borders of a territorial state, and it was the state's task to direct this circulation with the help of the very "apparatus of calculation" that brought it into existence (Mitchell 2008, 1118). Yet the freedom and liberal vision of society that the economic representative forms expressed were in stark contrast to the notion of sovereign government control that marked the political field at the time. These tensions hastened the emergence of a quite separate and distinct field of economics (Fourcade 2007) with its distinct ordering mechanism. The economy was conceived of as an abstract, placeless space in how it was represented in national accounts, but also in the graphs that emerged in the discipline of economics from the 1870s onwards. These graphs determined the price of a product at the intersection of the utilities of a buyer and a seller, which were represented as lines in a coordinate system. The graphs did not provide any reference "to the countryside, the city, the factory, or any other conception of place" (Mitchell 2002, 85). Similarly the specificity of labour, of the buyer, or the seller did not matter; what counted were abstractions. The focus was on the population (Klein 1997). A concern with probabilities emerged.

strategy Monnet developed turned out to be effective. His goal was “to breach national sovereignties in ways that were sufficiently limited to encourage consent but sufficiently large to lead states towards the unity needed for peace” (Monnet in Ross 2011, 25) because he “never believed that one fine day Europe would be created by some great political mutation” (Monnet qtd. in Walters and Haahr 2005, 27). Instead, he made use of economic modes of governance, which did not appear to threaten the sovereignty of member states because they were not making use of the forms of representation typically associated with the sovereign state (Abélès 2000a); just as almost fifty years later the Lisbon strategy found with its Open Method of Coordination (OMC) — based on governance through non-binding performance indicators, benchmarks, and scoreboards — inspiration in management and business circles to not infringe upon national prerogatives (Ross 2011; Walters 2002; Walters and Haahr 2005).

From its start the ECSC and its founding fathers built on the economic field and on its forms of representation—such as double-entry bookkeeping, national accounts, and various forms of numerical indicators, ranging from prices, to aggregated indicators like GDP—to express flows of goods, services, costs, and benefits, (Abélès 1996; Haas 1968; Holmes 2000; Ross 2011). Monnet included the assembly (a typically political and democratic representative form) into the institutional structure only because of significant pressures on the part of professional politicians, and even then, its initial role was very weak. By contrast, Monnet developed specific forms of representation and adapted them to a European scale that visualized a European economy and the flows of goods that were supposed to be governed, and thus made them governable. Among these forms of representation the balance sheet and the plan stood out (Merlingen 2006; Walters and Haahr 2005).⁴

Each participant in the planning exercise knew their own situation in detail.

4. This is not a uniquely European phenomenon. Neumann and Sending note that “originating within economic governance in the postwar era, there is today a plethora of different global indicators and ratings that amount to a truly global ‘audit culture’ (Strathern 2000) where more and more areas of the social are presented and rendered intelligible within a liberal framework aimed at producing and consuming freedom.” New representative forms such as indicators, ratings, standards, and benchmarks are productive of a new type of governance, a form of liberal governance, in which there is a dispersion of responsibility to those who are being governed, together with a focus on managing uncertainty and accounting for the possibility of failure (Best 2014; Stripple and Bulkeley 2013).

The aim of the bilan [the balance sheet] was to demonstrate to these partners in hard, statistical terms the bigger picture or overall view ... For Monnet this grasp of the bigger picture was the essential starting point for any successful planning venture. Rather like national income accounting or any other technology of national economic measurement (Miller 1986), the bilan sought to give a tangible, calculable form to the industrial performance of its units, whether these were connected with the modernization of the French economy, or later, the economic needs and priorities of the nascent common market. But it also suggests that for Monnet planning was a transformative process, bringing new realities into existence and striving to shape the subjectivity of its participants. (Walters and Haahr 2005, 32)

It is not surprising then that the first undertaking of the newly established High Authority was to create a balance sheet to adapt the participants' behaviour to the governance of a European economy. Another mechanism by which the High Authority created the very flows it sought to govern was the creation of a price mechanism. All producers in coal and steel had to submit their price lists to the High Authority which then distributed those price lists to potential buyers (Walters and Haahr 2005). The circulation of the price lists themselves already established a visible flow across European borders. It had the real material effect of making the transborder flows of the commodities of coal and steel possible. The price lists created an even, borderless European space of flows based on competition and price-equality across countries.

Even after the head start in economic integration, efforts emerged to create a European Defense Community but they failed because this area was too closely tied to the traditional prerogatives of the territorial state (Glarbo 1999; Ross 2011).⁵ “States and their military-security alliances were still concerned with the question of territory in the post-war period. But territory, at least in this military and geopolitical sense, was not

5. A similar logic might still hold true today. For example, a Member of the European Parliament said that “now the big member states no longer accept giving new things to Europe, except perhaps for the single market. This is partly because the new issues on the table are at the cusp of national sovereignty: foreign policy, social policy, fiscal policy, JHA [justice and home affairs] . . . and here they really don't want to play. The result is that movement is slow, very slow, or not at all” (qtd. in Ross 2011, 62)

central to the kind of government practiced within the framework of the EC/EU. Instead, the logic was to secure Western Europe by creating and governing new, ‘extra-territorial’ spaces — the most significant of which was the common market” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 109). And so European integration continued along the economic dimension with the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Functionaries with an economic/legal background tended to dominate the institutions (Georgakakis and de Lassalle 2007). Even at a later date, in the 1980s, Jacques Delors sought to include social policy in the integration project but he failed (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009), although numerous scholars laud him for his outstanding agential role in initiating the Single Market and the European Monetary Union (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Jabko 1999).

Over time more issue areas were integrated into the management of the common market, usually on an informal basis first. Only later did the member states add them formally to the integration project in international treaties (Lewis 2005; Majone 1993; Wallace 2002). European integration proceeded with a focus on removing barriers to the free flow of goods, services, capital, and people (Cornett and Caporaso 1992; Jabko 1999; Ross 2011), by focusing on such issues as “non-tariff barriers (ntbs), subsidies, health and safety standards, border controls, unnecessary transportation costs, and discriminatory practices” (Cornett and Caporaso 1992, 227; Ross 2011), or the establishment of standardized passports (Walters and Haahr 2005). The integration process “opened national monopolies to competition in telecommunications, gas, electricity, and postal services” (Ross 2011, 4). Although it was a progress that proceeded in fits and starts, it systematically followed the dimension of market creation and regulation (Lewis 2003; Ross 2011; Eberlein 2003). Once integration started in the economic field and adopted its representative forms, those who were immersed in it appropriated the economic habitus, and a certain path dependency developed. In short, the shape European integration took was a conditioned intentionality of actors who had been shaped by their past experiences, made use of those experiences in creative ways, and in their confrontations with other actors with different experiences created new forms of order.

7.1.2 Liberal Governance as the Regulation of a Space of Flows

While the initial goal of European integration was the abolition of barriers between countries to prevent the occurrence of war, the beginnings of European integration in the economic field with its concomitant representative forms set into place a dynamic whose goal became to create a competitive market to enhance economic growth and prosperity (Abélès 1996; Bruter 2009). Once the EU's forms of representation formed the internal market as a space of flows and provided the necessary tools and technologies to regulate it as such, the EU's governing apparatus sought to regulate this space of flows accordingly (Urry 2003). In other words the forms of representation are the expression of a space of flows and they create a space of flows that has to be governed with the help of liberal governance. The objective becomes to enhance the circulation of positive flows and to reduce the circulation of negative flows (Rajokvic 2010). "It is simply a matter of maximising the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimizing what is risky and inconvenient, like theft and disease, while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed" (Foucault 2008, 19). Thus the Treaty on the European Union reaffirms in the preamble the "objective to facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by including provisions on justice and home affairs in this Treaty." To do so it establishes "measures concerning the entry and movement of persons in the internal market" (Article 3d), but it also sets out, for example, "a common policy in the sphere of transport" (Article 3f).

With this focus on flows and circulation also comes the understanding that perfection is impossible. The goal is to operate on the population, that is, with probabilities, by relying on and affecting the milieu, that is, the environmental surroundings "bearing on all who live in" them (Foucault 2008, 21). The purpose is to take previous developments into account and work with the material givens to incorporate them into new projects. Uncertainty is accepted as a fact and there is an inherent understanding of the possibility of change. Indeed, things are considered to be always in motion and incomplete (Diez 1996; Elden 2007; Foucault 2008; Neumann and Sending 2010; Walters and Haahr 2005). "One works on the future" (Foucault 2008, 20). Foucault has identified precisely these

mechanisms with the discovery of economy as a form of power, and “the introduction of economy into political practice” (Neumann and Sending 2010, 10) within the state in the nineteenth century (Foucault 2008; Joseph 2010; Walters and Haahr 2005). He used the word *governmentality* to describe these modes of governance through freedom, which found their origins in the governance of towns:

It involved cutting routes through the town, and streets wide enough to ensure four functions ... So, there was a hygienic function. Second, ensuring trade within the town. Third, connecting up this network of streets to external roads in such a way that goods from outside can arrive or be dispatched, but without giving up the requirements of customs control. And finally, an important problem for towns in the eighteenth century was allowing for surveillance, since the suppression of city walls made necessary by economic development that one could no longer close towns in the evening ... so that the insecurity of the towns was increased by the influx of the floating population of beggars, vagrants, delinquents ... and so on, who might come, as everyone knows, from the country ... In other words it was a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad ... Finally, Vigny’s redevelopment plan involved responding to what is, paradoxically, a fairly new and fundamental question of how to integrate possible future developments within a present plan ... The town is seen as developing: a number of things, events, elements, will arrive or occur. What must be done to meet something that is not exactly known in advance? (Foucault 2008, 18-19)⁶

Like Foucault’s town that is never accomplished, but always in the process of being created, the European Union is in constant movement towards an unclear goal. The Treaty on European Union states this explicitly in the preamble where it talks about the

6. Foucault describes the changes that occurred in towns in the nineteenth century in the example of Nantes. Someone called Vigné de Vigny put several development projects forward that were realized in Nantes at the time.

“further steps to be taken in order to advance European integration,” with the purpose to “promote economic and social progress for their peoples.” To evaluate the directionality and the speed of the movement “the European Council shall submit to the European Parliament . . . a yearly written report on the progress achieved by the Union” (Treaty on European Union 1992, Article D).

These are not merely the dead letters of a treaty though; many of the people working for the European Union see the EU in exactly this way. A Commission official said this about the sense of forward movement: “EMU is steaming ahead, and we’re hitting on all cylinders” (qtd. in Ross 2011, 29). In a conversation with me, a former employee of the European Commission who was close to the last Commission President José Manuel Barroso described the European Union as a vessel that does not have a clearly set goal, other than that it is a future-oriented project. A diplomat told me that the European Union was constantly evolving without having a set objective. It was not very clear where it was moving; he said it was like asking a child what she would like to become once she grows up.

The incompleteness of the European project with its frequent readjustments is the defining characteristic of the European Union (Abélès 1996; Abélès 2000a; Bellier and Wilson 2000; Walters and Haahr 2005). The EU is in constant movement towards a vague future that itself is changing like the horizon we walk toward (Bourlangers 1996; Diez 1996). It is recreated on a daily basis—it has a forgotten past and an indefinite territorial extent.⁷ “The most salient characteristic of EU officials’ discourses and practices is the link between the immediate present and an indeterminate future. In some circles it does not seem possible to be European without projecting oneself into a world which does not yet exist, and which cannot be adequately understood using the classical notions of political science” (Abélès 2000b, 31). This haziness differentiates the European Union from the territorial state, an internally complete and unchanging entity with a clearly stipulated past and a demarcated territory. By contrast, the former Commission President Jacques Delors famously characterized the European Union as “an unidentified

7. The European Union keeps enlarging every several years. Many of the governance projects it has established, such as the Single Market or Schengen, extend beyond the boundaries of the EU, but they do not include all the EU member states. Others, like the eurozone, are narrower than the EU.



Figure 7.1: Interior Design of the New European Central Bank Building in Frankfurt (photograph of a picture located on the fence of the construction site).

political object” (Abélès 2000b; Ross 2011). Yet, the European Union’s defining features are not the result of an absence of symbols as Abélès (2000b) suggests; they do not create the EU as a negativity. The EU’s “homeless and timeless” nature is just as constructed as the nation-state’s legitimating myths are. Very specific and localized forms of representation, many of which are situated in Brussels — the EU’s unofficial capital, “the symbol of Europe” (Commission of the European Communities 2003, 5) — create and are the expression of this ungraspable European project, a space of flows that is itself fluid, in constant movement in the direction of an unclear goal.

7.1.3 The EU’s Postmodern Architecture

One of the primary representational forms that characterize the European Union is its buildings. According to the Commission, “the design of Commission buildings (and in particular flagship projects) should be of a very high architectural standard which makes



Figure 7.2: Berlaymont building (the headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels).

an appropriate and positive symbolic statement underlining the nature of the Institution’s presence” (Commission of the European Communities 2007, 13). Its goal is to develop “Europe’s image through its buildings” (Commission of the European Communities 2003, 5) and “to promote the European idea, in particular based on the buildings occupied by the Institutions in the European Quarter” (ibid., 6). The guide to the Commission’s architectural policy from 2009 declares in point 4.7 of the annex that “special attention should be paid to ensuring that the message communicated by Commission buildings is consistent with the principles and values of European integration and the functioning of its institutions . . . The Commission will ensure that the image conveyed by the facades and volumes of its buildings reflects, partly by incorporating slender curved lines, the boldness, transparency and dynamics of the European project.” In other words, the EU’s buildings were selected and designed to communicate a specific message, arguably in line with the habitus of the actors embedded within the EU’s space of flows.

The functionaries and policy-makers in Brussels whose task it is to govern the Eu-



Figure 7.3: Street View Behind the Berlaymont building.

ropean space of flows are physically embedded inside the architectural environment of the Quartier européen, the European Quarter. These concrete places are an image of the space of flows and create its embodied experience. The Commission’s Architectural Policy (2009) explicitly states that one of its main tasks is to ensure the proper flow of people through its buildings and to the buildings: “buildings should facilitate communication through efficient management of internal and of incoming/outgoing flows (for instance visitors and suppliers)” (annex 4.8) and “the Commission’s buildings must be quickly and easily accessible by public transport” (annex 4.2). The EU institutions manage the flows into and out of their buildings in similar ways to how they manage such flows at their borders, for example, the airport:⁸ based on differently coloured batches, they divide less risky flows that can move at a higher speed from more risky flows that have to undergo more thorough checks and might have more limited access.

The majority of EU buildings are built in a postmodern architectural style that “im-

8. See Walters (2002) for an analysis of the EU’s management of flows of passengers at the airport.

poses its codified code-breaking language anywhere something is built. The liberation from cultural codes hides in fact the escape from historically rooted societies. In this perspective, postmodernism could be considered the architecture of the space of flows” (Castells 2000, 449; Figure 7.1).^{9 10} Postmodern architecture creates a sense of placelessness with an “architecture of nudity” (Castells 2000) characterized by meaningless, complete abstraction. In Brussels an old monastery and some of the city’s nineteenth-century architecture, among which were a few true masterpieces, were demolished to make space for the construction of new buildings serving the EC institutions (Hein 2004). In the process planners did not take into account local culture and spatial logics; they disconnected the buildings from the place in which they built them (see Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3). It is as if an invisible boundary separated the buildings of the EU bureaucracy from their local setting. “The perception of Brussels as the place of a faceless bureaucracy, and as a fictive space, is reflected in social theorist Jean Baudrillard’s statement: ‘Brussels is such an abstract place, it is not to Brussels that one is going to feel in debt; no one will feel a relation of reciprocity, of obligation, of responsibility toward Brussels’” (Hein 2004, 159). The faceless appearance of postmodern architecture is in stark contrast to the majority of representative government buildings, such as parliaments and embassies, which are typically constructed in the classicist style of state building (Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5).

Postmodern architecture has a special fascination with glass, and the overwhelming majority of buildings in Brussels housing EU institutions have a glass façade. While many of my interlocutors told me that a glass façade signifies transparency, a closer look at the buildings from the outside reveals that it is impossible to see the interior, although from the inside one can see out. The glass façade creates a distorted reflection of its surroundings. The buildings do not have a face; they do not represent a character of their own that would be penetrable or apprehendable (Figure 7.6). The glass façade

9. See Walters (2002) for an analysis of the EU’s management of flows of passengers at the airport.

10. The buildings in Luxembourg are an exception to this rule. These buildings are mainly constructed in the modern, internationalist, and functionalist style. However, the employees of the European institutions experience physical seclusion from the surrounding locality because the European quarter was constructed outside the city in Kirchberg. The urban highway running through the middle of the quarter is also a material expression of the space of flows, given the iconic resemblance of highways to rivers (Ley 1989).



Figure 7.4: Russian embassy in Brussels.

has the same effect as sunglasses on a person's face (Jameson 1984). The seer is not seen; one only observes a reflection of the self but not the character of the other.

A sense of placelessness is also created by secluding specific buildings from their local surroundings through the "creation of an interior sense of inescapability" (Harvey 1989, 83). The buildings of the European Parliament in Brussels and in Strasbourg share many characteristics with the Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles, which Jameson (1984) takes as his model to describe postmodern architecture.¹¹ The EP's entrances are, like the Bonaventure's entrances, "curiously unmarked ways-in" (Jameson 1984, 81) that are not entirely easy to find. After having passed the security checks, one needs to take the elevators to reach the main interior plaza of the EP. In other words, the entrances are

11. Some authors disagree with Jameson's description of the Bonaventure Hotel as postmodern. For Gottdiener (1995), for example, eclectic quotations of past historical styles characterize postmodern architecture, such as we see them in Las Vegas (Ley 1989). Suffice it to say that postmodern architecture is not a unified style. Gottdiener would prefer to call the Bonaventure Hotel an "anti-modern" architecture, which does not appear too far from the term *postmodern*, and he otherwise agrees with Jameson's description of the effects of this kind of architecture on spatial conceptions.



Figure 7.5: Belgian parliament in Brussels.

hidden away from the bustling activity inside the building. They are not the pompous affairs with red carpets one knows from palace architecture. Perhaps, as in the case of the Bonaventure Hotel, the architects of the EP would have wished that the building did not have any entrances at all. “The entryway is always the seam that links the building to the rest of the city that surrounds it: for it does not wish to be a part of the city, but rather its equivalent and its replacement or substitute” (Jameson 1984, 81). The European Parliament is an encompassing, self-contained space. Most EP employees usually enter the building between 8:00 and 9:00 am and they leave between 9:00 and 10:00 pm. The European Parliament is a city of its own, a locally detached European city where one can catch excerpts of conversations in many different languages. One finds everything a person might need inside the building: a cafeteria, a supermarket, a gym, a dry cleaner, a post office, several banks, bookstores, a hairdresser, and a travel agent. According to an employee of the EP, the building creates the impression of a market place. One meets so many people, everybody is busy, and the place is full of movement. The building



Figure 7.6: Building of the European Parliament in Brussels.

blurs the linear separation between inside and outside (Harvey 1989; Habermas 1997), in opposition to the container schema that characterizes the territorial state.

The individual easily loses her orientation inside the EP. “The postmodern hyperspace has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world” (Jameson 1984, 83). One of my interviewees in the EP told me at the end of an interview, “if I was to leave you here, it would take you until midnight to find your way out.” Several of my interlocutors mentioned that they had a hard time orienting themselves in the EP buildings, in particular in the building in Strasbourg. Two employees said that every time they go to Strasbourg they get lost at least once, and every time it takes them at least half an hour to reorient themselves because they have to return through lengthy corridors back to their starting position. This experience results from the “collapse of perspective in the immense, disorienting spaces” (Gottdiener 1995, 123), and it fundamentally differs from the classicist palace where one can undertake quick rule-of-thumb calculations to establish one’s exact position in space at every instance.

The frequent travel of EU functionaries and policy-makers further intensifies the phenomenological experience of a space of flows. Members of the European Parliament

spend four days per week in Brussels and the remaining three days in their domestic constituency. Once a month the whole European Parliament moves to Strasbourg for one week for the plenary sessions. Diplomats in the Council frequently travel to their home country, and every second month the Council of Ministers holds its meetings in Luxembourg instead of Brussels.

7.1.4 The Euro: Symbol of a Space of Flows

The same space of flows also finds expression in the EU's symbols, among which the euro is one of the most prominent. As a shared European currency, the euro is a medium of exchange, whose task is to facilitate the circulation of positive flows in the European Union by avoiding the risks associated with currency fluctuations, and reduce the transaction costs linked to exchanging currencies. The European currency, like any other, functions based on the "circulation of universals" (Latour 2005, 229), that is, the circulation of one particular artifact that exists in an almost endless number of editions. By virtue of its function the euro circulates from one person's hands into another's, thus carrying the imagery of a space of flows with it (Harvey 1996, 234).

In the case of national currencies these flows are symbolically attached to a clearly defined territory by the cultural referents imprinted on the currency.¹² On the euro's paper money, however, we find generic architectural designs from major design periods, such as the Renaissance, baroque, classicism, or modernism, but we do not find any actually existing buildings that could be located in real places. Hein observes that "none of the design periods on the bills covers the same spatial zone, and none of them coincides with the geographic definition of Europe as the western peninsula of the Eurasian continent, bounded on the east by the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. None overlaps exactly with the current extent of the EU or an assumed future shape" (2004, 2). In short,

12. National currencies became important only in the nineteenth century. Before that a large variety of local currencies without government sanction were common. In the second half of the nineteenth century the circulation of currencies was clearly delimited by the territorial boundaries of the nation state (Agnew 2009). Today this is no longer the case. For many scholars this is an indication that some elements of the territorial state system are dissolving (Harvey 1996), which does not contradict my argument. I am analyzing the European Union as arguably "the most advanced postmodern political form," not as the only postmodern phenomenon.

the symbolism of the euro indicates a detachment from place and territory, “a shared culture without a clear geographic referent” (ibid., 4). When I asked employees from EU institutions what they felt when they saw the euro, they said they did not feel anything — that the currency did not evoke any particular feelings or attachments in them — but also that the euro was one of the most important symbols of the European Union.

7.1.5 The Creation of a Space of Flows through an Assembly-Line Production of Texts

The people working for the European Union probably experience the space of flows most directly in their daily legislative and non-legislative work. The European Union governs largely through the production of texts that simultaneously characterize and define the European Union.¹³ Those texts — international treaties, legislative acts, Council conclusions, action plans, progress reports, road maps, etc. — are forms that represent the European Union with potentially significant effects. The EU is frequently criticized for the opaqueness and the incomprehensibility of the language it employs. Thus the voters of the French and the Dutch referenda to the Constitutional Treaty were concerned about the large number of pages in the treaty document, and about the impenetrability of its language. These impressions contributed to their voting against the treaty.

Most of the diplomats stationed in Brussels, the members and employees in the European Parliament, and the highly trained functionaries in the European Commission spend their daily work routine in an assembly-line production of those texts that characterize the EU and through which the EU governs. The texts circulate at an impressive speed through the hands of a large number of authors so that effective authorship gets lost. In fact, the individual actors involved in the production of texts experience them as a flow, and the best they can hope for is to avert the negative and promote the positive flows. In other words, in the procedures of governance, the European governors are themselves phenomenologically experiencing the phenomenon they set themselves out to

13. Majone (1993) has described the EU as a “regulatory state” for this reason.

govern: the European space of flows. The representative practices create that space of flows and are also its expression. They probably come about as pragmatic solutions to practical problems (see, for example, Lewis 2003). While a certain circulation of texts also occurs in domestic state legislation and during international negotiations, as we will see, there are several elements that render the negotiation process in the EU qualitatively different from its domestic and international variants.

If we take the example of an ordinary legislative act in the European Union, then a particular Directorate General (DG) in the European Commission initiates the text. Already in this initial preparatory stage the document goes through many different hands. The Commission sends questions to the Permanent Representations, who forward them to their respective ministries, or the Commission can arrange meetings with national representatives to seek their advice (see also Adler-Nissen 2009). The Commission might also outsource an impact assessment to an external agency, and it might consult stakeholders. These initial inputs lead to the creation of a legislative initiative within one DG. All the other DGs get a chance to comment on the text and suggest modifications to it. For example, twelve commissioners and sixteen DGs are involved in the preparations for the “energy union.” The Commission as a collective institution sends the text to the presidency of the Council and the European Parliament.

The presidency places the document on the agenda of the respective working groups of the Council. The working groups’ diplomats then send the document to their home country with a request for instructions. Every member state can organize its domestic process differently, but typically one particular organ is responsible for distributing the text to the respective ministries. In some cases one legislative act can be the responsibility of two or more ministries. The responsible ministries then write instructions for their respective diplomat in Brussels. Usually a governmental committee with representatives from all the ministries has to agree with these instructions, which can often occur in a silent procedure. Committees in the national parliament can decide to debate the instructions, and potentially subject them to a vote in the national parliament. Once the diplomat in Brussels receives the instructions she goes to working group meetings in which diplomats from the twenty-eight member states seek a compromise on the proposed

legislative text. The presidency is responsible for drafting a compromised text, but the other delegations usually express their national position in a particular drafted wording of the text. Within the EU those proposed revisions to a text are one of the most crucial forms of member states' representation. Often a delegation finds out whether its national position won out or not when it reads the next revised draft of the text. During the whole process the diplomats send minutes from the working group meetings to their home ministries.

Once the working group has agreed on a rough version of the text (or sometimes before the working group has agreed), the Council presidency puts the draft text on the agenda of the Mertens or the Antici working groups, who prepare the Coreper meeting (the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which is composed of either the heads of missions in Brussels, or the deputy heads of missions), and subsequently on the agenda of Coreper.¹⁴ Each national diplomat responsible for the text at the working-group level comments on the respective agenda item, and the document gets sent to the home country. In the home country the responsible ministry writes instructions, which have to be agreed on by a governmental committee that usually convenes on a weekly basis. In particularly contentious moments the government itself might have to make a decision, and the national parliament can also express itself (the domestic procedures vary from country to country). If the item is a I item on the Coreper agenda, there is an understanding that the text has been fully agreed upon at the working group level. If it is a II item, Coreper discusses the agenda item in its meeting. The member state representatives propose amendments to the text; it is not unusual that delegations physically circulate papers in the room with their proposed amendments (see [Figure 7.7](#)). If a text does not exist the work is stalled; the delegations complain that they “don't even have a text today,” so they cannot take any action.

14. In some cases, especially when it comes to highly technical files, for example, in the area of financial regulation, a particular text goes through a number of different working-group levels. The higher levels are less technical than the lower levels.

Proposal for a Directive on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from medium combustion plants

Draft amendments to document 16105/14

(11) For the purposes of controlling emissions into air from medium combustion plants, emission limit values and requirements for monitoring should be set out in this Directive. For medium combustion plants covered by Chapter II of Directive 2010/75/EU, the emission limit values and monitoring requirements set out in this Directive should be considered to represent the Union-wide minimum requirements.

However, ~~Member States may exempt where~~ medium combustion plants ~~which~~ are part of an installation covered by Chapter II of Directive 2010/75/EU and emission limit values apply pursuant to the provisions of article 13(5) and article 15(3) of that directive to those plants, it may be unduly burdensome to subject the plants to additional emission related obligations under this directive. Therefore, Member States should in such cases have the possibility of exempting such plants from compliance with the emission limit values set out in Annex II and the provisions of article 6 for those pollutants for which emission limit values apply pursuant to the provisions of article 13(5) and article 15(3) of Directive 2010/75/EU to those combustion plants.

Figure 7.7: Proposed Revisions for a Directive Circulated During a Coreper I Meeting

The national position is defined in terms of edits to the text. Delegations can often disagree on very specific wording. Thus at a Coreper I meeting they were debating whether they should write *in* or *as* in a legislative act, whether there should be an *s* at the end of the word *commitment*, or whether they should undertake a “study” or a “stock taking” of a particular subject matter. The impenetrability of EU legislation is often a direct result of the carefully drafted linguistic compromises that result from these sessions. The presidency decides, with the support of the Council Legal Service and the Council General Secretariat, in a relatively opaque rule-of-thumb evaluation from sensing the atmosphere in the room which amendments it will accept and which it will reject or

accept in a modified version. Votes occur very rarely at this level, and only under very extreme circumstances.¹⁵ Often the permanent representatives see whether their position won out only once they read the revised version of the text. By way of example, this is an extract from a Coreper I meeting:

Presidency: Taking into consideration the strong opposition I will delete the “vehicle generated” from the mandate.

Member State 1: Sorry, maybe it’s my lack of English but you want to keep the text as is without the *vehicle generated*? But that’s what we said no to.

Presidency: You said no to the *vehicle generated*.

Interruption (Noise in the room)

Presidency: We will say that we are opposed to it, and we will see how the European Parliament will react. So if you agree with that we will go for the mandate.

Member State 2: We proposed to take out the word *including*. Nobody was opposed to that so I assume the *including* is out.

Presidency: No, we will bear that in mind, but for now we will keep the word *including*.

(Noise in the room)

Council Legal Service: Without the *including* it would create a problem of interpretation in other parts of the directive.

Member State 2: Sorry, we would like to get this right. Could we replace *including* by *in particular*?

Presidency: We will bear this in mind and we will try. I have received your guidance and with your permission I will move to the next item.

If Coreper agrees on a draft text it goes on the agenda of the Council of Ministers as an A item, which means that the text will not be discussed any further. If there are still

15. In particularly tense situations a permanent representative might make a phone call to his home ministry to see if a particular position is still acceptable, or if the permanent representative has to indicate that his country will abstain or vote against a certain legislation.

outstanding issues the draft legislation goes on the agenda as a B item. In each case the agenda gets sent home together with a commentary and the responsible ministry prepares a mandate for the minister who will go to the Council meeting. A governmental committee and potentially the national parliament have to approve the mandate, and they can make suggestions for its modification. Once the ministers are at the Council and an easy agreement does not appear in sight, bilateral meetings can take place off the main negotiation table in the hallways of the building and in the national rooms, which usually involve the concerned delegation(s), the presidency, at times the European Commission, the Council Legal Service, and the Council General Secretariat. Once an agreement has been reached the Council of ministers reconvenes and votes on the respective agreement. The Council has reached a general approach. National delegations take minutes during the Council meeting, which they provide to their respective national governmental bodies dealing with EU affairs. The general approach is the mandate based on which the Presidency of the Council can negotiate in trialogues with the European Parliament to reach an agreement on the legislative act.¹⁶

In the European Parliament the text goes from the Commission to the responsible committee. In each political group a policy adviser drafts a first text, which she then sends to all the MEPs from her group who could take an interest in the issue area. They send suggestions for changes back to the policy adviser. In this way each political group has its initial draft text. The committee works to find a compromise text. A first debate between MEPs from the different political groups takes place and the committee selects a rapporteur, who takes note of the debates in the committee and drafts a first compromise text based on the debates. That compromise text goes to the respective parties who propose amendments to it. Simultaneously the MEPs have hallway negotiations and informal coffee-break chats to reach an agreement. As several employees of the EP told me, the EP building with its many interior public meeting spaces is well suited for such encounters. Once the MEPs reach a compromise, the text is put to a vote in the

16. These meetings are called trialogues because three parties are present: the Presidency of the Council, the European Commission, and the Rapporteur of the European Parliament. The negotiating parties are the Presidency of the Council and the Rapporteur of the European Parliament; the European Commission operates as an “honest broker”.

committee, from whence the text goes to the conference of the presidency, which decides whether the text should be on the program of the plenum. In the plenum parties can suggest further amendments to the text. Eventually the plenum votes on the text, which then forms the basis for the dialogues with the Council. The dialogues seek to establish a compromise text between the Council presidency and the rapporteur from the European Parliament. The text finally has to be approved by the Council of ministers (after having passed through the different national apparatuses and Coreper) and the plenary of the European Parliament.

I had to go through this lengthy elaboration of the legislative process to fully demonstrate how the constant flow of texts operates, and how many hands the draft legislation circulates through. Each permanent representation employs several people at the secretarial level whose main task is to manage these flows of texts and move them from one folder into another. The texts circulate at a high speed; a single agent might not hold the text in her hands for more than a few days. It is not unusual for individual delegations to say that their home ministry did not have enough time to look at the text, and that they have a scrutiny reservation or a parliamentary reservation on a particular document. In some instances I heard complaints that a particular institution had only a few hours to establish a standpoint on a specific document.

The fact that the people working for the European Union physically experience the space of flows in their daily work is apparent in the language they employ. In a few instances I heard a diplomat say that they were lucky to have been able to “catch” a bad instruction, that is, they were able to stop a negative flow from circulating further. “Everything is in a flow, there are no set positions,” the assistant to a Member of the European Parliament told me. And a diplomat from a member state said that before coming to Brussels he thought it was good to have a very clear position and to secure that position 100 percent, but during his work in Brussels he realized that it was best to have a position somewhere in the middle, “then you can build coalitions to the left and to the right, and you can just go with the flow.” A permanent process of negotiation defines EU legislation. In this process each actor is in a constant search for ever-changing coalitions. Stable positions do not exist.

The usual national legislative process, and international negotiations between states, might be in some ways similar to the processes in which the European Union governs, and to that extent the mechanisms identified in EU legislation might be applicable elsewhere. However, there are also some substantive differences. For one, in national legislation and in international treaty negotiations, the texts do not go through as many hands as they do in the EU. The number of actors involved is considerably smaller. Second, in the European Union, in the words of one Commission official, “everything is quicker than in an ordinary administration. One goes ahead without looking back, as if one were driving without a rear-view mirror” (qtd. in Abélès 2000b, 32). Third, at the domestic and at the international level there is not the same focus on and need for finding a compromise agreement; a vote in the national parliament ends the discussion on a particular piece of legislation. By contrast, the European Union has developed a true skill in finding a compromise solution in “drafting exercises,” during which texts are drafted and redrafted until an agreeable solution has been identified in and through the text’s wording. The text is a form of representation that through those drafting exercises becomes incomprehensible for the population. At the same time it is a tool through which the different actors reach a compromise agreement and the European Union governs.

While a need for compromise is necessary when so many actors are involved, a focus on consensus, which Lewis (2003) still identified in the Council, does not appear to exist anymore.¹⁷ Behind the scenes, diplomats are ardently taking note of the respective national positions — of how they are changing, what the vote count is, and whether a blocking minority has emerged to stop a particular piece of legislation from moving forward.¹⁸ These changing coalitions are moving so fast that at Coreper I meetings one

17. The focus on compromise also involves a strong degree of self-restraint. To some extent it is a self-disciplining mechanism. In this regard I am slightly more critical than Adler-Nissen (2009) and Lewis (2003). The diplomats do not want to lose their reputation in front of their colleagues by being on the losing side or by being considered a deal-breaker. Once a Deputy Permanent Representative said “if I go with this position into Coreper it would be like lying naked on a bed of needles and having everybody shoot at me. If this is really what we want, I’ll do it, but maybe the position is not so important that we would have to lose a reputation that it would take us two years of hard work to regain.” National ministries can sometimes be responsive to such reasoning and accept it as a valid argument to change the diplomat’s instructions.

18. Often a certain degree of speculation is involved in calculating the votes because diplomats deduce how a member state will vote from the verbal interventions of its representatives. Those verbal interventions do not always explicitly indicate how a state will vote, although the diplomats usually recognize

conversation is held at the negotiation table, and a second occurs simultaneously on the diplomats' cell phones. They comment on how the meeting is going, they strategize who should speak first, and they seek support for their position from other, potentially like-minded representatives at the table. According to a Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) "the increase in the areas in which decisions are made by qualified majority in the Council also brings with it a need to create like-minded groups. The negotiations about principal questions are thus shifting ever more off the negotiation table. Fulfilling the demand for transparent negotiations thus becomes unrealistic in practice." The room as a whole is generally very busy. People walk in and out, conversations take place at the sidelines of the main negotiation table, and diplomats make phone calls, occasionally to reach a minister or a commissioner. The topics change quickly from issues of air pollution and the regulation of roaming charges to cable cars, and for each topic a different diplomat advises the DPR. The Coreper I meeting room appears like a stock market trading centre — it is the space of flows in action.

One of the difficulties with the drafting exercises in which so many actors get involved is that they can lead to a loss of agency. According to a MEP "so many people are involved that you cannot foresee what the outcome of the whole thing is going to be." Once a text enters into this machine it is impossible for an individual actor to control the outcome because each actor, and each institutional body, owns the text for only a very short period of time before passing it on to the next actor. According to a diplomat, "there is not one author. It is a collective enterprise. Many people are involved. Many institutions are involved. It is the machine of searching for a compromise, which writes the text." A European functionary in the Commission spoke of a "culture of random urgency" to describe this phenomenon (Abélès 1996, 52).¹⁹ The urgency refers to the speed at which action has to take place because of the pressure of the calendar and the respective "road map" (itself a form of representation that expresses the incompleteness and forward movement of the European project, next to being a technology for organizing

certain key words, such as "this is a strong point," or "this is a red line," but occasionally a diplomat can say in Coreper "we have crossed all our red lines." Without that this would indicate a negative vote. An actual vote occurs only rarely below the level of the Council of Ministers, and so everything is left in a certain twilight; "somehow we know," as a DPR told me, and sometimes they speculate.

19. My translation from French.

governance),²⁰ and the fact that the next person is waiting in line to receive the relay. The randomness indicates the lack of control, and the lack of oversight the individual experiences in her daily activity. There is no time to reflect about what the EU should look like. People are constantly running from one crisis to the next and trying to fix and readapt what they can in the rush.²¹ One diplomat said “sometimes we hurry too much. We should stop from time to time and reflect upon whether the agreement that appears to be coming forward is in line with the general goals we set ourselves for integration.” A few diplomats agreed that everything happens at such a high speed that they barely have any time to reflect upon what they are doing. One added, and then all of a sudden they find themselves with a piece of legislation that nobody actually wanted.²²

Once the machinery gets started, the drafting and redrafting begins, and nobody is in full control. A permanent representative once mentioned in a conversation that he would be curious to know who is leading this whole thing, meaning the European Union. The EU’s elites are clearly aware of the fact that existing forms of representation set a dynamic in place where the best one can hope for is to avert negative flows and to promote positive flows. On a number of occasions national delegations lamented the course a particular piece of legislation took, without having a sense that they would be able to affect it. In particular instances the presidency decided not to propose a draft text for a Council meeting, so that discussion focuses on the crux of the issue, rather than getting entangled in a drafting exercise whose outcome nobody can fully control.

20. The calendar is a representative form of the European Union and a technique of governance. The European Union constantly sets itself deadlines for when a particular project has to be completed, such as in the case of the Single Market, the European Monetary Union, or the Lisbon Strategy, which set the goal of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010 (Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council 2010; Walters and Haahr 2005). Even the goal itself is a dynamic forward motion, rather than a stable end-point. The calendars are usually called “road maps.” One minister commented on such a road map by saying that “it is useful to have the way ahead defined so clearly in the road map.”

21. Interview with a person close to former Commission President José Manuel Barroso.

22. In the Lisbon treaty such an instance occurred in the provisions of delegated acts. The member states unanimously adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, but now, once the treaty has come into effect, all the member states, the “fathers of the treaties,” unanimously agree that they do not like these provisions. A diplomat from a large member state who participated in the negotiations to the Lisbon treaty said “I think it is very clear now that when we drafted the treaty, article 290 was drafted in a certain way, and we were not very careful about it. I know that the next time we revise the treaties we will look into changing this article.” The diplomats agree that these provisions are one of the first things they will look at in the next treaty revisions, but nobody wants to start the revising process because everybody is afraid of opening a Pandora’s box.

The lack of control I identify in the daily functioning of the European Union is a defining characteristic of the concept of governance. “By contrast with government, responsibility or even power, the particularity of ‘governance’ lies in its free-floating and largely non-transitive character. Governance does not demand to be pegged to any point of origin — it comes close to dispensing with human agency altogether” (Kalmo and Skinner 2010, 22). Liberal governance focuses on governing through freedom, on seeking to enhance positive flows and diminish negative flows under the full awareness that complete control is impossible. I have suggested that quotidian forms of representation that phenomenologically create and express the existence of a European space of flows have resulted in the adoption of liberal governance procedures to direct the flows in that space accordingly. This finding is in direct opposition to the intergovernmental approach of European integration (Moravcsik 2007). If European integration was the result of bargains between sovereign and independent member states, it would not make any sense that in certain situations those member states can 1) unanimously disagree with a piece of legislation that they have unanimously adopted, and 2) that they are unwilling to rectify the situation because they are concerned about launching a process whose outcome they cannot control. The finding is also in opposition to the literature on the principal-agent problematic (Nielson and Tierney 2003) and to the neo-functionalist argument of integration, because in this literature member states can lose control in favour of supranational institutions or an international organization (Bellier and Wilson 2000; Franchino 2007; Haas 1958; Mattli and Slaughter 1998; Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998). Existing forms of representation are such that they lead to an overall loss of agency. High-ranking officials are not in full control of the edifice and they do not know who is in control.²³ All they can do is to try and promote the positive flows of texts and reduce the negative flows.

23. Other scholars who have studied particular moments in the history of European integration have identified similar instances, but they usually attribute explanatory power to the agential dimension and they consider the lack of control as a more circumstantial phenomenon (Guiraudon 2003; Jabko 1999).

7.1.6 The EU Governs a Space of Flows

In line with this day-to-day phenomenological experience of the space of flows in Brussels, EU functionaries and policy-makers see the European Union as a space of flows and govern it accordingly. The minister of one member state said at the Competitive Council “anything that serves as an unfortunate barrier should be removed.” Another minister spoke of the “abolition of barriers for the free flow of services,” while still another mentioned that the “unnecessary borders for e-commerce should be removed.” During my time in Brussels the Coreper I negotiations and the technical councils prepared by Coreper I focused on increasing competitiveness and growth of the European Union by eliminating barriers to free movement. The specific topics on the agenda were, among others: a) in the area of telecommunication, the creation of the “Digital Single Market” to remove barriers to on-line trading; b) in the area of transport, the establishment of a Transeuropean Transport Network (TENtec) by 2020, in particular with a focus on eliminating, in the words of the commissioner, the “missing links” and “bottlenecks” (see also Scott 2002) that can slow down flows; c) in the area of services, the completion of the market in services and goods; d) the establishment of a “European space renaissance,” including the regulation and circulation of satellite data; e) in the area of energy, completion of the internal energy market as part of the energy union until the end of 2015; f) in the area of research and innovation, the creation of a “European Research Area,” which is, in the words of the commissioner, a “real internal market so that there are no barriers for our researchers”; g) a directive on enhancing the mobility of workers; and h) in the area of the environment, a package on waste and the circular economy, a directive on limiting the use of plastic bags to avoid the contamination of the marine environment, a directive on regulating the cross-border pollination of GMOs, and a clean-air package, which includes “a directive on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from medium combustion plants.”

The case of regulation in the area of environmental policy is particularly interesting because the initial Treaty of Rome did not foresee any cooperation in that area. Instead cooperation in environmental policy organically developed in the daily work of the in-

stitutions until it was legally codified in international treaties as an area of cooperation (Majone 1993). For many policy-makers and functionaries trans-border environmental flows naturally require cooperation at the European level. Environmental cooperation follows the logic of managing a space of flows, although it is not an economic issue per se. By contrast social policy is conspicuous by its absence. Only in its connection to the free movement of workers and citizens is social policy incorporated as an area of European integration (Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Höpfner and Schäfer 2012; Majone 1993). We cannot explain the absence of social policy by a lack of interest on the EU population's part to have social policy addressed at the European level (Bruter 2009), given that, according to eurobarometer studies, 55 percent of the EU population thought it was a key priority that the EU should "pay less attention to the economy and more to social justice," whereas 33 percent thought that it was not a key priority.²⁴ It appears that social policy does not fit the EU's conception of order in terms of managing flows.

One counter-argument to my claim of cooperation in managing flows is that European integration proceeds in purely technical issue areas where not much is at stake in political terms (Moravcsik 2007). However, all the issues that concern state intervention in the economy, such as those falling under the Commission Directorate General for Competition (for example, anti-dumping supervision) are ideologically very controversial, as representatives sitting on those committees informed me. Typically they position France and the Southern European states in conflict with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, and some Northern and Eastern European countries. They are very contested, but they are concerned with promoting the correct regulation of flows.

It does not appear to be the case that the EU cooperates in all those areas that lead to positive-sum outcomes. The diplomats I spoke with who work in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy agreed that tighter EU cooperation in foreign policy would lead to a more effective foreign policy for the member states, but through that cooperation, they said, the individual state would lose its visibility on the international stage (see also Glarbo 1999). It appears that cooperation in foreign and security policy

24. Only in the UK and the Netherlands did those who thought social policy was not a key priority outnumber those who thought it was.

is slow because the forms of representation in this field are tightly associated with the identity formation of the nation-state (Adler-Nissen 2013; Campbell 1992; Diez 1996; Zaiotti 2011), and EU member states are quite reluctant to give up on foreign policy as a form of representation. Accordingly foreign and security policy collaboration in the EU more closely resembles traditional multilateral diplomacy than cooperation pertaining to issues of the internal market.

The dynamics in Coreper II, and in particular in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), are quite different from the dynamics in Coreper I, which deals with the regulation of the internal market. In Coreper II and the PSC the diplomats are on average more formally dressed than in Coreper I, perhaps in line with the more serious nature of “high politics.” In Coreper II there are fewer people in the room than in Coreper I, and I had no doubt that the main action was happening at the negotiation table, rather than on people’s cell phones, or on the sidelines. The pace of the negotiations was much slower, the topics did not change as frequently, and the movement of people around the room was significantly reduced, in part because the PR does not require as many experts as the DPR. The requirement of unanimity for many of the topics that Coreper II addresses does not establish the same pressure on finding floating coalitions. Traditional methods of multilateral interstate bargaining are the main working method.

The differences between Coreper I and Coreper II are even more intensified in the case of the PSC. The PSC can debate a single topic over several hours. Other than the president, the Council Legal Service, the ambassadors, and their assistants (the Nicolaidis), there are barely any other people in the room, and there is little movement of people coming and going, except for the occasional guest speaker. Most of the time is dedicated to discussing particular foreign policy issues, rather than taking any concrete action, adopting legislation, or public statements. Compared to Coreper I, PSC spends very little time on drafting exercises.

Several permanent representatives and diplomats found that Coreper I, which deals with matters pertaining to the internal market, is the real communitarian venue, whereas Coreper II and the PSC still follow the patterns of traditional diplomacy. The dispositions of the actors involved in Coreper II and PSC are also more adapted to traditional forms

of inter-state bargaining, given that they usually come from the ministries of foreign affairs and have undergone diplomatic training in their national diplomatic academies. By contrast the deputy permanent representatives and diplomats involved in the work of Coreper I tend to come from a variety of different sectoral ministries (Trondal 2010). In sum, the dynamics at Coreper II and PSC resemble the conventional dynamics of multilateral diplomacy, since the topics they address have traditionally been more in the prerogatives of conventional foreign policy, even if the potential benefits from integration in the area of foreign policy could be very high.²⁵

The last counter-argument I want to take into account is the claim that the EU cooperates in areas of “distributively neutral regulation” (Eberlein and Grande 2005, 93; also see Caporaso 1996; Majone 1993). In strictly technical terms it is very hard to find actually distributively neutral regulation. Even if no financial transfers are involved, for some member states it will be more costly to adapt to a particular piece of legislation than for others. The issue might not be how expensive a particular piece of legislation is but how it is framed — how it is represented — that then affects how it is governed. Is it framed as flow that has to be managed or as a redistributive issue so that a given stock needs to be divided between different states?

7.1.7 The Difficulty of Understanding the EU’s Space of Flows

It is not only the case that EU functionaries and policy makers govern economic integration as a space of flows, but that is also how the EU’s forms of representation characterize and define much of the EU for its citizens. When asked what European identity means to them, most Europeans speak about the absence of borders and the euro (Bruter 2009). EU functionaries and policy-makers responded in a similar fashion. They mentioned bridges and roads, the euro, the absence of borders, and the lowering of roaming charges as the most crucial symbols of the European Union. In the words of the Coreper I presidency during a Coreper session, “one of the most popular things Europe has done was to lower roaming charges.” Many of my interviewees remarked that such symbols are

25. This dividing line is not entirely neat because Coreper II also deals, for example, with issues pertaining to financial markets.

hard to see and hard to identify. One notices them when they do not exist, but one does not see them when they are in front of one's eyes. The absence of borders is more difficult to notice than their presence and lower roaming charges are harder to notice than higher ones. Even if one notices these symbols, identifying and grasping the nature of the beast that they create is still difficult, in part perhaps because it is so unfamiliar. According to my interviewees even national political elites often have difficulties understanding the project they are a part of. Some ministers do not understand that once they have agreed to something in the Council, it has not yet been approved, because the European Parliament still has a say. Apparently even a Member of the European Parliament was confused about whether she was still acting within the same institution when she travelled to Strasbourg for the plenary sessions.

7.1.8 The Remaining Representative Forms of the Nation-State in the Community Method

Some of the forms of representation traditionally associated with the territorial state still persist within this form of governance. Thus in the Council a national representative is present for each member state, with a tag that clarifies the country she represents. The voting rights in the Council are distributed based on a rough key taking into account population size, and those voting rights influence the dynamics of the negotiations. I was told that people listen more when one of the big member states speaks. National language turns out to be a particularly strong form of nation-state representation. Thus the German and the Austrian delegates will always speak in German at the Coreper meetings to uphold the status of German as one of the three Coreper languages. They do so even though they both speak excellent English and French, and speaking in German puts them at a disadvantage. Many other diplomats do not speak German, so they depend on the interpreters. In the process of interpretation parts of the message get lost or become transformed. I heard diplomats on several occasions complain that they were not sure what the German representative said.²⁶ Also in the European Parliament national

26. At another level, native language plays a binding role. Across the EU institutions functionaries, policy-makers and diplomats more easily connect with people they can speak with in their native

forms of representation still exist. Thus most Members of the European Parliament speak in their native language in the plenary sessions to be understood by their domestic constituency, who votes for them. Language also forms a close bond in a series of informal networks. Diplomats, functionaries, and politicians are more likely to obtain valuable information from those people with whom they share a common native language, even if these people work for a different institution. In these curious ways the nation-state can still penetrate the EU's space of flows.

On rare occasions issues of traditional national sovereignty can even flare up at Coreper I negotiations. Thus the Spanish delegate started his intervention on the Sky 2+ regulation with the remark that the United Kingdom has been illegally occupying Gibraltar since the Peace of Utrecht and that he was requesting an exemption clause for Gibraltar airport from Sky 2+ for this reason. The comment appeared so out of place that the entire room broke out in laughter. The British delegate took the floor next and apologized for this very frustrating and purely bilateral issue that had to be brought to the floor. In other words, the situation was remarkable for its uniqueness, and its almost grotesque nature. It took the other delegations by surprise, although it turned out to be a more serious and protracted problem than it initially appeared to be. The Transport Council sought to breach the impasse with the help of its traditional method — by finding a compromise in the text of the regulation, “in search of a neutral formula that will not infringe on sovereignty.” It ultimately turned out to be unsuccessful and reached a non-consensual agreement.

7.2 The EU's Democratic Deficit: An Instance of Hysteresis

As economic actors increasingly pursued integration in the economic field, they started to infringe upon the political field, and upon political actors' standing. While different political actors responded to this infringement in a variety of ways (governments, for example, often sought to limit integration so that their territorial nation-states would

language, and in this way they can more easily obtain information.

remain distinct and visible actors), for space reasons and to avoid drawing too complicated a picture, I concentrate on European political actors. Especially the European Parliament and its members sought to enhance their standing in the European arena and in the process they improved the political outlook of the European Union.

Available grand narratives of European integration, namely neo-functionalism (Haas 1958, 2001; Schmitter 2004) and inter-governmentalism (Hoffmann 1966; Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1993, 1998), pay little attention to the role of the European Parliament in shaping the processes of European integration. According to neo-functionalism, integration proceeds almost automatically through spill-over effects from one area of integration into another, while the European Commission plays a crucial role in representing the European interest and navigating the process, if not directing it. Following an intergovernmental logic, integration proceeds through bargains between governments, when and if it is in member states' interest to integrate. By contrast, we can see another dynamic running through the process of European integration like a red thread, namely a tension between a European political field (mainly animated by MEPs), the EU's space of flows (mainly inhabited by Commission and some Council bureaucrats and diplomats), and the traditional international field concentrated around classic procedures of multilateral diplomacy. The actors of these three fields are engaged in struggles over the dominant forms of representation in the European Union, and thereby in struggles over the nature of the project of integration. The EP succeeded in enhancing its power within the European order against most odds. Only if we account for the role of political representative forms, such as the practices surrounding the elections to the EP, rather than capabilities, legal responsibilities, or purely normative and discursive formations, can we understand the EP's success, and the ways in which the European Communities adopted the shape of a territorial federal polity in some ways and not in others. Outcomes over struggles about forms of representation define not merely the power of the individual actors or detailed institutional arrangements²⁷ but also the big vision of what the European Union is and where it is headed.

27. For this narrower focus see, for example, Jachtenfuchs (2001), Joerges and Neyer (1997), Peterson and Scharp (1998), and Franchino (2000).

7.2.1 The Interlinkages between the Economic and the Political Field

The “unique set of historical circumstances that resulted in the formation of capitalism” (Little 2002, 53) established a clear distinction between a public political field and a supposedly apolitical economic field (Gill 1998; Sassen 2006; Weiss and Wodak 2000). European integration initially maintained this distinction and proceeded in the economic field, while it was essentially non-existent in the public political field. The political field was the state’s responsibility, and the actors in the political field were and still remain reluctant to give up their prerogatives in those areas that are “close to what used to be the sacrosanct core of sovereignty,” according to a Commission official (qtd. in Ross 2011, 69; Abélès 1996). Among these areas, foreign policy, with its identity-generating effects, and social policy, with its focus on financial redistribution, play a key role.

But the alleged separation between economics and politics is a chimera and market integration has affected member states’ capacities to shape their social policy (Scharpf 1997, 1999). Enhanced capital mobility has had an effect on governments’ capabilities to tax corporations, and the reduced government income affects governments’ redistributive capacities. There is an “indirect impact of extending the reach and scope of the four freedoms on social measures such as codetermination, collective labor law, and tax policy” (Höpner and Schäfer 2012, 445). Similarly, the adoption of the euro indirectly affected social policies by limiting the room for fiscal policy to manoeuvre, be it with the Stability and Growth Pact, its enhanced version, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, or through debt conditionality.²⁸

Foreign policy and economic integration cannot be entirely separated from each other. During my time in Brussels they intersected in numerous ways. The Competitiveness Council discussed a partnership on Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean area together with a “road map” to establish “the first cornerstone in a Euro-Mediterranean partnership” to “develop peace and stability in a strategic area.” The Transport, Telecommunication, and Energy Council, a Council formation that tradition-

28. The Greek debt crisis has been a powerful example of how economic and financial integration has crucial and irrevocable effects on social policy.

ally falls under Coreper I (which is responsible for market integration), discussed the security of energy supply together with its external dimension, in particular regarding the EU-US Energy Council, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for Energy Council, Russia's abandonment of the South stream pipeline project, and the winter package that the European Commission "babysits" to guarantee Russian gas supply to the Ukraine. And the Environment Council, another Coreper I Council formation, discussed international cooperation towards reaching an agreement at the Paris climate summit, as well as a European vision for 2015 that includes the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that the United Nations Member States adopted in 2015 which are intended to reach beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to advance poverty eradication and sustainable development.

The effects that integration in the economic field had on the political field resulted in pressures on the part of some political actors to adopt political forms of representation into the process of European integration to enhance the standing of political actors. Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in particular felt uncomfortable and experienced hysteresis as they were losing their standing in favour of the economic field in which integration was proceeding. In 1979 the European Parliament was directly elected because of the pressure mounted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the French national assembly, and the German Bundestag.

7.2.2 The Direct Election of the European Parliament as a Representative Form

The direct election of the European Parliament operates as a form of representation, not merely in the conventional sense of the term as the political representation of a people, but also in the sense in which I have used the term "forms of representation" throughout this dissertation. Elections are a public spectacle, an event, and a representative practice, during which the people located within a particular territory comes to life. The imagined community of the nation is actively experienced and embodied in the process of the elections.

Parliamentary elections constitute the power of the parliament in a public spectacle, similar to how the coronation ritual constituted the power of the king in the Middle Ages. Parliamentary elections as a form of representation are based on an indexical connection between the opinion of the population located in the territory of the EU and the Members of the European Parliament through the mechanism of the ballot. By virtue of this indexical connection it is understood that the European Parliament as a whole expresses the general will of the population iconically, that is, by resembling the will of the population. One might even go further and suggest that this representation “creates the identity of a people that only comes into existence through this process of representation” (Diez 1996, 270).²⁹ The European Parliament (as much as any universally elected parliament) gains its legitimacy and authority by virtue of this indexical and iconic connection to the population.

Unlike the euro, the border-free Schengen area, and the EU’s architecture, the elections to the European Parliament are one of the very few representative forms of the European Union that unequivocally state the EU’s territorial extent. All the citizens of EU member states are allowed to vote in European elections whereas citizens of non-EU member states are not allowed to vote. There are no opt-out clauses for the elections to the European Parliament, and no exceptions for non-member states with a special status. The elections to the European Parliament mark a clear inside that is separate from its outside. They bring the container schema of the EU into existence. Together with a few other political representative forms, the elections create an image of a European territorial—albeit federal—state as Europe’s international order. The elections are also the representative form that defines the European Parliament as at least co-sovereign over the territory of the European Union, as it allegedly represents the people of the territory. The EP sees itself as one of two chambers in the European legislative process, with the Council being the second chamber that, according to the traditional federal model, represents the states. The EP made strategic use of the direct elections as a representative form to enhance its position vis-à-vis other EU institutions in the European order.

29. My translation from German.

Some political actors pushed for the direct election of the European Parliament because they felt that by virtue of establishing this form of representation, the power of the European Parliament would increase, even though its competency did not increase, at least not initially. “For Spennale, President of the Parliament from 1976 to 1977, ‘a Parliament elected by universal suffrage, because it would have a greater political weight, would obtain greater powers in the interinstitutional dialogue than those of the current Assembly.’ For Sasse, it was necessary for the community’s development to be based on ‘the same institutional characteristics as dominate the exercise of public authority in the States.’ It would, according to him, ‘be impossible to refuse to the Community what goes without saying in the States’ and that, once directly elected, the ‘Assembly could more easily pressure the governments’” (Corbett 1998, 50).³⁰

While rationalist and institutionalist integration scholars (Kreppel 1999; Majone 2001; Pierson 1996; Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998; Tallberg 2000; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) cannot account for how changes in representative forms rather than changes in competencies could have an effect on an institution’s power, constructivist integration scholars (Checkel 2001, 2005; Hooghe 2005; Lewis 2005; Risse 2001, 2004; Risse and Engenhann-Martin 2002) have until now focused on the role of language, ideas, identities, and norms for increasing an institution’s legitimacy but not on the role of more material representative forms such as practices or artifacts. It is true that an increasing number of scholars are highlighting the role of symbolism for the construction of the European Union (Manners 2000; McNamara 2015) but they have not remarked how struggles over these representative forms have shaped the European integration process.

Beyond increasing the power of the EP, the direct election of the members of the European Parliament had the additional effect of creating a clearly political field at the European level. Prior to the direct election of the EP, it was composed of members from the national parliaments whose main field of action was at the domestic level (Corbett 1998, 66). With the creation of political actors (and transnational European political parties) whose main focus was to engage in the processes of European integration, those

30. The description of the developments from the first elections of the EP up until the Maastricht Treaty draws heavily on Corbett (1998).

actors started to realize the full extent of their loss of power and social standing compared to their role in the domestic political field, in particular since they were not detached from domestic politics. The turnover rate between members of national parliaments and the EP is very high. MEPs also continue to be members of their national parties. MEPs and member state MPs thus operate in a single political field.

7.2.3 The Democratic Deficit as an Instance of Hysteresis and a Strategy

As a result of MEPs' inferior role in European integration, they became frustrated and started to experience hysteresis: "The net effect is, therefore, likely to have been a radicalizing one on MEPs and on their determination to fight for institutional change, to overcome what they began to call a 'democratic deficit' in the Community" (Corbett 1998, 123). The European Parliament was the first to coin the term *democratic deficit* to express the dissatisfaction with the inferior role of political actors on the European stage (in particular parliaments and political parties) compared to the crucial role the national parliaments, political parties, and the individual members of parliament typically play in domestic politics (Corbett 1998; Ross 2011).

The overwhelming majority of scholars who have addressed the EU's democratic deficit have done so through a legal and normative lens (Eriksen 2005; Habermas 2001; Linklater 1998; Lord and Beetham 2001; Noury and Roland 2002; Scharpf 1999; Sjursen 2006) and have thus missed analyzing how the democratic deficit became an issue in the first place. They have studied whether the EU has a democratic deficit or not, and what can be done to reduce it (Arnall and Wincott 2003; Barker 2001; Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Fossum 2003; Neyer 2003; Schimmelfennig 2003; Schmitter 2000; Siberson 2004; Weiler 2001), but barely anybody has noticed how the term emerged initially. The European Parliament invented the phrase for strategic reasons, namely to strengthen those representative forms in the EU that enhance the EP's standing in the European order. Only if we are anchored in the political field and expect political representative forms to operate within it do we have to worry about the democratic deficit. Only then

do we feel perplexed if democratic representation does not exist. With this background in mind, Moravcsik's (2007) critique of the "democratic deficit" as an ill-conceived concept for the European Community, given that the EC deals mainly with technical issues of low political salience, is misleading. It entirely ignores the circumstances under which political actors, rather than academics, started to make use of the term strategically to contest and rectify the proclaimed technicality and "low politics" of European integration.

7.2.4 The EP Makes Full Use of its Representative Forms to Enhance its Position

According to an MEP and a senior adviser from the Council Legal Service, once the EP was directly elected, its members started to raise media awareness about the democratic deficit and among their friends in their domestic national parties. The EP's first step was to demand changes within the treaty framework. The EP wanted, for example, to establish such representative practices as being able to vote on the candidate for the presidency of the Commission that the member states had agreed on, and subsequently being able to have a vote of confidence for the Commission as a whole.³¹ It felt that the direct elections to the EP provided it with the necessary leverage. If we compare these representative practices to the rituals of inauguration from the Middle Ages, the EP wanted to position itself vis-à-vis the Commission in the same way that the pope positioned himself in relation to kings in the coronation ritual.

The European Council (which operates on the basis of traditional multilateral diplomacy) refused to let the plenary of the EP vote on the president of the Commission. Instead it suggested that the Enlarged Bureau of the Parliament should meet with the president of the European Council to discuss the proposed candidate. "Whether or not such a procedure could, at least in certain circumstances, give Parliament a real influence, it certainly lacked the visibility, weight and public impact of a vote in plenary" (Corbett 1998, 136). This controversy between the European Council and the EP was a struggle

31. The demands also included modified institutional procedures in the processes of EU legislation that would enhance the EP's position, and enhanced integration in the area of European Political Cooperation, which dealt with foreign policy, a typically political subject matter.

over visible representative forms, rather than over actual competencies, but both sides understood well that those representative practices by themselves increased the EP's power. It would have been unimaginable for the president of the Commission to take up his office had he been publicly rejected by a plenary vote in the European Parliament, even if there was no legal basis inhibiting him from doing so. The EP played on this exact logic when it simply unilaterally decided to hold a vote of confidence in plenary for the Commission as a whole, although no treaty provisions established such a procedure. The EP repeated this procedure in subsequent Commission appointments, and during Jacques Delors's first Commission in 1985, the commissioners waited for this vote before taking their oath, thus in practice legitimizing the procedure the EP had unilaterally adopted (Corbett 1998). By doing so the EU also adopted representative practices that were already familiar from domestic politics, could therefore be easily understood by the population, and made the European order resemble the domestic order of a federal state.

Overall, however, the EP felt that the Commission and the Council (whose employees are more fully involved in the EU's space of flows or the traditional international field of multilateral diplomacy) did not sufficiently meet the EP's demands for more political representative forms in the processes of European integration. Spinelli, the primary driver in enhancing the EP's role in the earlier stages of its existence, "felt that the experience of the rejection of the 1980 budget, the ignoring of EP 'own initiative' resolutions, inadequate response to EP legislative amendments and the lack of a Community authority to execute a common foreign policy had changed Members' attitudes. A growing perception of how inadequate Community instruments, powers and resources were, how little influence Parliament had, led to a radicalization of attitudes" (Corbett 1998, 142).

The sense of hysteresis increased and led to new initiatives on the part of the EP, the next one a proposal for a Draft Treaty on European Union (DTEU). Spinelli thought that the directly elected parliament should prepare a constitution that would then be put forward for ratification to national parliaments, thus sidelining the diplomats in the Council. "As the main political parties would be represented, a proposal for greater integration would 'gather momentum in the debates of the Assembly, whereas it would lose it in a conference of national diplomats.' In [Spinelli's] view: 'if the final draft is accepted

by a massive majority in the Assembly, it will arrive at the national Parliaments for the final ratification with a political force behind it which no diplomatic intergovernmental conference could provide” (qtd. in Corbett 1998, 144-45). We can see in this quote how Spinelli relies on the power of typically domestic political forms of representation in his argument, but also on the understanding that parliamentary political actors speak the same language, and will mutually support each other, whereas the diplomats and government officials more deeply embedded in the traditional procedures of interstate bargaining are likely to spoil the whole enterprise.

A group in the EP formed around Spinelli to write a draft treaty (Holmes 2000). Once the EP adopted the draft treaty, its members sought support from national parliaments and national political parties, which they gained (with a few rare exceptions) on the basis that “a strengthening of the EP’s position within the institutional system of the Community was part of a common struggle for parliamentary democracy” (Corbett 1998, 185). An institutional-interest-based explanation (see, for example, Moravcsik 1998; Majone 2001; Pollack 2003; Rittberger 2001) cannot account for the strong emphasis on enhancing political forms of representation, rather than exclusively focusing on increasing the EP’s competencies, nor can it account for why national parliaments in their overwhelming majority supported the EP.

True to its origins, the draft treaty aimed to establish a European Union on the model of a federal state (Abélès 2000b; Pinelli 2013). In its preamble it stated the goal to reach democratic unification at the European level. The DTEU established a union citizenship and a union territory. The Commission, as the effective government of this union, should be responsible to the EP, and the EP should have the capacity to dismiss it by a qualified majority, while the Commission’s president should reflect the results of the elections to the EP. In other words, the representative forms the EP sought to establish would create the image of a European territorial federal state as Europe’s new international order. This vision for a European order was in stark contrast to the vision of a European space of flows governed with the help of liberal governance, as it had been developed in particular in the work of the Commission and parts of the Council.

The EP managed to generate sufficient political support for the draft treaty from na-

tional parliaments, political parties, and eventually some governments to bring the issue onto the agenda of the member state governments. They initiated an intergovernmental conference (IGC) to discuss the DTEU and the broader issue of treaty reform. The EP was the initial motor that launched these treaty revisions. While numerous scholars have mentioned either the entrepreneurial role of the Delors Commission in convincing the member states to sign the Single European Act (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996; Jabko 1999), or the role of interstate bargaining (Moravcsik 1991), the fact that the crucial initiating impulse for treaty reform emerged from the EP is usually omitted.

However, the EP's efforts to maintain the treaty revisions in the hands of parliamentary political actors were ultimately unsuccessful. As a result, the intergovernmental conference deleted most of the provisions intended to enhance political representative forms in the European Communities, and consequently to strengthen the position of the EP. The EP was dissatisfied with what was left from its initial draft treaty, and numerous national parliaments, European party federations (which are composed of national parties), and even political and government leaders agreed with the EP's perspective.

Despite this failure, the EP continued in its endeavours. The next strategic step it planned in its struggle was to hold a joint conference between the EP and national parliaments, called the Assizes, formally the Conference of the Parliaments of the European Community. Instead of classic multilateral diplomacy, the attendees decided to seat themselves not by national delegation but by party affiliation, which influenced the dynamics of the meetings. The Assizes agreed on a resolution aiming to establish a "European Union of a Federal Type" (Corbett 1998, 284), and to prepare a constitution for it. The Assizes also made a number of concrete suggestions for treaty revisions, most of which sought to establish a more political form of integration, both in its forms of representation and in the issues the Communities should henceforward govern. Thus the goal was to integrate European Political Cooperation (the foreign policy cooperation of member states that functioned outside of the Community framework on the basis of traditional diplomacy) into the legislative apparatus, and include social policy in the processes of European integration. The EP also intended to enhance its powers by increasing its right to co-decision in legislation, and it continued to insist on its right to

elect the president of the Commission nominated by Council, and subsequently have a vote of confidence on the Commission as a whole, which would more clearly adopt the role of a government. The EP's pressure to include the issue of political union on the agenda turned out to be successful, and found support among at least some leading political elites, such as German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1995), French President Francois Mitterrand (1991), German President Richard von Weizsäcker (1992), and British Prime Minister John Major (Lücke 1991). A European Council convened, and tasked the intergovernmental conference with addressing the issues raised by the Assizes.

The intergovernmental conference, which negotiated the Treaty on European Union, commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, met some of the demands of the EP and the Assizes. It integrated the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into the European Union, but into a separate pillar. It created a European citizenship, including voting rights, a right to petition, and the establishment of an ombudsman. The intergovernmental conference extended the legislative powers of the EP, and the EP obtained a formal right to hold a vote of confidence on the Commission, while it also was to be consulted on the Council's nomination of the President of the Commission (Abélès 1996). Finally, a hidden symbolic hint made reference to the federal state model as a goal for the project of European integration, given that the treaty refers to an "ever closer Union," a term that leans on the concept of "more perfect Union" in the American constitution (Neue Züricher Zeitung 1991). Through the skilful use of representative forms like the Assizes and public votes held in plenary sessions, the EP succeeded in enhancing its standing and simultaneously increased the political dimension of the EC/EU.

Overall, however, the EP was dissatisfied with many of the treaty provisions, among them the large number of different legislative procedures (a result of the EU's notorious search for compromise), which rendered the whole European legislative process illegible to citizens and increased the maze of the space of flows. The EP was still hoping to attain more, and so were many national parties and national parliaments (CDU/CSU 1991; FDP 1992; SPD 1991). The political actors succeeded in gaining public opinion on their side — numerous newspapers criticized the lack of democracy and the lack of power attributed to the EP in the Maastricht Treaty (EU-Magazin 1992).

As a next step the EP decided to continue its practice of holding unsolicited public votes in plenary sessions on the president of the Commission. The EP was heavily drawing on the symbolic leverage of the plenary sessions, which are broadcast live and involve a huge travelling circus of all the MEPs and many of their support staff moving from Brussels to Strasbourg. Helmut Kohl, alias the president of the European Council at the time, and Commission President Jacques Santer had to accept that a negative vote from the EP would signal that the European Council had to find a new candidate for the post, although the treaties did not stipulate such a need. The EP's standing increased, although its legal competencies did not.

The EP also unilaterally decided to have hearings for the individual Commission members. Although the Commission initially refused to go through this procedure, the EP refused to schedule a vote of confidence for the Commission as a whole until the Commissioners would appear for their hearings, which they eventually did. The first time the EP held hearings with the Santer's Commission, a negative opinion on the part of the EP resulted in merely reshuffling competencies, but in the case of Juncker's Commission inaugurated in 2014, the EP's practice led to several commissioners being replaced, although the treaties still did not provide the EP with any formal power to elect individual commissioners. In 2005 the EP even managed to establish a procedure for having individual commissioners resign during their running term, although again the treaties did not provide for such an option. The EP succeeded in its efforts because it leaned on familiar representative forms from the domestic political field, which made these highly visible and public practices also comprehensible to the people, and because it could rely on its own authority based on direct EU-wide parliamentary elections.

Furthermore the EP obtained a de facto confirmation from the Commission that it would withdraw a legislative initiative if the EP opposed a proposed legislation in plenary session, again, an element that is not stated in the treaties. The EP argued with the point that it would be unimaginable in a democracy to have legislation adopted that had been rejected by a democratically elected parliament. The EP's argumentation was successful, as the Commission President Santer declared in the plenary of the EP, "in the democratic procedures which are common to our Member States, the rejection of draft

legislation by the elected Parliament puts an end to the legislative procedure. We all know that this is not the case under the terms of the Treaty on European Union. As I have said, the Commission cannot go beyond the limits imposed by the Treaty without laying itself open to legal and constitutional challenges. Nevertheless, the Commission fully acknowledges the democratic legitimacy of the elected parliament, and will thus attach very special importance to Parliament's rejection of the proposals in question" (in Corbett 1998, 352-53). With these successes the EP pushed for additional treaty reforms to further decrease the EU's democratic deficit, still with the support from multiple other actors in the political field (Diez 1996; see also Bellier and Wilson 2000).³² The EP pressed for its demands in the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty, and the treaty lead to a further increase of the EP's power in the legislative process.

After the missed opportunity with the Treaty of Nice, the EP finally reached one of its long-term aspirations: the establishment of a public deliberative body based on the model of the Philadelphia Convention whose goal was to institute a constitution for Europe. The Convention for the Future of Europe led by former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing met from February 2002 until July 2003. It was composed of 105 representatives, including member state delegates, representatives of the national parliaments, representatives of the European Commission, and representatives of the EP. The dynamics of the convention were very different from a regular intergovernmental conference. According to a senior official from the Council Legal Service and a diplomat involved in the negotiations, given the large number of participants the convention developed its very own dynamic that was impossible to control, although the MEPs were considerably better organized than everybody else was. They felt particularly comfortable in this format, which was so familiar to their habitus. According to an MEP, the delegates from the national parliaments sided with the MEPs. The convention was markedly different from traditional multilateral bargaining, but also from the representative forms of the EU's space of flows. It created the image of a federal state in the making. The fact that the convention was public led to a very strong momentum, and increased its legitimacy,

32. The German Bundestag also discussed the need for European symbols such as a flag, and an anthem, but also a European passport and a European driving license (Diez 1996).

so that governments could not ignore its outcomes and simply decide to write their own text in the traditional procedure of intergovernmental bargaining.³³

Given the convention's character as an organ for state formation and the strong role political actors played within it, it is not surprising that the final document included a large amount of symbolism that provided the EU with the forms of representation of a democratic, federal state (Meyer 2009; Pinelli 2013). Choosing to call the treaty a constitution and have a convention deliberate on it in public are already symbolic acts. The goal was to have one consolidated document that would combine all the international treaties on which the EU has been built historically, rather than having a document that would merely add to those treaties as was once the case.

In its content, the constitution established the function of a "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs," and included the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Instead of calling EU legislation *regulations* and *directives*, whose meaning the conventionalists thought was unclear to EU citizens, the constitution employed the terms "European law" and "European framework law" (d'Estaing 2007). It further anchored the EU's symbolism, including a flag and an anthem within a legal document.³⁴ The EU obtained a legal personality, and its legislative procedures were considerably simplified, so that the EP received a right to co-decision in all EU legislation, with the exception of CFSP and CSDP. The goal was "to put into place a normal legislative procedure that resembles the ones in effect in democratic countries" (d'Estaing 2007, 23).³⁵ Effectively the EP obtained the role of a second chamber as it exists in many national parliamentary systems (Dehaene 2008). It further acquired the right to "elect" the president of the Commission after he had been nominated by the Council, taking the results of the elections to the EP into account. The representative practices and symbols proposed in the constitutional treaty resembled those from domestic democratic political orders as we know them from many European territorial states, and they would have resulted in a significant improvement in the standing of the EP.

33. Interview with a member state diplomat; interview with an MEP.

34. The Council of Europe, an inherently political body, developed the flag and anthem in 1956 and 1964 respectively (Abélès 1996).

35. My translation from French.

The MEPs and representatives of the national parliaments were mainly pushing for the symbolism to be included in the treaty. According to several of my interviewees, they did not consider these symbolic elements to play a purely decorative role, but attributed large importance to them. These political actors' vision was to create a federal state, in which the Commission functions as the government, who is accountable to the European Parliament, and gains its democratic legitimacy and authority by virtue of the EP's vote of confidence (Dehaene 2008).³⁶

By contrast, the vision of the Commission, staffed by bureaucrats embedded within the EU's space of flows rather than by political actors, was quite different. The Commission published a White Paper in which it replaced the concept of government with the notion of governance (European Commission 2001). The argument was that "the EU was such a unique political construction to defy any comparison with that of the national state" (Pinelli 2013, 183), and thus cannot be based on forms of representative democracy. Instead the Commission's legitimacy stems from decentralized processes of stakeholder consultation and participation. Although the Commission continues to pursue this postmodern form of governance in its daily practice (Meyer 1999; Shore 2011), the Constitutional Treaty did enhance the European Parliament's standing, which occurred to some extent at the expense of the position of the Commission and the Council, the principal actors involved in the traditional community method, and the EU's space of flows (see also Ross 2011). The format and the dynamics of the convention might have played a crucial role in this outcome. The Convention's public format probably also contributed to the fact that even more integration-reluctant member states felt themselves obliged to accept and sign on to the Constitutional Treaty.

However, in the ratification process the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the constitution in a referendum. A period of reflection ensued. The popular rejection of the constitution weighed heavily, but all the member state governments had signed the treaty, and seventeen out of twenty-five member states had already ratified it (Blanchet 2011). This fact significantly shaped the ensuing negotiations. The solution that emerged in bilateral and intergovernmental negotiations was to maintain the main institutional

36. Interview with an MEP.

innovations, but eliminate much of the symbolism that made the EU resemble a federal state. On the one hand, as soon as someone sought to modify elements of the institutional balance, others brought up the argument that all of this had already been agreed upon and signed.³⁷ On the other hand, a sense emerged in Brussels (which continues to this day) that the constitution's symbolism was responsible for its rejection in the Dutch and French referenda (Ross 2011), although this understanding might not have been based on sound analysis (Bruter 2009).³⁸ While many criticized the EU's symbolism prior to the failed referenda for being too "pale" (Abélès 1996; Shore 2000; Walters 2002), after the referenda it was criticized for having been too strong and therefore frightening for the population. The political actors had to accept a partial defeat; the Federal Europe they wanted to create took a back seat, even as most of the treaty's institutional provisions remained in place. "The option chosen in the end was that of a text that bore the least possible resemblance to the Constitutional Treaty, while taking over most of its substantial innovations" (Blanchet 2011, 1243-44).

The anthem and the flag were gone from the treaty text. The text did not reproduce the Charter of fundamental rights because it would have resembled the Constitutional Treaty too much, so instead a mere reference was added (Blanchet 2011). The words *regulations* and *directives* replaced the terms *European laws* and *European framework laws*, and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs would henceforward be called "High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission".³⁹ It was also decided to drop the word *constitution*. Eventually the treaty would be called the Lisbon Treaty, after the city where the heads of government signed it. Instead of having one consolidated treaty, the negotiators decided to transform the treaty text into an amendment treaty, which merely listed the amendments to previous treaties. This made the text particularly reader unfriendly (Blanchet 2011) and hard to work with, according to a diplomat involved in the negotiations, but it also made it look like a short document (d'Estaing 2007), which gave the impression

37. Interview with a diplomat who participated in the negotiations.

38. It appears that the French rejected the Constitutional Treaty because of a lack of Social Europe. Too little politics was the problem, not too much politics (Statham and Trenz 2013).

39. A diplomat involved in the negotiations told me that, in particular, the German Bundestag felt "sad" about the symbolism's elimination from the treaty.

that by the mere virtue of its size it could not introduce any major changes. The size of the treaty then supported French President Nicolas Sarkozy's argument in front of the French national assembly that it was "a tiny little treaty," and therefore did not require a referendum.⁴⁰ The big leap toward a federal Europe that MEPs had hoped for came off the agenda and many representative forms of the space of flows were back on the table. The Lisbon Treaty resulted in a European order with many different facets: liberal governance procedures to order a space of flows, representative forms that resemble the domestic order in a federal state, and some representative forms of traditional multilateral diplomacy between states.

Even after the signing and ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, struggles over forms of representation continue at the European level. The EP keeps pushing for an improvement of the democratic outlook of the EU, for now by extending the current treaty provisions in practice. The most recent initiative occurred during the last elections to the EP in May 2014, when the major parties launched their campaigns with Spitzenkandidaten, top candidates that run for each party, with the understanding that the Spitzenkandidat of the party who wins the elections will become the president of the European Commission. To be clear, the Lisbon Treaty does not include such a provision. It stipulates in article 9D, paragraph 7 "taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members." The European Council lived under the assumption that its proposition of a candidate to the EP was not a mere formality.

According to a participant in the Convention, MEPs already deliberated during the Convention to institute a procedure that was common from domestic politics, where the top candidate of the party who wins the elections usually becomes the head of government. According to an MEP, Daniel Cohn-Bendit as the leader of the European Greens sought to introduce this mechanism in the 2009 elections to the EP by declaring himself

40. Interview with a senior official from the Council Legal Service who participated in the negotiations to the Lisbon Treaty.

the Spitzenkandidat of the Greens, who will become the Commission president in the unlikely event that the party wins the elections. Given that he was the representative of a rather small party, his efforts turned out to be unsuccessful. The initiative gained momentum as soon as Martin Schulz, then president of the EP, and the head of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (one of the two major political groups in the EP) jumped on the bandwagon. Martin Schulz was able to make full use of his position of authority as president of the EP, of the visibility that position granted him, and of his many official travels across Europe, to propagate the idea. Other political parties at the European level joined and elected their own Spitzenkandidaten. Once other parties had selected their Spitzenkandidaten, the pressure was on the remaining parties to do likewise.⁴¹ The European People's Party was the last party group to nominate Jean-Claude Juncker as its candidate at the Congress in Dublin in March 2014. After all the other parties had nominated their candidates, they had little choice left but to follow suit. Roughly 2000 members in attendance elected him. Among those present were Angela Merkel and Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary.

The media liked the organization of the electoral campaign on the basis of Spitzenkandidaten because it was a familiar scheme from domestic politics and therefore made intuitive sense. European parties obtained representative faces who campaigned against each other for the presidency of the Commission. It was the first time that there was an effort to install a unified European-wide electoral campaign for a single European people in a European territory, rather than having multiple national campaigns. Even to the surprise of many MEPs, the process developed its own dynamics and gained such a strong momentum that governments could not turn their backs on it. After the elections the EP convened, and without waiting for the nomination by the European Council, unilaterally elected Jean-Claude Juncker as president of the European Commission. All the major parties of the EP, including the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and Martin Schulz himself, supported Juncker's candidacy against their own immediate self-interests. They felt that this election set a public precedent that would have far-reaching implications for the future. It reduced the EU's democratic deficit, created new forms of representation

41. Pinelli (2013) had predicted the entire process, including the dynamics that would unfold.

with which the citizens could identify, politicized the European Commission, improved the relative position of the EP, and brought the European Union one step closer to a federal state model.⁴² According to one employee of the EP, the last elections were “the biggest achievement for democracy at the European level.”

The European Council was very reluctant to accept the EP’s unilateral act. David Cameron and Viktor Orbán in particular sought to build a coalition that would reject the EP’s election, but Angela Merkel was also lukewarm about the EP’s initiative (Vogel 2014).⁴³ The resistance Juncker’s election generated from his fellow party members in the European Council indicates that it was similarly worried that Juncker’s election would create precedence, that it was a representative practice during which everybody had seen that everybody had seen that things had changed (to paraphrase Swidler 2001, 87), and that this would eliminate the possibility of the European Council influencing the choice of the Commission’s president in the future. Ultimately, however, the media pressure and the Brussels-based expert opinion was so strong that the European Council as an inter-governmental body could not reverse the dynamics the EP had set in place.⁴⁴

Overall the EP is searching for ways to bring the EU closer to its citizens (Abélès 2000b), which fundamentally differs from the approach of the European Commission. A senior Commission official remarked, “we’ve always tried to aim our communications at our immediate stakeholders and this leads us to put out messages that are too complicated and specialized. But we’ve never tried, until very recently in the work of Margot Walstrom to aim at the public in general” (Ross 2011, 83). Another Commission official who was involved in public communication work noted that “the EU cannot explain itself. The Commission hasn’t the slightest idea how to explain what is going on from a political point of view” (Ross 2011, 83). Perhaps this is because the Commission does not operate in the logic of politics or with political forms of representation.

The EP sees its main task precisely in establishing political forms of representation that the citizens can understand. According to one MEP, “the EU is too abstract for

42. Interview with two employees of the Commission; three interviews with employees of the EP; two interviews with assistants to MEPs; interview with an MEP.

43. Interview with a policy adviser from a research think tank.

44. Interview with a diplomat from a member state.

its citizens. The problem is not so much that it is too complicated — most people do not understand how the German system works either, but they feel connected to it.” He thought that one of the EP’s main tasks was to slow the legislative process down and to translate it into a language comprehensible for ordinary citizens. The Council sees the EP’s role in a similar light, but does not necessarily think that is a good thing. According to a DPR “the Parliament is on the search for symbols, but we should not give optical concessions to the Parliament, which eventually will result in juridical concessions.” According to another DPR, “the EP is a highly political body, and it might require particular concessions for media publicity.” A diplomat criticized the EP for being a very political body that lacks technical knowledge and requests legislative changes for populist purposes. She felt that the people do not have to understand what the EU is doing because it does not concern them directly anyway. We can see in these controversies the ongoing struggle between actors from a political field who seek to establish political representative forms to enhance their standing, and those who are fully emerged in the EU’s space of flows and do not like it when those flows are halted.

Whereas the EP has been able to gradually increase its powers and work towards making the EU resemble a federal state, the actors in the EU’s space of flows continue to make use of liberal governance procedures, while MEPs are gradually being engulfed by the space of flows as their powers increase. As MEPs continue to push for politicization at the European level, two interesting phenomena are occurring. For one, MEPs across parties are closely bounded together, and we see a high degree of inter-party alignment of votes (Bardi 2014). As a result we cannot observe in the EP the traditional party political divides we know from domestic politics (Abélès 1996; Abélès 2000b). A focus on reaching consensus to have a united front in an effort to increase the political dimension of European integration paradoxically has led to a depoliticization of the EP. Additionally, as the EP gains in power and is ever more involved in the EU’s legislative process, MEPs increasingly integrate into the EU’s space of flows. Their habitus might be slowly changing. At this point MEPs are located at an intersection between the space of flows during the four days per week they spend in Brussels involved in the regular legislative processes, and the political field during the remaining three days per week they spend in

their domestic constituency doing their political work with a focus on getting reelected in the next elections (Abélès 1996). While the EP is getting dragged into the EU's space of flows, the Commission might very well become ever more politicized as it increasingly depends on the EP and on the elections to the European Parliament.

There is no way to tell what way the EU will develop. It continues to be a “fundamentally contested project” (Bankowski and Christodoulidis 1998, 349). In interesting and confusing ways several fields continue to overlap and transcend each other in today's European Union. Because of how profoundly these fields are intergrown, they give rise to a single European order with many facets and shades to it. While many European political actors still have a federal state model in their minds, many of the EU's functionaries and bureaucrats have fully embraced the model of liberal governance of a space of flows (Derrida 1992; Meyer 2009; Pinelli 2013; Risse 2001; Ross 2011; Scott 2002; Weiler 1994; Wessels 2014). They put their bets on a form of output legitimacy, on the “Europe of results” whose main purpose is to create economic growth through the enhancement of positive flows with such flagship projects as the digital market or the elimination of roaming charges (Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2014; Juncker 2014; Adler-Nissen 2009; Blanchet 2011; Bruter 2009; Ross 2011).⁴⁵ Perhaps because this vision lacks a socio-political component, and in particular after the financial crisis, at least some domestic political forces intend to renege on all promises of European integration and seek renationalization (Eberlein and Grande 2005; Höpfner and Schäfer 2012; Markus 2009; Pinelli 2013; Walters and Haahr 2005), while many governments appear to be returning to the ideal of traditional diplomacy with interstate bargaining at the European Council (Abélès 1996; Craig 2013; Dawson and de Witte 2013; de Schoutheete 2007; Puetter 2014).⁴⁶

Former French President Sarkozy said, “only the Heads of State or Government

45. Even if the model was successful in creating economic growth, that does still not have to automatically result in any form of output legitimacy, as the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates (Wilson 2000), or the Irish “no” in the first referendum to the Lisbon Treaty, which occurred despite the fact that “Ireland had been genuinely blessed by EU membership, in two decades rising from being one of the EU's poorest countries to having its second-highest average income” (Ross 2011, 7).

46. As a result of the financial crisis the European Council in particular has gained significant strength (Puetter 2014). It has started to give tasks to the other institutions, a role that is not established in the treaties.

(could) take up responsibilities because at the end they (were) the only ones to dispose of the democratic legitimacy to decide in the crisis” (qtd. in Wessels 2014, 43). We see here an increasing intensification of struggles within the political field about the proper locus of politics. The need for an explicitly political dimension to the European project becomes ever more important, yet what form that political dimension should take remains contested. Under the current circumstances, the most one can tell is that the European Union of the future will emerge out of these struggles over different visions of what Europe is, which are to a large extent based on and expressed in struggles over forms of representation.⁴⁷ How convincingly the different actors can present themselves to the European people(s) will likely determine their success or failure.

7.2.5 Limitations of the Analytical Framework

The attentive reader will have noticed several small inconsistencies in my thick description of the dynamics of European integration. European order formation today appears to be a more complex process than it used to be. Or perhaps it is easier to discern the main trends with hindsight. From my current vantage point in the EU, probably more than in the historical cases I analyzed, I see numerous fields overlap and their actors interact with each other in intricate ways in the processes of European integration. For space reasons and to avoid drawing an overly complicated picture, I concentrated on two fields but other fields occasionally appeared in the background of the analysis. In particular an international political field structured around the representative forms of traditional multilateral diplomacy continues to play an important role in the European order, and I occasionally glossed over it in the analysis. An additional field that I did not even touch upon is the legal field. It certainly also shaped the European order and drew it in still different directions.

A second factor that makes the analysis of the current European order more complicated than the historical orders I studied here is that the fluctuations of actors between fields in the EU are quite significant, so the fields do not have clear boundaries, and the

47. For a discussion of possible scenarios of how to ensure democratic forms of representation in the wake of the financial crisis, see de Schoutheete and Micossi 2013.

representative forms are not entirely neatly separated between fields. For example, the European Parliament has its buildings constructed in the postmodern architectural style, its MEPs are involved in the EU's assembly-line production of texts that phenomenologically creates the EU's space of flows, and yet MEPs continue to embody the habitus of actors from the political field in significant ways because they are also engrained in the political processes surrounding elections. As Bourdieu (1990) suggested, logical inconsistencies are a common occurrence in the world of practice because the logic of practice is not that of logic but that of convenience and practicality. The European Union is a messy construct, but even so, I hope that the analysis has demonstrated how a focus on forms of representation, on fields, on habitus, on hysteresis, and on struggles over representative forms can help us understand how the European order obtained the features that characterize it today.

7.3 Synopsis

In this chapter I argued that European integration originated in the economic field, which is conceived as a space of flows thanks to concrete forms of representation. Given that European economic integration is defined in the form of a space of flows, the EU governs it accordingly. The focus is on enhancing the circulation of positive flows and limiting the circulation of negative flows. Order is understood in the form of liberal governance, which does not emanate from one centre, but is diffuse and even leads to a loss of agency. Liberal governance operates through freedom; it seeks to channel flows in certain directions by influencing the environment in which those flows occur, but without being able to fully control them.

While European integration started in the economic field, it increasingly affected the political field as well. A sub-section of political actors pushed for the adoption of political forms of representation at the European level, and succeeded in 1979 when the first direct elections to the European Parliament took place. These direct elections had the additional effect of creating full-time political actors on the European stage for the first time. Once these actors realized their inferior role compared to the high social standing they

were used to in domestic politics, they started to experience hysteresis. This hysteresis found expression in the critique of the EU's democratic deficit. The democratic deficit animated the efforts of members of the European Parliament, supported by national parliaments and parties, to enhance political forms of representation at the European level, and make the EU resemble a federal state. Within this order the EP would have possibly the highest standing.

Over time, as the European Parliament gains in power and the apparent democratic deficit dwindles, the EP gets ever more involved in the EU's assembly-line production of texts, and thus its members are increasingly inhabiting the EU's space of flows and adapting to it. At present MEPs still inhabit the traditional political field three days per week when they are in their domestic constituencies. During the four days per week they spend in Brussels, they are ever more embedded in the EU's space of flows. Perhaps partly as a result of their partial co-optation we are increasingly seeing contestation about the proper locus of politics, and about which forms of representation are arguably the more political ones inside the political field. Thus nationalist political parties with the goal of renationalizing European politics are on the rise; meanwhile the European Council increasingly claims for itself the highest political pedestal. Composed of the heads of states or governments, it resorts to traditional diplomatic forms of interstate bargaining. The EU's future shape will emerge out of these open-ended struggles over forms of representation.

The chapter focused on the European Union under the assumption (which is still subject to empirical scrutiny) that it is the most advanced postmodern political form, and therefore some of the patterns of its development are arguably more easily identifiable than in cases where they are less pronounced. This also means that we might be able to discern similar dynamics in other cases. Other organizations of regional integration that have been modelled on the European Union are the most obvious candidates, but comparable trends might also be at stake in general processes of global governance. International organizations such as the United Nations or international financial institutions have, for example, developed modes of liberal governance operating through freedom by adopting similar standards, and benchmarks as those that guide the EU's Open Method

of Coordination (OMC) (Best 2014). To some extent, global governance trends could even be influenced by the approaches adopted inside the EU. The EU likes to export the regulation of its space of flows onto the global level, into the realm of global governance (Cini and McGowan 1998; Damro 2001; van Ham 2010; Young 2006), although with the recent governance problems the EU faces in terms of the financial crisis and the migrant crisis, these phenomena might adopt a more covert nature.⁴⁸ Whether these liberal forms of global governance centring on the management of flows will also result in profound forms of hysteresis and far-reaching struggles over forms of representation on the part of political actors remains to be seen. As the theoretical chapter of the dissertation outlines, those actors who lose their standing in the processes of changing international orders can accept their inferior role or they can find a mutually agreeable solution with the other actors involved.

48. According to a Commission official, “international markets are more and more important for us and we’ve learned to deal with abuses of competition and mergers successfully among ourselves. We are fast becoming the institution of reference about governance. In these areas as well, a real international authority promoting the rule of law” (qtd. in Ross 2011, 114). While Ross’s respondents were confident about the EU’s leading role in approaches to global governance, eurocrats also raised concern about the extent to which this approach can be successful in the still-existing traditional foreign policy field where nation-states play a key role.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Forms of representation have a constitutive effect on the international order that emerges. Whether they are diplomatic practices, practices of warfare, representative buildings, artifacts, or particular forms of address, forms of representation define and characterize the units of the international system. They shape our understanding of what the units of international relations look like, to some extent independently from domestic processes. For that reason we need to study forms of representation as explanans in their own right. Representational forms are the stuff reality is made from. As such they have two effects. On the one hand they create social facts by carrying ideas that shape how we think about the world. Given that forms of representation always have some material dimension, they can also affect reality in quite instrumental ways. For example, the Palestinian Authority's request for a seat at the United Nations is a form of representation that defines sovereign statehood, but simultaneously a seat at the United Nations would create quite instrumental opportunities for the Palestinian Authority to lobby for their cause in the United Nations.

In the very process of defining the units of the international system, forms of representation also position those units in relationships of subordination, superiority, or equality with each other. For example, Cartesian maps position states horizontally next to each other in relations of equality. The basic spatial grammar that emerges from, on the one hand, how the units of the system are defined and, on the other hand, how they relate to each other, has a constitutive effect on the international order that emerges at the

deepest, most fundamental level. Thus the ordering principle of empire derives from hierarchical relations between highly heterogeneous units positioned in a homogenous space, whereas the territorial balance of power is based on horizontal relations between like-units in the form of territorial states as unitary actors with a single power centre, where power spreads evenly from over a given territory and stops at the boundary. Liberal governance on the other hand originates in the conception of a space of flows.

When representational forms change, the international order changes. An intentional mechanism of change springs from struggles over forms of representation that emerge in particular when certain actors are confronted with an inferior societal position compared to what they are used to because they transferred from one social field to another. For different reasons they moved from one domain of social life (such as economics, politics, or religion) to another, or they changed their sphere of activity from one geographical region to a different one. As a result they are confronted with the prevalent forms of representation in the new field, and often those new forms of representation position them in an inferior role to what they were used to in their old field. One of their strategies to improve their standing can be to try to change the existing forms of representation. If they succeed, they both improve their own position and also change the nature of the international order as a whole.

For example, in [chapter 4](#) I demonstrated how technological progress in the fourteenth century resulted in more direct contact between rulers. Consequently the emperor and the pope, who had hitherto operated as semi-mythical figures, started to shape the lives of European kings more directly. The kings, who had been *de facto*, but not *de jure*, independent, felt uncomfortable about their increasingly experienced subordination to the emperor and the pope, and developed representative forms that expressed their independence. They changed coronation rituals, they invented their own imperial crowns following the motto “*rex imperator in regno suo*” (“the king is emperor in his realm”), and they transformed religious ceremonial practices into courtly ceremonies to express their own superiority over their feudal lords. European kings eventually succeeded in their efforts because they could make use of existing forms of representation and adapt them to their own purposes. The absence of a clear rupture ensured societal understanding.

As kings established their de facto and de jure independence from the emperor and the pope, they also contributed to the collapse of empire as Europe's ordering mechanism; the balance of power would emerge from its remnants.

A second mechanism is an unintentional form of change, based on coincidental changes in forms of representation. A relatively minor modification in a particular form of representation can lead to chain reactions over time with positive loophole effects that will generate more dramatic changes in forms of representation, which can eventually culminate in the emergence of a new international order. Chapter 5 showed how the emergence of linear perspectival painting for religious reasons had cumulative effects on mapping techniques, practices of warfare, and palace and garden architecture. The combined effects of these changes in forms of representation resulted in the conception of the territorial state, which became the principal unit of international relations well before on-the-ground state-building activities had been completed.

8.1 Contributions to the Existing Literature

The proposed theoretical approach builds on the existing literature and makes, or reinforces, four main contributions to available scholarship on international orders: 1) it explains how there can be a disconnection between IR's macro-concepts and the on-the-ground realities of international relations; 2) it adds a relational rather than a unit-centred perspective to order formation and maintenance; 3) it accounts for overlapping structures, geographical difference, and structural indeterminacy; and 4) it overcomes the dichotomy between the material and the ideational, the functional and the symbolic.

A focus on the role of forms of representation in shaping the deep generative grammar of international orders has several advantages. It helps us understand an apparent empirical anomaly, namely how there can be a quite persistent gap between the types of international order that emerge and the material foundations that are supposed to underpin those orders. Thus forms of representation can explain how universal monarchy could be Europe's ordering principle in the Middle Ages, although a ruler's power could not extend much further than to the next parish, and it helps us understand how a

territorial balance of power could become Europe's main ordering principle in the middle of the eighteenth century, although fully formed territorial states emerged only in the nineteenth century.

Several IR scholars have already identified similarly puzzling phenomena. For example, the apparent “organized hypocrisy” of the principle of territorial sovereignty comes to mind (Krasner 2010; see also Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; Kratochwil 1986), as does the “Territorial Trap” in international relations theory (Agnew 1994), or the question concerning how the state gets anthropomorphized (Jackson 2004; Neumann 2004; Reus-Smit 2013c; Wendt 2004; Wight 2004).¹ These three observations share in common that the authors identify a disconnection, or a gap between the concepts IR scholars, but often even statesmen themselves, make use of to understand international relations, and the on-the-ground realities. The notion of “organized hypocrisy” suggests that although there is a widespread understanding that no one can interfere in the domestic affairs of states, and states are sovereign and independent actors in international relations, these principles are in reality broken countless times by such phenomena as military interventions, global financial flows, or membership in international organizations that they are rendered effectively meaningless.² Similarly Agnew identified a territorial trap in IR scholarship that establishes three unwarranted assumptions about states, namely that they are “fixed units of sovereign space,” which function as “‘containers’ of society” and expose a “domestic/foreign polarity” (Agnew 1994, 53). He said the territorial trap is a form of “political imagination” that makes it impossible to conceptualize international order change. Third, the anthropomorphization-of-the-state debate centres on the question of whether we can justify the relatively common practice of thinking of states as people when they are clearly not. In each case it remains puzzling how organized hypocrisy, sovereignty myths, or anthropomorphizing the state could have been

1. For similar critiques see also Cutler (2001), Hobson (2012), and Paul (1999).

2. In Krasner's (2010) rendition, organized hypocrisy decouples the logic of appropriateness (norms) and the logic of consequences (behaviour), which he observes in the modern international state system. He analytically differentiates between international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/ Vattelien sovereignty (meaning the non-submission to a higher authority), and domestic sovereignty. He claims that these three sovereignties should occur simultaneously but because they do not he concludes that organized hypocrisy is the common state of affairs. According to Krasner organized hypocrisy persists because it suits the interests of the most powerful actors in the system.

maintained for such extended periods of time without becoming blatantly obvious.

A focus on forms of representation allows us to see that these widespread phenomena are not simply mistakes IR scholars in their ivory towers have made because they never ventured outside to look carefully enough at reality; they are precisely what we see when we look at the representative forms of international relations. Such forms of representation as territorial maps, representative state buildings (usually constructed in the classicist style, which solidifies the container schema with its clear separating line between inside and outside), and diplomatic representatives who personify their states create these IR phenomena that do not necessarily match with on-the-ground realities. However, that does not make them meaningless. They have significant analytical purchase because they have constitutive and causal effects on how political elites interact with each other in specific domains. These IR concepts expressed in specific forms of representation shape the international order, which emerges in concrete micro-spaces (such as the gothic cathedral, the palace of Versailles, or the European Parliament in Brussels) that can be quite detached from the day-to-day functioning of the rest of society.

Secondly, focusing on representative forms also has the advantage that it is a relational rather than a unit-centred approach to international order formation (Jackson and Nexon 1999; see also Albert 2010). A common, and sometimes hidden, assumption in IR scholarship is that the units of the international system first come into existence and only subsequently enter into interactions with other units of the system, and through that interaction then form a particular international order. Especially in constructivist scholarship, a moment of ontological discontinuity underlies this assumption because it is understood that once the units enter into interactions, those interactions will shape their identity (Wendt 1999). Numerous accounts exist in the IR literature of how national identity emerges in relation to an external other, but without much consideration whether these processes of identity formation also have an effect on the fundamental nature of the units of the international system (see, for example, Campbell 1998; Neumann 1998; Zarakol 2011). Consequently the units appear to have two layers, a (national) identity layer that is subject to change, and a deeper unchanging primary identity that establishes the actor as an actor of a particular kind (for example territorial state, feu-

dal lord, Multinational Corporation, etc.). Beyond the obvious observation that such an approach cannot help us understand deep changes in the international order because apparently those would be “calls to change the subject!” (Wendt 2000, 175), it is not clear which mechanism ensures that the surface (national) identity layer and the deeper state-identity layer do not intermingle with each other. How do they remain strictly separate layers?

Because there is no apparent answer to this question, an approach that is relational all the way down — that focuses on how the units of the international system themselves emerge in the process of interaction, rather than prior to it — has not only empirical, but also meta-theoretical advantages given that it ensures ontological consistency. A relationist approach with its focus on interaction is more dynamic, and hence arguably better able to account for the possibility of change (Rosenau 1979), and it has the advantage of making the analysis of primary identities possible, while simultaneously maintaining the social reality of international units like the state.³ Alternative relationist approaches such as Nexon’s (2009) network approach share some of these advantages with a focus on forms of representation, but the sole consideration of network ties does not allow us to analyze their qualitative nature; it merely informs us about their existence. By contrast, with a focus on forms of representation we can see not only that the units are related but also how they are positioned in relation to each other, and how their identities emerge by virtue of specific forms of representation. A focus on forms of representation then adds to network analysis a way to move beyond the quantitative existence of network ties to study their qualitative characteristics.

Thirdly, the assumption of much contemporary scholarship that a single overarching order characterizes a unified international system misses out the possibility of overlap in orders (Adler and Greve 2009), geographical difference, and indeterminacy. By focusing on domain-specific and potentially geographically limited fields that are enacted at concrete micro-sites, we can understand how overlapping orders and geographical difference are possible, and how apparently contradictory tendencies within a global order can ac-

3. A theoretical framework that disaggregates the units of the system into smaller entities, such as interest groups, for example, tends to lose the social reality of the units (Albert 2010, 104).

tually result from the coexistence of several parallel orders. Fluctuations and movements between fields also allow us to identify overlap as a crucial avenue for international order change.

Finally, an attention to forms of representation allows us to overcome the dichotomy between the material and the ideational, the functional and the symbolic, which has become almost as prominent in IR scholarship as the structure-agency debate. Constructivist scholars commonly position their arguments about the relevance of ideas in opposition to materialist explanations, while realist and many rational choice scholars more broadly oppose their arguments about the relevance of material factors to ideational accounts (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000-1, 2002; English 2002; Fearon and Wendt 2001; Krasner 1993; Lebow, Mueller, and Wohlforth 1995; Philpott 2001; Reus-Smit 1999; Wohlforth 1994-1995). More recently a trend has emerged to combine material and ideational accounts together (Cox, 1986; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Ikenberry 2011; Phillips 2011; Sorensen, 2008). These can certainly be useful heuristic devices, but on an ontological level we have to recognize that bracketing the material and the ideational, just like its predecessor bracketing agency and structure, can only ever be a second-best solution. To be recognizable for other people, ideas always have to find expression in some material form, while the material is always already imbued with some (albeit often incomplete) ideas that exist prior to intersubjective meaning formation.

Constructivists have difficulties admitting both of these claims. With regard to the first claim they suggest that even though ideas come in some material form, the material form they take is irrelevant to the meaning they convey. Kratochwil (2000) has argued that the fact we need a tongue to speak — and that speech resonates through sound waves — is irrelevant to the meaning being conveyed, as is the fact that we might write words on a piece of paper. These claims are precisely what I take issue with. When we speak we form different kinds of sentences than when we write. In speech the tone of our voice, the iconicity of speech, shapes the meaning of what we convey, often just as much as words do. Who utters particular words, the indexicality of speech, matters as well, as speech act theorists have recognized (Austin 1965; Searle 1995; Waever 1995). A person's handwriting can communicate a different kind of message. Computer programs allow us

to write differently than we used to when we were writing on typewriters, as do smart phones and twitter accounts. These material phenomena shape the language we use and thus the meaning of what we communicate. They are not irrelevant material props. So the material form that ideas take matters. We have to acknowledge that the materiality surrounding us mainly takes the form of artifacts that are the results of human creation, and specific ideas already went into their construction and design. Those ideas shape the final product we get. At the same time though artifacts' meaning is not fully determined, as realists and many rational choice scholars tend to unproblematically assume. Even such quintessentially violence-inducing artifacts as guns can carry a variety of different meanings depending on the social context in which we use them.

A focus on forms of representation, together with a Peircean semeiotic approach, allows us to study this profound interconnectivity between the material and the ideational. Forms of representation are made of material stuff. One needs certain material resources to be able to produce specific forms of representation, even though some forms of representation require more material resources than others. Those material resources then contribute to the meaning that is conveyed, but they do not determine it. Thus the Church had to have unusual amounts of wealth in the Middle Ages to be able to build gothic cathedrals, which by the sheer amount of resources that went into their construction were awe-inspiring. At the same time, the gothic cathedral conveyed particular messages symbolically, many of which are hard to discern even for the regular churchgoer.

The degree to which indexical (signifying causally), iconic (signifying via resemblance), and symbolic (signifying via arbitrary social convention) features play a role in the significative meaning of forms of representation varies according to the individual representative forms. For example, indexical elements certainly play a more crucial role in the military than they do in diplomatic precedence and courtly ceremony. Yet, even in as hard a case as the army, we should not discard its iconic and symbolic features (see [chapter 5](#) and [chapter 6](#)). Occasionally a king could focus on the proper distance between the buttonholes of his soldiers' uniforms because how his soldiers looked created an impression about the kingdom. Next to the significative meaning that forms of representation communicate, they often have important functional effects. This is the case

with the legislative texts that circulate through the European Union, as much as with armies or Cartesian maps that statesmen used to make decisions about the adequate territorial balance of power. Throughout the dissertation I have sought to demonstrate how forms of representation are material and ideational simultaneously, and how they have ideational effects but also result in hard material consequences. Forms of representation are more than signs. They are also technologies of order formation. The degree to which they expose these two characteristics varies according to the specific form of representation, but it is extremely rare that they are exclusively one or the other.

8.2 The Dissertation's Eurocentric Focus

Perhaps one of the major limitations of this dissertation is its Eurocentric focus. All the dissertation's case studies centre on the European order. The reason for that is that I intended to demonstrate change over time while maintaining the geographical region constant. Adding another regional lens would have expanded the scope of an already very extensive dissertation to the point that it would have become an unfeasible project. Instead of analyzing change over time in Europe, I could have picked a different geographical region. I am very sympathetic to Dipesh Chakrabarty's (2000) arguments about the need to "provincialize Europe," or Hobson's (2012) arguments about "the Eurocentric conception of world politics." My goal was not to universalize the evolution of the European order by suggesting that the changes in European order signify changes in global order. My intention has not been to write a Eurocentric history. Nor do I suggest that the European order operates as a model that regional orders elsewhere should or will follow. My goal was considerably more modest. I studied the European order as one among many possible case studies. I chose the European case study above all the other possible cases for purely pragmatic reasons. I had a prior deep-grounded understanding of European history and European societies, I speak several European languages fluently, and I have social ties that provided me with exceptional opportunities to gain access to empirical material. Had I chosen any other case the work would have been of a lower quality. That said, I am quite optimistic that my arguments can travel

in some form across geographical regions because my theoretical framework makes a claim about the ontological entities we should focus our analysis on, namely forms of representation as exposed in material culture, embodied practices, and language; it does not make any claims about what those ontological entities should or do look like. We should employ inductive reasoning to identify which concrete forms of representation matter at particular places and in particular moments of time. I would be delighted if someone would provincialize my argument and show how it plays out differently in different geographical regions of the world, and across different time spans.

In the meantime, all I can do is provide a few illustrative examples from other scholars' work which suggest that a focus on forms of representation does have analytical purchase in other geographical settings. To my surprise we can even occasionally recognize some of the same representative forms I noticed in several European orders in other regions of the world. Thus Wedeen (2007) identified in Qat Chews, which are public places of deliberation in Yemen, very similar spatial practices of marking societal rank as those of diplomatic precedence that played such an important role in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe. The seating arrangements in Qat Chews are in line with people's societal rank. Those with high status sit in front of the room. The lower the social status, the more removed a person is from the head of the room. The people with the lowest societal rank sit close to the door, where the participants put their shoes and leave for the washroom. When a new person enters the room all the others adjust their position according to the person's rank.

Empirical studies of international order change and forms of representation in other geographical regions that have the same long-term historical perspective as my own are relatively rare, but one undertaken by Sanskrit scholar Sheldon Pollock is worth mentioning at some length. In a fascinating study of language practices in premodern South and Southeast Asia (between the fifth and fifteenth centuries), Pollock (2006) has shown how the vast spread of Sanskrit from Pakistan and Afghanistan in the West all the way to Cambodia and Java in the East was intimately tied to conceptions of universal empire extending over that same region, while later vernacularization coincided with the invention of spatially delimited "vernacular polities." Like my own work, Pollock's is

concerned with the “real consequentiality of representations, which can create what they appear merely to designate” (p. 7).

Around the fifth century Sanskrit ceased to be a language exclusively used for religious and ceremonial purposes, and kings over a vast geographical area encompassing much of South and Southeast Asia started to employ it as a language for the “poetry of power” (Pollock 2006, 129).⁴ Elites never used Sanskrit for the day-to-day functioning of government, but only as an aesthetic form in which poets expressed the glory of the king and the extent of his kingdom in an almost mythical fashion. Often these poems and other forms of literature were inscribed in temple structures, on pillars in royal courts, or on rocks and copper plates spread through the countryside. These highly place-bound representative forms created the image of universal empire, which at no point became a reality. At times the texts could even tie claims to universal rule to the king’s local and highly place-bound deeds.

Sanskrit appeared as the right vehicle to express the king’s power and glory because Sanskrit has unique figures of sound and complex meters, which Chinese translators at the time called “marvelous sounds” (Pollock 2006, 136). This aesthetics of sound could express the king’s power iconically. Sanskrit also has an abundance of figures of speech, some of which are unique to the language. For example the *śleṣa* contains a capacity to express two meanings at the same time. Courtly poets made frequent use of this unique figure of speech to liken a dynastic family to gods so that they not only resembled each other, but they linguistically became identical. Sanskrit also had such a stable grammatical structure that even researchers today have difficulties locating texts geographically and temporally. For kings who wanted to express their universal rule, such properties were ideal.

The knowledge of Sanskrit grammar functioned as a weapon of the king; it helped him secure his alleged universal rule. Thus King Bhoja was particularly known for his mastery of Sanskrit grammar. According to a Sanskrit verse written several centuries after his rule, “he corrects the grammar in communications sent by other kings and exchanges

4. From the empirical evidence available to him (which for this period is generally rather thin) Pollock (2006) could not determine why Sanskritic language practices changed at around that time.

verses and counterverses . . . with rivals, such as Bhima, king of the Gujarati Caulukyias, almost as acts of war” (qtd. in Pollock 2006, 180). A king’s grammar skills were tied to his capacity to maintain social order. “If the preservation of language sounds (varṇa) that grammar achieves was linked essentially to the preservation of the social orders (varṇa), and so to that of the polity at large, the obligation to maintain the order of language was no less than, and perhaps no different from, the obligation to maintain the political and spiritual order” (Pollock 2006, 183).

Kings throughout South and Southeast Asia claimed to rule over a geographic area that coincided with the spread of Sanskrit and was the known universe. Each king’s court within this geographic area was declared to be the centre of the cosmos, complete with a Mount Meru and a Ganga River, in line with ancient sacred scriptures. Unlike medieval Europe, which had one single imagined centre, South Asia was scattered with universal empires. This curious form of international order must have required a delicate balance between sufficient contact for every dynasty in this vast region to adopt the same notion of universal empire based on the same representative forms, and not too much contact so that kings would not disqualify each others’ claims to universal rule.

Pollock remains relatively agnostic about the cause of Sanskrit’s demise as the language of the kings, and the associated end of this curious international order.⁵ We might speculate that once political elites across different kingdoms came into increasing contact with each other it became difficult to uphold so many different claims to universal rulership simultaneously. For example, “Al-Biruni, visiting India in the early eleventh century, declared in reference to the ninth-century Kashmiri king Muktapida, ‘According to their account he ruled over the whole world. But this is exactly what they say of most of their kings. However, they are incautious enough to assign him a time not much anterior to our own time, which leads to their lie being found out’” (Pollock 2006, 249).

Perhaps this was why the universal imperial claims over a Sanskrit cosmos in the tenth century started to give way to spatially delimited claims of rule extending roughly over the geographic area in which a king’s vernacular language was spoken. Royal courts consciously developed vernacular languages, and codified their grammars so that the ver-

5. He briefly mentions that the rise of Islam might have been a contributing factor (Chapter 12.2).

vernacular languages could replace the functions hitherto attributed to Sanskrit. Courtly literature and poetry that glorified the king and expressed the spatial extent of his rule were henceforward written in local languages. The goal was to “create a written literature, along with its complement, a political discourse, in local languages according to models supplied by” the ancient Sanskrit culture (Pollock 2006, 23). In other words, similar to the European experience, which took place a little later, the actors in the international system adapted forms of representation from the old order and transposed them into a new context. The imperial representative forms were transformed to now express spatially limited rule. The extent of the king’s rule roughly coincided with the extent of the vernacular languages. “It was the text-artifacts themselves that by their very presence and idiom, as well as their circulation and representations, produced in the minds and bodies of people the reality of images they transmitted. They both articulated in their discourse and produced by their diffusion a new cultural-political space” (Pollock 2006, 414). The entities that emerged were not territorial states; the geographical extent of kingly rule was considerably more vague than that. For lack of a better word, Pollock calls them “vernacular polities”.⁶

Pollock’s work helps us understand the constitutive effects of forms of representation on elements of international order in premodern South and Southeast Asia. In many ways his efforts are very similar to my own when he seeks to understand how “representation comprises an important element of reality” (Pollock 2006, 249), although his research focuses exclusively on the role of language and linguistic artifacts. Pollock’s work also differs from mine in that while he gives us insight into the character of the international system’s units, which is an important component of international order, he does not elaborate on how the units relate to each other. The relations between the units might provide a good starting point for understanding how forms of representation

6. Beyond the linguistic representative forms, Eaton and Wagoner (2014) attribute architectural forms of representation to these very same polities in their study of central Indian kingdoms from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. The authors show how several kingdoms fought about the symbolic as much as the physical appropriation of frontier cities. Whenever those cities changed hands, the new rulers provided the entrance gates with a face-lift to have them iconically represent the new rule, but they could also bring architectural artifacts from the city to their own royal court and expose them there, or they could imitate architectural phenomena from the frontier city at their own court. In short, rulers physically manipulated their architectural environment to express the geographical extent of their rule.

change, which then brings about a change in international order, a point about which Pollock remains rather agnostic. This is not intended as a critique of Pollock, who did an incredible amount of heavy lifting by studying a vast array of primary sources in Sanskrit, and whose work was limited by the availability of historical data.

Several other scholars have studied the significant effects that spatial arrangements and architectural sites in different localities have for creating societal orders. Asian cities in particular represent people's conception of the cosmos, rulership, and order in their architectural layout and design (Levinson 1996). For example, in a fascinating study of Kandy in Sri Lanka, Duncan (1989) shows how the spatial arrangements in the city iconically represented the kingdom and the universe over which the Kandyan king ruled with the help of specific localized practices in Kandy itself, very much in the way that Louis XIV was ruling over France via his ceremonial apparatus in the palace of Versailles (see [chapter 5](#)). Kandy consisted of two rectangles. The western rectangle belonged to the worldly sphere, where the nobles lived, and where the city's commercial activities took place. It was split into twenty-one rectangles iconically representing the twenty-one administrative units of the kingdom. Once per year the king walked around the western rectangle to express his control over the city, and the kingdom as a whole. This was not a purely symbolic act, but "was deemed to have magical efficacy in maintaining power over the capital and the wider kingdom that was magically reproduced within it through the power of like numbers" (Duncan 1989, 188). The eastern rectangle was the sacred square that iconically represented the centre of the cosmos complete with a lake, the Ocean of Milk. It contained the king's palace, three temples to the gods, and the Temple of the Relic with a tooth of the Buddha, which provided the king with supernatural powers. The spatial arrangements in Kandy signified gradations of sacredness and ensured various degrees of access depending on one's social standing in ways that are reminiscent of the spatial arrangements in gothic cathedrals (see [chapter 4](#)). The further east one ventured, the more sacred the space was. The eastern square was the sacred square in Kandy — in its eastern parts the Temple of the Relic was located, and in the eastern parts of the Temple of the Relic we find Buddha's tooth. "Urban form in Kandy speaks of hierarchy, of power, and of the relationship between mere mortals and the god-king. The city as a

whole represents the cosmos in miniature with the profane square containing the citizens symbolizing the earth and the sacred square containing the Buddha, the gods and the king symbolizing heaven” (Duncan 1989, 188).

We also find iconic and symbolic representations in Beijing as the “Celestial Capital” of an ancient Chinese empire (Samuels and Samuels 1989). The Chinese view of the cosmos with the emperor as the “Son of Heaven” at the centre of it found expression in Beijing’s architectural design and layout, which was based on rectilinearity and centrality. The city itself had the shape of a square, which was divided into an eastern and a western part by the sacred north-south axis connecting the Forbidden City to the city’s “Front Gate” (Qianmen). Commoners were not allowed to use either the north-south axis, or the Forbidden City, or the main entrance of the Front Gate; these were for the emperor’s exclusive use, which physically indicates his unique and central position in the Chinese capital. The capital’s “layout and structure epitomized by a seeming endless maze of walled compounds within walled compounds were imbued with the signs of power, authority, and hierarchy” (Samuels and Samuels 1989, 204).⁷

The embodied practices in the Chinese imperial order resembled some of the embodied practices of the European imperial order. In the Chinese order representatives of a variety of different rulers from such places as Korea, Siam, Burma, or Laos travelled with presents to Beijing to obtain a mandate from the emperor with the insignia of rulership, which provided the respective rulers with the necessary legitimacy. They were involved in this tribute system, although the Chinese emperor otherwise had little practical influence over their rule (Ringmar 2012). It appears that the Chinese emperor functioned just like the Holy Roman Emperor as a semi-mythical figure, and the hierarchical ordering principle of empire was upheld through such very specific and place-bound forms of representation

7. The Communist leadership obviously changed much of the outward appearance of Beijing in “a process whereby the secular and the profane ultimately overran the sacred and the celestial fabric of old Beijing” (Samuels and Samuels 1989, 207). At the same time though, the Communist leadership retained a lot of the ancient imperial symbolism. Thus Mao Zedong proclaimed the new People’s Republic of China from the Gate of Heavenly Peace, the major entrance point to the once Forbidden City, from where the ancient Chinese emperors used to proclaim their reign. He also built Tiananmen Square, as the “symbolic and operational core of China and of Beijing,” exactly on the sacred north-south axis of imperial Beijing, just in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) (Samuels and Samuels 1989, 221). The Communist leadership even built their private residential and office complexes within the Forbidden City.

as the spatial arrangements of Beijing or the koutou, an embodied practice, which a Russian representative described like this: “They all went down on their knees, and, after the lapse of a few minutes, ben[t] their heads thrice to the ground. After this all arose upon their feet, then again kneeled and prostrated themselves three times. In this manner they kneeled thrice, and performed nine prostrations” (qtd. in Ringmar 2012, 10).

In the Japanese system the shogun in Edo held ceremonies similar to the Chinese emperor’s. In fact the Japanese ceremony was copied from its Chinese original, although it was taken less seriously in Edo. What mattered more were the bi-annual processions of the daimyos into Edo, which were required by the institution of the sankin kotai that obliged the daimyo to reside in Edo every second year, similar to how Louis XIV demanded that his aristocracy lived in Versailles. The processions served to mark the standing of the respective daimyo in the Japanese order, and the daimyos engaged in practices similar to European ambassadors during their official entry to a capital city (see [chapter 6](#)). “It was a matter of prestige to send as many men as possible and often they would hire temporary laborers to swell the ranks just as the procession entered Edo or the home capital. This, the spectators were supposed to conclude, is a particularly powerful daimyo hailing from a particularly distinguished region. Clearly the processions were a spectacle no one wanted to miss” (Ringmar 2012, 11).

The notion of hysteresis might also find broader applicability beyond the European case. Ringmar’s exposition of the performance of East Asian orders demonstrates how the British experienced hysteresis in the nineteenth century when they were required by the Chinese emperor to koutou, that is, to physically express their subordination to the Chinese emperor — after they had so successfully established the principle of sovereign equality in Europe and ensured themselves the position of a great power ([chapter 6](#)). Among other things, the opium wars between China and Great Britain were fought over such forms of representation as the koutou. However, the Chinese continued to insist on it. According to the British they were “‘ignorant,’ ‘stupid,’ and ‘incredibly stubborn’” (Ringmar 2012, 17). Only after a Franco-British contingent destroyed the imperial palace did the Chinese stop insisting on the koutou. One of the British officers involved in the

operation said that “the destruction of the emperor’s palace was the strongest proof of our superior strength; it served to undeceive all Chinamen in their absurd conviction of their monarch’s universal sovereignty” (qtd. in Ringmar 2012, 17). The destruction of China’s representative forms brought about the end of China’s imperial order, but not without leaving a gap between China’s position in the newly emerging global order and its dispositions from the no-longer-existing Chinese political field. Thus Neumann (2011) remarks how the position of powers such as China, Japan, or India in the current international order does not adequately reflect their dispositions (see also Suzuki 2008). They regularly complain about their inadequate status in international society, and “for each such polity, there is work to be done in mapping and specifying what” (Neumann 2011, 164) the dominant forms of representation were in the fields from which these polities emerged, how those forms of representation positioned the different units of those fields in relation to each other, and what the consequences of these historical experiences are for the dispositions and the polities’ positions within the global order.

Across different geographical settings representative forms and dynamics over forms of representation can occur that are similar to those I highlighted in my European case studies, but markedly different representative forms and types of international order can emerge as well. For example, in Native American culture naming practices embedded communities in their immediate local environment because they attached stories and cosmic views to the land and its geographic features, but naming practices also had functional purposes, inasmuch as they informed communities about “where plants could be gathered, shellfish collected, mammals hunted and fish caught” (Cornon qtd. in Harvey 1996, 264). The names of specific places could even change according to the season of the year. When settlers then arbitrarily modified place names to remind themselves of their homeland, they also contributed to the destruction of the Native American societal order, not just by removing emotional attachments to the land, but also by destroying the functional basis of societal operation (Harvey 1996). Among the Wik-Mungkan in Australia, on the other hand, societal order, and one’s position in it were based on a relational form: the types of gifts people gave each other (Douglas 1994). According to the kinds of gifts a person gave to particular people, one obtained a specific societal

identity, but the gifts also established one's functional role in society's operation.

One particularly important note of caution relates to the kinds of representative forms we pay attention to. This dissertation focused disproportionately on visual and embodied forms of representation. Through my inductive analysis it appeared that those representative forms were the monuments, the most crucial representative forms, for understanding the character of the units of the European order and their relation to each other. I suspect that this is so because Western culture puts a high premium on sight and the body, but I have not undertaken the necessary analysis to say so for sure. Even so, other representative forms experienced through sound, smell, touch, or taste can play an important, if probably subordinate role in European order, and space constraints have prevented me from analyzing them in more depth. For example, the sound of church bells in medieval Germany created a "sound space" indicating the extent of a feudal lord's power.⁸ The further one was located from the centre of a lord's rule, the less one could hear the church bells, and the weaker the lord's power was (Stock and Vohringer 2014).

Different cultures value the senses quite differently, and how we value our senses might in part at least be the result of the sensual stimuli we receive from our environment. In our world of plastic-wrapped, frozen foods and antiperspirants it can be quite hard to imagine that smell can have a role in creating and maintaining societal order (McHugh 2012). In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe smell was considered the lowest of the sense organs, the one closest to the animals, for which human beings had less use once they started walking upright and seeing and hearing over long distances. But "among the Songhay people of Mali and Niger, smell, taste, and sound contribute to the organization of their religious and philosophical experiences (Stoller 1989). Songhay sorcerers and griots learn about power and history by 'eating' it, ingesting odors and tastes, savoring textures and sounds. The stomach is considered the site of human personality and agency. Social relations are considered in terms of eating" (Gibbs 2005, 37). The Ongee people,

8. Sound space differs from visual space in that visual space is confined by walls, whereas sound space might not be. We can hear the sounds emanating from the kitchen or from our neighbours below, even if we are in our living room and do not see what is happening in the kitchen or what our neighbours are doing downstairs.

a scheduled tribe in India, draw maps in the form of movements of scents, and they measure time in “cycles of odors” (Gibbs 2005).

McHugh notes how in premodern India smell contributed to the reproduction of a social hierarchy between the societal elites who could afford expensive perfumes and those at the bottom of the hierarchy more frequently exposed to illness, death, and foul food, all of which stink. “Personal odor [was] usually a good litmus test for one’s standing in the universe” (McHugh 2012, 6). Karma, the results of one’s previous actions that continue into one’s future lives, found expression in one’s personal smells. Good people smelled good; if others stank, this was the result of their past misdeeds. In this light an able king had to master olfactory aesthetics or he would not be able to master his societal order. A good perfume “should be like a well-run kingdom, with the correct balance of allies (mild materials), neutrals, and enemies (pungent materials)” (McHugh 2012, 5). While the mastery of smells contributed to the maintenance of societal order and ensured the king’s standing in the Sanskrit cosmopolis, McHugh remarks that sound was the most elevated sense at the time because of the primary role of the poetics, aesthetics, and politics of Sanskrit as the language of gods and kings. A note of caution prevails then: If we want to study the ordering mechanisms in other cultures we occasionally might have to focus more on representative forms that appeal to our other sense organs, be they sound, smell, taste, or touch.

8.3 Avenues for Future Research

Beyond the *longue durée* approach to international order change I have espoused, the dissertation’s theoretical framework, in particular its analysis of representational forms’ effects, can have a broader applicability for a range of different issues of interest to IR scholarship. One of those subjects is state recognition. Beyond IR’s attention to matters of legitimacy or effective statehood, the framework presented here directs scholars’ attentions to the struggles over forms of representation that establish sovereign statehood. Only in this light can we understand the Palestinian Authority’s efforts to obtain a seat at the United Nations; the reluctance to let Kurds fight against the Islamic State

of Iraq and Syria out of a concern that this war effort would establish a representative form of a sovereign Kurdish state and would thus bring the Kurds so much closer to sovereign statehood; North and South Korea's decision to build a barrack exactly at the thirty-eighth latitude that forms the border between the two countries to hold peace negotiations there (Hartmann 1988); the United States's refusal to deal with the Viet Cong guerillas like with representatives of a sovereign state during peace negotiations in Paris in 1968 expressed in disputes over seating arrangements (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011); and the Russians' exact same behaviour during negotiations over security and humanitarian issues in Geneva in 2014. An observer to those negotiations remarked that "the question of status is obviously the question that is everywhere. Where people sit over lunch is status related. Russia made it very clear that Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not have the same status as the independent states at the table".⁹ A theory built around forms of representation and struggles over forms of representation might help us understand some of the puzzling phenomena IR scholars have identified when taking a closer look at state sovereignty. For example, Krasner's (2010, 2009) focus on sovereignty as organized hypocrisy, or Jackson's (1987, 2000) interest in failed states come to mind.

Related to the question of state recognition is also the question of non-recognition. After all, only sovereign states are recognized as full actors in the international system, although numerous other forms of polities have existed, including hunter-gatherer tribes, nomadic kinship structures, or city states (Agnew 2009, 113). Sovereign states share certain representative forms, while other polities have other representative forms, because if they had the representative forms of sovereign states, in line with my argument, they would appear as sovereign states in the international order. So what do these other representative forms look like? To what extent can they, or can they not be recognized? Which kinds of struggles surround these alternative forms of representation?

Historically we might interpret processes of colonization as moments of non-recognition. In the case of the British Empire, for example, we can distinguish between at least four different types of relationships between the British core and the periphery: quasi-independent states with a degree of influence from the core, indirect colonial rule, direct

9. Field notes from participant observation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

colonial rule, and settler colonization (Donnelly 2006, 2009). A cursory glance at the empirical evidence suggests that the categorization of indigenous people into “savages,” “barbarians,” “semi-barbarians,” and “civilized people” might be a useful indicator of the kinds of colonization strategies that were employed in each individual case. Forms of representation can help us understand how different peoples obtained such categories, how they were recognized to be civilized and organized in states, or uncivilized and without adequate political organization.

Before the British set out to conquer the New World, they expected to find “cities, castles, townes and villages” (as indicated in the Charter to Sir Walter Raleigh qtd. in Sack 1986, 132), over which the British were supposed to acquire suzerainty. Because the British could not find such cities, castles, towns, and villages, they depicted the land as empty space on charters and grants that could be subdivided with the help of “abstract metrical lines of latitude” (Sack 1986, 88; see also Branch 2012). “Spaces could only be claimed in such a manner, because there were no known political authorities that could be — and had to be — included in a treaty” (Branch 2012, 288).¹⁰ The concept of “terra nullius,” no one’s land (the understanding that the land on the North American continent and in Australia was unoccupied), meant that it was available for colonization without restraints (Black 1996; Go 2008; Hobson and Sharman 2005). Obviously, the land was occupied, but for the Europeans inhabited land was filled with towns and villages, cultivated fields and domesticated animals, stone buildings and monuments, as indicators of political organization (Shapiro 1994). The absence of a written language, considered necessary for social organization (M’Closkey 1994; Strang 1996), or the alleged absence of art — defined as the lack of figurative and realistic drawings and paintings on non-utilitarian objects — additionally underlined the impression of the native population’s lack of civilization (M’Closkey 1994). “Their customs and land uses seemed so alien and their political processes so inconspicuous that many Europeans concluded that Indians were sub-human” (Sack 1986, 133), that is, not another civilization that was occupying the land, but no civilization at all, and hence the land was vacant and free to be used by

10. There is a marked contrast between British depictions of space in the New World, and their contemporary depictions of Ireland, over which they had suzerainty: “maps, surveys, and plans of English plantations in Ireland conformed to the rich pre-existing Irish context” (Sack 1986, 139).

the Europeans.

By contrast, in India the colonial strategy was not one of settlement, but rather of either directly or indirectly administering the colonial subjects (Keene 2002). The focus was on gradually acquiring concessions from local rulers to increase profits from trade. Indian people were not considered savages. “Fitch reported in the first Englishman’s letter ‘home’ ... how wealthy the inhabitants of Goa were, how richly varied their commodities appeared, how sumptuous their palatial homes seemed, and how busy and bustling other Indian cities were as well” (Wolpert 1993, 140). While their culture appeared strange and exotic, it stayed nonetheless similar enough to European culture to remain recognizable. It was beyond doubt that their land was not empty of political structures. However, “it was difficult for the English to accept the diplomatic postulates of other people and of other forms of government, which reflected profound cleavages, cultural as well as ideological, as well as a lack of interest to admit that difference was not synonymous with inferiority” (Black 1996, 148).¹¹ The people living in India were considered semi-civilized people, not yet civilized enough to rule themselves (Chakrabarty 2000).

While several non-Western states managed to avoid colonization, Siam did not have the geographical advantages that would shield it from colonization, such as Nepal or Afghanistan, nor did it have the necessary military power, such as Japan, nor was there a situation of stalemate between the major colonial powers, as in China (Strang 1996). In other words, Siam could have been colonized, but it was not. Strang attributes this outcome mainly to Siam’s “strategy of defensive Westernization” (1996, 37), that is, a conscious effort to develop Western representative forms to be recognized by the West as an independent state (see also Ringmar 2012). Thus Siam started to use such Western tools as Cartesian maps to negotiate territorial claims with Western powers (Branch 2014).¹²

11. My translation from French.

12. While some rulers, such as the Siamese king, but also the Japanese shogun, undertook explicit efforts to adopt the representative forms of European nation-states, in other cases the colonizers actively suppressed indigenous representative forms and replaced them with their own colonial forms of representation to suppress local attachments and particularisms (Casey 2009; Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012; Mitchell 1988). Thus when the Spanish and the Portuguese colonized Latin America, they changed the names of places and established cities based on a grid system with a central plaza decorated by a sword and a cross as the symbols of Spanish rule. Colonial representative buildings and a church bordered the

If we study the processes of colonization as moments of non-recognition, we might also be able to study decolonization processes as instances when colonized people adopted the representative forms of nation-states to be recognized, often without actually having the on-the-ground institutions the nation-states in Western Europe had developed. Thus Go finds that “as a symbol, anti-colonial nationalism and its principle of universal self-determination was different from tribal or localized identities of the nineteenth century” (Go 2008, 217). The international outcry that emerged against Italian efforts to recolonize Ethiopia before the Second World War suggests that the adoption of the representative forms of nation states might have been efficient in obtaining recognition, if not immediate independence. A range of scholarship has already focused on how normative changes delegitimized the institution of colonialism after the Second World War (see, for example, Crawford 2002; Reus-Smit 2013a, 2013c), but what this scholarship omits is that the political communities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America after the Second World War were not the same as those who had been colonized two centuries earlier. A focus on forms of representation allows us to analyze how the changes that occurred in the colonized societies affected their sovereign independence. Such a perspective might also help us shed a better light on the vast variety of decolonization outcomes. Not all communities were recognized as independent sovereign states: some communities managed to rid

plaza as the hub of societal, economic, and political life (Robinson 1989). In several cases archeologists have found churches built directly on top of indigenous pyramids. In the process of removing indigenous forms of representation, the colonizers also destroyed alternative conceptions of political organization, such as the Aztecs’ and Incas’ notion of “kin-territories,” or “people places” (Robinson 1989, 161). The indigenous people had to fall into place; they had to adapt to a new form of political order. Like the Spanish, the British also used representative forms to instill their superiority over the colonized people. Thus they built in the Sri Lankan Kandy an unnecessary tunnel through a mountain with the sole purpose “to impress the Kandyan with the full sense of the irresistible power of their conquerors” (Stewart qtd. in Duncan 1989, 190). In Kandy’s sacred square they built a school and established tennis courts to desacralize this holy place. The British also erected British statues at major intersections, one of which was a statue of the Governor Ward, which included a quote that described the Sinhalese as a semi-civilized people (Duncan 1989). Simultaneously they left the Sinhalese temples to decay. “A new cultural and political system had been ushered in and the old landscape model which spoke of what had been important under the old system was being transformed or allowed to fall into ruination.” British “cultural hegemony was achieved in part through a conscious attempt to change the Sinhalese elites, but very largely it was achieved through an attempt to transform Kandy into an outlier of British culture” (Duncan 1989, 192). The British representative forms had a strong effect on many Kandyans as they sought to adapt to the new British model. Only thanks to British tourists’ subsequent interest in ancient Kandyan architecture, art, and crafts could Kandyans regain a sense of national pride that animated their struggle for independence.

themselves of their colonial overlords in the early nineteenth century, and others were never colonized.

Matters of recognition and non-recognition are not merely a phenomenon of the imperial past. In today's world they can be of equal salience for different polities that do not intend to look like territorial states and perhaps for that very reason struggle to be noticed. Obvious cases are the many polities created by native peoples. At least some indigenous people, such as Taiaiake Alfred, reject the concept of the sovereign state, and therefore also presumably refuse to adopt its representative forms: "sovereignty is an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and coercive Western notion of power. Indigenous peoples can never match the awesome coercive force of the state; so long as sovereignty remains the goal of indigenous politics, therefore Native communities will occupy a dependent and reactionary position relative to the state. Acceptance of 'Aboriginal rights' in the context of state sovereignty represents the culmination of white society's efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples" (qtd. in Havercroft 2008, 129). In this light we can understand why the native peoples of Australia refused conventional diplomatic protocol and decided to start their campaign for aboriginal rights with a beach umbrella as their diplomatic residence, which they later upgraded to a tent embassy (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010). The Australian government did not recognize the tent embassy, and sought to replace it with more conventional representative forms, but without much avail. The tent embassy became a symbol, an icon, and an index of Australian aboriginals' fight for recognition. Other representative forms that seek to demonstrate the distinctiveness of native peoples' polities are efforts to reestablish native history and indigenous naming practices, or upholding ritual performances such as the powwow dance (Kerisit 1994). Shapiro (1994) suggests that it is also necessary to create space in the international political field so that indigenous people have room to express their forms of political organization. More concretely he proposes, for example, abandoning Cartesian mapping practices because they do not provide an adequate spatial grammar to express the existence of indigenous polities.

Beyond indigenous polities, we can think of many other types of international actors, which are, could be, or should be gaining a position in the international system. Matters

of recognition and representation are crucial for all of them. The previous chapter focused on the European Union, but we can also think about the position of diasporas, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or maybe even some international organizations, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations. As they struggle to become units of the international system, struggles over forms of representation can break out, and new types of international order might emerge from them. This dissertation provides a theoretical framework that can serve as a guideline to address these issues.

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